1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
13 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
26 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
27 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
30 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
31 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
35 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
40 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
42 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
43 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
44 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
45 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
46 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
49 use crate::prelude::*;
50 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
52 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
53 use crate::sync::Mutex;
54 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
59 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
61 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
65 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
66 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
69 pub struct AvailableBalances {
70 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
71 pub balance_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
73 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
75 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
76 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
79 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
82 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
84 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
86 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
87 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
88 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
89 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
90 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
91 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
93 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
97 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
98 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
99 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
100 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
103 enum InboundHTLCState {
104 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
105 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
106 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
107 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
108 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
109 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
110 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
111 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
112 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
113 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
114 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
115 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
116 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
117 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
118 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
120 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
124 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
125 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
126 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
128 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
129 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
130 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
131 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
132 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
133 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
135 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
136 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
137 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
138 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
139 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
140 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
141 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
142 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
144 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
145 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
147 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
148 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
149 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
150 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
151 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
152 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
153 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
154 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
157 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
161 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
162 state: InboundHTLCState,
165 enum OutboundHTLCState {
166 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
167 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
168 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
169 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
170 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
171 /// money back (though we won't), and,
172 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
173 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
174 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
175 /// we'll never get out of sync).
176 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
177 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
178 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
180 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
181 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
182 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
187 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
188 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
189 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
190 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
191 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
192 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
193 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
194 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
198 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
200 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
201 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
204 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
207 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
208 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
213 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
214 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
216 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
217 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
222 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
226 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
227 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
232 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
233 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
234 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
238 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
240 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
241 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
242 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
245 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
250 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
254 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
255 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
256 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
257 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
258 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
259 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
260 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
262 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
263 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
264 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
265 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
266 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
267 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
268 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
270 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
271 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
272 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
277 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
278 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
279 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
281 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
282 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
284 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
285 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
286 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
287 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
288 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
289 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
290 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
291 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
292 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
294 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
295 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
296 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
297 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
298 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
299 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
300 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
301 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
302 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
303 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
304 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
305 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
306 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
307 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
308 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
309 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
311 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
312 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
313 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
314 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
315 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
316 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
317 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
318 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
320 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
321 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
322 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
323 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
325 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
327 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
329 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
330 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
331 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
332 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
336 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
338 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
340 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
342 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
343 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
344 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
345 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
346 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
348 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
349 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
351 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
353 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
354 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
356 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
357 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
358 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
359 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
360 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
361 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
363 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
364 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
366 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
367 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
368 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
369 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
370 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
372 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
373 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
375 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
376 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
378 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
379 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
380 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
381 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
387 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
388 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
390 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
391 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
392 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
397 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
398 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
400 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
401 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
407 macro_rules! secp_check {
408 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
411 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
416 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
417 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
418 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
419 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
420 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
421 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
422 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
423 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
425 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
427 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
429 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
433 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
435 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
436 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
437 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
439 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
440 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
442 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
443 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
444 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
445 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
446 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
448 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
449 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
453 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
459 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
462 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
463 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
464 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
465 holding_cell_msat: u64,
466 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
469 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
470 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
471 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
472 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
473 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
474 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
475 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
476 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
477 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
478 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
481 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
482 struct HTLCCandidate {
484 origin: HTLCInitiator,
488 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
496 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
498 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
500 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
501 htlc_value_msat: u64,
502 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
507 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
508 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
509 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
510 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
511 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
513 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
514 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
515 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
516 htlc_value_msat: u64,
518 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
519 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
523 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
524 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
525 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
526 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
527 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
528 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
529 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
530 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
531 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
532 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
533 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
536 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
537 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
538 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
539 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
540 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
541 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
542 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
543 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
546 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
548 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
549 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
550 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
551 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
552 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
553 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
554 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
555 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
558 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
559 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
560 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
561 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
562 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
563 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
564 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
565 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
566 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
567 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
568 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
569 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
570 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
571 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
572 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
574 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
575 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
576 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
577 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
579 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
580 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
581 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
582 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
584 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
585 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
586 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
587 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
588 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
590 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
591 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
592 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
593 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
595 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
596 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
597 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
599 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
600 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
601 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
602 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
603 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
605 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
606 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
609 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
610 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
612 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
613 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
614 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
615 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
617 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
618 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
620 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
621 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
624 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
625 (0, update, required),
628 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
629 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
630 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
631 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
632 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
636 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
637 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
638 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
640 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
642 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
643 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
644 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
648 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
650 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
651 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
652 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
657 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
658 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
659 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
660 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
661 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
663 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
664 /// in a timely manner.
665 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
668 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
669 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
670 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
672 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
673 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
674 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
675 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
679 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
680 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
681 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
683 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
684 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
685 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
686 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
688 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
692 /// The current channel ID.
693 channel_id: ChannelId,
694 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
695 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
696 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
699 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
700 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
702 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
703 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
704 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
706 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
707 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
708 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
709 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
711 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
712 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
714 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
716 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
717 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
718 destination_script: Script,
720 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
721 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
722 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
724 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
725 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
726 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
727 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
728 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
729 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
731 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
732 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
733 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
734 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
735 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
736 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
738 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
740 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
741 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
742 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
744 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
745 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
746 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
747 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
748 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
749 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
750 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
752 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
754 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
755 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
756 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
757 // HTLCs with similar state.
758 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
759 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
760 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
761 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
762 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
763 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
764 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
765 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
766 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
769 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
770 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
771 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
773 update_time_counter: u32,
775 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
776 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
777 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
778 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
779 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
780 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
782 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
783 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
785 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
786 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
787 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
788 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
790 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
791 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
793 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
795 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
797 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
798 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
799 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
800 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
801 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
802 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
803 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
804 channel_creation_height: u32,
806 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
809 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
811 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
814 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
816 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
819 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
821 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
823 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
824 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
827 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
829 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
831 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
832 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
834 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
836 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
837 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
838 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
840 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
842 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
843 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
844 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
846 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
847 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
848 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
850 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
852 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
854 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
855 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
856 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
857 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
859 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
860 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
861 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
863 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
864 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
865 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
867 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
868 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
869 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
870 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
871 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
872 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
873 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
874 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
876 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
877 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
878 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
879 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
880 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
882 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
883 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
885 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
886 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
887 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
888 /// unblock the state machine.
890 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
891 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
892 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
894 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
895 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
896 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
898 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
899 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
900 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
901 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
902 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
903 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
904 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
905 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
907 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
908 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
910 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
911 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
912 // the channel's funding UTXO.
914 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
915 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
916 // associated channel mapping.
918 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
919 // to store all of them.
920 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
922 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
923 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
924 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
925 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
926 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
928 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
929 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
931 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
932 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
934 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
935 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
936 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
938 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
939 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
940 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
943 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
944 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
945 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
946 self.update_time_counter
949 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
950 self.latest_monitor_update_id
953 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
954 self.config.announced_channel
957 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
958 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
961 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
962 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
963 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
964 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
967 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
968 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
969 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
972 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
973 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
974 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
975 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
976 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
979 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
980 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
981 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
982 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
984 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
985 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
987 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
988 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
990 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
991 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
993 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
996 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
997 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
998 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
999 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1000 self.channel_state &
1001 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1002 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1003 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1004 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1007 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1008 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1009 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1010 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1011 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1014 // Public utilities:
1016 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1020 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1022 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1023 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1024 self.temporary_channel_id
1027 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1031 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1032 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1033 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1037 /// Gets the channel's type
1038 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1042 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1044 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1045 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1046 self.short_channel_id
1049 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1050 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1051 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1054 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1055 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1056 self.outbound_scid_alias
1059 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1060 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1061 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1062 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1063 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1064 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1067 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1068 /// get_funding_created.
1069 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1070 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1073 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1074 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1075 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1078 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1079 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1080 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1081 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1085 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1088 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1089 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1092 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1093 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1096 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1097 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1098 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1101 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1102 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1105 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1106 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1107 self.counterparty_node_id
1110 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1111 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1112 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1115 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1116 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1117 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1120 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1121 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1123 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1124 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1125 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1126 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1128 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1132 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1133 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1134 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1137 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1138 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1139 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1142 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1143 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1144 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1146 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1147 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1152 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1153 self.channel_value_satoshis
1156 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1157 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1160 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1161 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1164 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1165 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1166 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1168 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1169 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1170 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1171 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1172 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1174 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1178 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1179 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1180 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1183 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1184 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1185 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1188 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1189 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1190 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1193 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1194 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1195 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1198 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1199 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1200 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1203 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1204 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1205 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1208 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1209 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1210 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1211 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1212 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1215 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1217 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1218 self.prev_config = None;
1222 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1223 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1227 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1228 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1229 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1230 let did_channel_update =
1231 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1232 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1233 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1234 if did_channel_update {
1235 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1236 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1237 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1238 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1240 self.config.options = *config;
1244 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1245 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1246 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1247 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1248 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1251 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1252 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1253 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1254 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1255 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1257 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1258 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1259 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1260 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1261 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1262 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1263 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1265 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1266 where L::Target: Logger
1268 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1269 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1270 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1272 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1273 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1274 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1275 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1277 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1278 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1279 if match update_state {
1280 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1281 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1282 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1283 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1284 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1286 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1290 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1291 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1292 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1294 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1296 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1297 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1298 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1300 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1301 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1302 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1303 transaction_output_index: None
1308 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1309 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1310 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1311 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1312 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1315 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1317 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1318 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1319 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1321 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1322 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1325 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1326 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1329 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1331 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1332 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1333 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1335 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1336 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1342 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1343 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1344 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1345 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1346 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1347 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1348 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1352 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1353 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1355 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1357 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1358 if generated_by_local {
1359 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1360 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1369 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1371 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1372 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1373 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1374 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1375 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1376 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1377 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1380 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1381 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1382 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1383 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1387 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1388 preimages.push(preimage);
1392 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1393 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1395 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1397 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1398 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1400 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1401 if !generated_by_local {
1402 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1410 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1411 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1412 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1413 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1414 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1415 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1416 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1417 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1419 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1421 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1422 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1423 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1424 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1426 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1428 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1429 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1430 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1431 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1434 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1435 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1436 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1437 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1439 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1442 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1443 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1444 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1445 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1447 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1450 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1451 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1456 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1457 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1462 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1464 let channel_parameters =
1465 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1466 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1467 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1474 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1477 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1478 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1479 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1480 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1482 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1483 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1484 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1492 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1493 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1499 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1500 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1501 /// our counterparty!)
1502 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1503 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1504 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1505 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1506 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1507 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1508 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1510 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1514 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1515 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1516 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1517 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1518 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1519 //may see payments to it!
1520 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1521 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1522 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1524 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1527 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1528 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1529 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1530 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1531 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1534 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1535 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1538 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1542 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1543 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1544 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1545 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1546 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1547 // which are near the dust limit.
1548 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1549 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1550 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1551 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1552 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1554 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1555 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1557 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1560 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1561 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1562 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1565 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1566 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1568 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1569 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1570 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1571 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1572 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1573 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1574 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1577 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1580 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1581 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1582 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1584 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1585 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1586 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1587 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1588 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1589 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1591 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1592 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1598 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1599 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1601 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1602 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1603 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1604 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1605 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1606 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1607 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1610 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1613 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1614 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1615 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1617 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1618 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1619 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1620 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1621 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1622 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1624 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1625 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1629 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1630 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1631 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1632 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1633 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1634 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1635 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1637 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1638 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1640 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1647 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1648 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1649 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1650 /// corner case properly.
1651 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1652 -> AvailableBalances
1653 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1655 let context = &self;
1656 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1657 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1658 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1660 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1661 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1662 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1663 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1666 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1668 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1669 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1671 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1673 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1675 if context.is_outbound() {
1676 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1677 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1679 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1680 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1682 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1683 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1684 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1685 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1688 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1689 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1690 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1691 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1693 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1694 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1695 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1696 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1697 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1698 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1699 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1700 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1701 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1702 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1704 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1707 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1708 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1709 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1710 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1711 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1714 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1715 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1717 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1718 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1719 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1721 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1722 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1723 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1724 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1728 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1730 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1731 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1732 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1733 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1734 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1735 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1736 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1738 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1739 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1741 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1742 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1743 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1745 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1746 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1747 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1748 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1749 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1752 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1753 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1754 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1755 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1756 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1757 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1760 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1761 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1762 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1764 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1768 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1769 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1771 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1772 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1776 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1777 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1778 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1779 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1781 outbound_capacity_msat,
1782 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1783 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1788 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1789 let context = &self;
1790 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1793 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1794 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1796 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1797 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1799 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1800 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1802 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1803 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1804 let context = &self;
1805 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1807 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1810 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1811 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1813 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1814 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1816 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1817 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1819 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1820 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1824 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1825 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1831 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1832 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1833 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1836 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1837 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1838 included_htlcs += 1;
1841 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1842 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1846 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1847 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1848 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1849 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1850 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1851 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1856 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1858 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1859 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1864 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1865 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1869 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1870 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1871 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1874 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1875 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1877 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1878 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1879 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1881 total_pending_htlcs,
1882 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1883 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1884 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1886 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1887 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1888 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1890 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1892 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1897 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1898 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1900 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1901 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1903 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1904 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1906 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1907 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1908 let context = &self;
1909 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1911 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1914 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1915 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1917 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1918 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1920 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1921 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1923 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1924 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1928 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1929 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1935 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1936 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1937 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1938 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1939 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1940 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1943 included_htlcs += 1;
1946 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1947 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1950 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1951 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1953 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1954 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1955 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1960 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1961 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1962 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1965 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1966 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1968 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1969 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1971 total_pending_htlcs,
1972 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1973 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1974 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1976 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1977 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1978 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1980 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1982 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1987 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
1988 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
1989 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
1990 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
1997 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
1999 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2000 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2003 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2005 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2006 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2007 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2011 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2012 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2013 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2016 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2018 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2019 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2022 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2023 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2024 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2025 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2026 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2027 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2028 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2029 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2030 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2031 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2032 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2034 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2035 // return them to fail the payment.
2036 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2037 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2038 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2040 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2041 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2046 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2047 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2048 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2049 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2050 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2051 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2052 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2053 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2054 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2055 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2056 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2057 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2058 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2062 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2064 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2065 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2068 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2069 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2074 // Internal utility functions for channels
2076 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2077 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2078 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2080 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2082 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2083 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2084 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2086 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2089 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2091 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2094 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2095 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2096 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2098 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2100 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2101 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2102 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2103 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2104 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2107 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2108 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2109 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2110 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2111 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2112 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2113 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2116 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2117 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2119 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2120 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2123 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2124 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2125 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2126 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2127 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2128 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2131 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2132 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2133 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2134 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2137 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2138 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2140 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2141 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2142 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2146 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2147 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2148 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2150 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2151 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2152 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2153 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2155 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2156 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2157 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2158 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2159 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2160 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2161 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2162 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2163 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2164 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2165 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2169 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2170 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2171 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2172 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2173 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2174 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2176 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2178 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2179 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2180 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2181 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2182 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2183 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2184 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2185 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2187 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2188 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2198 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2199 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2200 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2201 // outside of those situations will fail.
2202 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2206 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2211 1 + // script length (0)
2215 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2216 2 + // witness marker and flag
2217 1 + // witness element count
2218 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2219 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2220 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2221 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2222 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2223 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2225 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2226 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2227 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2233 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2234 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2235 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2236 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2238 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2239 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2240 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2242 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2243 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2244 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2245 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2246 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2247 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2250 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2251 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2254 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2255 value_to_holder = 0;
2258 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2259 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2260 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2261 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2263 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2264 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2267 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2268 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2271 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2274 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2275 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2277 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2279 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2280 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2281 where L::Target: Logger {
2282 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2283 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2284 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2285 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2286 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2287 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2288 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2289 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2293 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2294 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2295 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2296 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2298 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2299 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2301 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2303 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2304 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2305 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2307 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2308 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2309 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2310 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2311 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2312 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2313 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2315 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2316 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2317 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2319 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2320 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2322 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2325 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2326 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2330 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2334 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2335 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2336 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2337 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2338 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2339 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2342 // Now update local state:
2344 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2345 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2346 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2347 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2348 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2349 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2350 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2354 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2355 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2356 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2357 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2358 // do not not get into this branch.
2359 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2360 match pending_update {
2361 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2362 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2363 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2364 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2365 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2366 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2367 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2370 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2371 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2372 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2373 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2374 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2375 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2376 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2382 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2383 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2384 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2386 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2387 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2388 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2390 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2391 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2394 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2395 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2397 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2398 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2400 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2401 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2404 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2407 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2408 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2409 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2410 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2415 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2416 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2417 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2418 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2419 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2420 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2421 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2422 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2423 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2424 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2425 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2426 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2427 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2428 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2429 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2431 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2432 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2433 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2434 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2435 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2438 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2439 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2440 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2446 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2447 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2449 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2453 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2454 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2455 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2456 /// before we fail backwards.
2458 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2459 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2460 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2461 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2462 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2463 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2464 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2467 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2468 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2469 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2470 /// before we fail backwards.
2472 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2473 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2474 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2475 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2476 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2477 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2478 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2480 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2482 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2483 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2484 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2486 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2487 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2488 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2490 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2491 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2492 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2494 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2499 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2500 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2506 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2507 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2508 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2509 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2510 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2514 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2515 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2516 force_holding_cell = true;
2519 // Now update local state:
2520 if force_holding_cell {
2521 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2522 match pending_update {
2523 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2524 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2525 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2526 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2530 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2531 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2532 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2533 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2539 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2540 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2541 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2547 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2549 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2550 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2553 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2554 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2555 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2560 // Message handlers:
2562 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2563 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2564 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2565 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2566 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2570 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2573 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2574 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2576 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2577 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2578 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2579 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2582 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2584 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2585 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2586 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2587 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2589 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2590 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2592 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2593 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2595 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2596 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2597 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2598 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2599 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2600 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2604 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2605 initial_commitment_tx,
2608 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2609 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2612 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2613 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2616 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2617 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2618 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2619 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2620 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2621 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2622 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2623 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2624 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2625 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2626 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2627 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2629 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2631 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2632 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2633 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2634 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2635 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2636 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2637 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2639 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2640 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2641 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2643 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2645 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2646 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2648 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2650 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2651 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2655 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2656 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2657 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2658 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2659 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2660 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2661 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2664 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2665 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2667 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2668 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2669 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2670 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2672 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2675 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2676 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2677 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2680 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2681 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2682 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2683 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2684 // when routing outbound payments.
2685 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2689 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2691 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2692 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2694 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2695 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2697 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2698 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2699 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2700 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2701 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2702 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2703 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2704 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2705 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2707 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2708 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2709 let expected_point =
2710 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2711 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2713 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2714 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2715 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2716 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2717 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2718 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2720 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2721 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2722 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2723 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2724 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2726 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2727 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2731 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2734 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2735 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2737 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2739 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2742 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2743 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2744 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2745 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2746 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2747 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2749 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2750 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2751 if local_sent_shutdown {
2752 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2754 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2755 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2756 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2757 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2759 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2760 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2762 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2765 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2766 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2768 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2769 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2772 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2773 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2774 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2775 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2777 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2778 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2780 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2781 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2782 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2783 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2784 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2785 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2786 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2787 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2788 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2789 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2790 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2792 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2793 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2794 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2795 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2796 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2797 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2801 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2802 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2805 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2806 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2807 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2809 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2810 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2811 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2812 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2813 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2814 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2815 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2819 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2820 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2821 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2822 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2823 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2824 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2825 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2829 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2830 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2831 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2832 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2833 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2834 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2837 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2838 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2839 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2840 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2841 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2843 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2847 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2851 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2852 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2853 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2854 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2855 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2856 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2857 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2858 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2859 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2860 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2861 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2862 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2863 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2864 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2865 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2866 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2869 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2870 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2871 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2872 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2876 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2877 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2879 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2880 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2883 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2884 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2885 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2889 // Now update local state:
2890 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2891 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2892 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2893 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2894 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2895 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2896 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2901 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2903 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2904 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2905 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2906 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2907 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2908 None => fail_reason.into(),
2909 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2910 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2911 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2912 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2914 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2918 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2919 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2920 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2921 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2923 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2924 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2929 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2932 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2933 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2934 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2936 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2937 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2940 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2943 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2944 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2945 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2947 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2948 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2951 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2955 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2956 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2957 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2959 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2960 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2963 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2967 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2968 where L::Target: Logger
2970 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2971 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2973 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2974 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2976 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2977 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2980 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2982 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2984 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2985 let commitment_txid = {
2986 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2987 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2988 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2990 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2991 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2992 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2993 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
2994 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2995 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2999 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3001 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3002 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3003 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3004 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3007 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3008 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3009 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3010 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3013 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3015 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3016 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3017 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3018 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3019 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3020 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3021 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3022 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3023 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3024 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3025 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3031 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3032 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3035 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3036 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3037 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3038 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3039 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3040 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3041 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3042 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3043 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3044 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3045 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3046 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3047 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3050 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3051 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3052 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3053 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3054 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3055 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3056 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3058 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3059 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3060 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3061 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3062 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3063 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3064 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3065 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3067 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3068 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3071 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3073 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3074 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3075 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3078 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3081 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3082 commitment_stats.tx,
3084 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3085 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3086 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3089 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3090 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3092 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3093 let mut need_commitment = false;
3094 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3095 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3096 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3097 need_commitment = true;
3101 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3102 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3103 Some(forward_info.clone())
3105 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3106 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3107 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3108 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3109 need_commitment = true;
3112 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3113 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3114 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3115 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3116 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3117 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3118 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3119 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3120 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3121 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3122 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3123 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3124 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3125 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3127 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3129 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3130 need_commitment = true;
3134 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3135 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3136 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3137 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3138 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3139 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3141 nondust_htlc_sources,
3145 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3146 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3147 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3148 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3150 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3151 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3152 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3153 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3154 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3155 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3156 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3157 // includes the right HTLCs.
3158 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3159 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3160 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3161 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3162 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3163 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3165 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3166 &self.context.channel_id);
3167 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3170 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3171 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3172 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3173 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3174 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3175 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3176 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3177 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3178 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3182 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3183 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3184 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3185 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3188 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3189 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3190 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3191 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3192 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3193 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3194 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3196 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3197 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3198 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3199 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3202 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3203 /// for our counterparty.
3204 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3205 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3206 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3207 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3209 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3210 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3211 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3212 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3214 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3215 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3216 updates: Vec::new(),
3219 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3220 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3221 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3222 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3223 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3224 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3225 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3226 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3227 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3228 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3229 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3230 // to rebalance channels.
3231 match &htlc_update {
3232 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3233 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3234 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3236 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3237 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3239 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3242 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3243 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3244 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3245 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3246 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3247 // into the holding cell without ever being
3248 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3249 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3250 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3253 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3259 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3260 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3261 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3262 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3263 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3264 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3265 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3266 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3267 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3268 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3269 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3270 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3272 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3273 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3274 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3275 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3276 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3277 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3278 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3279 // for a full revocation before failing.
3280 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3281 update_fail_count += 1;
3284 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3286 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3293 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3294 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3296 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3297 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3302 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3303 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3304 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3305 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3306 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3308 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3309 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3310 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3312 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3313 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3319 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3320 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3321 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3322 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3323 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3324 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3325 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3326 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3327 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3329 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3332 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3333 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3335 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3336 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3339 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3341 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3342 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3343 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3347 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3348 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3349 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3350 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3351 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3352 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3353 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3354 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3355 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3358 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3360 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3361 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3364 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3365 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3366 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3367 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3369 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3373 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3374 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3375 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3376 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3377 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3378 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3379 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3380 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3384 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3385 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3386 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3387 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3388 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3389 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3390 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3391 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3392 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3394 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3395 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3398 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3399 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3400 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3401 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3402 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3403 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3404 let mut require_commitment = false;
3405 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3408 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3409 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3410 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3412 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3413 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3414 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3415 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3416 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3417 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3422 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3423 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3424 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3425 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3426 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3428 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3429 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3430 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3435 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3436 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3438 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3442 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3443 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3445 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3446 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3447 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3448 require_commitment = true;
3449 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3450 match forward_info {
3451 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3452 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3453 require_commitment = true;
3455 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3456 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3457 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3459 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3460 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3461 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3465 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3466 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3467 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3468 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3474 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3475 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3476 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3477 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3479 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3480 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3481 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3482 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3483 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3484 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3485 require_commitment = true;
3489 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3491 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3492 match update_state {
3493 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3494 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3495 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3496 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3497 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3499 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3500 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3501 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3502 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3503 require_commitment = true;
3504 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3505 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3510 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3511 let release_state_str =
3512 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3513 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3514 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3515 if !release_monitor {
3516 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3517 update: monitor_update,
3519 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3521 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3526 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3527 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3528 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3529 if require_commitment {
3530 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3531 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3532 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3533 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3534 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3535 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3536 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3537 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3538 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3540 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3541 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3542 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3543 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3544 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3547 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3548 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3549 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3550 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3551 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3552 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3554 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3555 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3557 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3558 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3560 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3561 if require_commitment {
3562 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3564 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3565 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3566 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3567 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3569 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3570 &self.context.channel_id(),
3571 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3574 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3575 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3577 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3578 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3580 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3581 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3587 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3588 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3589 /// commitment update.
3590 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3591 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3592 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3594 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3595 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3598 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3599 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3600 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3601 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3603 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3604 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3605 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3606 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3607 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3608 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3609 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3611 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3612 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3614 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3615 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3617 if !self.context.is_live() {
3618 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3621 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3622 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3623 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3624 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3625 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3626 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3627 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3628 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3629 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3630 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3634 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3635 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3636 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3637 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3638 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3639 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3642 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3643 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3647 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3648 force_holding_cell = true;
3651 if force_holding_cell {
3652 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3656 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3657 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3659 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3660 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3665 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3666 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3668 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3670 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3671 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3672 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3673 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3677 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3678 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3679 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3683 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3684 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3687 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3688 // will be retransmitted.
3689 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3690 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3691 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3693 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3694 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3696 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3697 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3698 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3699 // this HTLC accordingly
3700 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3703 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3704 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3705 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3706 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3709 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3710 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3711 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3712 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3713 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3714 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3719 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3721 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3722 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3723 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3724 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3728 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3729 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3730 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3731 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3732 // the update upon reconnection.
3733 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3737 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3739 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3740 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3744 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3745 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3746 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3747 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3748 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3749 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3750 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3752 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3753 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3754 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3755 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3756 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3757 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3758 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3760 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3761 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3762 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3763 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3764 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3765 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3766 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3769 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3770 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3771 /// to the remote side.
3772 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3773 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3774 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3775 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3778 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3780 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3781 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3783 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3784 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3785 // first received the funding_signed.
3786 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3787 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3788 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3790 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3791 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3792 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3793 funding_broadcastable = None;
3796 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3797 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3798 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3799 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3800 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3801 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3802 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3803 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3804 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3805 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3806 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3807 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3808 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3809 next_per_commitment_point,
3810 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3814 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3816 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3817 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3818 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3819 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3820 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3821 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3823 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3824 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3825 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3826 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3827 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3828 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3832 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3833 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3835 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3836 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3837 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3840 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3841 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3842 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3843 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3844 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3845 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3846 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3847 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3848 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3852 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3853 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3855 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3856 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3858 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3859 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3861 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3862 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3864 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3865 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3866 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3867 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3868 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3869 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3870 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3871 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3872 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3873 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3874 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3875 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3876 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3877 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3879 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3880 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3881 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3887 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3888 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3889 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3890 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3891 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3892 per_commitment_secret,
3893 next_per_commitment_point,
3895 next_local_nonce: None,
3899 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3900 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3901 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3902 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3903 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3905 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3906 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3907 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3908 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3909 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3910 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3911 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3912 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3913 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3914 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3919 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3920 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3922 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3923 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3924 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3925 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3926 reason: err_packet.clone()
3929 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3930 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3931 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3932 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3933 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3934 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3937 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3938 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3939 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3940 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3941 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3948 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3949 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3950 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3951 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3955 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3956 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3957 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3958 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3959 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3960 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3964 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3965 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3966 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3967 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3968 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3969 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3970 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3975 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3976 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3978 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3979 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3980 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3981 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3982 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3983 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3984 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3985 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3988 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3990 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3991 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3992 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3993 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3994 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3997 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3998 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3999 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4002 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4003 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4004 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4005 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4006 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4009 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4010 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4011 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4012 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4013 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4016 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4017 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4018 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4019 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4020 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4021 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4022 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4023 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4027 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4028 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4029 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4030 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4032 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4036 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4037 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4038 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4039 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4041 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4043 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4045 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4046 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4047 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4048 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4049 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4050 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4052 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4053 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4054 channel_ready: None,
4055 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4056 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4057 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4061 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4062 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4063 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4064 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4065 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4066 next_per_commitment_point,
4067 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4069 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4070 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4071 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4075 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4076 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4077 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4079 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4080 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4081 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4084 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4087 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4090 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4091 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4092 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4093 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4094 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4095 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4096 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4098 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4100 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4101 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4102 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4103 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4104 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4105 next_per_commitment_point,
4106 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4110 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4111 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4112 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4114 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4117 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4118 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4119 raa: required_revoke,
4120 commitment_update: None,
4121 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4123 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4124 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4125 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4127 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4130 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4131 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4132 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4133 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4134 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4135 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4138 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4139 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4140 raa: required_revoke,
4141 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4142 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4146 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4150 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4151 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4152 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4153 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4155 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4157 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4159 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4160 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4161 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4162 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4163 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4164 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4166 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4167 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4168 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4169 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4170 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4172 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4173 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4174 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4175 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4178 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4179 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4180 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4181 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4182 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4183 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4184 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4185 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4186 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4187 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4188 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4189 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4190 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4191 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4192 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4194 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4197 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4198 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4201 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4202 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4203 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4204 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4205 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4206 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4209 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4210 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4211 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4212 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4213 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4214 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4217 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4223 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4224 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4225 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4226 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4228 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4229 return Ok((None, None, None));
4232 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4233 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4234 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4236 return Ok((None, None, None));
4239 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4241 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4242 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4243 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4244 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4246 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4247 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4249 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4250 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4252 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4253 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4254 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4255 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4257 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4258 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4259 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4266 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4267 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4269 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4270 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4273 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4274 /// within our expected timeframe.
4276 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4277 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4278 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4281 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4284 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4285 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4289 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4290 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4292 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4293 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4295 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4296 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4297 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4298 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4299 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4301 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4302 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4306 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4308 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4309 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4312 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4313 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4314 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4317 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4320 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4321 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4322 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4323 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4325 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4328 assert!(send_shutdown);
4329 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4330 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4331 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4333 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4334 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4336 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4341 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4343 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4344 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4346 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4347 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4348 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4349 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4350 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4351 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4354 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4355 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4357 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4358 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4359 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4360 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4364 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4365 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4366 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4367 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4368 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4369 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4371 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4372 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4379 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4380 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4382 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4385 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4386 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4388 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4390 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4391 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4392 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4393 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4394 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4395 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4396 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4397 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4398 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4400 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4401 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4404 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4408 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4409 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4410 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4411 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4413 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4414 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4416 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4417 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4419 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4420 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4422 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4423 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4426 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4427 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4430 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4431 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4432 return Ok((None, None, None));
4435 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4436 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4437 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4438 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4440 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4442 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4445 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4446 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4447 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4448 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4449 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4453 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4454 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4455 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4459 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4460 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4461 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4462 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4463 monitor_update: None,
4464 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4465 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4467 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4468 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4469 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4470 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4474 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4476 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4477 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4478 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4479 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4481 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4484 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4485 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4487 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4488 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4489 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4490 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4491 monitor_update: None,
4492 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4493 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4495 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4496 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4497 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4498 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4503 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4504 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4505 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4506 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4508 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4509 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4510 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4512 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4518 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4519 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4520 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4522 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4523 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4525 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4526 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4529 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4530 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4531 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4532 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4533 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4535 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4536 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4537 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4539 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4540 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4543 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4544 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4545 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4546 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4547 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4548 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4549 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4550 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4552 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4555 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4556 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4557 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4558 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4560 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4564 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4565 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4566 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4567 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4569 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4575 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4576 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4577 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4578 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4579 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4580 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4581 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4583 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4584 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4587 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4589 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4590 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4596 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4597 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4598 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4599 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4600 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4601 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4602 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4604 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4605 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4612 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4613 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4616 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4617 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4620 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4621 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4625 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4626 &self.context.holder_signer
4630 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4632 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4633 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4634 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4635 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4636 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4637 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4639 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4641 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4649 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4650 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4654 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4655 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4656 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4657 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4660 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4661 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4662 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4663 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4666 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4667 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4668 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4669 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4670 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4671 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4674 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4675 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4676 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4677 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4678 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4679 if !release_monitor {
4680 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4689 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4690 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4693 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4694 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4695 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4697 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4698 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4699 if self.context.channel_state &
4700 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4701 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4702 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4703 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4704 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4707 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4708 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4709 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4710 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4711 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4712 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4714 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4715 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4716 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4718 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4719 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4720 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4721 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4722 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4723 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4729 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4730 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4731 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4734 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4735 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4736 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4739 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4740 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4741 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4744 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4745 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4746 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4747 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4748 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4749 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4754 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4755 self.context.channel_update_status
4758 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4759 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4760 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4763 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4765 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4766 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4767 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4771 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4772 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4773 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4776 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4780 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4781 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4782 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4783 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4784 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4786 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4787 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4788 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4790 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4791 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4794 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4795 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4796 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4797 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4798 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4799 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4800 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4801 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4802 self.context.channel_state);
4804 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4808 if need_commitment_update {
4809 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4810 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4811 let next_per_commitment_point =
4812 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4813 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4814 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4815 next_per_commitment_point,
4816 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4820 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4826 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4827 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4828 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4829 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4830 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4831 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4832 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4834 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4837 let mut msgs = (None, None);
4838 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4839 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4840 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4841 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4842 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4843 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4844 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4845 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4846 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4847 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4848 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4849 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4850 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4851 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4852 // channel and move on.
4853 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4854 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4856 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4857 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4858 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4860 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4861 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4862 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4863 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4864 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4865 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4866 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4867 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4872 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4873 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4874 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4875 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4876 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4879 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4880 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4881 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4882 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4883 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4884 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
4887 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4888 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4889 // may have already happened for this block).
4890 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4891 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4892 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4893 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
4896 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4897 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4898 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4899 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4907 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4908 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4909 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4910 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4912 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4913 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4916 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4918 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4919 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4920 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4921 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4923 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4926 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4929 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4930 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4931 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4932 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4934 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4937 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4938 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4939 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4941 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4942 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4944 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4945 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4946 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4954 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4956 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4957 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
4958 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4960 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4961 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4964 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4965 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4966 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4967 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4968 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4969 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4970 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4971 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4972 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4975 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4976 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4977 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4978 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4980 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4981 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4982 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4984 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4985 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4986 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4987 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4989 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4990 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4991 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
4992 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4993 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4994 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4995 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4998 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
4999 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5001 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5004 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5005 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5006 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5007 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5008 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5009 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5010 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5011 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5012 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5013 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5014 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5015 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5016 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5017 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5018 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5019 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5020 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5026 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5031 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5032 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5034 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5035 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5036 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5037 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5039 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5042 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5044 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5045 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5046 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5047 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5048 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5049 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5051 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5052 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5055 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5056 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5057 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5058 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5059 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5060 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5062 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5063 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5066 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5067 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5068 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5069 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5070 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5076 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5077 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5078 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5079 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5081 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5084 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5088 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5092 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5093 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5097 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5101 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5102 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5105 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5109 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5111 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5116 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5117 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5118 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5120 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5125 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5127 None => return None,
5130 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5132 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5133 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5135 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5136 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5142 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5144 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5145 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5146 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5147 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5148 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5149 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5150 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5152 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5153 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5154 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5155 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5156 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5157 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5158 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5159 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5160 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5161 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5162 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5163 contents: announcement,
5168 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5172 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5173 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5174 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5175 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5176 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5177 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5178 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5179 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5181 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5183 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5184 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5185 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5186 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5188 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5189 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5190 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5191 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5194 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5195 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5196 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5197 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5200 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5203 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5204 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5205 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5206 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5207 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5208 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5211 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5213 Err(_) => return None,
5215 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5216 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5221 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5222 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5223 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5224 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5225 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5226 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5227 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5228 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5229 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5230 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5231 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5232 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5233 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5234 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5235 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5236 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5239 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5242 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5243 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5244 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5245 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5246 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5247 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5248 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5249 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5250 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5252 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5253 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5254 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5255 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5256 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5257 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5258 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5259 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5260 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5262 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5263 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5264 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5265 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5266 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5267 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5268 next_funding_txid: None,
5273 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5275 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5276 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5277 /// commitment update.
5279 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5280 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5281 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5282 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5283 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5284 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5285 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5288 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5289 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5290 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5292 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5293 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5298 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5299 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5301 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5303 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5304 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5306 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5307 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5308 /// regenerate them.
5310 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5311 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5313 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5314 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5315 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5316 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5317 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5318 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5319 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5321 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5322 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5324 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5325 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5326 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5329 if amount_msat == 0 {
5330 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5333 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5334 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5335 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5336 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5339 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5340 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5341 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5344 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5345 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5346 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5347 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5348 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5349 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5350 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5351 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5354 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5355 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5356 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5357 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5358 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5359 else { "to peer" });
5361 if need_holding_cell {
5362 force_holding_cell = true;
5365 // Now update local state:
5366 if force_holding_cell {
5367 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5372 onion_routing_packet,
5378 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5379 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5381 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5383 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5388 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5389 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5390 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5394 onion_routing_packet,
5397 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5402 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5403 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5404 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5405 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5407 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5408 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5409 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5411 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5412 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5416 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5417 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5418 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5419 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5420 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5421 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5422 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5425 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5426 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5427 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5428 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5429 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5430 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5433 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5435 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5436 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5437 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5438 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5439 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5441 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5442 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5445 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5446 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5447 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5448 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5449 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5450 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5451 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5452 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5453 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5454 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5455 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5458 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5462 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5463 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5464 where L::Target: Logger
5466 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5467 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5468 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5470 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5472 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5473 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5474 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5475 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5476 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5477 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5478 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5479 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5480 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5481 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5482 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5488 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5491 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5492 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5493 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5494 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5495 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5496 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5498 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5499 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5500 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5502 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5503 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5504 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5507 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5508 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5512 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5513 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5515 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5517 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5518 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5519 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5520 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5522 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5523 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5524 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5525 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5526 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5527 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5531 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5532 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5536 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5537 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5542 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5543 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5545 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5546 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5547 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5548 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5549 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5550 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5551 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5552 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5554 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5555 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5556 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5559 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5560 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5561 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5567 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5569 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5570 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5571 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5572 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5573 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5575 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5577 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5583 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5584 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5586 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5587 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5588 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5589 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5590 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
5592 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5593 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5594 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5597 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5598 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5599 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5601 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5602 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5605 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5606 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5608 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5609 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5610 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5613 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5614 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5615 let mut chan_closed = false;
5616 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5620 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5622 None if !chan_closed => {
5623 // use override shutdown script if provided
5624 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5625 Some(script) => script,
5627 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5628 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5629 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5630 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5634 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5635 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5637 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5643 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5644 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5645 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5646 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5647 monitor_update: None,
5648 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5649 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5651 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5652 Some(shutdown_result)
5654 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5657 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5659 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5660 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5661 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5662 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5663 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5664 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5667 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5668 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5670 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5671 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5672 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5675 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5676 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5677 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5678 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5679 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5681 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5682 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5689 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5690 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5692 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
5695 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5696 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5697 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5699 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5700 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5704 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5708 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5709 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5710 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5711 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5714 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5715 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5716 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5717 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5718 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5719 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5720 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5721 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5723 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5724 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5725 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5726 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5728 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5729 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5731 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5732 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5734 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5735 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5736 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5738 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5739 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5741 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5742 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5743 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5744 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5745 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5748 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5749 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5751 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5752 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5754 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5756 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5758 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5759 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5760 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5761 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5764 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5765 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5767 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5768 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5769 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5770 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5774 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5775 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5776 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5780 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5781 Ok(script) => script,
5782 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5785 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5788 context: ChannelContext {
5791 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5792 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5793 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5794 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5799 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5801 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5802 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5803 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5804 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5806 channel_value_satoshis,
5808 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5810 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5811 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5814 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5815 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5818 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5819 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5820 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5821 pending_update_fee: None,
5822 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5823 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5824 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5825 update_time_counter: 1,
5827 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5829 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5830 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5831 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5832 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5833 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5834 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5836 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5837 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5838 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5839 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5841 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5842 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5843 closing_fee_limits: None,
5844 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5846 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5847 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5848 short_channel_id: None,
5849 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5851 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5852 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5853 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5854 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5855 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5856 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5857 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5858 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5859 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5860 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5861 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5862 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5864 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5866 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5867 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5868 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5869 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5870 counterparty_parameters: None,
5871 funding_outpoint: None,
5872 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5874 funding_transaction: None,
5875 is_batch_funding: None,
5877 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5878 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5879 counterparty_node_id,
5881 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5883 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5885 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5886 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5888 announcement_sigs: None,
5890 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5891 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5892 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5893 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5895 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5896 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5898 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5899 outbound_scid_alias,
5901 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5902 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5904 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5905 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5910 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5912 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5916 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5917 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5918 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5919 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5920 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5921 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5922 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5923 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5924 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5929 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5930 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5931 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5932 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5933 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5934 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5935 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5936 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
5937 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5938 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5939 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5941 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5942 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5944 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5945 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5946 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5947 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5950 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5951 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5953 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5956 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5957 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5958 return Err((self, e));
5962 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5964 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5966 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5967 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5969 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
5970 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
5971 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
5972 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5973 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5974 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5977 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5978 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
5980 let channel = Channel {
5981 context: self.context,
5984 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5985 temporary_channel_id,
5986 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5987 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5990 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5992 next_local_nonce: None,
5996 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5997 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5998 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5999 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6000 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6001 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6002 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6003 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6004 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6005 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6008 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6009 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6010 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6011 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6012 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6013 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6019 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6020 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6021 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6022 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6023 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6024 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6026 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6028 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6029 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6030 // We've exhausted our options
6033 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6034 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6037 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6038 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6039 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6040 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6042 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6043 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6044 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
6045 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6046 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6047 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6049 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6051 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6052 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6055 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6056 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6057 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6059 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6060 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6063 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6064 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6067 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6068 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6072 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6073 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6074 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6075 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6076 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6077 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6078 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6079 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6080 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6081 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6082 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6083 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6084 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6085 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6086 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6087 first_per_commitment_point,
6088 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6089 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6090 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6091 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6093 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6098 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6099 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6101 // Check sanity of message fields:
6102 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6103 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6105 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6106 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6108 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6109 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6111 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6112 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6114 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6115 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6117 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6118 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6119 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6121 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6122 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6123 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6125 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6126 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6127 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6129 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6130 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6132 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6133 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6136 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6137 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6138 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6140 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6141 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6143 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6146 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6147 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6149 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6150 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6152 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6153 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6155 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6156 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6159 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6160 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6161 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6163 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6164 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6166 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6167 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6170 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6171 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6174 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6175 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6176 &Some(ref script) => {
6177 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6178 if script.len() == 0 {
6181 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6182 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6184 Some(script.clone())
6187 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6194 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6195 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6196 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6197 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6198 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6200 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6201 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6203 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6206 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6207 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6208 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6209 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6210 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6211 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6214 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6215 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6216 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6219 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6220 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6222 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6223 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6229 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6230 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6231 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6232 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6235 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6236 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6237 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6238 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6239 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6240 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6241 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6242 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6243 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6244 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6245 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6248 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6250 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6251 // support this channel type.
6252 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6253 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6254 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6257 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6258 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6259 // `static_remote_key`.
6260 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6263 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6264 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6265 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6267 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6270 channel_type.clone()
6272 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6273 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6279 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6280 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6281 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6282 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6283 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6284 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6285 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6286 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6287 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6290 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6291 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6294 // Check sanity of message fields:
6295 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6298 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6299 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6301 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6302 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6304 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6305 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6306 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6308 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6309 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6311 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6312 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6314 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6316 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6317 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6318 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6320 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6323 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6324 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6327 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6328 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6329 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6331 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6332 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6334 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6335 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6337 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6338 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6340 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6341 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6343 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6344 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6346 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6347 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6350 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6352 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6353 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6354 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6358 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6359 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6360 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6361 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6362 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6364 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6365 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6367 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6368 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6369 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6371 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6372 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6375 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6376 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6377 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6378 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6379 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6380 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6383 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6384 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6385 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6386 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6387 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6390 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6391 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6392 &Some(ref script) => {
6393 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6394 if script.len() == 0 {
6397 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6398 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6400 Some(script.clone())
6403 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6405 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6410 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6411 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6412 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6413 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6417 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6418 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6419 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6423 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6424 Ok(script) => script,
6425 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6428 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6429 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6431 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6434 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6438 context: ChannelContext {
6441 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6442 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6444 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6449 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6451 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6452 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6453 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6454 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6457 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6459 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6460 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6463 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6464 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6465 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6467 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6468 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6469 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6470 pending_update_fee: None,
6471 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6472 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6473 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6474 update_time_counter: 1,
6476 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6478 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6479 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6480 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6481 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6482 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6483 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6485 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6486 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6487 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6488 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6490 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6491 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6492 closing_fee_limits: None,
6493 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6495 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6496 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6497 short_channel_id: None,
6498 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6500 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6501 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6502 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6503 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6504 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6505 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6506 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6507 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6508 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6509 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6510 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6511 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6514 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6516 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6517 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6518 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6519 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6520 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6521 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6522 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6524 funding_outpoint: None,
6525 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6527 funding_transaction: None,
6528 is_batch_funding: None,
6530 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6531 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6532 counterparty_node_id,
6534 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6536 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6538 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6539 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6541 announcement_sigs: None,
6543 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6544 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6545 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6546 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6548 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6549 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6551 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6552 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6554 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6555 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6557 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6558 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6563 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6565 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6571 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6572 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6574 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6575 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6576 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6577 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6579 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6580 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6582 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6583 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6586 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6589 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6590 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6591 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6593 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6594 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6595 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6596 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6598 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6599 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6600 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6601 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6602 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6603 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6604 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6605 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6606 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6607 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6608 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6609 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6610 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6611 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6612 first_per_commitment_point,
6613 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6614 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6615 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6617 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6619 next_local_nonce: None,
6623 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6624 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6626 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6628 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6629 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6632 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6633 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6635 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6636 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6638 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6639 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6640 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6641 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6642 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6643 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6644 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6645 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6646 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6649 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6650 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6652 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6653 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6654 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6655 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6657 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6658 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6659 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6660 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6661 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6663 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6664 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6669 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6670 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6671 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6675 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6676 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6678 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6679 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6680 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6682 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6684 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6685 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6686 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6687 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6690 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6691 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6692 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6693 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6694 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6696 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6698 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6699 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6700 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6703 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6704 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6705 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6709 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6710 initial_commitment_tx,
6713 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6714 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6717 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6718 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6721 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6723 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6724 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6725 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6726 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6727 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6728 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6729 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6730 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6731 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6732 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6733 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6735 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6737 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6738 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6739 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6740 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6741 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6742 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6744 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6745 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6746 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6747 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6749 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6751 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6752 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6753 let mut channel = Channel {
6754 context: self.context,
6756 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6757 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6758 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6760 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6764 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6765 }, channel_monitor))
6769 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6770 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6772 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6778 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6779 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6780 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6781 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6782 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6784 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6785 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6786 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6787 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6793 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6794 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6795 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6796 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6797 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6798 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6803 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6804 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6805 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6806 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6808 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6809 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6810 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6811 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6816 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6817 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6818 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6819 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6820 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6821 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6826 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6827 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6828 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6831 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6833 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6834 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6835 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6836 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6837 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6839 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6840 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6841 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6842 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6844 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6845 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6846 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6848 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6850 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6851 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6852 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6853 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6854 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6855 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6856 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6858 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6859 // deserialized from that format.
6860 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6861 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6862 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6864 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6866 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6867 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6868 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6870 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6871 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6872 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6873 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6876 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6877 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6878 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6881 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6882 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6883 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6884 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6886 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6887 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6889 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6891 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6893 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6895 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6898 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6900 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6905 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6906 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6908 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6909 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6910 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6911 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6912 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6913 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6914 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6916 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6918 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6920 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6923 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6924 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6925 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6928 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6930 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6931 preimages.push(preimage);
6933 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6934 reason.write(writer)?;
6936 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6938 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6939 preimages.push(preimage);
6941 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6942 reason.write(writer)?;
6945 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6946 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6947 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6949 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6950 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6951 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6955 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6956 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6957 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6959 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6960 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6964 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6965 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6966 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6967 source.write(writer)?;
6968 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6970 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6971 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6972 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6974 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6975 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6977 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6979 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6980 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6982 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6984 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6985 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6990 match self.context.resend_order {
6991 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6992 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6995 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6996 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6997 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6999 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7000 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7001 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7002 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7005 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7006 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7007 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7008 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7009 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7012 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7013 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7014 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7015 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7017 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7018 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7019 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7021 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7023 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7024 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7025 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7026 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7028 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7029 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7030 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7031 // consider the stale state on reload.
7034 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7035 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7036 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7038 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7039 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7040 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7042 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7043 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7045 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7046 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7047 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7049 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7050 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7052 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7055 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7056 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7057 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7059 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7062 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7063 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7065 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7066 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7067 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7069 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7071 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7073 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7075 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7076 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7077 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7078 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7079 htlc.write(writer)?;
7082 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7083 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7084 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7086 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7087 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7089 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7090 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7091 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7092 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7093 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7094 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7095 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7097 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7098 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7099 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7100 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7101 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7103 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7104 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7106 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7107 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7108 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7109 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7111 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7113 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7114 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7115 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7116 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7117 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7118 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7119 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7121 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7122 (2, chan_type, option),
7123 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7124 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7125 (5, self.context.config, required),
7126 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7127 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7128 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7129 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7130 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7131 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7132 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7133 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7134 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7135 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7136 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7137 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7138 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7139 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7140 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7141 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7142 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7143 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7144 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7151 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7152 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7154 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7155 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7157 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7158 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7159 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7161 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7162 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7163 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7164 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7166 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7168 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7169 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7170 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7171 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7172 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7174 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7175 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7178 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7179 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7180 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7182 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7184 let mut keys_data = None;
7186 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7187 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7188 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7189 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7190 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7191 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7192 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7193 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7194 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7195 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7199 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7200 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7201 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7204 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7206 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7207 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7208 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7210 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7212 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7213 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7214 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7215 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7216 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7217 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7218 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7219 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7220 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7221 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7222 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7223 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7224 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7229 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7230 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7231 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7232 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7233 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7234 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7235 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7236 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7237 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7238 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7239 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7240 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7242 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7243 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7246 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7247 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7250 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7251 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7253 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7255 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7259 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7260 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7261 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7262 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7263 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7264 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7265 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7266 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7267 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7268 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7269 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7271 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7272 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7273 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7275 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7276 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7277 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7279 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7283 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7284 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7285 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7286 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7289 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7290 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7291 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7293 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7294 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7295 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7296 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7299 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7300 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7301 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7302 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7305 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7307 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7309 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7310 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7311 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7312 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7314 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7315 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7316 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7317 // consider the stale state on reload.
7318 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7321 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7322 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7323 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7325 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7328 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7329 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7330 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7332 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7333 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7334 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7335 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7337 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7338 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7340 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7341 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7343 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7344 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7345 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7347 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7349 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7350 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7352 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7353 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7356 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7358 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7359 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7360 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7361 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7363 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7366 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7367 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7369 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7371 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7372 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7374 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7375 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7377 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7379 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7380 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7381 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7383 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7384 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7385 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7389 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7390 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7391 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7393 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7399 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7400 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7401 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7402 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7403 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7404 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7405 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7406 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7407 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7408 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7410 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7411 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7412 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7413 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7414 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7415 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7416 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7418 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7419 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7420 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7421 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7423 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7425 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7426 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7428 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7430 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7431 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7432 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7433 (2, channel_type, option),
7434 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7435 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7436 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7437 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7438 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7439 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7440 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7441 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7442 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7443 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7444 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7445 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7446 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7447 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7448 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7449 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7450 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7451 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7452 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7453 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7454 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7455 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7458 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7459 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7460 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7461 // required channel parameters.
7462 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7463 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7464 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7466 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7468 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7469 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7470 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7471 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7474 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7475 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7476 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7478 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7479 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7481 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7482 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7487 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7488 if iter.next().is_some() {
7489 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7493 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7494 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7495 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7496 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7497 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7500 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7501 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7502 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7504 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7505 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7507 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7508 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7509 // separate u64 values.
7510 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7512 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7514 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7515 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7516 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7517 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7519 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7520 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7522 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7523 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7524 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7525 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7526 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7529 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7530 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7534 context: ChannelContext {
7537 config: config.unwrap(),
7541 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7542 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7543 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7546 temporary_channel_id,
7548 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7550 channel_value_satoshis,
7552 latest_monitor_update_id,
7554 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7555 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7558 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7559 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7562 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7563 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7564 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7565 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7569 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7570 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7571 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7572 monitor_pending_forwards,
7573 monitor_pending_failures,
7574 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7577 holding_cell_update_fee,
7578 next_holder_htlc_id,
7579 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7580 update_time_counter,
7583 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7584 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7585 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7586 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7588 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7589 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7590 closing_fee_limits: None,
7591 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7593 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7594 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7596 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7598 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7599 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7600 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7601 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7602 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7603 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7604 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7605 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7606 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7609 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7611 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7612 funding_transaction,
7615 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7616 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7617 counterparty_node_id,
7619 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7623 channel_update_status,
7624 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7628 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7629 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7630 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7631 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7633 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7634 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7636 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7637 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7638 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7640 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7641 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7643 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7644 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7646 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7649 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7658 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7659 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7660 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7661 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7662 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7664 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7665 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7666 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7667 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7668 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7669 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7670 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7671 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7672 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7673 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7674 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7675 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7676 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7677 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7678 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7679 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7680 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7681 use crate::util::test_utils;
7682 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7683 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7684 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7685 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7686 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7687 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7688 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7689 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7690 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7691 use crate::prelude::*;
7693 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7696 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7697 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7703 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7704 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7705 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7706 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7710 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7711 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7712 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7713 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7714 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7715 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7716 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7717 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7721 signer: InMemorySigner,
7724 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7725 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7728 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7729 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7731 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7732 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7735 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7739 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7741 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7742 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7743 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7744 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7745 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7748 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7749 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7750 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7751 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7755 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7756 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7757 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7761 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7762 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7763 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7764 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7766 let seed = [42; 32];
7767 let network = Network::Testnet;
7768 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7769 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7770 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7773 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7774 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7775 let config = UserConfig::default();
7776 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7777 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7778 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7780 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7781 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7785 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7786 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7788 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7789 let original_fee = 253;
7790 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7791 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7792 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7793 let seed = [42; 32];
7794 let network = Network::Testnet;
7795 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7797 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7798 let config = UserConfig::default();
7799 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7801 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7802 // same as the old fee.
7803 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7804 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7805 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7809 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7810 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7811 // dust limits are used.
7812 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7813 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7814 let seed = [42; 32];
7815 let network = Network::Testnet;
7816 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7817 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7818 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7820 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7821 // they have different dust limits.
7823 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7824 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7825 let config = UserConfig::default();
7826 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7828 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7829 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7830 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7831 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7832 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7834 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7835 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7836 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7837 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7838 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7840 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7841 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7842 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7843 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7845 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7846 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7847 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7849 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7850 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7852 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7853 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7854 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7856 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7857 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7858 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7859 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7862 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7864 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7865 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7866 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7867 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7868 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7869 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7870 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7871 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7872 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7874 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7877 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7878 // the dust limit check.
7879 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7880 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7881 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7882 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7884 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7885 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7886 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7887 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7888 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7889 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7890 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7894 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7895 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7896 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7897 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7898 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7899 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7900 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7901 let seed = [42; 32];
7902 let network = Network::Testnet;
7903 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7905 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7906 let config = UserConfig::default();
7907 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7909 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7910 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7912 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7913 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7914 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7915 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7916 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7917 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7919 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7920 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7921 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7922 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7923 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7925 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7927 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7928 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7929 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7930 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7931 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7933 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7934 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7935 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7936 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7937 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7941 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7942 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7943 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7944 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7945 let seed = [42; 32];
7946 let network = Network::Testnet;
7947 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7948 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
7949 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7951 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7953 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7954 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7955 let config = UserConfig::default();
7956 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7958 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7959 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7960 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7961 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7963 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7964 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7965 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7967 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7968 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7969 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7970 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7972 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7973 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7974 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7976 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7977 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7979 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7980 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7981 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7982 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7983 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7984 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7985 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7987 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7989 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7990 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7991 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7992 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7993 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7997 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7998 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7999 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8000 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8001 let seed = [42; 32];
8002 let network = Network::Testnet;
8003 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8004 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8005 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8007 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8008 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8009 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8010 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8011 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8012 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8013 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8014 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8016 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8017 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8018 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8019 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8020 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8021 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8023 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8024 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8025 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8026 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8028 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8030 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8031 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8032 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8033 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8034 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8035 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8037 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8038 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8039 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8040 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8042 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8043 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8044 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8045 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8046 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8048 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8049 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8051 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8052 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8053 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8055 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8056 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8057 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8058 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8059 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8061 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8062 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8064 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8065 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8066 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8070 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8072 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8073 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8074 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8076 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8077 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8078 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8079 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8081 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8082 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8083 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8085 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8087 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8088 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8091 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8092 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8093 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8094 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8095 let seed = [42; 32];
8096 let network = Network::Testnet;
8097 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8098 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8099 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8102 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8103 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8104 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8106 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8107 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8109 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8110 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8111 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8113 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8114 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8116 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8118 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8119 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8121 // Channel Negotiations failed
8122 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8123 assert!(result.is_err());
8128 fn channel_update() {
8129 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8130 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8131 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8132 let seed = [42; 32];
8133 let network = Network::Testnet;
8134 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8135 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8136 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8138 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8139 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8140 let config = UserConfig::default();
8141 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8143 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8144 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8145 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8146 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8147 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8149 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8150 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8151 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8152 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8153 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8155 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8156 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8157 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8158 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8160 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8161 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8162 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8164 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8165 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8167 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8168 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8169 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8171 short_channel_id: 0,
8174 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8175 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8176 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8178 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8179 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8181 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8183 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8185 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8186 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8187 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8188 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8190 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8191 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8192 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8194 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8197 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8200 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8202 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8203 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8204 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8205 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8206 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8207 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8208 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8209 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8210 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8211 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8212 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8213 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8214 use crate::sync::Arc;
8216 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8217 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8218 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8219 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8221 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8223 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8224 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8225 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8226 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8227 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8229 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8230 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8236 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8237 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8238 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8240 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8241 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8242 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8243 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8244 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8245 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8247 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8249 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8250 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8251 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8252 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8253 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8254 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8256 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8257 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8258 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8259 selected_contest_delay: 144
8261 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8262 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8264 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8265 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8267 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8268 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8270 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8271 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8273 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8274 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8275 // build_commitment_transaction.
8276 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8277 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8278 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8279 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8280 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8282 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8283 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8284 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8285 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8289 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8290 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8291 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8292 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8296 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8297 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8298 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8300 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8301 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8303 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8304 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8306 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8308 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8309 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8310 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8311 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8312 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8313 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8314 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8316 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8317 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8318 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8319 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8321 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8322 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8323 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8325 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8327 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8328 commitment_tx.clone(),
8329 counterparty_signature,
8330 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8331 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8332 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8334 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8335 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8337 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8338 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8339 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8341 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8342 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8345 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8346 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8348 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8349 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8350 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8351 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8352 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8353 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8354 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8355 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8357 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8360 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8361 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8362 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8366 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8369 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8370 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8371 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8373 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8374 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8375 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8376 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8377 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8378 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8379 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8380 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8382 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8386 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8387 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8388 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8389 "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", {});
8391 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8392 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8394 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8395 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8396 "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", {});
8398 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8399 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8400 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8401 "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", {});
8403 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8404 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8406 amount_msat: 1000000,
8408 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8409 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8411 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8414 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8415 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8417 amount_msat: 2000000,
8419 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8420 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8422 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8425 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8426 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8428 amount_msat: 2000000,
8430 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8431 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8432 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8433 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8435 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8438 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8439 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8441 amount_msat: 3000000,
8443 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8444 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8445 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8446 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8448 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8451 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8452 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8454 amount_msat: 4000000,
8456 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8457 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8459 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8463 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8464 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8465 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8467 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8468 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8469 "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", {
8472 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8473 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8474 "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" },
8477 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8478 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8479 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8482 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8483 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8484 "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" },
8487 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8488 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8489 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8492 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8493 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8494 "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" }
8497 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8498 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8499 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8501 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8502 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8503 "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", {
8506 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8507 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8508 "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" },
8511 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8512 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8513 "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" },
8516 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8517 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8518 "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" },
8521 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8522 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8523 "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" },
8526 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8527 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8528 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8531 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8532 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8533 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8535 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8536 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8537 "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", {
8540 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8541 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8542 "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" },
8545 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8546 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8547 "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" },
8550 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8551 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8552 "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" },
8555 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8556 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8557 "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" }
8560 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8561 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8562 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8563 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8565 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8566 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8567 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80084a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994abc996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d005101473044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc31201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8570 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8571 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8572 "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" },
8575 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8576 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8577 "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" },
8580 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8581 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8582 "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" },
8585 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8586 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8587 "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" }
8590 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8591 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8592 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8593 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8595 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8596 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8597 "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", {
8600 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8601 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8602 "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" },
8605 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8606 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8607 "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" },
8610 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8611 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8612 "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" },
8615 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8616 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8617 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8620 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8621 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8622 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8624 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8625 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8626 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8629 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8630 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8631 "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" },
8634 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8635 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8636 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff010000000000000000015c060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546014830450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8639 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8640 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8641 "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" }
8644 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8645 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8646 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8648 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8649 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8650 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8653 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8654 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8655 "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" },
8658 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8659 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8660 "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" },
8663 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8664 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8665 "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" }
8668 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8669 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8670 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8672 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8673 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8674 "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", {
8677 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8678 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8679 "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" },
8682 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8683 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8684 "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" }
8687 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8688 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8689 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8690 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8691 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8692 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8694 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8695 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8696 "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", {
8699 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8700 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8701 "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" },
8704 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8705 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8706 "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" }
8709 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8710 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8711 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8712 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8713 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8715 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8716 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8717 "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", {
8720 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8721 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8722 "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" },
8725 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8726 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8727 "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" }
8730 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8731 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8732 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8734 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8735 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8736 "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", {
8739 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8740 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8741 "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" }
8744 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8745 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8746 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8747 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8748 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8750 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8751 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8752 "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", {
8755 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8756 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8757 "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" }
8760 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8761 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8762 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8763 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8764 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8766 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8767 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8768 "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", {
8771 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8772 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8773 "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" }
8776 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8777 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8778 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8779 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8781 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8782 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8783 "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", {});
8785 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8786 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8787 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8788 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8789 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8791 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8792 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8793 "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", {});
8795 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8796 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8797 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8798 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8799 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8801 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8802 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8803 "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", {});
8805 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8806 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8807 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8809 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8810 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8811 "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", {});
8813 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8814 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8815 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8816 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8817 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8819 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8820 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8821 "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", {});
8823 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8824 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8825 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8826 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8827 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8829 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8830 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8831 "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", {});
8833 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8834 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8835 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8836 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8837 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8838 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8840 amount_msat: 2000000,
8842 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8843 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8845 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8848 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8849 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8850 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8852 amount_msat: 5000001,
8854 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8855 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8856 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8857 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8859 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8862 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8863 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8865 amount_msat: 5000000,
8867 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8868 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8869 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8870 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8872 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8876 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8877 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8878 "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", {
8881 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8882 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8883 "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" },
8885 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8886 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8887 "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" },
8889 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8890 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8891 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
8894 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8895 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8896 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8897 "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", {
8900 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8901 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8902 "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" },
8904 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8905 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8906 "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" },
8908 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8909 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8910 "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" }
8915 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8916 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8918 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8919 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8920 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8921 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8923 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8924 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8925 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8927 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8928 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8930 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8931 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8933 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8934 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8935 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8939 fn test_key_derivation() {
8940 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8941 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8943 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8944 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8946 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8947 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8949 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8950 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8952 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8953 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8955 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8956 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8958 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8959 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8961 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8962 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8966 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8967 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8968 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8969 let seed = [42; 32];
8970 let network = Network::Testnet;
8971 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8972 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8974 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8975 let config = UserConfig::default();
8976 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8977 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8979 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8980 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8982 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8983 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8984 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8985 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8986 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8987 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8988 assert!(res.is_ok());
8992 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8993 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8994 // resulting `channel_type`.
8995 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8996 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8997 let network = Network::Testnet;
8998 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8999 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9001 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9002 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9004 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9005 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9007 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9008 // need to signal it.
9009 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9010 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9011 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9014 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9016 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9017 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9018 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9020 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9021 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9022 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9025 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9026 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9027 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9028 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9029 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9032 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9033 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9037 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9038 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9039 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9040 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9041 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9042 let network = Network::Testnet;
9043 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9044 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9046 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9047 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9049 let config = UserConfig::default();
9051 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9052 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9053 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9054 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9055 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9057 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9058 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9059 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9062 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9063 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9064 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9066 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9067 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9068 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9069 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9070 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9071 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9073 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9077 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9078 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9080 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9081 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9082 let network = Network::Testnet;
9083 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9084 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9086 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9087 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9089 let config = UserConfig::default();
9091 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9092 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9093 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9094 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9095 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9096 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9097 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9098 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9100 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9101 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9102 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9103 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9104 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9105 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9108 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9109 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9111 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9112 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9113 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9114 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9116 assert!(res.is_err());
9118 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9119 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9120 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9122 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9123 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9124 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9127 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9129 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9130 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9131 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9132 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9135 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9136 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9138 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9139 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9141 assert!(res.is_err());
9145 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9146 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9147 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9148 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9149 let seed = [42; 32];
9150 let network = Network::Testnet;
9151 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9152 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9153 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9155 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9156 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9157 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9158 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9160 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9161 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9162 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9167 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9176 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9177 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9178 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9183 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9184 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9190 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9193 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9194 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9195 &accept_channel_msg,
9196 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9197 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9200 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9201 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9202 let tx = Transaction {
9204 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9208 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9211 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9214 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9215 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9220 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9221 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9222 &funding_created_msg,
9226 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9227 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9235 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9236 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9237 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9238 &funding_signed_msg,
9243 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9250 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9251 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9252 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9253 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9255 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9256 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9257 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9260 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9261 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9262 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9270 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9271 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9272 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9273 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9276 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9277 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9279 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9280 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9281 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9283 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());