1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 enum OutboundHTLCState {
170 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
171 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
172 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
173 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
174 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
175 /// money back (though we won't), and,
176 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
177 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
178 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
179 /// we'll never get out of sync).
180 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
181 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
182 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
184 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
185 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
186 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
191 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
192 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
193 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
194 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
195 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
196 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
197 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
198 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
202 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
204 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
205 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
208 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
209 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
211 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
212 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
217 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
218 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
220 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
221 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
226 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
231 state: OutboundHTLCState,
233 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
236 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
237 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
238 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
242 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
244 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
245 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
246 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
249 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
254 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
258 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
259 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
260 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
261 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
262 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
263 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
264 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
266 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
267 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
268 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
269 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
270 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
271 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
272 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
274 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
275 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
276 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
278 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
279 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
280 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
281 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
282 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
283 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
285 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
286 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
288 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
289 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
290 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
291 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
292 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
293 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
294 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
295 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
296 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
298 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
299 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
300 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
301 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
302 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
303 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
304 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
305 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
306 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
307 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
308 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
309 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
310 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
311 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
312 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
313 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
315 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
316 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
317 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
318 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
319 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
320 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
321 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
322 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
324 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
325 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
326 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
327 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
329 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
331 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
333 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
334 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
335 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
336 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
340 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
342 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
344 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
346 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
347 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
348 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
349 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
350 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
352 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
353 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
355 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
357 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
358 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
360 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
361 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
362 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
363 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
364 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
365 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
367 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
368 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
370 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
371 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
372 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
373 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
374 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
376 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
377 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
379 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
380 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
382 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
383 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
384 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
385 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
391 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
392 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
394 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
395 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
396 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
401 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
402 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
404 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
405 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
406 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
411 macro_rules! secp_check {
412 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
415 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
420 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
421 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
422 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
423 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
424 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
425 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
426 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
427 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
429 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
431 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
433 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
437 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
439 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
440 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
441 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
443 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
444 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
446 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
447 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
448 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
449 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
450 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
452 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
453 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
457 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
463 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
466 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
467 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
468 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
469 holding_cell_msat: u64,
470 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
473 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
474 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
475 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
476 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
477 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
478 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
479 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
480 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
481 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
482 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
485 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
486 struct HTLCCandidate {
488 origin: HTLCInitiator,
492 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
500 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
502 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
504 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
505 htlc_value_msat: u64,
506 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
511 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
512 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
513 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
514 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
515 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
517 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
518 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
519 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
520 htlc_value_msat: u64,
522 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
523 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
527 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
528 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
529 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
530 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
531 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
532 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
533 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
534 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
535 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
536 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
537 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
540 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
542 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
543 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
544 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
545 pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
546 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
549 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
550 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
551 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
552 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
553 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
554 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
555 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
556 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
559 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
561 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
562 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
563 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
564 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
565 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
566 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
567 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
568 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
571 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
572 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
573 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
574 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
575 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
576 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
577 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
578 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
579 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
580 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
581 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
582 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
583 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
584 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
585 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
587 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
588 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
589 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
590 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
592 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
593 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
594 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
595 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
597 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
598 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
599 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
600 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
601 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
603 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
604 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
605 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
606 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
608 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
609 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
610 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
612 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
613 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
614 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
615 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
616 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
618 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
619 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
622 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
623 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
625 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
626 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
627 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
628 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
630 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
631 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
633 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
634 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
637 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
638 (0, update, required),
641 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
642 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
643 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
644 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
645 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
649 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
650 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
651 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
653 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
655 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
656 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
657 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
661 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
663 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
664 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
665 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
670 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
671 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
672 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
673 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
674 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
676 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
677 /// in a timely manner.
678 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
681 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
682 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
683 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
685 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
686 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
687 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
688 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
692 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
693 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
694 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
696 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
697 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
698 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
699 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
701 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
705 /// The current channel ID.
706 channel_id: ChannelId,
707 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
708 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
709 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
712 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
713 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
715 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
716 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
717 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
719 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
720 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
721 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
722 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
724 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
725 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
727 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
729 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
730 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
731 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
733 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
734 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
735 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
737 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
738 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
739 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
740 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
741 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
742 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
744 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
745 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
746 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
747 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
748 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
749 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
751 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
753 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
754 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
755 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
757 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
758 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
759 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
760 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
761 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
762 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
763 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
765 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
766 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
767 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
769 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
770 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
771 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
772 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
773 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
774 /// outbound or inbound.
775 signer_pending_funding: bool,
777 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
779 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
780 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
781 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
782 // HTLCs with similar state.
783 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
784 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
785 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
786 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
787 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
788 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
789 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
790 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
791 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
794 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
795 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
796 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
798 update_time_counter: u32,
800 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
801 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
802 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
803 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
804 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
805 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
807 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
808 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
810 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
811 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
812 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
813 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
815 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
816 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
818 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
820 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
822 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
823 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
824 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
825 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
826 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
828 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
829 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
831 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
832 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
833 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
835 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
836 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
837 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
838 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
839 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
840 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
841 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
842 channel_creation_height: u32,
844 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
847 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
849 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
852 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
854 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
857 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
859 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
861 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
862 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
865 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
867 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
869 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
870 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
872 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
874 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
875 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
876 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
878 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
880 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
881 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
882 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
884 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
885 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
886 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
888 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
890 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
892 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
893 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
894 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
895 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
897 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
898 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
899 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
901 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
902 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
903 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
905 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
906 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
907 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
908 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
909 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
910 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
911 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
912 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
914 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
915 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
916 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
917 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
918 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
920 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
921 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
923 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
924 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
925 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
926 /// unblock the state machine.
928 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
929 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
930 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
932 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
933 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
934 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
936 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
937 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
938 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
939 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
940 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
941 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
942 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
943 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
945 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
946 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
948 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
949 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
950 // the channel's funding UTXO.
952 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
953 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
954 // associated channel mapping.
956 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
957 // to store all of them.
958 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
960 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
961 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
962 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
963 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
964 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
966 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
967 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
969 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
970 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
972 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
973 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
974 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
976 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
977 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
978 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
981 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
982 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
983 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
984 self.update_time_counter
987 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
988 self.latest_monitor_update_id
991 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
992 self.config.announced_channel
995 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
996 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
999 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1000 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1001 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1002 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1005 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1006 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1007 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
1010 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1011 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1012 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1013 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
1014 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1017 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1018 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1019 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1020 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
1022 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
1023 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
1025 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1026 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
1028 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1029 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
1031 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
1034 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1035 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1036 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1037 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1038 self.channel_state &
1039 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1040 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1041 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1042 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1045 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1046 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1047 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1048 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1049 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1052 // Public utilities:
1054 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1058 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1060 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1061 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1062 self.temporary_channel_id
1065 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1069 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1070 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1071 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1075 /// Gets the channel's type
1076 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1080 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1082 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1083 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1084 self.short_channel_id
1087 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1088 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1089 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1092 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1093 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1094 self.outbound_scid_alias
1097 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1099 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1100 return &self.holder_signer
1103 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1104 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1105 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1106 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1107 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1108 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1111 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1112 /// get_funding_created.
1113 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1114 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1117 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1118 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1119 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1120 if conf_height > 0 {
1127 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1128 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1129 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1132 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1133 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1134 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1135 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1139 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1142 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1143 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1146 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1147 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1150 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1151 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1152 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1155 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1156 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1159 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1160 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1161 self.counterparty_node_id
1164 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1165 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1166 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1169 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1170 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1171 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1174 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1175 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1177 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1178 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1179 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1180 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1182 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1186 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1187 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1188 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1191 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1192 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1193 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1196 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1197 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1198 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1200 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1201 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1206 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1207 self.channel_value_satoshis
1210 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1211 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1214 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1215 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1218 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1219 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1220 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1222 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1223 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1224 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1225 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1226 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1228 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1232 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1233 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1234 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1237 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1238 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1239 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1242 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1243 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1244 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1247 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1248 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1249 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1252 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1253 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1254 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1257 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1258 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1259 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1262 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1263 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1264 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1265 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1266 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1269 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1271 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1272 self.prev_config = None;
1276 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1277 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1281 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1282 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1283 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1284 let did_channel_update =
1285 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1286 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1287 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1288 if did_channel_update {
1289 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1290 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1291 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1292 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1294 self.config.options = *config;
1298 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1299 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1300 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1301 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1302 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1305 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1306 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1307 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1308 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1309 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1311 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1312 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1313 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1314 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1315 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1316 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1317 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1319 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1320 where L::Target: Logger
1322 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1323 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1324 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1326 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1327 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1328 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1329 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1331 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1332 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1333 if match update_state {
1334 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1335 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1336 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1337 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1338 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1340 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1344 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1345 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1346 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1348 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1350 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1351 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1352 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1354 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1355 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1356 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1357 transaction_output_index: None
1362 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1363 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1364 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1365 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1366 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1369 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1371 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1372 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1373 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1375 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1376 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1379 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1380 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1383 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1385 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1386 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1387 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1389 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1390 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1396 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1397 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1398 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1399 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1400 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1401 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1402 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1406 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1407 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1409 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1411 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1412 if generated_by_local {
1413 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1414 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1423 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1425 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1426 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1427 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1428 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1429 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1430 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1431 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1434 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1435 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1436 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1437 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1441 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1442 preimages.push(preimage);
1446 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1447 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1449 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1451 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1452 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1454 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1455 if !generated_by_local {
1456 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1464 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1465 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1466 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1467 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1468 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1469 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1470 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1471 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1473 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1475 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1476 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1477 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1478 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1480 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1482 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1483 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1484 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1485 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1488 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1489 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1490 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1491 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1493 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1496 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1497 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1498 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1499 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1501 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1504 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1505 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1510 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1511 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1516 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1518 let channel_parameters =
1519 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1520 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1521 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1528 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1531 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1532 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1533 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1534 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1536 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1537 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1538 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1546 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1547 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1553 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1554 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1555 /// our counterparty!)
1556 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1557 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1558 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1559 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1560 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1561 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1562 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1564 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1568 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1569 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1570 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1571 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1572 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1573 //may see payments to it!
1574 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1575 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1576 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1578 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1581 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1582 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1583 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1584 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1585 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1588 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1589 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1592 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1596 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1597 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1598 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1599 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1600 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1601 // which are near the dust limit.
1602 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1603 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1604 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1605 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1606 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1608 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1609 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1611 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1614 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1615 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1616 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1619 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1620 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1622 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1623 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1624 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1625 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1626 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1627 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1628 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1631 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1634 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1635 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1636 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1638 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1639 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1640 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1641 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1642 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1643 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1645 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1646 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1652 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1653 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1655 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1656 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1657 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1658 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1659 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1660 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1661 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1664 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1667 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1668 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1669 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1671 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1672 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1673 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1674 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1675 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1676 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1678 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1679 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1683 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1684 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1685 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1686 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1687 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1688 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1689 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1691 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1692 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1694 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1701 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1702 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1703 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1704 /// corner case properly.
1705 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1706 -> AvailableBalances
1707 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1709 let context = &self;
1710 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1711 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1712 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1714 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1715 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1716 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1717 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1720 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1722 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1723 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1725 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1727 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1729 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1730 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1734 if context.is_outbound() {
1735 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1736 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1738 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1739 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1741 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1742 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1743 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1744 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1747 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1748 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1749 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1750 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1751 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1752 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1753 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1756 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1757 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1758 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1759 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1760 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1761 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1762 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1763 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1764 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1765 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1766 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1768 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1771 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1772 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1773 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1774 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1775 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1778 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1779 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1781 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1782 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1783 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1785 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1786 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1787 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1788 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1792 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1794 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1795 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1796 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1797 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1798 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1799 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1800 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1802 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1803 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1805 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1806 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1807 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1809 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1810 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1811 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1812 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1813 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1816 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1817 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1818 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1819 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1820 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1821 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1824 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1825 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1826 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1828 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1832 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1833 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1835 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1836 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1840 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1841 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1842 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1843 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1845 outbound_capacity_msat,
1846 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1847 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1852 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1853 let context = &self;
1854 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1857 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1858 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1860 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1861 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1863 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1864 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1866 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1867 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1868 let context = &self;
1869 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1871 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1874 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1875 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1877 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1878 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1880 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1881 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1883 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1884 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1888 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1889 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1895 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1896 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1897 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1900 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1901 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1902 included_htlcs += 1;
1905 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1906 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1910 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1911 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1912 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1913 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1914 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1915 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1920 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1922 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1923 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1928 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1929 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1933 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1934 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1935 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1938 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1939 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1941 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1942 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1943 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1945 total_pending_htlcs,
1946 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1947 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1948 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1950 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1951 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1952 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1954 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1956 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1961 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1962 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1964 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1965 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1967 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1968 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1970 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1971 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1972 let context = &self;
1973 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1975 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1978 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1979 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1981 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1982 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1984 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1985 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1987 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1988 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1992 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1993 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1999 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2000 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2001 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2002 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2003 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2004 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2007 included_htlcs += 1;
2010 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2011 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2014 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2015 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2017 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2018 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2019 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2024 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2025 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2026 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2029 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2030 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2032 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2033 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2035 total_pending_htlcs,
2036 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2037 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2038 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2040 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2041 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2042 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2044 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2046 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2051 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2052 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2053 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2054 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2061 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2063 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2064 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2067 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2069 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2070 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2071 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2075 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2076 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2077 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2080 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2082 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2083 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2086 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2087 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2088 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2089 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2090 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2091 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2092 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2093 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2094 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2095 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2096 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2098 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2099 // return them to fail the payment.
2100 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2101 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2102 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2104 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2105 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2110 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2111 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2112 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2113 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2114 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2115 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2116 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2117 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2118 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2119 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2120 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2121 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2122 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2126 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2128 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2129 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2132 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2133 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2137 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2138 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
2139 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2140 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2141 let signature = match &self.holder_signer {
2142 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2143 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2144 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2145 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
2147 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2151 if self.signer_pending_funding {
2152 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
2153 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2156 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
2157 temporary_channel_id: self.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
2158 funding_txid: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
2159 funding_output_index: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
2162 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2164 next_local_nonce: None,
2168 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2169 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2170 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2171 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2173 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2174 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2175 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2176 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2178 match &self.holder_signer {
2179 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2180 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2181 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2182 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2183 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2186 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2190 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2191 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2192 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2193 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2194 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2195 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2198 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2199 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2201 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2207 // Internal utility functions for channels
2209 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2210 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2211 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2213 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2215 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2216 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2217 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2219 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2222 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2224 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2227 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2228 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2229 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2231 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2233 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2234 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2235 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2236 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2237 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2240 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2241 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2242 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2243 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2244 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2245 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2246 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2249 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2250 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2252 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2253 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2256 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2257 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2258 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2259 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2260 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2261 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2264 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2265 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2266 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2267 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2270 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2271 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2273 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2274 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2275 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2279 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2280 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2281 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2283 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2284 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2285 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2286 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2288 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2289 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2291 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2293 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2294 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2295 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2296 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2298 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2299 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2303 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2309 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2310 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2311 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2312 // outside of those situations will fail.
2313 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2317 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2322 1 + // script length (0)
2326 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2327 2 + // witness marker and flag
2328 1 + // witness element count
2329 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2330 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2331 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2332 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2333 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2334 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2336 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2337 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2338 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2344 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2345 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2346 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2347 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2349 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2350 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2351 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2353 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2354 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2355 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2356 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2357 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2358 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2361 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2362 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2365 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2366 value_to_holder = 0;
2369 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2370 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2371 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2372 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2374 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2375 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2378 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2379 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2382 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2385 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2386 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2388 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2390 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2391 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2392 where L::Target: Logger {
2393 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2394 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2395 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2396 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2397 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2398 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2399 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2400 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2404 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2405 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2406 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2407 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2409 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2410 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2412 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2414 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2415 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2416 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2418 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2419 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2420 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2421 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2422 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2423 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2424 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2426 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2427 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2428 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2430 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2431 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2433 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2436 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2437 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2441 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2445 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2446 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2447 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2448 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2449 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2450 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2453 // Now update local state:
2455 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2456 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2457 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2458 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2459 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2460 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2461 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2465 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2466 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2467 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2468 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2469 // do not not get into this branch.
2470 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2471 match pending_update {
2472 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2473 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2474 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2475 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2476 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2477 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2478 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2481 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2482 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2483 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2484 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2485 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2486 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2487 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2493 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2494 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2495 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2497 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2498 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2499 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2501 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2502 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2505 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2506 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2508 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2509 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2511 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2512 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2515 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2518 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2519 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2520 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2521 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2526 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2527 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2528 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2529 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2530 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2531 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2532 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2533 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2534 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2535 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2536 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2537 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2538 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2539 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2540 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2542 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2543 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2544 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2545 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2546 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2549 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2550 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2551 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2557 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2558 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2560 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2564 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2565 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2566 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2567 /// before we fail backwards.
2569 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2570 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2571 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2572 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2573 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2574 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2575 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2578 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2579 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2580 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2581 /// before we fail backwards.
2583 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2584 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2585 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2586 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2587 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2588 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2589 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2591 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2593 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2594 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2595 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2597 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2598 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2599 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2601 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2602 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2603 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2605 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2610 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2611 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2617 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2618 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2619 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2620 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2621 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2625 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2626 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2627 force_holding_cell = true;
2630 // Now update local state:
2631 if force_holding_cell {
2632 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2633 match pending_update {
2634 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2635 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2636 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2637 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2641 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2642 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2643 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2644 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2650 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2651 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2652 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2658 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2660 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2661 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2664 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2665 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2666 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2671 // Message handlers:
2673 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2674 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2675 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2676 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2677 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>, ChannelError>
2681 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2682 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2684 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2685 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2687 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2688 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2689 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2690 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2693 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2695 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2696 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2697 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2698 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2700 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2701 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2703 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2704 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2706 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2707 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2708 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2709 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2710 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2711 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2715 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2716 initial_commitment_tx,
2719 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2720 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2723 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2724 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2727 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2728 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2729 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2730 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2731 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2732 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2733 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2734 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2735 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2736 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2737 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2738 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2740 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2742 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2743 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2744 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2745 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2746 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2747 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2748 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2750 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2751 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2752 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2754 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2756 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2757 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2759 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2761 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2762 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2766 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2767 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2768 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2769 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2770 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2771 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2772 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2775 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2776 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2778 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2779 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2780 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2781 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2783 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2786 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2787 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2788 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2791 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2792 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2793 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2794 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2795 // when routing outbound payments.
2796 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2800 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2802 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2803 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2805 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2806 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2808 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2809 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2810 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2811 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2812 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2813 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2814 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2815 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2816 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2818 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2819 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2820 let expected_point =
2821 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2822 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2824 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2825 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2826 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2827 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2828 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2829 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2831 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2832 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2833 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2834 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2835 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2837 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2838 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2842 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2845 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2846 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2848 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2850 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2853 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2854 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2855 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2856 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2857 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2858 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2860 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2861 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2862 if local_sent_shutdown {
2863 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2865 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2866 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2867 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2868 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2870 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2871 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2873 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2874 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2876 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2877 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2879 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2880 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2883 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2884 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2885 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2886 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2888 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2889 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2892 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2893 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2894 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2895 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2896 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2897 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2898 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2899 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2900 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2901 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2902 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2904 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2905 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2906 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2907 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2908 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2909 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2913 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2914 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2917 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2918 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2919 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2921 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2922 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2923 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2924 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2925 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2926 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2927 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2931 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2932 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2933 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2934 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2935 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2936 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2937 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2941 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2942 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2943 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2944 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2945 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2946 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2949 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2950 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2952 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2953 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2954 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2956 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2957 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2961 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2964 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2965 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2969 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2970 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2974 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2975 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2976 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2977 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2978 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2979 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2980 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2981 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2982 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2984 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2985 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2986 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2987 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2988 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2991 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2992 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2993 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2994 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2995 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2998 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2999 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3001 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3002 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3005 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3006 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3007 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3011 // Now update local state:
3012 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3013 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3014 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3015 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3016 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3017 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3018 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3023 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3025 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3026 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3027 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3028 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3029 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3030 None => fail_reason.into(),
3031 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3032 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3033 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3034 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3036 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3040 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3042 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3043 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3045 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3046 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3051 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3054 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3055 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3056 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3058 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3059 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3062 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3065 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3066 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3067 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3069 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3070 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3073 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3077 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3078 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3081 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3082 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3085 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3089 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3090 where L::Target: Logger
3092 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3093 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3095 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3096 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3098 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3099 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3102 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3104 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3106 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3107 let commitment_txid = {
3108 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3109 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3110 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3112 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3113 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3114 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3115 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3116 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3117 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3121 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3123 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3124 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3125 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3126 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3129 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3130 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3131 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3132 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3135 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3137 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3138 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3139 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3140 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3141 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3142 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3143 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3144 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3145 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3146 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3147 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3153 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3154 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3157 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3158 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3159 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3160 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3161 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3162 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3163 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3164 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3165 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3166 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3167 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3168 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3169 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3172 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3173 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3174 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3175 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3176 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3177 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3178 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3180 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3181 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3182 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3183 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3184 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3185 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3186 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3187 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3189 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3190 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3193 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3195 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3196 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3197 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3200 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3203 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3204 commitment_stats.tx,
3206 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3207 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3208 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3211 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3212 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3214 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3215 let mut need_commitment = false;
3216 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3217 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3218 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3219 need_commitment = true;
3223 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3224 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3225 Some(forward_info.clone())
3227 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3228 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3229 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3230 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3231 need_commitment = true;
3234 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3235 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3236 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3237 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3238 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3239 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3240 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3241 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3242 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3243 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3244 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3245 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3246 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3247 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3249 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3251 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3252 need_commitment = true;
3256 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3257 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3258 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3259 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3260 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3261 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3263 nondust_htlc_sources,
3267 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3268 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3269 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3270 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3271 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3273 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3274 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3275 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3276 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3277 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3278 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3279 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3280 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3281 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3282 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3283 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3284 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3285 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3286 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3288 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3289 &self.context.channel_id);
3290 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3293 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3294 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3295 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3296 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3297 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3298 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3299 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3300 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3301 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3305 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3306 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3307 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3308 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3311 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3312 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3313 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3314 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3315 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3316 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3317 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3319 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3320 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3321 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3322 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3325 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3326 /// for our counterparty.
3327 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3328 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3329 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3330 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3332 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3333 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3334 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3335 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3337 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3338 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3339 updates: Vec::new(),
3342 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3343 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3344 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3345 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3346 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3347 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3348 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3349 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3350 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3351 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3352 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3353 // to rebalance channels.
3354 match &htlc_update {
3355 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3356 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3357 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3359 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3360 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3362 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3365 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3366 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3367 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3368 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3369 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3370 // into the holding cell without ever being
3371 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3372 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3373 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3376 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3382 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3383 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3384 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3385 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3386 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3387 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3388 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3389 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3390 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3391 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3392 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3393 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3395 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3396 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3397 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3398 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3399 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3400 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3401 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3402 // for a full revocation before failing.
3403 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3404 update_fail_count += 1;
3407 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3409 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3416 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3417 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3419 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3420 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3425 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3426 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3427 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3428 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3429 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3431 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3432 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3433 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3435 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3436 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3442 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3443 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3444 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3445 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3446 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3447 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3448 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3449 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3450 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3452 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3453 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3455 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3456 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3458 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3459 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3462 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3464 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3465 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3466 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3470 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3471 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3472 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3473 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3474 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3475 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3476 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3477 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3478 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3481 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3483 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3484 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3487 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3488 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3489 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3490 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3492 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3494 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3498 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3499 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3500 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3501 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3502 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3503 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3504 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3505 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3509 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3510 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3511 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3512 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3513 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3514 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3515 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3516 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3517 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3519 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3520 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3523 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3524 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3525 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3526 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3527 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3528 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3529 let mut require_commitment = false;
3530 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3533 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3534 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3535 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3536 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3538 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3539 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3540 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3541 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3542 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3543 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3545 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3549 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3550 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3551 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3552 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3553 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3555 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3556 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3557 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3562 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3563 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3565 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3569 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3570 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3572 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3573 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3574 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3575 require_commitment = true;
3576 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3577 match forward_info {
3578 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3579 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3580 require_commitment = true;
3582 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3583 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3584 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3586 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3587 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3588 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3592 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3593 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3594 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3595 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3601 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3602 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3603 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3604 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3605 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3607 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3608 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3609 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3610 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3611 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3612 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3613 require_commitment = true;
3617 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3619 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3620 match update_state {
3621 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3622 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3623 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3624 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3625 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3626 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3628 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3629 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3630 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3631 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3632 require_commitment = true;
3633 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3634 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3639 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3640 let release_state_str =
3641 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3642 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3643 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3644 if !release_monitor {
3645 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3646 update: monitor_update,
3648 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3650 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3655 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3656 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3657 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3658 if require_commitment {
3659 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3660 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3661 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3662 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3664 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3665 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3666 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3667 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3668 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3670 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3671 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3672 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3673 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3674 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3677 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3678 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3679 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3680 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3681 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3682 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3684 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3685 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3687 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3688 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3690 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3691 if require_commitment {
3692 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3694 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3695 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3696 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3697 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3699 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3700 &self.context.channel_id(),
3701 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3704 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3705 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3707 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3708 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3710 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3711 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3717 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3718 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3719 /// commitment update.
3720 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3721 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3722 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3724 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3725 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3728 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3729 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3730 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3731 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3733 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3734 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3735 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3736 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3737 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3738 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3739 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3741 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3742 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3744 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3745 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3747 if !self.context.is_live() {
3748 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3751 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3752 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3753 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3754 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3755 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3756 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3757 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3758 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3759 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3760 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3764 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3765 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3766 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3767 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3768 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3769 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3772 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3773 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3777 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3778 force_holding_cell = true;
3781 if force_holding_cell {
3782 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3786 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3787 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3789 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3790 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3795 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3796 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3798 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3800 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3801 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3802 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3803 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3807 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3808 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3809 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3813 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3814 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3817 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3818 // will be retransmitted.
3819 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3820 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3821 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3823 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3824 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3826 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3827 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3828 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3829 // this HTLC accordingly
3830 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3833 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3834 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3835 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3836 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3839 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3840 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3841 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3842 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3843 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3844 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3849 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3851 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3852 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3853 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3854 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3858 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3859 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3860 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3861 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3862 // the update upon reconnection.
3863 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3867 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3869 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3870 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3874 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3875 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3876 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3877 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3878 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3879 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3880 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3882 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3883 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3885 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3886 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3887 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3888 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3890 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3891 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3892 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3893 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3894 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3895 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3896 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3899 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3900 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3901 /// to the remote side.
3902 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3903 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3904 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3905 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3908 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3910 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3911 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3913 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3914 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3915 // first received the funding_signed.
3916 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3917 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3918 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3920 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3921 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3922 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3923 funding_broadcastable = None;
3926 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3927 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3928 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3929 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3930 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3931 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3932 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3933 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3934 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3935 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3936 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3937 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3938 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3939 next_per_commitment_point,
3940 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3944 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3946 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3947 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3948 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3949 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3950 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3951 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3953 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3954 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3955 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3956 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3957 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3958 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3962 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3963 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3965 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3966 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3968 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3969 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3972 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3973 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3974 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3975 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3976 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3977 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3978 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3979 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3980 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3984 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3985 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3987 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3988 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3990 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3991 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3993 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3995 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3996 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3997 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3998 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3999 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4000 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4001 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4002 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4003 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4004 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4005 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4006 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4008 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4009 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4010 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4016 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4019 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4020 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4021 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4023 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4024 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4026 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4027 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4029 let funding_created = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
4030 self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
4033 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed, {} funding_created, and {} channel_ready",
4034 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4035 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4036 if funding_created.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4037 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4039 SignerResumeUpdates {
4047 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4048 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4049 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4050 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4051 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4052 per_commitment_secret,
4053 next_per_commitment_point,
4055 next_local_nonce: None,
4059 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4060 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4061 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4062 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4063 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4064 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4066 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4067 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4068 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4069 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4070 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4071 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4072 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4073 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4074 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4075 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4080 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4081 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4083 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4084 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4085 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4086 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4087 reason: err_packet.clone()
4090 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4091 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4092 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4093 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4094 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4095 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4098 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4099 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4100 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4101 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4102 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4109 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4110 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4111 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4112 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4116 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4117 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4118 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4119 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4120 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4121 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4122 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4126 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4127 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4128 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4132 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4133 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4138 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4139 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4140 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4141 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4142 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4143 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4144 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4149 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4150 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4152 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4153 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4154 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4155 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4156 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4157 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4158 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4159 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4162 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4164 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4165 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4166 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4167 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4171 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4172 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4173 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4176 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4177 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4178 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4179 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4180 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4181 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4183 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4184 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4185 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4186 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4187 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4190 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4191 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4192 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4193 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4194 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4195 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4196 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4197 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4201 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4202 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4203 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4204 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4206 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4210 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4211 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4212 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4213 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4215 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4217 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4219 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4220 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4221 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4222 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4223 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4224 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4226 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4227 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4228 channel_ready: None,
4229 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4230 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4231 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4235 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4236 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4237 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4238 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4239 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4240 next_per_commitment_point,
4241 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4243 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4244 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4245 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4249 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4250 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4251 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4253 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4254 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4255 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4258 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4264 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4265 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4266 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4267 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4268 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4269 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4270 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4272 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4274 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4275 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4276 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4277 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4278 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4279 next_per_commitment_point,
4280 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4284 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4285 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4286 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4288 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4291 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4292 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4293 raa: required_revoke,
4294 commitment_update: None,
4295 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4297 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4298 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4299 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4301 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4304 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4305 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4306 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4307 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4308 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4309 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4312 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4313 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4314 raa: required_revoke,
4315 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4316 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4320 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4324 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4325 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4326 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4327 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4329 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4331 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4333 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4334 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4335 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4336 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4337 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4338 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4339 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4340 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4342 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4343 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4344 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4345 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4346 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4348 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4349 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4350 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4351 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4354 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4355 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4356 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4357 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4358 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4359 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4360 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4361 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4362 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4363 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4364 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4365 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4366 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4367 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4368 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4370 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4373 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4374 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4377 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4378 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4379 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4380 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4381 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4382 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4385 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4386 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4387 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4388 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4389 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4390 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4391 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4393 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4399 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4400 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4401 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4402 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4404 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4405 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4406 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4407 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4408 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4409 return Ok((None, None, None));
4412 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4413 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4414 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4416 return Ok((None, None, None));
4419 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4420 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4421 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4422 return Ok((None, None, None));
4425 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4427 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4428 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4429 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4430 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4432 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4433 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4435 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4436 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4438 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4439 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4440 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4441 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4443 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4444 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4445 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4449 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4454 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4455 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4457 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4458 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4461 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4462 /// within our expected timeframe.
4464 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4465 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4466 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4469 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4472 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4473 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4477 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4478 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4480 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4481 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4483 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4484 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4485 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4486 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4487 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4489 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4490 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4491 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4494 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4496 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4497 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4500 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4501 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4502 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4505 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4508 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4509 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4510 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4511 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4513 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4516 assert!(send_shutdown);
4517 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4518 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4519 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4521 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4522 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4524 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4529 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4531 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4532 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4534 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4535 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4536 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4537 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4538 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4539 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4542 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4543 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4545 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4546 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4547 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4548 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4552 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4553 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4554 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4555 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4556 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4557 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4559 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4560 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4567 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4568 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4570 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4573 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4574 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4576 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4578 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4579 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4580 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4581 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4582 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4583 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4584 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4585 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4586 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4588 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4589 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4592 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4596 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4597 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4598 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4599 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4601 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4602 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4604 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4605 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4607 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4610 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4611 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4614 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4615 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4618 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4619 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4620 return Ok((None, None, None));
4623 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4624 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4625 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4626 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4628 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4630 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4633 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4634 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4635 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4636 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4637 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4641 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4642 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4643 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4647 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4648 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4649 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4650 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4651 monitor_update: None,
4652 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4653 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4655 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4656 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4657 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4658 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4662 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4664 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4665 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4666 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4667 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4669 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4672 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4673 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4675 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4676 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4677 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4678 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4679 monitor_update: None,
4680 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4681 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4683 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4684 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4685 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4686 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4691 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4692 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4693 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4694 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4696 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4697 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4698 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4700 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4702 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4708 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4709 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4710 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4712 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4713 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4715 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4716 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4719 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4720 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4721 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4722 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4723 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4725 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4726 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4727 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4729 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4730 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4733 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4734 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4735 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4736 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4737 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4738 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4739 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4740 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4742 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4745 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4746 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4747 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4748 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4750 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4754 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4755 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4756 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4757 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4759 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4765 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4766 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4767 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4768 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4769 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4770 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4771 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4773 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4774 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4777 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4779 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4780 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4786 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4787 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4788 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4789 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4790 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4791 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4792 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4794 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4795 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4802 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4803 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4806 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4807 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4810 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4811 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4815 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
4816 &self.context.holder_signer
4820 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4822 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4823 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4824 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4825 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4826 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4827 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4829 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4831 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4839 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4840 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4844 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4845 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4846 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4847 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4850 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4851 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4852 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4853 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4856 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4857 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4858 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4859 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4860 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4861 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4864 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4865 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4866 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4867 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4868 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4869 if !release_monitor {
4870 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4879 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4880 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4883 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4884 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4885 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4887 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4888 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4889 if self.context.channel_state &
4890 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4891 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4892 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4893 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4894 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4897 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4898 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4899 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4900 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4901 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4902 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4904 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4905 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4906 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4908 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4909 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4910 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4911 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4912 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4913 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4919 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4920 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4921 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4924 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4925 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4926 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4929 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4930 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4931 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4934 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4935 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4936 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4937 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4938 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4939 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4944 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4945 self.context.channel_update_status
4948 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4949 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4950 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4953 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4955 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4956 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4957 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4961 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4962 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4963 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4966 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4970 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
4971 // channel_ready yet.
4972 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
4976 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4977 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4978 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4979 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4980 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4982 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4983 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4984 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4986 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4987 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4990 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4991 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4992 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4993 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4994 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4995 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4996 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4997 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4998 self.context.channel_state);
5000 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5004 if need_commitment_update {
5005 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5006 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5007 let next_per_commitment_point =
5008 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5009 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5010 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5011 next_per_commitment_point,
5012 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5016 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5022 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5023 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5024 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5025 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5026 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5027 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5028 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5030 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5033 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5034 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5035 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5036 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5037 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5038 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5039 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5040 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5041 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5042 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5043 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5044 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5045 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5046 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5047 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5048 // channel and move on.
5049 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5050 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5052 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5053 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5054 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5056 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5057 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5058 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5059 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5060 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5061 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5062 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5063 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5068 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5069 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5070 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5071 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5072 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5075 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5076 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5077 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5078 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5079 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5080 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5083 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5084 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5085 // may have already happened for this block).
5086 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5087 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5088 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5089 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5092 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5093 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5094 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5095 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5103 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5104 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5105 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5106 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5108 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5109 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5112 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5114 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5115 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5116 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5117 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5119 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5122 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5125 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5126 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5127 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5128 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5130 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5133 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5134 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5135 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5137 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5138 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5140 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5141 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5142 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5150 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5152 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5153 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5154 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5156 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5157 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5160 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5161 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5162 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5163 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5164 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5165 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5166 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5167 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5168 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5171 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5172 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5173 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5174 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5176 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5177 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5178 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5180 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5181 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5182 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5183 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5185 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5186 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5187 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5188 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5189 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5190 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5191 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5194 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5195 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5197 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5200 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5201 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5202 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5203 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5204 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5205 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5206 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5207 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5208 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5209 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5210 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5211 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5212 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5213 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5214 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5215 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5216 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5222 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5227 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5228 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5230 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5231 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5232 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5233 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5235 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5238 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5240 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5241 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5242 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5243 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5244 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5245 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5247 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5248 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5251 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5252 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5253 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5254 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5255 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5256 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5258 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5259 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5262 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5263 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5264 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5265 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5266 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5272 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5273 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5274 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5275 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5277 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5280 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5284 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5288 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5289 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5293 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5297 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5298 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5301 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5305 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5307 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5312 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5313 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5314 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5316 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5321 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5323 None => return None,
5326 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5328 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5329 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5331 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5332 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5335 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5340 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5342 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5343 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5344 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5345 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5346 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5347 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5348 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5350 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5351 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5352 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5353 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5354 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5355 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5356 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5357 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5358 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5359 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5360 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5361 contents: announcement,
5364 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5368 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5372 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5373 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5374 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5375 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5376 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5377 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5378 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5379 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5381 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5383 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5384 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5385 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5386 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5388 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5389 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5390 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5391 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5394 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5395 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5396 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5397 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5400 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5403 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5404 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5405 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5406 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5407 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5408 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5411 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5413 Err(_) => return None,
5415 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5416 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5421 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5422 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5423 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5424 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5425 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5426 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5427 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5428 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5429 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5430 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5431 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5432 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5433 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5434 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5435 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5436 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5439 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5442 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5443 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5444 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5445 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5446 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5447 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5448 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5449 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5450 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5452 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5453 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5454 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5455 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5456 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5457 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5458 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5459 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5460 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5462 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5463 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5464 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5465 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5466 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5467 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5468 next_funding_txid: None,
5473 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5475 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5476 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5477 /// commitment update.
5479 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5480 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5481 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5482 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5483 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5484 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5485 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5488 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5489 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5490 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5492 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5493 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5498 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5499 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5501 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5503 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5504 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5506 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5507 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5508 /// regenerate them.
5510 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5511 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5513 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5514 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5515 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5516 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5517 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5518 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5519 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5521 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5522 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5524 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5525 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5526 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5529 if amount_msat == 0 {
5530 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5533 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5534 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5535 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5536 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5539 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5540 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5541 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5544 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5545 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5546 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5547 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5548 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5549 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5550 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5551 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5554 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5555 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5556 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5557 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5558 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5559 else { "to peer" });
5561 if need_holding_cell {
5562 force_holding_cell = true;
5565 // Now update local state:
5566 if force_holding_cell {
5567 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5572 onion_routing_packet,
5578 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5579 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5581 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5583 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5588 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5589 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5590 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5594 onion_routing_packet,
5597 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5602 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5603 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5604 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5605 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5607 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5608 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5609 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5611 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5612 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5616 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5617 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5618 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5619 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5620 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5621 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5622 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5625 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5626 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5627 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5628 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5629 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5630 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5633 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5635 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5636 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5637 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5638 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5639 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5641 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5642 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5645 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5646 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5647 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5648 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5649 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5650 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5651 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5652 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5653 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5654 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5655 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5658 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5662 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5663 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5664 where L::Target: Logger
5666 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5667 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5668 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5670 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5672 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5673 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5674 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5675 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5676 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5677 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5678 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5679 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5680 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5681 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5682 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5688 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5691 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5692 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5693 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5694 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5695 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5696 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5698 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5699 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5700 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5702 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5703 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5704 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5707 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5708 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5712 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5713 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5715 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5717 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5718 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5719 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5720 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5722 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5723 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5724 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5725 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5726 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
5727 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5731 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5732 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5736 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5737 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5739 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5744 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5745 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5747 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5748 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5749 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5750 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5751 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5752 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5753 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5754 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5756 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5757 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5758 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5761 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5762 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5763 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5769 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5771 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5772 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5773 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5774 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5775 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5777 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5779 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5785 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5786 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5788 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5789 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5790 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5791 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5792 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
5794 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5795 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5796 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5799 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5800 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5801 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5803 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5804 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5807 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5808 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5810 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5811 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5812 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5815 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5816 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5817 let mut chan_closed = false;
5818 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5822 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5824 None if !chan_closed => {
5825 // use override shutdown script if provided
5826 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5827 Some(script) => script,
5829 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5830 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5831 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5832 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5836 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5837 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5839 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5845 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5846 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5847 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5848 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5849 monitor_update: None,
5850 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5851 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5853 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5854 Some(shutdown_result)
5856 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5859 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5861 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5862 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5863 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5864 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5865 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5866 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5869 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5870 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5872 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5873 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5874 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5877 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5878 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5879 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5880 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5881 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5883 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5884 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5891 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5892 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5894 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
5897 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5898 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5899 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5901 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5902 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5906 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5910 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5911 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5912 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5913 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5916 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5917 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5918 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5919 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5920 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
5921 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5922 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5923 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5925 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5926 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5927 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5928 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5930 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5931 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5933 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5934 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5936 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5937 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5938 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5940 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5941 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5943 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5944 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5945 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5946 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5947 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5950 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5951 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5953 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5954 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5956 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5958 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5960 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5961 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5962 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5963 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5966 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5967 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5969 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5970 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5971 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5972 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5976 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5977 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5978 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5982 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
5983 Ok(script) => script,
5984 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5987 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
5990 context: ChannelContext {
5993 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5994 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5995 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5996 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6001 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6003 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6004 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6005 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
6006 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6008 channel_value_satoshis,
6010 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6012 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6013 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6016 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6017 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6020 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6021 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6022 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6023 pending_update_fee: None,
6024 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6025 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6026 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6027 update_time_counter: 1,
6029 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6031 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6032 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6033 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6034 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6035 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6036 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6038 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6039 signer_pending_funding: false,
6041 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6042 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6043 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6044 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6046 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6047 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6048 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6049 closing_fee_limits: None,
6050 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6052 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6053 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6054 short_channel_id: None,
6055 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6057 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6058 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6059 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6060 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6061 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6062 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6063 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6064 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6065 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6066 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6067 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6068 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6070 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6072 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6073 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6074 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6075 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6076 counterparty_parameters: None,
6077 funding_outpoint: None,
6078 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6080 funding_transaction: None,
6081 is_batch_funding: None,
6083 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6084 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6085 counterparty_node_id,
6087 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6089 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6091 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6092 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6094 announcement_sigs: None,
6096 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6097 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6098 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6099 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6101 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6102 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6104 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6105 outbound_scid_alias,
6107 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6108 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6110 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6111 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6116 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6118 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6122 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6123 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6124 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6125 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6126 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6127 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6128 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6129 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6130 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6131 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6132 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6134 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6135 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6137 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6138 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6139 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6140 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6143 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6144 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6146 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6148 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
6149 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6151 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6152 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6153 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6154 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6155 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6156 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6159 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6160 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6162 let funding_created = self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6163 if funding_created.is_none() {
6164 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6165 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6166 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6170 let channel = Channel {
6171 context: self.context,
6174 Ok((channel, funding_created))
6177 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6178 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6179 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6180 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6181 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6182 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6183 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6184 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6185 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6186 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6189 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6190 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6191 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6192 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6193 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6194 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6200 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6201 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6202 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6203 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6204 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6205 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6207 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6209 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6210 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6211 // We've exhausted our options
6214 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6215 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6218 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6219 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6220 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6221 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6223 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6224 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6225 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6226 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6227 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6228 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6230 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6232 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6233 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6236 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6237 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6238 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6240 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6241 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6244 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6245 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6248 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6249 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6253 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6254 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6255 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6256 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6257 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6258 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6259 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6260 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6261 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6262 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6263 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6264 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6265 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6266 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6267 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6268 first_per_commitment_point,
6269 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6270 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6271 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6272 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6274 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6279 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6280 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6282 // Check sanity of message fields:
6283 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6286 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6289 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6290 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6292 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6293 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6295 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6298 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6299 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6300 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6302 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6303 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6304 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6306 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6307 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6308 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6310 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6311 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6313 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6317 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6318 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6319 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6321 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6322 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6324 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6325 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6327 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6328 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6330 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6333 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6334 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6336 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6337 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6340 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6341 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6342 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6344 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6345 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6347 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6348 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6349 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6351 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6352 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6355 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6356 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6357 &Some(ref script) => {
6358 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6359 if script.len() == 0 {
6362 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6363 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6365 Some(script.clone())
6368 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6370 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6375 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6376 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6377 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6378 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6379 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6381 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6382 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6384 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6387 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6388 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6389 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6390 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6391 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6392 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6395 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6396 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6397 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6400 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6401 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6403 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6404 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6410 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6411 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6412 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6413 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6416 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6417 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6418 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6419 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6420 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6421 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6422 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6423 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6424 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6425 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6426 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6429 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6431 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6432 // support this channel type.
6433 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6434 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6435 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6438 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6439 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6440 // `static_remote_key`.
6441 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6444 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6445 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6446 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6448 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6449 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6451 channel_type.clone()
6453 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6454 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6455 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6460 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6461 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6462 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6463 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6464 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6465 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6466 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6467 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6468 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6471 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6472 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6475 // Check sanity of message fields:
6476 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6477 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6479 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6480 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6482 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6483 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6485 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6486 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6487 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6489 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6490 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6492 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6493 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6495 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6497 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6498 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6499 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6501 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6502 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6504 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6505 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6508 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6509 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6510 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6512 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6513 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6515 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6516 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6518 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6519 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6521 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6522 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6524 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6525 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6527 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6528 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6531 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6533 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6534 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6535 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6539 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6540 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6541 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6542 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6543 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6545 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6546 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6548 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6549 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6550 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6552 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6553 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6556 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6557 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6558 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6559 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6563 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6564 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6565 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6566 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6569 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6570 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6571 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6572 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6576 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6577 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6578 &Some(ref script) => {
6579 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6580 if script.len() == 0 {
6583 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6584 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6586 Some(script.clone())
6589 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6591 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6596 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6597 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6598 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6599 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6603 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6604 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6605 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6609 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6610 Ok(script) => script,
6611 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6614 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6615 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6617 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6620 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6624 context: ChannelContext {
6627 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6628 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6630 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6635 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6637 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6638 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6639 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6640 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6643 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6645 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6646 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6649 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6650 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6651 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6653 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6654 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6655 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6656 pending_update_fee: None,
6657 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6658 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6659 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6660 update_time_counter: 1,
6662 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6664 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6665 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6666 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6667 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6668 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6669 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6671 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6672 signer_pending_funding: false,
6674 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6675 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6676 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6677 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6679 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6680 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6681 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6682 closing_fee_limits: None,
6683 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6685 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6686 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6687 short_channel_id: None,
6688 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6690 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6691 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6692 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6693 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6694 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6695 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6696 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6697 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6698 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6699 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6700 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6701 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6704 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6706 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6707 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6708 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6709 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6710 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6711 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6712 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6714 funding_outpoint: None,
6715 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6717 funding_transaction: None,
6718 is_batch_funding: None,
6720 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6721 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6722 counterparty_node_id,
6724 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6726 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6728 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6729 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6731 announcement_sigs: None,
6733 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6734 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6735 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6736 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6738 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6739 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6741 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6742 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6744 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6745 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6747 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6748 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6753 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6755 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6761 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6762 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6764 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6765 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6766 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6767 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6769 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6770 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6772 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6773 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6776 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6779 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6780 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6781 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6783 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6784 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6785 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6786 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6788 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6789 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6790 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6791 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6792 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6793 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6794 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6795 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6796 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6797 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6798 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6799 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6800 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6801 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6802 first_per_commitment_point,
6803 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6804 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6805 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6807 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6809 next_local_nonce: None,
6813 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6814 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6816 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6818 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6819 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6822 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6823 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6825 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6826 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6827 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6828 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6829 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6830 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6831 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6832 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6833 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6834 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6835 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6837 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
6840 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6841 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6842 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6846 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6847 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6849 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6850 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6851 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6853 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6855 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6856 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6857 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6858 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6861 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6862 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6863 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6864 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
6865 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6867 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6869 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6870 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6871 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6874 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6875 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6876 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6880 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6881 initial_commitment_tx,
6884 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6885 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6888 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6889 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6892 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6894 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6895 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6896 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6897 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6899 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
6901 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6902 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6903 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6904 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6905 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6906 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6907 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6908 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6909 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6910 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6911 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6913 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6915 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6916 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6917 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
6918 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6919 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6920 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6922 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
6923 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
6925 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6926 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6927 let mut channel = Channel {
6928 context: self.context,
6930 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6931 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6933 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
6937 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6938 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6940 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6946 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6947 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6948 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6949 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6950 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6952 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6953 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6954 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6955 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6961 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6962 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6963 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6964 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6965 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6966 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6971 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6972 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6973 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6974 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6976 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6977 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6978 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6979 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6984 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6985 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6986 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6987 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6988 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6989 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6994 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6995 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6996 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6999 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7001 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7002 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7003 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7004 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7005 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7007 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7008 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7009 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7010 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7012 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7013 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
7014 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7016 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7018 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7019 // deserialized from that format.
7020 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7021 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7022 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7024 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7026 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7027 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7028 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7030 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7031 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7032 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7033 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7036 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7037 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7038 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7041 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7042 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7043 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7044 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7046 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7047 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7049 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7051 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7053 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7055 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7058 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7060 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7065 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7066 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7068 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7069 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
7070 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7071 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7072 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7073 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7074 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7076 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7078 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7080 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7083 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7084 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7085 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7088 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7090 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7091 preimages.push(preimage);
7093 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7094 reason.write(writer)?;
7096 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7098 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7099 preimages.push(preimage);
7101 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7102 reason.write(writer)?;
7105 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
7106 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7107 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7109 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7110 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7111 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
7115 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7116 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7117 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
7119 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7120 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7124 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7125 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7126 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7127 source.write(writer)?;
7128 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7130 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
7131 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7132 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7134 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7135 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7137 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7139 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7140 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7142 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7144 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7145 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7150 match self.context.resend_order {
7151 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7152 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7155 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7156 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7157 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7159 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7160 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7161 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7162 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7165 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7166 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7167 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7168 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7169 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7172 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7173 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7174 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7175 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7177 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7178 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7179 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7181 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7183 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7184 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7185 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7186 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7188 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7189 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7190 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7191 // consider the stale state on reload.
7194 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7195 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7196 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7198 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7199 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7200 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7202 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7203 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7205 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7206 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7207 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7209 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7210 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7212 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7215 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7216 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7217 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7219 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7222 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7223 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7225 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7226 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7227 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7229 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7231 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7233 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7235 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7236 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7237 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7238 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7239 htlc.write(writer)?;
7242 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7243 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7244 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7246 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7247 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7249 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7250 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7251 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7252 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7253 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7254 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7255 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7257 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7258 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7259 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7260 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7261 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7263 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7264 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7266 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7267 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7268 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7269 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7271 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7273 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7274 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7275 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7276 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7277 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7278 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7279 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7281 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7282 (2, chan_type, option),
7283 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7284 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7285 (5, self.context.config, required),
7286 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7287 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7288 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7289 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7290 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7291 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7292 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7293 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7294 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7295 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7296 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7297 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7298 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7299 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7300 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7301 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7302 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7303 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7304 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7311 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7312 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7314 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7315 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7317 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7318 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7319 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7321 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7322 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7323 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7324 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7326 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7328 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7329 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7330 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7331 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7332 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7334 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7335 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7338 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7339 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7340 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7342 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7344 let mut keys_data = None;
7346 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7347 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7348 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7349 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7350 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7351 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7352 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7353 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7354 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7355 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7359 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7360 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7361 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7364 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7366 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7367 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7368 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7370 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7372 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7373 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7374 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7375 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7376 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7377 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7378 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7379 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7380 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7381 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7382 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7383 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7384 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7389 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7390 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7391 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7392 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7393 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7394 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7395 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7396 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7397 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7398 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7399 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7400 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7402 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7403 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7406 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7407 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7410 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7411 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7413 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7415 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7419 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7420 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7421 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7422 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7423 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7424 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7425 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7426 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7427 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7428 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7429 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7431 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7432 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7433 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7435 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7436 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7437 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7439 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7443 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7444 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7445 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7446 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7449 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7450 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7451 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7453 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7454 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7455 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7456 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7459 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7460 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7461 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7462 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7465 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7467 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7469 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7470 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7471 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7472 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7474 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7475 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7476 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7477 // consider the stale state on reload.
7478 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7481 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7482 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7483 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7485 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7488 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7489 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7490 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7492 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7493 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7494 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7495 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7497 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7498 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7500 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7501 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7503 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7504 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7505 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7507 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7509 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7510 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7512 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7513 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7516 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7518 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7519 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7520 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7521 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7523 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7526 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7527 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7529 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7531 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7532 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7534 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7535 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7537 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7539 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7540 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7541 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7543 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7544 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7545 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7549 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7550 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7551 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7553 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7559 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7560 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7561 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7562 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7563 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7564 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7565 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7566 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7567 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7568 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7570 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7571 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7572 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7573 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7574 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7575 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7576 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7578 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7579 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7580 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7581 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7583 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7585 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7586 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7588 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7590 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7591 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7592 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7593 (2, channel_type, option),
7594 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7595 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7596 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7597 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7598 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7599 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7600 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7601 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7602 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7603 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7604 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7605 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7606 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7607 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7608 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7609 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7610 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7611 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7612 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7613 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7614 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7615 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7618 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7619 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7620 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7621 // required channel parameters.
7622 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7623 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7624 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7626 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7628 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7629 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7630 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7631 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7634 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7635 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7636 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7638 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7639 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7641 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7642 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7647 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7648 if iter.next().is_some() {
7649 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7653 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7654 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7655 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7656 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7657 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7660 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7661 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7662 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7664 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7665 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7667 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7668 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7669 // separate u64 values.
7670 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7672 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7674 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7675 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7676 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7677 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7679 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7680 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7682 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7683 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7684 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7685 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7686 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7689 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7690 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7694 context: ChannelContext {
7697 config: config.unwrap(),
7701 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7702 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7703 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7706 temporary_channel_id,
7708 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7710 channel_value_satoshis,
7712 latest_monitor_update_id,
7714 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7715 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7718 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7719 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7722 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7723 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7724 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7725 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7729 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7730 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7731 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7732 monitor_pending_forwards,
7733 monitor_pending_failures,
7734 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7736 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7737 signer_pending_funding: false,
7740 holding_cell_update_fee,
7741 next_holder_htlc_id,
7742 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7743 update_time_counter,
7746 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7747 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7748 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7749 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7751 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7752 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7753 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7754 closing_fee_limits: None,
7755 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7757 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7758 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7760 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7762 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7763 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7764 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7765 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7766 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7767 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7768 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7769 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7770 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7773 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7775 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7776 funding_transaction,
7779 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7780 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7781 counterparty_node_id,
7783 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7787 channel_update_status,
7788 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7792 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7793 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7794 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7795 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7797 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7798 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7800 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7801 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7802 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7804 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7805 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7807 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7808 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7810 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7813 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7822 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7823 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
7824 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7825 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7826 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7827 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7828 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
7829 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7830 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7831 use crate::ln::channel::{ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7832 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7833 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7834 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7835 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7836 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7837 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7838 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7839 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7840 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7841 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7842 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7843 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7844 use crate::util::test_utils;
7845 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7846 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7847 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7848 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7849 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7850 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7851 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7852 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7853 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
7854 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
7855 use crate::prelude::*;
7857 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7860 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7861 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7867 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7868 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7869 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7870 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7874 signer: InMemorySigner,
7877 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7878 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7881 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7882 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
7884 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
7886 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7887 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7890 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
7894 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7896 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
7897 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7898 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7899 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7900 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
7903 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7904 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7905 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7906 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7910 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7911 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7912 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7916 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7917 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7918 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
7919 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
7922 let seed = [42; 32];
7923 let network = Network::Testnet;
7924 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7925 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7926 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7929 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7930 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7931 let config = UserConfig::default();
7932 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
7933 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7934 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7936 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7937 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7941 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7942 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7944 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7945 let original_fee = 253;
7946 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7947 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7948 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7949 let seed = [42; 32];
7950 let network = Network::Testnet;
7951 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7953 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7954 let config = UserConfig::default();
7955 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7957 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7958 // same as the old fee.
7959 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7960 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7961 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7965 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7966 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7967 // dust limits are used.
7968 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7969 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7970 let seed = [42; 32];
7971 let network = Network::Testnet;
7972 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7973 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7974 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7976 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7977 // they have different dust limits.
7979 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7980 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7981 let config = UserConfig::default();
7982 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7984 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7985 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7986 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7987 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7988 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7990 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7991 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7992 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7993 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7994 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7996 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7997 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7998 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7999 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8001 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8002 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8003 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8005 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8006 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8008 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8009 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8010 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8012 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8013 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8014 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8015 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8018 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8020 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8021 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8022 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8023 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8024 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8025 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8026 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8027 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8028 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8030 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8033 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8034 // the dust limit check.
8035 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8036 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8037 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8038 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8040 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8041 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8042 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8043 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8044 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8045 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8046 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8050 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8051 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8052 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8053 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8054 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8055 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8056 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8057 let seed = [42; 32];
8058 let network = Network::Testnet;
8059 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8061 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8062 let config = UserConfig::default();
8063 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8065 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8066 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8068 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8069 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8070 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8071 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8072 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8073 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8075 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8076 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8077 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8078 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8079 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8081 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8083 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8084 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8085 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8086 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8087 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8089 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8090 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8091 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8092 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8093 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8097 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8098 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8099 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8100 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8101 let seed = [42; 32];
8102 let network = Network::Testnet;
8103 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8104 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8105 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8107 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8109 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8110 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8111 let config = UserConfig::default();
8112 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8114 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8115 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8116 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8117 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8119 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8120 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8121 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8123 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8124 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8125 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8126 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8128 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8129 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8130 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8132 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8133 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8135 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8136 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8137 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8138 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8139 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8140 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8141 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8143 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8145 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8146 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8147 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8148 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8149 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8153 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8154 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8155 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8156 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8157 let seed = [42; 32];
8158 let network = Network::Testnet;
8159 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8160 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8161 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8163 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8164 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8165 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8166 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8167 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8168 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8169 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8170 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8172 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8173 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8174 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8175 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8176 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8177 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8179 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8180 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8181 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8182 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8184 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8186 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8187 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8188 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8189 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8190 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8191 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8193 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8194 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8195 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8196 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8198 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8199 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8200 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8201 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8202 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8204 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8205 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8207 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8208 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8209 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8211 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8212 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8213 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8214 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8215 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8217 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8218 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8220 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8221 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8222 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8226 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8228 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8229 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8230 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8232 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8233 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8234 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8235 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8237 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8238 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8239 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8241 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8243 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8244 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8247 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8248 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8249 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8250 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8251 let seed = [42; 32];
8252 let network = Network::Testnet;
8253 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8254 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8255 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8258 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8259 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8260 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8262 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8263 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8265 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8266 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8267 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8269 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8270 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8272 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8274 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8275 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8277 // Channel Negotiations failed
8278 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8279 assert!(result.is_err());
8284 fn channel_update() {
8285 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8286 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8287 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8288 let seed = [42; 32];
8289 let network = Network::Testnet;
8290 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8291 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8292 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8294 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8295 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8296 let config = UserConfig::default();
8297 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8299 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8300 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8301 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8302 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8303 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8305 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8306 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8307 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8308 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8309 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8311 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8312 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8313 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8314 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8316 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8317 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8318 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8320 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8321 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8323 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8324 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8325 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8327 short_channel_id: 0,
8330 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8331 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8332 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8334 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8335 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8337 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8339 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8341 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8342 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8343 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8344 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8346 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8347 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8348 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8350 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8353 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8356 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8358 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8359 use bitcoin::sighash;
8360 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8361 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
8362 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8363 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8364 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8365 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
8366 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8367 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8368 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
8369 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8370 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8371 use crate::sync::Arc;
8372 use core::str::FromStr;
8373 use hex::DisplayHex;
8375 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8376 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8377 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8378 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8380 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8382 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8383 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8384 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8385 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8386 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8388 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8389 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8395 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8396 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8397 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8399 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8400 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8401 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8402 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8403 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8404 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8406 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8408 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8409 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8410 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
8411 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8412 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
8413 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
8415 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8416 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8417 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8418 selected_contest_delay: 144
8420 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8421 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8423 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8424 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8426 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8427 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8429 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
8430 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8432 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8433 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8434 // build_commitment_transaction.
8435 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8436 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8437 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8438 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8439 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8441 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8442 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8443 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8444 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8448 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8449 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8450 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8451 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8455 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8456 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8457 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8459 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8460 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8462 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8463 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8465 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8467 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8468 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8469 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8470 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8471 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8472 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
8473 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8475 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8476 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8477 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8478 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8480 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8481 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8482 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8484 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8486 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8487 commitment_tx.clone(),
8488 counterparty_signature,
8489 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8490 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8491 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8493 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8494 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8496 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8497 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8498 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8500 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8501 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8504 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8505 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8507 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8508 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8509 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8510 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8511 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8512 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8513 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8514 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8516 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8519 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
8520 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8521 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8525 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8528 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8529 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8530 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8531 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8532 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8533 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8535 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8536 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8537 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8538 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8540 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8541 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8542 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8543 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8544 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8546 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8547 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8548 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8549 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8550 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
8551 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8553 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8557 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8558 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8559 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8560 "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", {});
8562 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8563 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8565 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8566 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8567 "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", {});
8569 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8570 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8571 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8572 "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", {});
8574 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8575 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8577 amount_msat: 1000000,
8579 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8580 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8582 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8585 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8586 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8588 amount_msat: 2000000,
8590 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8591 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8593 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8596 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8597 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8599 amount_msat: 2000000,
8601 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8602 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8603 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8604 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8606 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8609 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8610 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8612 amount_msat: 3000000,
8614 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8615 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8616 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8617 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8619 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8622 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8623 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8625 amount_msat: 4000000,
8627 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8628 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8630 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8634 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8635 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8636 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8638 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8639 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8640 "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", {
8643 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8644 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8645 "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" },
8648 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8649 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8650 "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" },
8653 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8654 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8655 "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" },
8658 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8659 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8660 "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" },
8663 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8664 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8665 "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" }
8668 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8669 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8670 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8672 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8673 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8674 "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", {
8677 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8678 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8679 "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" },
8682 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8683 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8684 "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" },
8687 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8688 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8689 "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" },
8692 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8693 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8694 "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" },
8697 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8698 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8699 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8702 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8703 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8704 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8706 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8707 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8708 "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", {
8711 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8712 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8713 "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" },
8716 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8717 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8718 "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" },
8721 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8722 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8723 "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" },
8726 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8727 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8728 "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" }
8731 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8732 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8733 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8734 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8736 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8737 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8738 "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", {
8741 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8742 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8743 "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" },
8746 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8747 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8748 "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" },
8751 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8752 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8753 "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" },
8756 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8757 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8758 "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" }
8761 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8762 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8763 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8764 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8766 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8767 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8768 "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", {
8771 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8772 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8773 "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" },
8776 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8777 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8778 "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" },
8781 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8782 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8783 "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" },
8786 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8787 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8788 "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" }
8791 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8792 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8793 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8795 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8796 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8797 "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", {
8800 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8801 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8802 "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" },
8805 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8806 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8807 "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" },
8810 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8811 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8812 "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" }
8815 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8816 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8817 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8819 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8820 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8821 "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", {
8824 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8825 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8826 "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" },
8829 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8830 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8831 "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" },
8834 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8835 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8836 "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" }
8839 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8840 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8841 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8843 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8844 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8845 "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", {
8848 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8849 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8850 "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" },
8853 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8854 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8855 "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" }
8858 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8859 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8860 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8861 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8862 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8863 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8865 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8866 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8867 "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", {
8870 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8871 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8872 "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" },
8875 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8876 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8877 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc03000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd727183483045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8880 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8881 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8882 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8883 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8884 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8886 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8887 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8888 "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", {
8891 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8892 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8893 "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" },
8896 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8897 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8898 "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" }
8901 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8902 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8903 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8905 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8906 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8907 "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", {
8910 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8911 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8912 "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" }
8915 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8916 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8917 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8918 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8919 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8921 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8922 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8923 "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", {
8926 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8927 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8928 "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" }
8931 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8932 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8933 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8934 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8935 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8937 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8938 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8939 "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", {
8942 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8943 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8944 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8947 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8948 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8949 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8950 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8952 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8953 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8954 "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", {});
8956 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8957 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8958 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8959 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8960 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8962 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8963 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8964 "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", {});
8966 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8967 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8968 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8969 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8970 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8972 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8973 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8974 "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", {});
8976 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8977 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8978 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8980 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8981 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8982 "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", {});
8984 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8985 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8986 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8987 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8988 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8990 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8991 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8992 "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", {});
8994 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8995 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8996 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8997 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8998 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9000 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9001 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9002 "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", {});
9004 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9005 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9006 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9007 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9008 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9009 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9011 amount_msat: 2000000,
9013 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9014 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9016 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9019 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9020 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9021 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9023 amount_msat: 5000001,
9025 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9026 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9027 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9028 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9030 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9033 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9034 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9036 amount_msat: 5000000,
9038 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9039 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9040 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9041 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9043 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9047 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9048 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9049 "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", {
9052 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9053 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9054 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec000000000000000000011f070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce501473044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
9056 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9057 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9058 "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" },
9060 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9061 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9062 "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" }
9065 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9066 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9067 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9068 "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", {
9071 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9072 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9073 "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" },
9075 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9076 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9077 "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" },
9079 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9080 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9081 "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" }
9086 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9087 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9089 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9090 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9091 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9092 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9094 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9095 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9096 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9098 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9099 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9101 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9102 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9104 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9105 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9106 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9110 fn test_key_derivation() {
9111 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9112 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9114 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9115 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9117 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9118 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9120 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9121 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9123 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9124 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9126 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9127 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9129 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9130 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9134 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9135 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9136 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9137 let seed = [42; 32];
9138 let network = Network::Testnet;
9139 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9140 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9142 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9143 let config = UserConfig::default();
9144 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9145 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9147 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9148 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9150 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9151 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9152 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9153 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9154 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9155 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9156 assert!(res.is_ok());
9160 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9161 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9162 // resulting `channel_type`.
9163 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9164 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9165 let network = Network::Testnet;
9166 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9167 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9169 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9170 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9172 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9173 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9175 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9176 // need to signal it.
9177 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9178 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9179 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9180 &config, 0, 42, None
9182 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9184 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9185 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9186 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9188 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9189 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9190 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9194 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9195 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9196 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9197 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9198 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9201 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9202 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9206 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9207 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9208 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9209 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9210 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9211 let network = Network::Testnet;
9212 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9213 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9215 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9216 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9218 let config = UserConfig::default();
9220 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9221 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9222 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9223 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9224 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9226 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9227 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9228 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9232 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9233 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9234 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9236 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9237 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9238 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9239 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9240 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9241 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9243 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9247 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9248 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9250 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9251 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9252 let network = Network::Testnet;
9253 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9254 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9256 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9257 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9259 let config = UserConfig::default();
9261 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9262 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9263 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9264 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9265 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9266 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9267 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9268 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9270 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9271 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9272 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9273 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9274 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9275 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9279 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9280 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9282 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9283 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9284 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9285 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9287 assert!(res.is_err());
9289 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9290 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9291 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9293 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9294 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9295 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9298 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9300 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9301 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9302 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9303 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9306 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9307 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9309 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9310 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9312 assert!(res.is_err());
9316 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9317 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9318 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9319 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9320 let seed = [42; 32];
9321 let network = Network::Testnet;
9322 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9323 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9324 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9326 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9327 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9328 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9329 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9331 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9332 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9333 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9338 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9348 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9349 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9350 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9355 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9356 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9362 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9365 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9366 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9367 &accept_channel_msg,
9368 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9369 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9372 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9373 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9374 let tx = Transaction {
9376 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9380 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9383 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9386 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9387 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9392 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9393 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9394 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9398 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9399 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9407 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9408 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9409 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9410 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(),
9415 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9422 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9423 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9424 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9425 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9427 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9428 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9429 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9432 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9433 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9434 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9442 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9443 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9444 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9445 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9448 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9449 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9451 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9452 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9453 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9455 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());