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Persist scorer upon update based on event handling
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channel.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
14
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
19
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
24
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
27 use crate::ln::msgs;
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
46
47 use crate::io;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
50 use core::ops::Deref;
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54
55 #[cfg(test)]
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 }
66
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68         /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69         pub balance_msat: u64,
70         /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72         /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74         /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 }
77
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
79 enum FeeUpdateState {
80         // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
81         RemoteAnnounced,
82         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83         // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84         // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85         // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86         // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87         // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
88
89         // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
90         Outbound,
91 }
92
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
97 }
98
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
115         ///
116         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
118         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
120         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
123         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
130         ///
131         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
139         Committed,
140         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
142         /// we'll drop it.
143         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147         /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148         /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
151 }
152
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
154         htlc_id: u64,
155         amount_msat: u64,
156         cltv_expiry: u32,
157         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158         state: InboundHTLCState,
159 }
160
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
168         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
172         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
175         Committed,
176         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178         RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
191 }
192
193 #[derive(Clone)]
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195         /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196         Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197         Failure(HTLCFailReason),
198 }
199
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201         fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
202                 match o {
203                         None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204                         Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
205                 }
206         }
207 }
208
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210         fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
211                 match self {
212                         OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213                         OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
214                 }
215         }
216 }
217
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
219         htlc_id: u64,
220         amount_msat: u64,
221         cltv_expiry: u32,
222         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223         state: OutboundHTLCState,
224         source: HTLCSource,
225 }
226
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
230                 // always outbound
231                 amount_msat: u64,
232                 cltv_expiry: u32,
233                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234                 source: HTLCSource,
235                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
236         },
237         ClaimHTLC {
238                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
239                 htlc_id: u64,
240         },
241         FailHTLC {
242                 htlc_id: u64,
243                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244         },
245 }
246
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
254 enum ChannelState {
255         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
262         FundingCreated = 4,
263         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
266         FundingSent = 8,
267         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268         /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269         TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271         /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272         OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
273         ChannelReady = 64,
274         /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
276         /// dance.
277         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278         /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279         /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280         /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281         MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
286         /// later.
287         /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289         /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293         /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
299 }
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
302
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
304
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312         /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
313         Enabled,
314         /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
315         DisabledStaged(u8),
316         /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
317         EnabledStaged(u8),
318         /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
319         Disabled,
320 }
321
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
323 #[derive(PartialEq)]
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325         /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326         /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
327         NotSent,
328         /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329         /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
330         MessageSent,
331         /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332         /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333         /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334         /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335         /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
336         Committed,
337         /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338         /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
339         PeerReceived,
340 }
341
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
343 enum HTLCInitiator {
344         LocalOffered,
345         RemoteOffered,
346 }
347
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
349 struct HTLCStats {
350         pending_htlcs: u32,
351         pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352         on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353         on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354         holding_cell_msat: u64,
355         on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
356 }
357
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360         tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361         feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362         total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363         num_nondust_htlcs: usize,  // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364         htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365         local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366         remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367         preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
368 }
369
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
372         amount_msat: u64,
373         origin: HTLCInitiator,
374 }
375
376 impl HTLCCandidate {
377         fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
378                 Self {
379                         amount_msat,
380                         origin,
381                 }
382         }
383 }
384
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
386 /// description
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
388         NewClaim {
389                 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390                 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391                 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
392         },
393         DuplicateClaim {},
394 }
395
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398         /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399         /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400         /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
401         NewClaim {
402                 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403                 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404                 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405                 htlc_value_msat: u64,
406         },
407         /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408         /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
409         DuplicateClaim {},
410 }
411
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414         pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415         pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416         pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417         pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418         pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419         pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420         pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421         pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422         pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
423 }
424
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427         pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428         pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429         pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430         pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431         pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432         pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
433 }
434
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
450
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
455
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
460 /// reserve.
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
466
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
471
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
475 ///
476 ///   * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 ///   * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 ///      for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 ///   * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
481
482 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
483 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
484 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
485 // inbound channel.
486 //
487 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
488 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
489 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
490         config: LegacyChannelConfig,
491
492         // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
493         // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
494         // have elapsed since the update occurred.
495         prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
496
497         inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
498
499         user_id: u128,
500
501         channel_id: [u8; 32],
502         temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
503         channel_state: u32,
504
505         // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
506         // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
507         // next connect.
508         // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
509         // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
510         // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
511         // many tests.
512         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
513         pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
514         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
515         announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
516
517         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
518         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
519
520         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
521
522         holder_signer: Signer,
523         shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
524         destination_script: Script,
525
526         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
527         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
528         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
529
530         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
531         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
532         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
533         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
534         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
535         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
536
537         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
538         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
539         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
540         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
541         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
542         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
543         /// send it first.
544         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
545
546         monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
547         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
548         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
549
550         // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
551         // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
552         // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
553         // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
554         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
555         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
556         monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
557
558         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
559         //
560         // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
561         // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
562         // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
563         // HTLCs with similar state.
564         pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
565         // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
566         // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
567         // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
568         // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
569         // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
570         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
571         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
572         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
573         feerate_per_kw: u32,
574
575         /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
576         /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
577         /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
578         /// time.
579         update_time_counter: u32,
580
581         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
582         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
583         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
584         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
585         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
586         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
587
588         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
589         target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
590
591         /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
592         /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
593         /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
594         pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
595
596         /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
597         /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
598         #[cfg(test)]
599         pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
600         #[cfg(not(test))]
601         closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
602
603         /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
604         /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
605         /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
606         /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
607         /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
608         /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
609         ///
610         /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
611         /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
612         /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
613         /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
614         inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
615
616         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
617         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
618         funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
619         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
620         /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
621         /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
622         /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
623         channel_creation_height: u32,
624
625         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
626
627         #[cfg(test)]
628         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
629         #[cfg(not(test))]
630         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
631
632         #[cfg(test)]
633         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
634         #[cfg(not(test))]
635         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
636
637         #[cfg(test)]
638         pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
639         #[cfg(not(test))]
640         holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
641
642         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
643         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
644
645         #[cfg(test)]
646         pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
647         #[cfg(not(test))]
648         holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
649
650         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
651         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
652         #[cfg(test)]
653         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
654         #[cfg(not(test))]
655         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
656         holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
657         minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
658
659         counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
660
661         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
662         funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
663
664         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
665         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
666         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
667
668         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
669
670         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
671
672         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
673         /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
674         /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
675         /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
676         /// to DoS us.
677         /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
678         /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
679         closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
680
681         /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
682         /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
683         announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
684
685         // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
686         // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
687         // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
688         // `build_commitment_transaction`.
689         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
690         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
691         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
692         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
693
694         /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
695         /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
696         /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
697         /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
698         /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
699         ///
700         /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
701         pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
702
703         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
704         // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
705         // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
706         // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
707         // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
708         // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
709         // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
710         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
711
712         /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
713         channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
714
715         // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
716         // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
717         // the channel's funding UTXO.
718         //
719         // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
720         // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
721         // associated channel mapping.
722         //
723         // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
724         // to store all of them.
725         latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
726
727         // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
728         // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
729         // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
730         // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
731         outbound_scid_alias: u64,
732
733         // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
734         channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
735
736         // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
737         channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
738
739         /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
740         /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
741         channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
742
743         /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
744         /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
745         /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
746         /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
747         pending_monitor_updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
748 }
749
750 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
751 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
752         fee: u64,
753         total_pending_htlcs: usize,
754         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
755         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
756         feerate: u32,
757 }
758
759 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
760
761 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
762         const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
763         const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
764         if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
765 }
766
767 #[cfg(not(test))]
768 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
769 #[cfg(test)]
770 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
771
772 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
773
774 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
775 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
776 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
777 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
778 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
779
780 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
781 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
782 /// It's 2^24 - 1.
783 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
784
785 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
786 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
787
788 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
789 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
790 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
791 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
792 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
793 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
794
795 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
796 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
797
798 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
799 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
800 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
801 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
802 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
803 /// standard.
804 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
805 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
806
807 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
808 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
809
810 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
811 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
812 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
813 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
814         Ignore(String),
815         Warn(String),
816         Close(String),
817 }
818
819 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
820         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
821                 match self {
822                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
823                         &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
824                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
825                 }
826         }
827 }
828
829 macro_rules! secp_check {
830         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
831                 match $res {
832                         Ok(thing) => thing,
833                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
834                 }
835         };
836 }
837
838 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
839         /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
840         /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
841         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
842         ///
843         /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
844         ///
845         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
846         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
847                 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
848                         1
849                 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
850                         100
851                 } else {
852                         config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
853                 };
854                 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
855         }
856
857         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
858         /// required by us according to the configured or default
859         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
860         ///
861         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
862         ///
863         /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
864         /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
865         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
866                 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
867                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
868         }
869
870         /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
871         /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
872         /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
873         /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
874         pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
875                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
876                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
877         }
878
879         pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
880                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
881         }
882
883         fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
884                 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
885                 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
886                 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
887                 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
888                 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
889                 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
890                         config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
891                         their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
892                         ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
893                 }
894
895                 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
896                 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
897                 // `only_static_remotekey`.
898                 #[cfg(anchors)]
899                 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
900                         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
901                                 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
902                                 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
903                         }
904                 }
905
906                 ret
907         }
908
909         /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
910         /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
911         /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
912         pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
913                 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
914                 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
915                         // We've exhausted our options
916                         return Err(());
917                 }
918                 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
919                 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
920                 // accepted one.
921                 //
922                 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
923                 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
924                 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
925                 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
926                 // whatever reason.
927                 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
928                         self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
929                         assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
930                         self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
931                 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
932                         self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
933                 } else {
934                         self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
935                 }
936                 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
937         }
938
939         // Constructors:
940         pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
941                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
942                 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
943                 outbound_scid_alias: u64
944         ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
945         where ES::Target: EntropySource,
946               SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
947               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
948         {
949                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
950                 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
951                 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
952                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
953
954                 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
955                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
956                 }
957                 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
958                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
959                 }
960                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
961                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
962                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
963                 }
964                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
965                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
966                 }
967                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
968                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
969                         // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
970                         // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
971                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel  reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
972                 }
973
974                 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
975                 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
976
977                 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
978
979                 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
980                 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
981                 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
982                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
983                 }
984
985                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
986                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
987
988                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
989                         Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
990                 } else { None };
991
992                 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
993                         if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
994                                 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
995                         }
996                 }
997
998                 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
999
1000                 Ok(Channel {
1001                         user_id,
1002
1003                         config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1004                                 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1005                                 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1006                                 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1007                         },
1008
1009                         prev_config: None,
1010
1011                         inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1012
1013                         channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1014                         temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1015                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1016                         announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1017                         secp_ctx,
1018                         channel_value_satoshis,
1019
1020                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1021
1022                         holder_signer,
1023                         shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1024                         destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1025
1026                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1027                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1028                         value_to_self_msat,
1029
1030                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1031                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1032                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1033                         pending_update_fee: None,
1034                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1035                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1036                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1037                         update_time_counter: 1,
1038
1039                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1040
1041                         monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1042                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1043                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1044                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1045                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1046                         monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1047
1048                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1049                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1050                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1051                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1052
1053                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1054                         pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1055                         closing_fee_limits: None,
1056                         target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1057
1058                         inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1059
1060                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1061                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1062                         short_channel_id: None,
1063                         channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1064
1065                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1066                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1067                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1068                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1069                         holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1070                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1071                         holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1072                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1073                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1074                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1075                         holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1076                         minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1077
1078                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1079
1080                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1081                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1082                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1083                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1084                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
1085                                 funding_outpoint: None,
1086                                 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1087                                 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1088                         },
1089                         funding_transaction: None,
1090
1091                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1092                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1093                         counterparty_node_id,
1094
1095                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1096
1097                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1098
1099                         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1100                         closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1101
1102                         announcement_sigs: None,
1103
1104                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1105                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1106                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1107                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1108
1109                         workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1110
1111                         latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1112                         outbound_scid_alias,
1113
1114                         channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1115                         channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1116
1117                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1118                         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1119
1120                         channel_type,
1121                         channel_keys_id,
1122
1123                         pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1124                 })
1125         }
1126
1127         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1128                 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1129                 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1130         {
1131                 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1132                 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1133                 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1134                 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1135                 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1136                         fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1137                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1138                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1139                 }
1140                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1141                 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1142                 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1143                 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1144                 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1145                 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1146                         if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1147                                 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1148                                         log_warn!(logger,
1149                                                 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1150                                                 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1151                                         return Ok(());
1152                                 }
1153                         }
1154                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1155                 }
1156                 Ok(())
1157         }
1158
1159         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1160         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1161         pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1162                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1163                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1164                 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1165                 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1166         ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1167                 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1168                           SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1169                           F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1170                           L::Target: Logger,
1171         {
1172                 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1173
1174                 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1175                 // support this channel type.
1176                 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1177                         if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1178                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1179                         }
1180
1181                         // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1182                         // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1183                         // `static_remote_key`.
1184                         if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1185                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1186                         }
1187                         // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1188                         if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1189                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1190                         }
1191                         if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1192                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1193                         }
1194                         channel_type.clone()
1195                 } else {
1196                         let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1197                         if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1198                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1199                         }
1200                         channel_type
1201                 };
1202                 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1203
1204                 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1205                 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1206                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1207                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1208                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1209                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1210                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1211                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1212                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1213                 };
1214
1215                 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1216                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1217                 }
1218
1219                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1220                 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1221                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1222                 }
1223                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1224                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1225                 }
1226                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1227                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1228                 }
1229                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1230                 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1231                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1232                 }
1233                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1234                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1235                 }
1236                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1237                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1238                 }
1239                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1240
1241                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1242                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1243                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1244                 }
1245                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1246                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1247                 }
1248                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1249                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1250                 }
1251
1252                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1253                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1254                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1255                 }
1256                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1257                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1258                 }
1259                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1260                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1261                 }
1262                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1263                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1264                 }
1265                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1266                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1267                 }
1268                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1269                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1270                 }
1271                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis >  MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1272                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1273                 }
1274
1275                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1276
1277                 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1278                         if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1279                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1280                         }
1281                 }
1282
1283                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1284                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1285                         // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1286                         // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1287                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1288                 }
1289                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1290                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1291                 }
1292                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1293                         log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1294                                 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1295                 }
1296                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1297                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1298                 }
1299
1300                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1301                 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1302                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1303                 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1304                 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1305                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1306                 }
1307
1308                 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1309                 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1310                 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1311                 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1312                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1313                 }
1314
1315                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1316                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1317                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1318                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1319                                         if script.len() == 0 {
1320                                                 None
1321                                         } else {
1322                                                 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1323                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1324                                                 }
1325                                                 Some(script.clone())
1326                                         }
1327                                 },
1328                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1329                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1330                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1331                                 }
1332                         }
1333                 } else { None };
1334
1335                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1336                         Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1337                 } else { None };
1338
1339                 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1340                         if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1341                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1342                         }
1343                 }
1344
1345                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1346                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1347
1348                 let chan = Channel {
1349                         user_id,
1350
1351                         config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1352                                 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1353                                 announced_channel,
1354                                 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1355                         },
1356
1357                         prev_config: None,
1358
1359                         inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1360
1361                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1362                         temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1363                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1364                         announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1365                         secp_ctx,
1366
1367                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1368
1369                         holder_signer,
1370                         shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1371                         destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1372
1373                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1374                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1375                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1376
1377                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1378                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1379                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1380                         pending_update_fee: None,
1381                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1382                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1383                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1384                         update_time_counter: 1,
1385
1386                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1387
1388                         monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1389                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1390                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1391                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1392                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1393                         monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1394
1395                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1396                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1397                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1398                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1399
1400                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1401                         pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1402                         closing_fee_limits: None,
1403                         target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1404
1405                         inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1406
1407                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1408                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1409                         short_channel_id: None,
1410                         channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1411
1412                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1413                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1414                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1415                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1416                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1417                         holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1418                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1419                         holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1420                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1421                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1422                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1423                         holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1424                         minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1425
1426                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1427
1428                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1429                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1430                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1431                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1432                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1433                                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1434                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1435                                 }),
1436                                 funding_outpoint: None,
1437                                 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1438                                 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1439                         },
1440                         funding_transaction: None,
1441
1442                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1443                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1444                         counterparty_node_id,
1445
1446                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1447
1448                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1449
1450                         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1451                         closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1452
1453                         announcement_sigs: None,
1454
1455                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1456                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1457                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1458                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1459
1460                         workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1461
1462                         latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1463                         outbound_scid_alias,
1464
1465                         channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1466                         channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1467
1468                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1469                         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1470
1471                         channel_type,
1472                         channel_keys_id,
1473
1474                         pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1475                 };
1476
1477                 Ok(chan)
1478         }
1479
1480         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1481         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1482         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1483         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1484         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1485         /// an HTLC to a).
1486         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1487         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1488         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1489         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1490         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1491         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1492         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1493         #[inline]
1494         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1495                 where L::Target: Logger
1496         {
1497                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1498                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1499                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1500
1501                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1502                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1503                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1504                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1505
1506                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1507                 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1508                         if match update_state {
1509                                 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1510                                 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1511                                 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1512                                 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1513                                 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound());  generated_by_local },
1514                         } {
1515                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1516                         }
1517                 }
1518
1519                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1520                         commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1521                         get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1522                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1523
1524                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1525                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1526                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1527                                         offered: $offered,
1528                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1529                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1530                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1531                                         transaction_output_index: None
1532                                 }
1533                         }
1534                 }
1535
1536                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1537                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1538                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1539                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1540                                         let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1541                                                 0
1542                                         } else {
1543                                                 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1544                                         };
1545                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1546                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1547                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1548                                         } else {
1549                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1550                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1551                                         }
1552                                 } else {
1553                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1554                                         let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1555                                                 0
1556                                         } else {
1557                                                 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1558                                         };
1559                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1560                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1561                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1562                                         } else {
1563                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1564                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1565                                         }
1566                                 }
1567                         }
1568                 }
1569
1570                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1571                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1572                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1573                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1574                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1575                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1576                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1577                         };
1578
1579                         if include {
1580                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1581                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1582                         } else {
1583                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1584                                 match &htlc.state {
1585                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1586                                                 if generated_by_local {
1587                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1588                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1589                                                         }
1590                                                 }
1591                                         },
1592                                         _ => {},
1593                                 }
1594                         }
1595                 }
1596
1597                 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1598
1599                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1600                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1601                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1602                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1603                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1604                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1605                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1606                         };
1607
1608                         let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1609                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1610                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1611                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1612                                 _ => None,
1613                         };
1614
1615                         if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1616                                 preimages.push(preimage);
1617                         }
1618
1619                         if include {
1620                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1621                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1622                         } else {
1623                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1624                                 match htlc.state {
1625                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1626                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1627                                         },
1628                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1629                                                 if !generated_by_local {
1630                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1631                                                 }
1632                                         },
1633                                         _ => {},
1634                                 }
1635                         }
1636                 }
1637
1638                 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1639                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1640                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1641                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1642                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1643                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1644                 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1645                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1646
1647                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1648                 {
1649                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1650                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1651                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1652                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1653                         } else {
1654                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1655                         };
1656                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1657                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1658                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1659                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1660                 }
1661
1662                 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1663                 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1664                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1665                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1666                 } else {
1667                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1668                 };
1669
1670                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1671                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1672                 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1673                         (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1674                 } else {
1675                         (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1676                 };
1677
1678                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1679                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1680                 } else {
1681                         value_to_a = 0;
1682                 }
1683
1684                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1685                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1686                 } else {
1687                         value_to_b = 0;
1688                 }
1689
1690                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1691
1692                 let channel_parameters =
1693                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1694                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1695                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1696                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
1697                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
1698                                                                              self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1699                                                                              funding_pubkey_a,
1700                                                                              funding_pubkey_b,
1701                                                                              keys.clone(),
1702                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
1703                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1704                                                                              &channel_parameters
1705                 );
1706                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1707                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1708                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1709                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1710
1711                 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1712                 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1713                 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1714
1715                 CommitmentStats {
1716                         tx,
1717                         feerate_per_kw,
1718                         total_fee_sat,
1719                         num_nondust_htlcs,
1720                         htlcs_included,
1721                         local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1722                         remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1723                         preimages
1724                 }
1725         }
1726
1727         #[inline]
1728         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1729                 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1730                 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1731                 // outside of those situations will fail.
1732                 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1733         }
1734
1735         #[inline]
1736         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1737                 let mut ret =
1738                 (4 +                                           // version
1739                  1 +                                           // input count
1740                  36 +                                          // prevout
1741                  1 +                                           // script length (0)
1742                  4 +                                           // sequence
1743                  1 +                                           // output count
1744                  4                                             // lock time
1745                  )*4 +                                         // * 4 for non-witness parts
1746                 2 +                                            // witness marker and flag
1747                 1 +                                            // witness element count
1748                 4 +                                            // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1749                 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1750                 2*(1 + 71);                                    // two signatures + sighash type flags
1751                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1752                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1753                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1754                 }
1755                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1756                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1757                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1758                 }
1759                 ret
1760         }
1761
1762         #[inline]
1763         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1764                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1765                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1766                 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1767
1768                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1769                 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1770                 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1771
1772                 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1773                         assert!(self.is_outbound());
1774                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1775                 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1776                         assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1777                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1778                 }
1779
1780                 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1781                         value_to_counterparty = 0;
1782                 }
1783
1784                 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1785                         value_to_holder = 0;
1786                 }
1787
1788                 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1789                 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1790                 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1791                 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1792
1793                 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1794                 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1795         }
1796
1797         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1798                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1799         }
1800
1801         #[inline]
1802         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1803         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1804         /// our counterparty!)
1805         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1806         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1807         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1808                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1809                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1810                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1811                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1812
1813                 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1814         }
1815
1816         #[inline]
1817         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1818         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1819         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1820         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1821                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1822                 //may see payments to it!
1823                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1824                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1825                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1826
1827                 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1828         }
1829
1830         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1831         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1832         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1833         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1834                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1835         }
1836
1837         /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1838         /// entirely.
1839         ///
1840         /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1841         /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1842         ///
1843         /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1844         /// disconnected).
1845         pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1846                 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1847         where L::Target: Logger {
1848                 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1849                 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1850                 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1851                 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1852                 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1853                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1854                 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1855                         assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1856                 }
1857         }
1858
1859         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1860                 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1861                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1862                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1863                 // either.
1864                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1865                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1866                 }
1867                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1868
1869                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1870
1871                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1872                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1873                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1874
1875                 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1876                 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1877                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1878                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1879                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1880                                 match htlc.state {
1881                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1882                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1883                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1884                                                 } else {
1885                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1886                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1887                                                 }
1888                                                 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1889                                         },
1890                                         _ => {
1891                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1892                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1893                                         }
1894                                 }
1895                                 pending_idx = idx;
1896                                 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1897                                 break;
1898                         }
1899                 }
1900                 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1901                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1902                         // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1903                         // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1904                         debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1905                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1906                 }
1907
1908                 // Now update local state:
1909                 //
1910                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1911                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1912                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1913                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1914                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1915                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1916                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1917                         }],
1918                 };
1919
1920                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1921                         // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1922                         // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1923                         // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1924                         // do not not get into this branch.
1925                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1926                                 match pending_update {
1927                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1928                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1929                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1930                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1931                                                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1932                                                         debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1933                                                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1934                                                 }
1935                                         },
1936                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1937                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1938                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1939                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1940                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1941                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1942                                                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1943                                                 }
1944                                         },
1945                                         _ => {}
1946                                 }
1947                         }
1948                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1949                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1950                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1951                         });
1952                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1953                         self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1954                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1955                 }
1956                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1957                 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1958
1959                 {
1960                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1961                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1962                         } else {
1963                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1964                                 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1965                         }
1966                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1967                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1968                 }
1969
1970                 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1971                         monitor_update,
1972                         htlc_value_msat,
1973                         msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1974                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1975                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1976                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1977                         }),
1978                 }
1979         }
1980
1981         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1982                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1983                         UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(_) } => {
1984                                 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
1985                                 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1986                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1987                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1988                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1989                                 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1990                                 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1991                                 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1992                                         monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1993                                         htlc_value_msat,
1994                                 }
1995                         },
1996                         UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } => {
1997                                 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1998                                 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1999                                 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2000                                         monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
2001                                         htlc_value_msat,
2002                                 }
2003                         }
2004                         UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2005                 }
2006         }
2007
2008         /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2009         /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2010         /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2011         /// before we fail backwards.
2012         ///
2013         /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2014         /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2015         /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2016         pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2017         -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2018                 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2019                         .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2020         }
2021
2022         /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2023         /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2024         /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2025         /// before we fail backwards.
2026         ///
2027         /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2028         /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2029         /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2030         fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2031         -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2032                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2033                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2034                 }
2035                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2036
2037                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2038                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2039                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2040
2041                 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2042                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2043                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2044                                 match htlc.state {
2045                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2046                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2047                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2048                                                 } else {
2049                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2050                                                 }
2051                                                 return Ok(None);
2052                                         },
2053                                         _ => {
2054                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2055                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2056                                         }
2057                                 }
2058                                 pending_idx = idx;
2059                         }
2060                 }
2061                 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2062                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2063                         // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2064                         // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2065                         debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2066                         return Ok(None);
2067                 }
2068
2069                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2070                         debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2071                         force_holding_cell = true;
2072                 }
2073
2074                 // Now update local state:
2075                 if force_holding_cell {
2076                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2077                                 match pending_update {
2078                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2079                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2080                                                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2081                                                         debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2082                                                         return Ok(None);
2083                                                 }
2084                                         },
2085                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2086                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2087                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2088                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2089                                                 }
2090                                         },
2091                                         _ => {}
2092                                 }
2093                         }
2094                         log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2095                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2096                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2097                                 err_packet,
2098                         });
2099                         return Ok(None);
2100                 }
2101
2102                 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2103                 {
2104                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2105                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2106                 }
2107
2108                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2109                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2110                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2111                         reason: err_packet
2112                 }))
2113         }
2114
2115         // Message handlers:
2116
2117         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2118                 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2119
2120                 // Check sanity of message fields:
2121                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2122                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2123                 }
2124                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2125                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2126                 }
2127                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2128                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2129                 }
2130                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2131                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2132                 }
2133                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2134                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2135                 }
2136                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2137                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2138                                 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2139                 }
2140                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2141                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2142                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2143                 }
2144                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2145                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2146                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2147                 }
2148                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2149                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2150                 }
2151                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2152                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2153                 }
2154
2155                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2156                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2157                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2158                 }
2159                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2160                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2161                 }
2162                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2163                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2164                 }
2165                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2166                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2167                 }
2168                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2169                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2170                 }
2171                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2172                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2173                 }
2174                 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2175                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2176                 }
2177
2178                 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2179                         if *ty != self.channel_type {
2180                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2181                         }
2182                 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2183                         // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2184                 } else {
2185                         let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2186                         if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2187                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2188                         }
2189                         self.channel_type = channel_type;
2190                 }
2191
2192                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2193                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2194                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2195                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2196                                         if script.len() == 0 {
2197                                                 None
2198                                         } else {
2199                                                 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2200                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2201                                                 }
2202                                                 Some(script.clone())
2203                                         }
2204                                 },
2205                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2206                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2207                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2208                                 }
2209                         }
2210                 } else { None };
2211
2212                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2213                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2214                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2215                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2216                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2217
2218                 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2219                         self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2220                 } else {
2221                         self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2222                 }
2223
2224                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2225                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2226                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2227                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2228                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2229                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2230                 };
2231
2232                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2233                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2234                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2235                 });
2236
2237                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2238                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2239
2240                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2241                 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2242
2243                 Ok(())
2244         }
2245
2246         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2247                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2248
2249                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2250                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2251                 {
2252                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2253                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2254                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2255                         // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2256                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2257                                 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2258                                 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2259                                 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2260                         secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2261                 }
2262
2263                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2264                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2265
2266                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2267                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2268                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2269                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2270
2271                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2272                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2273
2274                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2275                 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2276         }
2277
2278         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2279                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2280         }
2281
2282         pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2283                 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2284         ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2285         where
2286                 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2287                 L::Target: Logger
2288         {
2289                 if self.is_outbound() {
2290                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2291                 }
2292                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2293                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2294                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2295                         // channel.
2296                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2297                 }
2298                 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2299                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2300                 }
2301                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2302                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2303                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2304                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2305                 }
2306
2307                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2308                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2309                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
2310                 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2311                 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2312
2313                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2314                         Ok(res) => res,
2315                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2316                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2317                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2318                         },
2319                         Err(e) => {
2320                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2321                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2322                                 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2323                         }
2324                 };
2325
2326                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2327                         initial_commitment_tx,
2328                         msg.signature,
2329                         Vec::new(),
2330                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2331                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2332                 );
2333
2334                 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2335                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2336
2337                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2338
2339                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2340                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2341                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2342                 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2343                 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2344                 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2345                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2346                                                           shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2347                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2348                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2349                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2350                                                           obscure_factor,
2351                                                           holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2352
2353                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2354
2355                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2356                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2357                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2358                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2359
2360                 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2361
2362                 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2363                 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2364
2365                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2366                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2367                         signature,
2368                         #[cfg(taproot)]
2369                         partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2370                 }, channel_monitor))
2371         }
2372
2373         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2374         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2375         pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2376                 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2377         ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2378         where
2379                 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2380                 L::Target: Logger
2381         {
2382                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2383                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2384                 }
2385                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2386                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2387                 }
2388                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2389                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2390                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2391                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2392                 }
2393
2394                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2395
2396                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2397                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2398                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2399                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2400
2401                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2402                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2403
2404                 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2405                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2406                 {
2407                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2408                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2409                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2410                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2411                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2412                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2413                         }
2414                 }
2415
2416                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2417                         initial_commitment_tx,
2418                         msg.signature,
2419                         Vec::new(),
2420                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2421                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2422                 );
2423
2424                 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2425                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2426
2427
2428                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2429                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2430                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2431                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2432                 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2433                 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2434                 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2435                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2436                                                           shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2437                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2438                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2439                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2440                                                           obscure_factor,
2441                                                           holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2442
2443                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2444
2445                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2446                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2447                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2448                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2449
2450                 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2451
2452                 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2453                 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2454                 Ok(channel_monitor)
2455         }
2456
2457         /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2458         /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2459         /// reply with.
2460         pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2461                 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2462                 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2463         ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2464         where
2465                 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2466                 L::Target: Logger
2467         {
2468                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2469                         self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2470                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2471                 }
2472
2473                 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2474                         if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2475                                 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2476                                 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2477                                 // when routing outbound payments.
2478                                 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2479                         }
2480                 }
2481
2482                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2483
2484                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2485                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2486                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2487                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2488                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
2489                 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2490                         // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2491                         (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2492                                               (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2493                 {
2494                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2495                         // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2496                         let expected_point =
2497                                 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2498                                         // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2499                                         // the current one.
2500                                         self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2501                                 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2502                                         // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2503                                         // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2504                                         debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2505                                         self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2506                                 } else {
2507                                         // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2508                                         // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2509                                         Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2510                                                         &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2511                                                 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2512                                 };
2513                         if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2514                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2515                         }
2516                         return Ok(None);
2517                 } else {
2518                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2519                 }
2520
2521                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2522                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2523
2524                 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2525
2526                 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2527         }
2528
2529         /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2530         pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2531                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2532                         self.funding_transaction.clone()
2533                 } else {
2534                         None
2535                 }
2536         }
2537
2538         /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2539         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2540                 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2541                         pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2542                         pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2543                         on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2544                         on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2545                         holding_cell_msat: 0,
2546                         on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2547                 };
2548
2549                 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2550                         (0, 0)
2551                 } else {
2552                         let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2553                         (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2554                                 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2555                 };
2556                 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2557                 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2558                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2559                         stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2560                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2561                                 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2562                         }
2563                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2564                                 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2565                         }
2566                 }
2567                 stats
2568         }
2569
2570         /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2571         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2572                 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2573                         pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2574                         pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2575                         on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2576                         on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2577                         holding_cell_msat: 0,
2578                         on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2579                 };
2580
2581                 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2582                         (0, 0)
2583                 } else {
2584                         let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2585                         (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2586                                 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2587                 };
2588                 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2589                 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2590                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2591                         stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2592                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2593                                 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2594                         }
2595                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2596                                 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2597                         }
2598                 }
2599
2600                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2601                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2602                                 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2603                                 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2604                                 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2605                                 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2606                                         stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2607                                 }
2608                                 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2609                                         stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2610                                 } else {
2611                                         stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2612                                 }
2613                         }
2614                 }
2615                 stats
2616         }
2617
2618         /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2619         /// Doesn't bother handling the
2620         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2621         /// corner case properly.
2622         pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2623                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2624                 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2625
2626                 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2627                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2628                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2629                                 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2630                         }
2631                 }
2632                 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2633
2634                 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2635                                 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2636                                 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2637                         0) as u64;
2638                 AvailableBalances {
2639                         inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2640                                         - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2641                                         - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2642                                         - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2643                                 0) as u64,
2644                         outbound_capacity_msat,
2645                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2646                                         self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2647                                                 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2648                                 0) as u64,
2649                         balance_msat,
2650                 }
2651         }
2652
2653         pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2654                 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2655         }
2656
2657         // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2658         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2659         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2660                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2661                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2662                 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2663         }
2664
2665         // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2666         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2667         #[inline]
2668         fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2669                 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2670         }
2671
2672         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2673         // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2674         // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2675         // are excluded.
2676         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2677                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2678
2679                 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2680                         (0, 0)
2681                 } else {
2682                         (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2683                                 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2684                 };
2685                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2686                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2687
2688                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2689                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2690                 match htlc.origin {
2691                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2692                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2693                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
2694                                 }
2695                         },
2696                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2697                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2698                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
2699                                 }
2700                         }
2701                 }
2702
2703                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2704                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2705                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2706                                 continue
2707                         }
2708                         // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2709                         // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2710                         included_htlcs += 1;
2711                 }
2712
2713                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2714                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2715                                 continue
2716                         }
2717                         match htlc.state {
2718                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2719                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2720                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2721                                 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2722                                 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2723                                 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2724                                 _ => {},
2725                         }
2726                 }
2727
2728                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2729                         match htlc {
2730                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2731                                         if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2732                                                 continue
2733                                         }
2734                                         included_htlcs += 1
2735                                 },
2736                                 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2737                                          // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2738                         }
2739                 }
2740
2741                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2742                 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2743                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2744                 {
2745                         let mut fee = res;
2746                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2747                                 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2748                         }
2749                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2750                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2751                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2752                                 fee,
2753                                 total_pending_htlcs,
2754                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2755                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2756                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2757                                 },
2758                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2759                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2760                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2761                                 },
2762                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2763                         };
2764                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2765                 }
2766                 res
2767         }
2768
2769         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2770         // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2771         // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2772         // excluded.
2773         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2774                 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2775
2776                 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2777                         (0, 0)
2778                 } else {
2779                         (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2780                                 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2781                 };
2782                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2783                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2784
2785                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2786                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2787                 match htlc.origin {
2788                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2789                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2790                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
2791                                 }
2792                         },
2793                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2794                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2795                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
2796                                 }
2797                         }
2798                 }
2799
2800                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2801                 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2802                 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2803                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2804                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2805                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2806                                 continue
2807                         }
2808                         included_htlcs += 1;
2809                 }
2810
2811                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2812                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2813                                 continue
2814                         }
2815                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2816                         // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2817                         match htlc.state {
2818                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2819                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2820                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2821                                 _ => {},
2822                         }
2823                 }
2824
2825                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2826                 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2827                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2828                 {
2829                         let mut fee = res;
2830                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2831                                 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2832                         }
2833                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2834                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2835                                 fee,
2836                                 total_pending_htlcs,
2837                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2838                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2839                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2840                                 },
2841                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2842                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2843                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2844                                 },
2845                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2846                         };
2847                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2848                 }
2849                 res
2850         }
2851
2852         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2853         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2854                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2855                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2856                 if local_sent_shutdown {
2857                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2858                 }
2859                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2860                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2861                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2862                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2863                 }
2864                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2865                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2866                 }
2867                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2868                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2869                 }
2870                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2871                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2872                 }
2873                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2874                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2875                 }
2876
2877                 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2878                 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2879                 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2880                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2881                 }
2882                 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2883                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2884                 }
2885                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2886                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2887                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2888                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2889                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2890                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2891                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2892                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2893                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2894                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2895                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2896                 // transaction).
2897                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2898                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2899                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2900                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2901                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2902                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2903                         }
2904                 }
2905
2906                 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2907                         (0, 0)
2908                 } else {
2909                         let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2910                         (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2911                                 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2912                 };
2913                 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2914                 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2915                         let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2916                         if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2917                                 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2918                                         on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2919                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2920                         }
2921                 }
2922
2923                 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2924                 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2925                         let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2926                         if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2927                                 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2928                                         on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2929                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2930                         }
2931                 }
2932
2933                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2934                         self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2935                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2936                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2937                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2938                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2939                 }
2940
2941                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2942                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2943                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2944                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2945                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2946                 };
2947                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2948                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2949                 };
2950
2951                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2952                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2953                 }
2954
2955                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2956                         // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2957                         // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2958                         // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2959                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2960                         // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2961                         // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2962                         // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2963                         // sensitive to fee spikes.
2964                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2965                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2966                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2967                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2968                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2969                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2970                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2971                         }
2972                 } else {
2973                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2974                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2975                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2976                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2977                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2978                         }
2979                 }
2980                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2981                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2982                 }
2983                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2984                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2985                 }
2986
2987                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2988                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2989                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2990                         }
2991                 }
2992
2993                 // Now update local state:
2994                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2995                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2996                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2997                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2998                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2999                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3000                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3001                 });
3002                 Ok(())
3003         }
3004
3005         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3006         #[inline]
3007         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3008                 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3009                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3010                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3011                                 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3012                                         None => fail_reason.into(),
3013                                         Some(payment_preimage) => {
3014                                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3015                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3016                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3017                                                 }
3018                                                 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3019                                         }
3020                                 };
3021                                 match htlc.state {
3022                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3023                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3024                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3025                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3026                                         },
3027                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3028                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3029                                 }
3030                                 return Ok(htlc);
3031                         }
3032                 }
3033                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3034         }
3035
3036         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3037                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3038                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3039                 }
3040                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3041                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3042                 }
3043
3044                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3045         }
3046
3047         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3048                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3049                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3050                 }
3051                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3052                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3053                 }
3054
3055                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3056                 Ok(())
3057         }
3058
3059         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3060                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3061                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3062                 }
3063                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3064                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3065                 }
3066
3067                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3068                 Ok(())
3069         }
3070
3071         pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<&ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelError>
3072                 where L::Target: Logger
3073         {
3074                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3075                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3076                 }
3077                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3078                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3079                 }
3080                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3081                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3082                 }
3083
3084                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3085
3086                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3087
3088                 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3089                 let commitment_txid = {
3090                         let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3091                         let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3092                         let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3093
3094                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3095                                 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3096                                 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3097                                 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3098                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3099                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3100                         }
3101                         bitcoin_tx.txid
3102                 };
3103                 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3104
3105                 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3106                 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3107                 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3108                         update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3109                 } else { false };
3110                 if update_fee {
3111                         debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3112                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3113                         if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3114                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3115                         }
3116                 }
3117                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3118                 {
3119                         if self.is_outbound() {
3120                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3121                                 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3122                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3123                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3124                                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3125                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3126                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3127                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3128                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3129                                                         assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3130                                                 }
3131                                 }
3132                         }
3133                 }
3134
3135                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3136                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3137                 }
3138
3139                 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3140                 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3141                 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3142                 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3143                 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3144                 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3145                 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3146                 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3147                 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3148                         use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3149                         // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3150                         let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3151                         separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3152                 }
3153
3154                 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3155                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3156                 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3157                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3158                                 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3159                                         self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3160                                         false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3161
3162                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3163                                 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3164                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3165                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3166                                         log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3167                                         encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3168                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3169                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3170                                 }
3171                                 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3172                                         htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3173                                 }
3174                         } else {
3175                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3176                         }
3177                         if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3178                                 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3179                                         nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3180                                 }
3181                         }
3182                         debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3183                 }
3184
3185                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3186                         commitment_stats.tx,
3187                         msg.signature,
3188                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3189                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3190                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3191                 );
3192
3193                 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3194                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3195
3196                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3197                 let mut need_commitment = false;
3198                 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3199                         if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3200                                 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3201                                 need_commitment = true;
3202                         }
3203                 }
3204
3205                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3206                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3207                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
3208                         } else { None };
3209                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3210                                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3211                                         log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3212                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3213                                 need_commitment = true;
3214                         }
3215                 }
3216                 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3217                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3218                         if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3219                                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3220                                         log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3221                                 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3222                                 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3223                                 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3224                                 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3225                                         // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3226                                         // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3227                                         // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3228                                         // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3229                                         // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3230                                         // claim anyway.
3231                                         claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3232                                 }
3233                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3234                                 need_commitment = true;
3235                         }
3236                 }
3237
3238                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3239                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3240                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3241                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3242                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3243                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3244                                 claimed_htlcs,
3245                                 nondust_htlc_sources,
3246                         }]
3247                 };
3248
3249                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3250                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3251                 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3252                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3253
3254                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3255                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3256                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3257                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3258                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3259                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3260                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3261                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
3262                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3263                                 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3264                                 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3265                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3266                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3267                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3268                         }
3269                         log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3270                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3271                         self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3272                         return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3273                 }
3274
3275                 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3276                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3277                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3278                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3279                         let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3280                         // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3281                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3282                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3283                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3284                         true
3285                 } else { false };
3286
3287                 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3288                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3289                 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3290                 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3291                 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3292         }
3293
3294         /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3295         /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3296         /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3297         pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3298                 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3299                    (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3300                         self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3301                 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3302         }
3303
3304         /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3305         /// for our counterparty.
3306         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3307                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3308                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3309                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3310                                 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3311
3312                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3313                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3314                                 updates: Vec::new(),
3315                         };
3316
3317                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3318                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3319                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3320                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3321                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3322                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3323                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3324                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3325                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3326                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3327                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3328                                 // to rebalance channels.
3329                                 match &htlc_update {
3330                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3331                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3332                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3333                                                         Err(e) => {
3334                                                                 match e {
3335                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3336                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3337                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3338                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3339                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3340                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3341                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
3342                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3343                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3344                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3345                                                                         },
3346                                                                         _ => {
3347                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3348                                                                         },
3349                                                                 }
3350                                                         }
3351                                                 }
3352                                         },
3353                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3354                                                 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3355                                                 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3356                                                 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3357                                                 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3358                                                 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3359                                                 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3360                                                         if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3361                                                                 (msg, monitor_update)
3362                                                         } else { unreachable!() };
3363                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3364                                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3365                                         },
3366                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3367                                                 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3368                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3369                                                                 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3370                                                                 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3371                                                                 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3372                                                                 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3373                                                                 // for a full revocation before failing.
3374                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3375                                                         },
3376                                                         Err(e) => {
3377                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3378                                                                 else {
3379                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3380                                                                 }
3381                                                         }
3382                                                 }
3383                                         },
3384                                 }
3385                         }
3386                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3387                                 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3388                         }
3389                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3390                                 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3391                         } else {
3392                                 None
3393                         };
3394
3395                         let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3396                         // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3397                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3398                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3399                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3400
3401                         log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3402                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3403                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3404
3405                         self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3406                         self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3407                         (Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()), htlcs_to_fail)
3408                 } else {
3409                         (None, Vec::new())
3410                 }
3411         }
3412
3413         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3414         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3415         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3416         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3417         /// revoke_and_ack message.
3418         pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, &ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
3419                 where L::Target: Logger,
3420         {
3421                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3422                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3423                 }
3424                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3425                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3426                 }
3427                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3428                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3429                 }
3430
3431                 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3432
3433                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3434                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3435                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3436                         }
3437                 }
3438
3439                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3440                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3441                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3442                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3443                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3444                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3445                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3446                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3447                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3448                 }
3449
3450                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3451                 {
3452                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3453                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3454                 }
3455
3456                 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3457                         self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3458                         &secret
3459                 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3460
3461                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3462                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3463                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3464                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3465                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3466                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3467                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3468                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3469                         }],
3470                 };
3471
3472                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3473                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3474                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3475                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3476                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3477                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3478                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3479                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3480
3481                 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3482                         self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3483                 }
3484
3485                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3486                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3487                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3488                 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3489                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3490                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3491                 let mut require_commitment = false;
3492                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3493
3494                 {
3495                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3496                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3497                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3498
3499                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3500                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3501                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3502                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3503                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3504                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3505                                         }
3506                                         false
3507                                 } else { true }
3508                         });
3509                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3510                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3511                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3512                                         if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3513                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3514                                         } else {
3515                                                 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3516                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3517                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3518                                         }
3519                                         false
3520                                 } else { true }
3521                         });
3522                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3523                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3524                                         true
3525                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3526                                         true
3527                                 } else { false };
3528                                 if swap {
3529                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3530                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3531
3532                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3533                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3534                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3535                                                 require_commitment = true;
3536                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3537                                                 match forward_info {
3538                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3539                                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3540                                                                 require_commitment = true;
3541                                                                 match fail_msg {
3542                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3543                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3544                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3545                                                                         },
3546                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3547                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3548                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3549                                                                         },
3550                                                                 }
3551                                                         },
3552                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3553                                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3554                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3555                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3556                                                         }
3557                                                 }
3558                                         }
3559                                 }
3560                         }
3561                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3562                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3563                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3564                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3565                                 }
3566                                 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3567                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3568                                         // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3569                                         let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3570                                         mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3571                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3572                                         require_commitment = true;
3573                                 }
3574                         }
3575                 }
3576                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3577
3578                 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3579                         match update_state {
3580                                 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3581                                         debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3582                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3583                                         self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3584                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
3585                                 },
3586                                 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3587                                 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3588                                         debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3589                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3590                                         require_commitment = true;
3591                                         self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3592                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
3593                                 },
3594                         }
3595                 }
3596
3597                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3598                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3599                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3600                         if require_commitment {
3601                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3602                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3603                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3604                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3605                                 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3606                                 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3607                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3608                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3609                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3610                         }
3611                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3612                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3613                         self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3614                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3615                         self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3616                         return Ok((Vec::new(), self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()));
3617                 }
3618
3619                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3620                         (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3621                                 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap();
3622                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3623                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3624                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3625                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3626
3627                                 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3628                                 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3629                                 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3630                         },
3631                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3632                                 if require_commitment {
3633                                         let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3634
3635                                         // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3636                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3637                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3638                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3639
3640                                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3641                                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3642                                         self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3643                                         self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3644                                         Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3645                                 } else {
3646                                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3647                                         self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3648                                         self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3649                                         Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3650                                 }
3651                         }
3652                 }
3653         }
3654
3655         /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3656         /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3657         /// commitment update.
3658         pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3659                 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3660                 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3661         }
3662
3663         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3664         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3665         /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3666         /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3667         ///
3668         /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3669         /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3670         fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3671                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3672                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3673                 }
3674                 if !self.is_usable() {
3675                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3676                 }
3677                 if !self.is_live() {
3678                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3679                 }
3680
3681                 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3682                 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3683                 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3684                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3685                 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3686                 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3687                 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3688                 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat  + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3689                         //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3690                         log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3691                         return None;
3692                 }
3693
3694                 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3695                 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3696                 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3697                 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3698                         log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3699                         return None;
3700                 }
3701                 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3702                         log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3703                         return None;
3704                 }
3705
3706                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3707                         force_holding_cell = true;
3708                 }
3709
3710                 if force_holding_cell {
3711                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3712                         return None;
3713                 }
3714
3715                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3716                 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3717
3718                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3719                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3720                         feerate_per_kw,
3721                 })
3722         }
3723
3724         /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3725         /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3726         /// resent.
3727         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3728         /// completed.
3729         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L)  where L::Target: Logger {
3730                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3731                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3732                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3733                         return;
3734                 }
3735
3736                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3737                         // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3738                         // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3739                         return;
3740                 }
3741
3742                 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3743                         self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3744                 }
3745
3746                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3747                 // will be retransmitted.
3748                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3749                 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3750                 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3751
3752                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3753                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3754                         match htlc.state {
3755                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3756                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3757                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3758                                         // this HTLC accordingly
3759                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
3760                                         false
3761                                 },
3762                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3763                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3764                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3765                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3766                                         true
3767                                 },
3768                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3769                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3770                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3771                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3772                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3773                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3774                                         true
3775                                 },
3776                         }
3777                 });
3778                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3779
3780                 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3781                         if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3782                                 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3783                                 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3784                         }
3785                 }
3786
3787                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3788                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3789                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3790                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3791                                 // the update upon reconnection.
3792                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3793                         }
3794                 }
3795
3796                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3797                 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3798         }
3799
3800         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3801         /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3802         /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3803         /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3804         /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3805         /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3806         /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3807         ///
3808         /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3809         /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3810         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3811         fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3812                 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3813                 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3814                 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3815         ) {
3816                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3817                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3818                 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3819                 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3820                 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3821                 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3822                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3823         }
3824
3825         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3826         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3827         /// to the remote side.
3828         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3829                 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3830                 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3831         ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3832         where
3833                 L::Target: Logger,
3834                 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3835         {
3836                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3837                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3838                 self.pending_monitor_updates.clear();
3839
3840                 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3841                 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3842                 // first received the funding_signed.
3843                 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3844                         if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3845                                 self.funding_transaction.take()
3846                         } else { None };
3847                 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3848                 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3849                 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3850                         funding_broadcastable = None;
3851                 }
3852
3853                 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3854                 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3855                 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3856                 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3857                 //   the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3858                 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3859                 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3860                         assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3861                                 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3862                         self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3863                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3864                         Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3865                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3866                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3867                                 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3868                         })
3869                 } else { None };
3870
3871                 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3872
3873                 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3874                 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3875                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3876                 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3877                 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3878                 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3879
3880                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3881                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3882                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3883                         return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3884                                 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3885                                 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3886                         };
3887                 }
3888
3889                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3890                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3891                 } else { None };
3892                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3893                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3894                 } else { None };
3895
3896                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3897                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3898                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3899                 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3900                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3901                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3902                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3903                 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3904                         raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3905                 }
3906         }
3907
3908         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3909                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3910         {
3911                 if self.is_outbound() {
3912                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3913                 }
3914                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3915                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3916                 }
3917                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3918                 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3919
3920                 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3921                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3922                 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3923                 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3924                 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3925                 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3926                         let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3927                         let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3928                         let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3929                         let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3930                         if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3931                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3932                                         msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3933                         }
3934                         if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3935                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3936                                         msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3937                         }
3938                 }
3939                 Ok(())
3940         }
3941
3942         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3943                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3944                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3945                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3946                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3947                         per_commitment_secret,
3948                         next_per_commitment_point,
3949                         #[cfg(taproot)]
3950                         next_local_nonce: None,
3951                 }
3952         }
3953
3954         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3955                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3956                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3957                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3958                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3959
3960                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3961                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3962                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3963                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3964                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3965                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3966                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3967                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3968                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3969                                 });
3970                         }
3971                 }
3972
3973                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3974                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3975                                 match reason {
3976                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3977                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3978                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3979                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3980                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
3981                                                 });
3982                                         },
3983                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3984                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3985                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3986                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3987                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3988                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3989                                                 });
3990                                         },
3991                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3992                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3993                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3994                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3995                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3996                                                 });
3997                                         },
3998                                 }
3999                         }
4000                 }
4001
4002                 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4003                         Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4004                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4005                                 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4006                         })
4007                 } else { None };
4008
4009                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4010                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4011                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4012                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4013                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4014                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4015                 }
4016         }
4017
4018         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4019         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4020         ///
4021         /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4022         /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4023         /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4024         /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4025         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4026                 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4027                 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4028         ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4029         where
4030                 L::Target: Logger,
4031                 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4032         {
4033                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4034                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4035                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4036                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4037                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4038                 }
4039
4040                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4041                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4042                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4043                 }
4044
4045                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4046                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
4047                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
4048                                         let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4049                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4050                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4051                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4052                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4053                                         }
4054                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4055                                                 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4056                                                         ($err_msg: expr) => {
4057                                                                 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4058                                                                 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4059                                                         }
4060                                                 }
4061                                                 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4062                                                         This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4063                                                         More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4064                                                         If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4065                                                         ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4066                                                         ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4067                                                         Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4068                                                         See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4069                                         }
4070                                 },
4071                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4072                         }
4073                 }
4074
4075                 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4076                 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4077                 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4078                 if  msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4079                         return Err(
4080                                 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4081                         );
4082                 }
4083
4084                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4085                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4086                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4087
4088                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4089                         assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4090                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4091                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4092                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4093                         })
4094                 } else { None };
4095
4096                 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4097
4098                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4099                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4100                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4101                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4102                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4103                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4104                                 }
4105                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4106                                 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4107                                         channel_ready: None,
4108                                         raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4109                                         order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4110                                         shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4111                                 });
4112                         }
4113
4114                         // We have OurChannelReady set!
4115                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4116                         return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4117                                 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4118                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4119                                         next_per_commitment_point,
4120                                         short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4121                                 }),
4122                                 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4123                                 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4124                                 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4125                         });
4126                 }
4127
4128                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4129                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4130                         // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4131                         None
4132                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4133                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4134                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4135                                 None
4136                         } else {
4137                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4138                         }
4139                 } else {
4140                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4141                 };
4142
4143                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4144                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4145                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4146                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4147                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4148
4149                 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4150                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4151                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4152                         Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4153                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4154                                 next_per_commitment_point,
4155                                 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4156                         })
4157                 } else { None };
4158
4159                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4160                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
4161                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4162                         } else {
4163                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4164                         }
4165
4166                         Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4167                                 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4168                                 raa: required_revoke,
4169                                 commitment_update: None,
4170                                 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4171                         })
4172                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4173                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
4174                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4175                         } else {
4176                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4177                         }
4178
4179                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4180                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4181                                 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4182                                         channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4183                                         commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4184                                         order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4185                                 })
4186                         } else {
4187                                 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4188                                         channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4189                                         raa: required_revoke,
4190                                         commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4191                                         order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4192                                 })
4193                         }
4194                 } else {
4195                         Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4196                 }
4197         }
4198
4199         /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4200         /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4201         /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4202         fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4203                 -> (u64, u64)
4204                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4205         {
4206                 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4207
4208                 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4209                 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4210                 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4211                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4212                 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4213                 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4214
4215                 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4216                 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4217                 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4218                 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4219                 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4220
4221                 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4222                         let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4223                         proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4224                         proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4225                 }
4226
4227                 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4228                 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4229                 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4230                 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4231                 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4232                 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4233                 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4234                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4235                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4236                 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4237                                 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4238                                 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4239                                 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4240                                 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4241                                         proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4242                         } else {
4243                                 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4244                         };
4245
4246                 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4247                 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4248         }
4249
4250         /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4251         /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4252         /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4253         /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4254         fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4255                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4256                         self.channel_state &
4257                                 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4258                                  ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4259                                 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4260                         self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4261         }
4262
4263         /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4264         /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4265         /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4266         pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4267                 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4268                         if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4269                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4270                         } else {
4271                                 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4272                         }
4273                 }
4274                 Ok(())
4275         }
4276
4277         pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4278                 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4279                 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4280                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4281         {
4282                 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4283                         return Ok((None, None));
4284                 }
4285
4286                 if !self.is_outbound() {
4287                         if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4288                                 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4289                         }
4290                         return Ok((None, None));
4291                 }
4292
4293                 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4294
4295                 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4296                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4297                 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4298                         our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4299
4300                 let sig = self.holder_signer
4301                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4302                         .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4303
4304                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4305                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4306                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4307                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4308                         signature: sig,
4309                         fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4310                                 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4311                                 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4312                         }),
4313                 }), None))
4314         }
4315
4316         pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4317                 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4318         ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4319         where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4320         {
4321                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4322                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4323                 }
4324                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4325                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4326                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4327                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4328                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4329                 }
4330                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4331                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4332                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4333                         }
4334                 }
4335                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4336
4337                 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4338                         return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4339                 }
4340
4341                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4342                         if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4343                                 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4344                         }
4345                 } else {
4346                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4347                 }
4348
4349                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4350                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4351                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4352                 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4353
4354                 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4355                         Some(_) => false,
4356                         None => {
4357                                 assert!(send_shutdown);
4358                                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4359                                 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4360                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4361                                 }
4362                                 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4363                                 true
4364                         },
4365                 };
4366
4367                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4368
4369                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4370                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4371
4372                 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4373                         self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4374                         let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4375                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4376                                 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4377                                         scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4378                                 }],
4379                         };
4380                         self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4381                         self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
4382                         Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
4383                 } else { None };
4384                 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4385                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4386                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4387                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4388                         })
4389                 } else { None };
4390
4391                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4392                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4393                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4394                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4395                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4396                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4397                         match htlc_update {
4398                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4399                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4400                                         false
4401                                 },
4402                                 _ => true
4403                         }
4404                 });
4405
4406                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4407                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4408
4409                 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4410         }
4411
4412         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4413                 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4414
4415                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4416
4417                 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4418                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4419                 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4420                 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4421                 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4422                 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4423                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4424                         tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4425                         tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4426                 } else {
4427                         tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4428                         tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4429                 }
4430
4431                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4432                 tx
4433         }
4434
4435         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4436                 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4437                 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4438                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4439         {
4440                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4441                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4442                 }
4443                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4444                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4445                 }
4446                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4447                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4448                 }
4449                 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4450                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4451                 }
4452
4453                 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4454                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4455                 }
4456
4457                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4458                         self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4459                         return Ok((None, None));
4460                 }
4461
4462                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4463                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4464                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4465                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4466                 }
4467                 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4468
4469                 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4470                         Ok(_) => {},
4471                         Err(_e) => {
4472                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4473                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4474                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4475                                 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4476                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4477                         },
4478                 };
4479
4480                 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4481                         if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4482                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4483                         }
4484                 }
4485
4486                 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4487                 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4488                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4489                                 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4490                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4491                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4492                                 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4493                         }
4494                 }
4495
4496                 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4497
4498                 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4499                         ($new_fee: expr) => {
4500                                 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4501                                         (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4502                                 } else {
4503                                         self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4504                                 };
4505
4506                                 let sig = self.holder_signer
4507                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4508                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4509
4510                                 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4511                                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4512                                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
4513                                         let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4514                                         Some(tx)
4515                                 } else { None };
4516
4517                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4518                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4519                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4520                                         fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4521                                         signature: sig,
4522                                         fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4523                                                 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4524                                                 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4525                                         }),
4526                                 }), signed_tx))
4527                         }
4528                 }
4529
4530                 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4531                         if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4532                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4533                         }
4534                         if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4535                                 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4536                         }
4537                         if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4538                                 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4539                         }
4540
4541                         if !self.is_outbound() {
4542                                 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4543                                 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4544                                 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4545                                 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4546                         } else {
4547                                 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4548                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4549                                                 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4550                                 }
4551                                 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4552                                 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4553                         }
4554                 } else {
4555                         // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4556                         // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4557                         if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4558                                 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4559                                         if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4560                                                 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4561                                         } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4562                                                 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4563                                         } else {
4564                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4565                                         }
4566                                 } else {
4567                                         if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4568                                                 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4569                                         } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4570                                                 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4571                                         } else {
4572                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4573                                         }
4574                                 }
4575                         } else {
4576                                 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4577                                         propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4578                                 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4579                                         propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4580                                 } else {
4581                                         propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4582                                 }
4583                         }
4584                 }
4585         }
4586
4587         // Public utilities:
4588
4589         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4590                 self.channel_id
4591         }
4592
4593         // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4594         //
4595         // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4596         pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4597                 self.temporary_channel_id
4598         }
4599
4600         pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4601                 self.minimum_depth
4602         }
4603
4604         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4605         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4606         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4607                 self.user_id
4608         }
4609
4610         /// Gets the channel's type
4611         pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4612                 &self.channel_type
4613         }
4614
4615         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4616         /// is_usable() returns true).
4617         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4618         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4619                 self.short_channel_id
4620         }
4621
4622         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4623         pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4624                 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4625         }
4626
4627         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4628         pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4629                 self.outbound_scid_alias
4630         }
4631         /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4632         /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4633         pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4634                 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4635                 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4636         }
4637
4638         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4639         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4640         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4641                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4642         }
4643
4644         /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4645         pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4646                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4647         }
4648
4649         /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4650         pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4651                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4652                         // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4653                         return 0;
4654                 }
4655
4656                 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4657         }
4658
4659         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4660                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4661         }
4662
4663         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4664                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4665         }
4666
4667         pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4668                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4669                         .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4670         }
4671
4672         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4673                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4674         }
4675
4676         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4677         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4678                 self.counterparty_node_id
4679         }
4680
4681         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4682         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4683                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4684         }
4685
4686         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4687         pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4688                 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4689         }
4690
4691         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4692         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4693                 return cmp::min(
4694                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4695                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4696                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4697                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4698
4699                         self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4700                 );
4701         }
4702
4703         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4704         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4705                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4706         }
4707
4708         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4709         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4710                 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4711         }
4712
4713         fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4714                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4715                         let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4716                         cmp::min(
4717                                 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4718                                 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4719                         )
4720                 })
4721         }
4722
4723         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4724                 self.channel_value_satoshis
4725         }
4726
4727         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4728                 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4729         }
4730
4731         pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4732                 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4733         }
4734
4735         pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4736                 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4737         }
4738
4739         /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4740         pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4741                 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4742         }
4743
4744         // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4745         pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4746                 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4747         }
4748
4749         // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4750         pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4751                 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4752         }
4753
4754         // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4755         pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4756                 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4757         }
4758
4759         // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4760         pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4761                 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4762         }
4763
4764         // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4765         pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4766                 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4767         }
4768
4769         /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4770         /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4771         /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4772         pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4773                 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4774                         return;
4775                 }
4776                 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4777                 prev_config.1 += 1;
4778                 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4779                         self.prev_config = None;
4780                 }
4781         }
4782
4783         /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4784         pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4785                 self.config.options
4786         }
4787
4788         /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4789         /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4790         pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4791                 let did_channel_update =
4792                         self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4793                         self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4794                         self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4795                 if did_channel_update {
4796                         self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4797                         // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4798                         // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4799                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
4800                 }
4801                 self.config.options = *config;
4802                 did_channel_update
4803         }
4804
4805         fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4806                 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4807         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4808                 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4809                         .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4810                 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4811                         (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4812                         return Err((
4813                                 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4814                                 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4815                         ));
4816                 }
4817                 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4818                         return Err((
4819                                 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4820                                 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4821                         ));
4822                 }
4823                 Ok(())
4824         }
4825
4826         /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4827         /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4828         /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4829         pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4830                 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4831         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4832                 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4833                         .or_else(|err| {
4834                                 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4835                                         self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4836                                 } else {
4837                                         Err(err)
4838                                 }
4839                         })
4840         }
4841
4842         pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4843                 self.feerate_per_kw
4844         }
4845
4846         pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4847                 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4848                 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4849                 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4850                 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4851                 // which are near the dust limit.
4852                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4853                 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4854                 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4855                 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4856                         feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4857                 }
4858                 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4859                         feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4860                 }
4861                 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4862         }
4863
4864         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4865                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4866         }
4867
4868         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4869                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4870         }
4871
4872         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4873                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4874         }
4875
4876         #[cfg(test)]
4877         pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4878                 &self.holder_signer
4879         }
4880
4881         #[cfg(test)]
4882         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4883                 ChannelValueStat {
4884                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4885                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4886                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4887                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4888                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4889                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4890                                 let mut res = 0;
4891                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4892                                         match h {
4893                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4894                                                         res += amount_msat;
4895                                                 }
4896                                                 _ => {}
4897                                         }
4898                                 }
4899                                 res
4900                         },
4901                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4902                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4903                 }
4904         }
4905
4906         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4907         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4908                 self.update_time_counter
4909         }
4910
4911         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4912                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4913         }
4914
4915         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4916                 self.config.announced_channel
4917         }
4918
4919         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4920                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4921         }
4922
4923         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4924         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4925         pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4926                 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4927         }
4928
4929         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4930         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4931                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4932         }
4933
4934         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4935         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4936         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4937                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4938                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4939         }
4940
4941         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4942         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4943         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4944         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4945                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4946         }
4947
4948         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4949         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4950         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4951                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4952         }
4953
4954         pub fn get_next_monitor_update(&self) -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4955                 self.pending_monitor_updates.first()
4956         }
4957
4958         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4959         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4960                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4961         }
4962
4963         /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4964         /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4965         /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4966         /// advanced state.
4967         pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4968                 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4969                 if self.channel_state &
4970                         !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4971                                 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4972                         // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4973                         // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4974                         debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4975                         return true;
4976                 }
4977                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4978                         self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4979                         // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4980                         // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4981                         // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4982                         // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4983                         //
4984                         // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4985                         // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4986                         // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4987                         //
4988                         // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4989                         // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4990                         // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4991                         if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4992                         assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4993                         assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4994                         return true;
4995                 }
4996                 false
4997         }
4998
4999         /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5000         pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5001                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5002         }
5003
5004         /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5005         pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5006                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5007         }
5008
5009         /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5010         pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5011                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5012         }
5013
5014         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5015         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5016         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5017         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5018                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
5019                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5020                         true
5021                 } else { false }
5022         }
5023
5024         pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5025                 self.channel_update_status
5026         }
5027
5028         pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5029                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5030                 self.channel_update_status = status;
5031         }
5032
5033         fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5034                 // Called:
5035                 //  * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5036                 //  * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5037                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5038                         return None;
5039                 }
5040
5041                 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5042                 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5043                         self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5044                 }
5045
5046                 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5047                         return None;
5048                 }
5049
5050                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5051                 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5052                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5053                         true
5054                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5055                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5056                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
5057                         true
5058                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5059                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5060                         false
5061                 } else {
5062                         if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5063                                 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5064                                 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5065                                 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5066                                 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5067                                 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5068                                 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5069                                         Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5070                                         self.channel_state);
5071                         }
5072                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5073                         false
5074                 };
5075
5076                 if need_commitment_update {
5077                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5078                                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5079                                         let next_per_commitment_point =
5080                                                 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5081                                         return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5082                                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5083                                                 next_per_commitment_point,
5084                                                 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5085                                         });
5086                                 }
5087                         } else {
5088                                 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5089                         }
5090                 }
5091                 None
5092         }
5093
5094         /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5095         /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5096         /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5097         pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5098                 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5099                 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5100         ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5101         where
5102                 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5103                 L::Target: Logger
5104         {
5105                 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5106                         for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5107                                 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5108                                 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5109                                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5110                                         if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5111                                                 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5112                                                 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5113                                                                 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5114                                                         if self.is_outbound() {
5115                                                                 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5116                                                                 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5117                                                                 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5118                                                                 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5119                                                                 // channel and move on.
5120                                                                 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5121                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5122                                                         }
5123                                                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
5124                                                         let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5125                                                         return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5126                                                 } else {
5127                                                         if self.is_outbound() {
5128                                                                 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5129                                                                         if input.witness.is_empty() {
5130                                                                                 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5131                                                                                 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5132                                                                                 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5133                                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5134                                                                         }
5135                                                                 }
5136                                                         }
5137                                                         self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5138                                                         self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5139                                                         self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5140                                                                 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5141                                                                 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5142                                                         }
5143                                                 }
5144                                         }
5145                                         // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5146                                         // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5147                                         // may have already happened for this block).
5148                                         if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5149                                                 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5150                                                 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5151                                                 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5152                                         }
5153                                 }
5154                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5155                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5156                                                 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5157                                                 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5158                                         }
5159                                 }
5160                         }
5161                 }
5162                 Ok((None, None))
5163         }
5164
5165         /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5166         /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5167         /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5168         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5169         ///
5170         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5171         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5172         /// post-shutdown.
5173         ///
5174         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5175         /// back.
5176         pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5177                 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5178                 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5179         ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5180         where
5181                 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5182                 L::Target: Logger
5183         {
5184                 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5185         }
5186
5187         fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5188                 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5189                 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5190         ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5191         where
5192                 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5193                 L::Target: Logger
5194         {
5195                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5196                 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5197                 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5198                 // ~now.
5199                 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5200                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5201                         match htlc_update {
5202                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5203                                         if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5204                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5205                                                 false
5206                                         } else { true }
5207                                 },
5208                                 _ => true
5209                         }
5210                 });
5211
5212                 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5213
5214                 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5215                         let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5216                                 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5217                         } else { None };
5218                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5219                         return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5220                 }
5221
5222                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5223                 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5224                    (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5225                         let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5226                         if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5227                                 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5228                                 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5229                                 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5230                                 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5231                         }
5232
5233                         // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5234                         // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5235                         // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5236                         // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5237                         //
5238                         // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5239                         // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5240                         // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map  being inconsistent, so we currently have
5241                         // to.
5242                         if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5243                                 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5244                                         self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5245                                 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5246                         }
5247                 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5248                                 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5249                         log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5250                         // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5251                         assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5252                         assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5253                         return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5254                 }
5255
5256                 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5257                         self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5258                 } else { None };
5259                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5260         }
5261
5262         /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5263         /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5264         /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5265         pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5266                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5267                         // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5268                         // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5269                         let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5270                         // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5271                         // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5272                         // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5273                         let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5274                         match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5275                                 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5276                                         assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5277                                         assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5278                                         assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5279                                         Ok(())
5280                                 },
5281                                 Err(e) => Err(e)
5282                         }
5283                 } else {
5284                         // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5285                         Ok(())
5286                 }
5287         }
5288
5289         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5290         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5291
5292         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5293                 if !self.is_outbound() {
5294                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5295                 }
5296                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5297                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5298                 }
5299
5300                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5301                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5302                 }
5303
5304                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5305                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5306
5307                 msgs::OpenChannel {
5308                         chain_hash,
5309                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5310                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5311                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5312                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5313                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5314                         channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5315                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5316                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5317                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5318                         max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5319                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5320                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5321                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5322                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5323                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5324                         first_per_commitment_point,
5325                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5326                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5327                                 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5328                                 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5329                         }),
5330                         channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5331                 }
5332         }
5333
5334         pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5335                 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5336         }
5337
5338         /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5339         pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5340                 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5341                 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5342         }
5343
5344         /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5345         /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5346         ///
5347         /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5348         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5349                 if self.is_outbound() {
5350                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5351                 }
5352                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5353                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5354                 }
5355                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5356                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5357                 }
5358                 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5359                         panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5360                 }
5361
5362                 self.user_id = user_id;
5363                 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5364
5365                 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5366         }
5367
5368         /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5369         /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5370         /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5371         ///
5372         /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5373         fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5374                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5375                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5376
5377                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5378                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5379                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5380                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5381                         channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5382                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5383                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5384                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5385                         max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5386                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5387                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5388                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5389                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5390                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5391                         first_per_commitment_point,
5392                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5393                                 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5394                                 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5395                         }),
5396                         channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5397                         #[cfg(taproot)]
5398                         next_local_nonce: None,
5399                 }
5400         }
5401
5402         /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5403         /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5404         ///
5405         /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5406         #[cfg(test)]
5407         pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5408                 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5409         }
5410
5411         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5412         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5413                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5414                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5415                 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5416                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5417         }
5418
5419         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5420         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5421         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5422         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5423         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5424         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5425         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5426         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5427                 if !self.is_outbound() {
5428                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5429                 }
5430                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5431                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5432                 }
5433                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5434                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5435                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5436                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5437                 }
5438
5439                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5440                 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5441
5442                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5443                         Ok(res) => res,
5444                         Err(e) => {
5445                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5446                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5447                                 return Err(e);
5448                         }
5449                 };
5450
5451                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5452
5453                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5454
5455                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5456                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5457                 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5458
5459                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5460                         temporary_channel_id,
5461                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5462                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5463                         signature,
5464                         #[cfg(taproot)]
5465                         partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5466                         #[cfg(taproot)]
5467                         next_local_nonce: None,
5468                 })
5469         }
5470
5471         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5472         /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5473         /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5474         /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5475         ///
5476         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5477         /// closing).
5478         ///
5479         /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5480         fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5481                 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5482         ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5483                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5484                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5485                 }
5486                 if !self.is_usable() {
5487                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5488                 }
5489
5490                 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5491                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5492                 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5493                 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5494
5495                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5496                         features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5497                         chain_hash,
5498                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5499                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5500                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5501                         bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5502                         bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5503                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
5504                 };
5505
5506                 Ok(msg)
5507         }
5508
5509         fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5510                 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5511                 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5512         ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5513         where
5514                 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5515                 L::Target: Logger
5516         {
5517                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5518                         return None;
5519                 }
5520
5521                 if !self.is_usable() {
5522                         return None;
5523                 }
5524
5525                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5526                         log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5527                         return None;
5528                 }
5529
5530                 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5531                         return None;
5532                 }
5533
5534                 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5535                 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5536                         Ok(a) => a,
5537                         Err(e) => {
5538                                 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5539                                 return None;
5540                         }
5541                 };
5542                 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5543                         Err(_) => {
5544                                 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5545                                 return None;
5546                         },
5547                         Ok(v) => v
5548                 };
5549                 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5550                         Err(_) => {
5551                                 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5552                                 return None;
5553                         },
5554                         Ok(v) => v
5555                 };
5556                 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5557
5558                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5559                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5560                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5561                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
5562                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5563                 })
5564         }
5565
5566         /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5567         /// available.
5568         fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5569                 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5570         ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5571                 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5572                         let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5573                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5574                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5575
5576                         let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5577                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5578                         let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5579                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5580                         Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5581                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5582                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5583                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5584                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5585                                 contents: announcement,
5586                         })
5587                 } else {
5588                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5589                 }
5590         }
5591
5592         /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5593         /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5594         /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5595         pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5596                 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5597                 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5598         ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5599                 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5600
5601                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5602
5603                 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5604                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5605                                 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5606                                  &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5607                 }
5608                 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5609                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5610                                 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5611                                 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5612                 }
5613
5614                 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5615                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5616                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5617                                 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5618                 }
5619
5620                 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5621         }
5622
5623         /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5624         /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5625         pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5626                 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5627         ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5628                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5629                         return None;
5630                 }
5631                 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5632                         Ok(res) => res,
5633                         Err(_) => return None,
5634                 };
5635                 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5636                         Ok(res) => Some(res),
5637                         Err(_) => None,
5638                 }
5639         }
5640
5641         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5642         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5643         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5644                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5645                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5646                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5647                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5648                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5649                 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5650                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5651                 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5652                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5653                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5654                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5655                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5656                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5657                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5658                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5659                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5660                         })
5661                 } else {
5662                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5663                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5664                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5665                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5666                         })
5667                 };
5668                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5669                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5670                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5671                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5672                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5673                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5674                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5675                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5676
5677                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5678                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5679                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5680                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5681                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5682                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5683                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5684                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5685                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5686                         // overflow here.
5687                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5688                         data_loss_protect,
5689                 }
5690         }
5691
5692
5693         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5694
5695         /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5696         /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5697         /// commitment update.
5698         ///
5699         /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5700         pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5701                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5702         -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5703                 self
5704                         .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5705                         .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5706                         .map_err(|err| {
5707                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5708                                 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5709                                 err
5710                         })
5711         }
5712
5713         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5714         /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5715         ///
5716         /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5717         /// the wire:
5718         /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5719         ///   wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5720         ///   awaiting ACK.
5721         /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5722         ///   we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5723         ///   regenerate them.
5724         ///
5725         /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5726         /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5727         ///
5728         /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5729         fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5730                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5731         -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5732                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5733                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5734                 }
5735                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5736                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5737                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5738                 }
5739
5740                 if amount_msat == 0 {
5741                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5742                 }
5743
5744                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5745                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5746                 }
5747
5748                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5749                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5750                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5751                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5752                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5753                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5754                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5755                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5756                 }
5757
5758                 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5759                 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5760                 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5761                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5762                 }
5763                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5764                 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5765                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5766                 }
5767
5768                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5769                 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5770                 if !self.is_outbound() {
5771                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5772                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5773                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5774                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5775                         if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5776                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5777                         }
5778                 }
5779
5780                 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5781                         (0, 0)
5782                 } else {
5783                         let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5784                         (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5785                                 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5786                 };
5787                 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5788                 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5789                         let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5790                         if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5791                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5792                                         on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5793                         }
5794                 }
5795
5796                 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5797                 if amount_msat / 1000 <  exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5798                         let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5799                         if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5800                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5801                                         on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5802                         }
5803                 }
5804
5805                 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5806                 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5807                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5808                 }
5809
5810                 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5811                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5812                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5813                         FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5814                 } else { 0 };
5815                 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5816                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5817                 }
5818
5819                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5820                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5821                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5822                 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5823                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5824                 }
5825
5826                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5827                         force_holding_cell = true;
5828                 }
5829
5830                 // Now update local state:
5831                 if force_holding_cell {
5832                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5833                                 amount_msat,
5834                                 payment_hash,
5835                                 cltv_expiry,
5836                                 source,
5837                                 onion_routing_packet,
5838                         });
5839                         return Ok(None);
5840                 }
5841
5842                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5843                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5844                         amount_msat,
5845                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5846                         cltv_expiry,
5847                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5848                         source,
5849                 });
5850
5851                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5852                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
5853                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5854                         amount_msat,
5855                         payment_hash,
5856                         cltv_expiry,
5857                         onion_routing_packet,
5858                 };
5859                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5860
5861                 Ok(Some(res))
5862         }
5863
5864         fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5865                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5866                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5867                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5868                 // is acceptable.
5869                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5870                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5871                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5872                         } else { None };
5873                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
5874                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5875                                 htlc.state = state;
5876                         }
5877                 }
5878                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5879                         if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5880                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5881                                 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5882                                 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5883                                 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5884                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5885                         }
5886                 }
5887                 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5888                         if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5889                                 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5890                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5891                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5892                                 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5893                         }
5894                 }
5895                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5896
5897                 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5898                 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5899                         htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5900
5901                 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5902                         self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5903                 }
5904
5905                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5906                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5907                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5908                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5909                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5910                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5911                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5912                                 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5913                         }]
5914                 };
5915                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5916                 monitor_update
5917         }
5918
5919         fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5920                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5921                 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5922                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5923
5924                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5925                 {
5926                         if !self.is_outbound() {
5927                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5928                                 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5929                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5930                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5931                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5932                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5933                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5934                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5935                                                         let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5936                                                         assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5937                                                 }
5938                                 }
5939                         }
5940                 }
5941
5942                 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5943         }
5944
5945         /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5946         /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5947         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5948                 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5949                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5950                 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5951
5952                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5953                 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5954                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5955                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5956
5957                 {
5958                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5959                         for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5960                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
5961                         }
5962
5963                         let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5964                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5965                         signature = res.0;
5966                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
5967
5968                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5969                                 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5970                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5971                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5972
5973                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5974                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5975                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5976                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5977                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5978                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5979                         }
5980                 }
5981
5982                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5983                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
5984                         signature,
5985                         htlc_signatures,
5986                         #[cfg(taproot)]
5987                         partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5988                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5989         }
5990
5991         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5992         /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5993         ///
5994         /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5995         /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5996         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5997                 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5998                 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5999                 match send_res? {
6000                         Some(_) => {
6001                                 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6002                                 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6003                                 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
6004                                 Ok(Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
6005                         },
6006                         None => Ok(None)
6007                 }
6008         }
6009
6010         /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6011         pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6012                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6013         }
6014
6015         pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6016                 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6017                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6018                 }
6019                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6020                         fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6021                         fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6022                         cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6023                 });
6024
6025                 Ok(())
6026         }
6027
6028         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6029         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6030         ///
6031         /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6032         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6033         pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6034                 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
6035         -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6036         where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6037                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6038                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6039                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6040                         }
6041                 }
6042                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6043                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6044                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6045                         }
6046                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6047                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6048                         }
6049                 }
6050                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6051                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6052                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6053                 }
6054
6055                 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6056                 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6057                 let mut chan_closed = false;
6058                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6059                         chan_closed = true;
6060                 }
6061
6062                 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6063                         Some(_) => false,
6064                         None if !chan_closed => {
6065                                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
6066                                 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6067                                         return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6068                                 }
6069                                 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6070                                 true
6071                         },
6072                         None => false,
6073                 };
6074
6075                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6076                 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6077                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6078                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6079                 } else {
6080                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6081                 }
6082                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6083
6084                 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6085                         self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6086                         let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6087                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6088                                 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6089                                         scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6090                                 }],
6091                         };
6092                         self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6093                         self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
6094                         Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
6095                 } else { None };
6096                 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6097                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
6098                         scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6099                 };
6100
6101                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6102                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6103                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6104                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6105                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6106                         match htlc_update {
6107                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6108                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6109                                         false
6110                                 },
6111                                 _ => true
6112                         }
6113                 });
6114
6115                 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6116                         "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6117
6118                 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6119         }
6120
6121         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6122         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6123         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6124         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6125         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6126         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6127                 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6128                 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6129                 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6130                 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6131                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6132
6133                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6134                 // return them to fail the payment.
6135                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6136                 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6137                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6138                         match htlc_update {
6139                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6140                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6141                                 },
6142                                 _ => {}
6143                         }
6144                 }
6145                 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6146                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6147                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6148                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6149                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6150                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6151                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6152                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6153                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6154                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6155                                 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6156                                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6157                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6158                                 }))
6159                         } else { None }
6160                 } else { None };
6161
6162                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6163                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6164                 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6165         }
6166
6167         pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6168                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6169                         .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6170                                 match htlc_update {
6171                                         HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6172                                                 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6173                                         _ => None,
6174                                 }
6175                         })
6176                         .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6177         }
6178 }
6179
6180 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6181 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6182
6183 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6184         (0, FailRelay),
6185         (1, FailMalformed),
6186         (2, Fulfill),
6187 );
6188
6189 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6190         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6191                 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6192                 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6193                 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6194                 match self {
6195                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6196                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6197                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6198                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6199                 }
6200                 Ok(())
6201         }
6202 }
6203
6204 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6205         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6206                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6207                         0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6208                         1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6209                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6210                 })
6211         }
6212 }
6213
6214 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6215         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6216                 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6217                 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6218                 match self {
6219                         AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6220                         AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6221                         AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6222                         AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6223                 }
6224         }
6225 }
6226
6227 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6228         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6229                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6230                         0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6231                         1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6232                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6233                 })
6234         }
6235 }
6236
6237 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6238         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6239                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6240                 // called.
6241
6242                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6243
6244                 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6245                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6246                 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6247                 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6248                 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6249
6250                 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6251                 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6252                 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6253                 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6254
6255                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6256                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6257                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6258
6259                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6260
6261                 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6262                 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6263                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6264                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6265                 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6266                 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6267
6268                 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6269                 // deserialized from that format.
6270                 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6271                         Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6272                         None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6273                 }
6274                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6275
6276                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6277                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6278                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6279
6280                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6281                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6282                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6283                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6284                         }
6285                 }
6286                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6287                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6288                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6289                                 continue; // Drop
6290                         }
6291                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6292                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6293                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6294                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6295                         match &htlc.state {
6296                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6297                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6298                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
6299                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6300                                 },
6301                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6302                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
6303                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6304                                 },
6305                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6306                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
6307                                 },
6308                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6309                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
6310                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6311                                 },
6312                         }
6313                 }
6314
6315                 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6316
6317                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6318                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6319                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6320                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6321                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6322                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6323                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6324                         match &htlc.state {
6325                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6326                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
6327                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6328                                 },
6329                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6330                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
6331                                 },
6332                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6333                                         // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6334                                         // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6335                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
6336                                 },
6337                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6338                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
6339                                         if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6340                                                 preimages.push(preimage);
6341                                         }
6342                                         let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6343                                         reason.write(writer)?;
6344                                 }
6345                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6346                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
6347                                         if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6348                                                 preimages.push(preimage);
6349                                         }
6350                                         let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6351                                         reason.write(writer)?;
6352                                 }
6353                         }
6354                 }
6355
6356                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6357                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6358                         match update {
6359                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6360                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
6361                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6362                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6363                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6364                                         source.write(writer)?;
6365                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6366                                 },
6367                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6368                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
6369                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6370                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6371                                 },
6372                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6373                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
6374                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6375                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
6376                                 }
6377                         }
6378                 }
6379
6380                 match self.resend_order {
6381                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6382                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6383                 }
6384
6385                 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6386                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6387                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6388
6389                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6390                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6391                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6392                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6393                 }
6394
6395                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6396                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6397                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6398                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6399                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6400                 }
6401
6402                 if self.is_outbound() {
6403                         self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6404                 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6405                         Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6406                 } else {
6407                         // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6408                         // commitment_signed, drop it.
6409                         None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6410                 }
6411                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6412
6413                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6414                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6415                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6416                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6417
6418                 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6419                 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6420                 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6421                 // consider the stale state on reload.
6422                 0u8.write(writer)?;
6423
6424                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6425                 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6426                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6427
6428                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6429                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6430                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6431
6432                 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6433                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6434
6435                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6436                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6437                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6438
6439                 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6440                 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6441
6442                 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6443                         Some(info) => {
6444                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
6445                                 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6446                                 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6447                                 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6448                         },
6449                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6450                 }
6451
6452                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6453                 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6454
6455                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6456                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6457                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6458
6459                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6460
6461                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6462
6463                 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6464
6465                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6466                 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6467                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6468                 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6469                         htlc.write(writer)?;
6470                 }
6471
6472                 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6473                 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6474                 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6475                 // out at all.
6476                 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6477                         Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6478
6479                 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6480                 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6481                 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6482                 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6483                 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6484                         if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6485                         { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6486
6487                 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6488                 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6489                 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6490                         if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6491                         { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6492
6493                 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6494                 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6495
6496                 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6497                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6498                 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6499                 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6500
6501                 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6502
6503                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6504                         (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6505                         // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6506                         // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6507                         // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6508                         // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6509                         // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6510                         // override that.
6511                         (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6512                         (2, chan_type, option),
6513                         (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6514                         (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6515                         (5, self.config, required),
6516                         (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6517                         (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6518                         (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6519                         (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6520                         (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6521                         (15, preimages, vec_type),
6522                         (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6523                         (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6524                         (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6525                         (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6526                         (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6527                         (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6528                         (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6529                         (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6530                         (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6531                 });
6532
6533                 Ok(())
6534         }
6535 }
6536
6537 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6538 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6539                 where
6540                         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6541                         SP::Target: SignerProvider
6542 {
6543         fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6544                 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6545                 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6546
6547                 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6548                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6549                 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6550                 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6551
6552                 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6553                 if ver == 1 {
6554                         // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6555                         config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6556                         config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6557                         config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6558                         config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6559                 } else {
6560                         // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6561                         let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6562                 }
6563
6564                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6565                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6566                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6567
6568                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6569
6570                 let mut keys_data = None;
6571                 if ver <= 2 {
6572                         // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6573                         // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6574                         let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6575                         keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6576                         while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6577                                 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6578                                 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6579                                 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6580                                 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6581                                 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6582                         }
6583                 }
6584
6585                 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6586                 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6587                         Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6588                         Err(_) => None,
6589                 };
6590                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6591
6592                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6593                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6594                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6595
6596                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6597
6598                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6599                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6600                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6601                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6602                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6603                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6604                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6605                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6606                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6607                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6608                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6609                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6610                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6611                                 },
6612                         });
6613                 }
6614
6615                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6616                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6617                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6618                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6619                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6620                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6621                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6622                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6623                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6624                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6625                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6626                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6627                                         2 => {
6628                                                 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6629                                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6630                                         },
6631                                         3 => {
6632                                                 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6633                                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6634                                         },
6635                                         4 => {
6636                                                 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6637                                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6638                                         },
6639                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6640                                 },
6641                         });
6642                 }
6643
6644                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6645                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6646                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6647                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6648                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6649                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6650                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6651                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6652                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6653                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6654                                 },
6655                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6656                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6657                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6658                                 },
6659                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6660                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6661                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6662                                 },
6663                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6664                         });
6665                 }
6666
6667                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6668                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6669                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6670                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6671                 };
6672
6673                 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6674                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6675                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6676
6677                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6678                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6679                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6680                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6681                 }
6682
6683                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6684                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6685                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6686                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6687                 }
6688
6689                 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6690
6691                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6692
6693                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6694                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6695                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6696                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6697
6698                 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6699                 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6700                 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6701                 // consider the stale state on reload.
6702                 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6703                         0 => {},
6704                         1 => {
6705                                 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6706                                 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6707                                 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6708                         },
6709                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6710                 }
6711
6712                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6713                 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6714                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6715
6716                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6717                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6718                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6719                 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6720                 if ver == 1 {
6721                         // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6722                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6723                 } else {
6724                         // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6725                         let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6726                 }
6727                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6728                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6729                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6730
6731                 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6732                 if ver == 1 {
6733                         // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6734                         minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6735                 } else {
6736                         // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6737                         let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6738                 }
6739
6740                 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6741                         0 => None,
6742                         1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6743                                 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6744                                 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6745                                 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6746                         }),
6747                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6748                 };
6749
6750                 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6751                 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6752
6753                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6754
6755                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6756                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6757
6758                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6759                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6760
6761                 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6762
6763                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6764                 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6765                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6766                 {
6767                         let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6768                         for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6769                                 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6770                         }
6771                 }
6772
6773                 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6774                         Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6775                                 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6776                         } else {
6777                                 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6778                         }))
6779                 } else {
6780                         None
6781                 };
6782
6783                 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6784                 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6785                 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6786                 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6787                 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6788                 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6789                 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6790                 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6791                 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6792                 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6793
6794                 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6795                 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6796                 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6797                 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6798                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6799                 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6800                 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6801
6802                 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6803                 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6804                 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6805                 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
6806
6807                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6808                         (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6809                         (1, minimum_depth, option),
6810                         (2, channel_type, option),
6811                         (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6812                         (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6813                         (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6814                         (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6815                         (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6816                         (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6817                         (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6818                         (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6819                         (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6820                         (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6821                         (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6822                         (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6823                         (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6824                         (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6825                         (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6826                         (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6827                         (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
6828                         (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6829                 });
6830
6831                 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6832                         let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6833                         // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6834                         // required channel parameters.
6835                         let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6836                         if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6837                                 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6838                         }
6839                         (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6840                 } else {
6841                         // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6842                         let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6843                         let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6844                         (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6845                 };
6846
6847                 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6848                         let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6849                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6850                                 match &htlc.state {
6851                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6852                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6853                                         }
6854                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6855                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6856                                         }
6857                                         _ => {}
6858                                 }
6859                         }
6860                         // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6861                         if iter.next().is_some() {
6862                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6863                         }
6864                 }
6865
6866                 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6867                 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6868                         // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6869                         // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6870                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6871                 }
6872
6873                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6874                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6875
6876                 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6877                 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6878                 // separate u64 values.
6879                 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6880
6881                 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
6882
6883                 Ok(Channel {
6884                         user_id,
6885
6886                         config: config.unwrap(),
6887
6888                         prev_config: None,
6889
6890                         // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6891                         // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6892                         inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6893
6894                         channel_id,
6895                         temporary_channel_id,
6896                         channel_state,
6897                         announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6898                         secp_ctx,
6899                         channel_value_satoshis,
6900
6901                         latest_monitor_update_id,
6902
6903                         holder_signer,
6904                         shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6905                         destination_script,
6906
6907                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6908                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6909                         value_to_self_msat,
6910
6911                         holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6912                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
6913                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
6914                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6915
6916                         resend_order,
6917
6918                         monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6919                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6920                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6921                         monitor_pending_forwards,
6922                         monitor_pending_failures,
6923                         monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6924
6925                         pending_update_fee,
6926                         holding_cell_update_fee,
6927                         next_holder_htlc_id,
6928                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6929                         update_time_counter,
6930                         feerate_per_kw,
6931
6932                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6933                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6934                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6935                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6936
6937                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6938                         pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6939                         closing_fee_limits: None,
6940                         target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6941
6942                         inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6943
6944                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6945                         funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6946                         short_channel_id,
6947                         channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6948
6949                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6950                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6951                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6952                         holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6953                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6954                         holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6955                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6956                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6957                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6958                         minimum_depth,
6959
6960                         counterparty_forwarding_info,
6961
6962                         channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6963                         funding_transaction,
6964
6965                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6966                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6967                         counterparty_node_id,
6968
6969                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6970
6971                         commitment_secrets,
6972
6973                         channel_update_status,
6974                         closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6975
6976                         announcement_sigs,
6977
6978                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6979                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6980                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6981                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6982
6983                         workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6984
6985                         latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6986                         // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6987                         outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6988
6989                         channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6990                         channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6991
6992                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6993                         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6994
6995                         channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6996                         channel_keys_id,
6997
6998                         pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6999                 })
7000         }
7001 }
7002
7003 #[cfg(test)]
7004 mod tests {
7005         use std::cmp;
7006         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7007         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7008         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7009         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7010         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7011         use hex;
7012         use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7013         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7014         #[cfg(anchors)]
7015         use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7016         use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7017         use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7018         use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7019         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7020         use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7021         use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7022         use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7023         use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7024         use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7025         use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7026         use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7027         use crate::routing::router::Path;
7028         use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7029         use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7030         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7031         use crate::util::test_utils;
7032         use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7033         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7034         use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7035         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7036         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7037         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7038         use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7039         use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7040         use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7041         use crate::prelude::*;
7042
7043         struct TestFeeEstimator {
7044                 fee_est: u32
7045         }
7046         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7047                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7048                         self.fee_est
7049                 }
7050         }
7051
7052         #[test]
7053         fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7054                 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7055                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7056                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7057         }
7058
7059         #[test]
7060         fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7061                 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7062                 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7063                 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7064                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7065                 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7066                         u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7067         }
7068
7069         struct Keys {
7070                 signer: InMemorySigner,
7071         }
7072
7073         impl EntropySource for Keys {
7074                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7075         }
7076
7077         impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7078                 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7079
7080                 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7081                         self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7082                 }
7083
7084                 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7085                         self.signer.clone()
7086                 }
7087
7088                 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7089
7090                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
7091                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7092                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7093                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7094                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
7095                 }
7096
7097                 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
7098                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7099                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7100                         ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
7101                 }
7102         }
7103
7104         #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7105         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7106                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7107         }
7108
7109         #[test]
7110         fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7111                 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7112                 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7113                         ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7114
7115                 let seed = [42; 32];
7116                 let network = Network::Testnet;
7117                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7118                 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7119                         returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7120                 });
7121
7122                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7123                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7124                 let config = UserConfig::default();
7125                 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7126                         Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7127                                 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7128                         },
7129                         Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7130                         Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7131                 }
7132         }
7133
7134         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7135         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7136         #[test]
7137         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7138                 let original_fee = 253;
7139                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7140                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7141                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7142                 let seed = [42; 32];
7143                 let network = Network::Testnet;
7144                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7145
7146                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7147                 let config = UserConfig::default();
7148                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7149
7150                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7151                 // same as the old fee.
7152                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7153                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7154                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7155         }
7156
7157         #[test]
7158         fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7159                 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7160                 // dust limits are used.
7161                 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7162                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7163                 let seed = [42; 32];
7164                 let network = Network::Testnet;
7165                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7166                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7167
7168                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7169                 // they have different dust limits.
7170
7171                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7172                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7173                 let config = UserConfig::default();
7174                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7175
7176                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7177                 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7178                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7179                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7180                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7181
7182                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7183                 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7184                 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7185                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7186                 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7187
7188                 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7189                 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7190                 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7191                         htlc_id: 0,
7192                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7193                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7194                         cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7195                         state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7196                 });
7197
7198                 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7199                         htlc_id: 1,
7200                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7201                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7202                         cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7203                         state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7204                         source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7205                                 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7206                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7207                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7208                                 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7209                         }
7210                 });
7211
7212                 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7213                 // the dust limit check.
7214                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7215                 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7216                 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7217                 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7218
7219                 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7220                 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7221                 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7222                 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7223                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7224                 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7225                 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7226         }
7227
7228         #[test]
7229         fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7230                 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7231                 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7232                 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7233                 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7234                 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7235                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7236                 let seed = [42; 32];
7237                 let network = Network::Testnet;
7238                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7239
7240                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7241                 let config = UserConfig::default();
7242                 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7243
7244                 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7245                 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7246
7247                 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7248                 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7249                 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7250                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7251                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7252                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7253
7254                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7255                 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7256                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7257                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7258                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7259
7260                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7261
7262                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7263                 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7264                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7265                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7266                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7267
7268                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7269                 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7270                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7271                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7272                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7273         }
7274
7275         #[test]
7276         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7277                 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7278                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7279                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7280                 let seed = [42; 32];
7281                 let network = Network::Testnet;
7282                 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7283                 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7284                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7285
7286                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7287
7288                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7289                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7290                 let config = UserConfig::default();
7291                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7292
7293                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7294                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7295                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7296                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7297
7298                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7299                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7300                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7301
7302                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7303                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7304                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7305                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7306                 }]};
7307                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7308                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7309                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7310
7311                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7312                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7313
7314                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7315                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7316                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7317                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7318                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7319                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7320                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7321                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7322                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7323                         },
7324                         _ => panic!()
7325                 }
7326
7327                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7328                 // is sane.
7329                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7330                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7331                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7332                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7333                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7334                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7335                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7336                         },
7337                         _ => panic!()
7338                 }
7339         }
7340
7341         #[test]
7342         fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7343                 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7344                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7345                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7346                 let seed = [42; 32];
7347                 let network = Network::Testnet;
7348                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7349                 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7350                 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7351
7352                 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7353                 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7354                 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7355                 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7356                 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7357                 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7358                 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7359                 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7360
7361                 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7362                 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7363                 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7364                 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7365                 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7366                 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7367
7368                 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7369                 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7370                 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7371                 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7372
7373                 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7374
7375                 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7376                 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7377                 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7378                 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7379                 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7380                 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7381
7382                 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7383                 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7384                 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7385                 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7386
7387                 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7388                 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7389                 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7390                 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7391                 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7392
7393                 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7394                 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7395                 // than 100.
7396                 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7397                 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7398                 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7399
7400                 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7401                 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7402                 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7403                 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7404                 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7405
7406                 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7407                 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7408                 // than 100.
7409                 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7410                 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7411                 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7412         }
7413
7414         #[test]
7415         fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7416
7417                 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7418                 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7419                 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7420
7421                 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7422                 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7423                 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7424                 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7425
7426                 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7427                 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7428                 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7429
7430                 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7431                 // to channel value
7432                 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7433                 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7434         }
7435
7436         fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7437                 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7438                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7439                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7440                 let seed = [42; 32];
7441                 let network = Network::Testnet;
7442                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7443                 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7444                 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7445
7446
7447                 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7448                 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7449                 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7450
7451                 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7452                 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7453
7454                 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7455                 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7456                 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7457
7458                 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7459                         let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7460
7461                         let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7462
7463                         assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7464                         assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7465                 } else {
7466                         // Channel Negotiations failed
7467                         let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7468                         assert!(result.is_err());
7469                 }
7470         }
7471
7472         #[test]
7473         fn channel_update() {
7474                 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7475                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7476                 let seed = [42; 32];
7477                 let network = Network::Testnet;
7478                 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7479                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7480
7481                 // Create a channel.
7482                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7483                 let config = UserConfig::default();
7484                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7485                 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7486                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7487                 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7488
7489                 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7490                 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7491                         contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7492                                 chain_hash,
7493                                 short_channel_id: 0,
7494                                 timestamp: 0,
7495                                 flags: 0,
7496                                 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7497                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7498                                 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7499                                 fee_base_msat: 110,
7500                                 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7501                                 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7502                         },
7503                         signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7504                 };
7505                 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7506
7507                 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7508                 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7509                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7510                 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7511                         Some(info) => {
7512                                 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7513                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7514                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7515                         },
7516                         None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7517                 }
7518         }
7519
7520         #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7521         #[test]
7522         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7523                 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7524                 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7525                 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7526                 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7527                 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7528                 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7529                 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7530                 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7531                 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7532                 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7533                 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7534                 use crate::sync::Arc;
7535
7536                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7537                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7538                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7539                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7540
7541                 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7542                         &secp_ctx,
7543                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7544                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7545                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7546                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7547                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7548
7549                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7550                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7551                         10_000_000,
7552                         [0; 32],
7553                         [0; 32],
7554                 );
7555
7556                 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7557                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7558                 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7559
7560                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7561                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7562                 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7563                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7564                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7565                 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7566
7567                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7568
7569                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7570                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7571                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7572                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7573                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7574                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7575                 };
7576                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7577                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7578                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7579                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
7580                         });
7581                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7582                 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7583
7584                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7585                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7586
7587                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7588                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7589
7590                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7591                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7592
7593                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7594                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7595                 // build_commitment_transaction.
7596                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7597                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7598                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7599                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7600                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7601
7602                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7603                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7604                                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7605                                 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7606                         };
7607                 }
7608
7609                 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7610                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7611                                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7612                                 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7613                         };
7614                 }
7615
7616                 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7617                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7618                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7619                         } ) => { {
7620                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7621                                         let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7622
7623                                         let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7624                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7625                                                 .collect();
7626                                         (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7627                                 };
7628                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7629                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7630                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7631                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7632                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7633                                 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7634                                 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7635
7636                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7637                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7638                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7639                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7640                                 $({
7641                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7642                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7643                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7644                                 })*
7645                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7646
7647                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7648                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
7649                                         counterparty_signature,
7650                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7651                                         &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7652                                         chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7653                                 );
7654                                 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7655                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7656
7657                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7658                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7659                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7660
7661                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7662                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7663
7664                                 $({
7665                                         log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7666                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7667
7668                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7669                                         let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7670                                                 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7671                                                 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7672                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7673                                         let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7674                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7675                                         assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7676
7677                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7678                                         if !htlc.offered {
7679                                                 for i in 0..5 {
7680                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7681                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7682                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7683                                                         }
7684                                                 }
7685
7686                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7687                                         }
7688
7689                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7690                                         let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7691                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7692
7693                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7694                                         assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7695                                         let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7696                                         let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7697                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7698                                         log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7699                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7700                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7701                                 })*
7702                                 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7703                         } }
7704                 }
7705
7706                 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7707                 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7708                                                  "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7709                                                  "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", {});
7710
7711                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7712                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7713
7714                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7715                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7716                                                  "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", {});
7717
7718                 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7719                 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7720                                                  "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7721                                                  "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", {});
7722
7723                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7724                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7725                                 htlc_id: 0,
7726                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
7727                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
7728                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7729                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7730                         };
7731                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7732                         out
7733                 });
7734                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7735                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7736                                 htlc_id: 1,
7737                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
7738                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
7739                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7740                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7741                         };
7742                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7743                         out
7744                 });
7745                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7746                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7747                                 htlc_id: 2,
7748                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
7749                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
7750                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7751                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7752                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7753                         };
7754                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7755                         out
7756                 });
7757                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7758                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7759                                 htlc_id: 3,
7760                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
7761                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
7762                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7763                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7764                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7765                         };
7766                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7767                         out
7768                 });
7769                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7770                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7771                                 htlc_id: 4,
7772                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
7773                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
7774                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7775                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7776                         };
7777                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7778                         out
7779                 });
7780
7781                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7782                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7783                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7784
7785                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7786                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7787                                  "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", {
7788
7789                                   { 0,
7790                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7791                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7792                                   "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" },
7793
7794                                   { 1,
7795                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7796                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7797                                   "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" },
7798
7799                                   { 2,
7800                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7801                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7802                                   "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" },
7803
7804                                   { 3,
7805                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7806                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7807                                   "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" },
7808
7809                                   { 4,
7810                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7811                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7812                                   "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" }
7813                 } );
7814
7815                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7816                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7817                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7818
7819                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7820                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7821                                  "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", {
7822
7823                                   { 0,
7824                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7825                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7826                                   "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" },
7827
7828                                   { 1,
7829                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7830                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7831                                   "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" },
7832
7833                                   { 2,
7834                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7835                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7836                                   "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" },
7837
7838                                   { 3,
7839                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7840                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7841                                   "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" },
7842
7843                                   { 4,
7844                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7845                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7846                                   "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" }
7847                 } );
7848
7849                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7850                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7851                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7852
7853                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7854                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7855                                  "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", {
7856
7857                                   { 0,
7858                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7859                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7860                                   "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" },
7861
7862                                   { 1,
7863                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7864                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7865                                   "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" },
7866
7867                                   { 2,
7868                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7869                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7870                                   "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" },
7871
7872                                   { 3,
7873                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7874                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7875                                   "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" }
7876                 } );
7877
7878                 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7879                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7880                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7881                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7882
7883                 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7884                                  "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7885                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80084a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994abc996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d005101473044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc31201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7886
7887                                   { 0,
7888                                   "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7889                                   "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7890                                   "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" },
7891
7892                                   { 1,
7893                                   "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7894                                   "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7895                                   "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" },
7896
7897                                   { 2,
7898                                   "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7899                                   "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7900                                   "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" },
7901
7902                                   { 3,
7903                                   "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7904                                   "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7905                                   "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" }
7906                 } );
7907
7908                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7909                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7910                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7911                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7912
7913                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7914                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7915                                  "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", {
7916
7917                                   { 0,
7918                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7919                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7920                                   "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" },
7921
7922                                   { 1,
7923                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7924                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7925                                   "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" },
7926
7927                                   { 2,
7928                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7929                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7930                                   "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" },
7931
7932                                   { 3,
7933                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7934                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7935                                   "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" }
7936                 } );
7937
7938                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7939                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7940                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7941
7942                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7943                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7944                                  "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", {
7945
7946                                   { 0,
7947                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7948                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7949                                   "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" },
7950
7951                                   { 1,
7952                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7953                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7954                                   "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" },
7955
7956                                   { 2,
7957                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7958                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7959                                   "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" }
7960                 } );
7961
7962                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7963                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7964                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7965
7966                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7967                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7968                                  "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", {
7969
7970                                   { 0,
7971                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7972                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7973                                   "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" },
7974
7975                                   { 1,
7976                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7977                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7978                                   "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" },
7979
7980                                   { 2,
7981                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7982                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7983                                   "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b014830450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7984                 } );
7985
7986                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7987                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7988                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7989
7990                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7991                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7992                                  "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", {
7993
7994                                   { 0,
7995                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7996                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7997                                   "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" },
7998
7999                                   { 1,
8000                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8001                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8002                                   "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" }
8003                 } );
8004
8005                 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8006                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8007                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8008                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8009
8010                 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8011                                  "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8012                                  "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", {
8013
8014                                   { 0,
8015                                   "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8016                                   "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8017                                   "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" },
8018
8019                                   { 1,
8020                                   "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8021                                   "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8022                                   "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" }
8023                 } );
8024
8025                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8026                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8027                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8028                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8029
8030                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8031                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8032                                  "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", {
8033
8034                                   { 0,
8035                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8036                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8037                                   "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" },
8038
8039                                   { 1,
8040                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8041                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8042                                   "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb58170147304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8043                 } );
8044
8045                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8046                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8047                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8048
8049                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8050                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8051                                  "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", {
8052
8053                                   { 0,
8054                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8055                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8056                                   "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8057                 } );
8058
8059                 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8060                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8061                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8062                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8063
8064                 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8065                                  "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8066                                  "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", {
8067
8068                                   { 0,
8069                                   "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8070                                   "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8071                                   "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" }
8072                 } );
8073
8074                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8075                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8076                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8077                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8078
8079                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8080                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8081                                  "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", {
8082
8083                                   { 0,
8084                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8085                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8086                                   "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" }
8087                 } );
8088
8089                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8090                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8091                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8092                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8093
8094                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8095                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8096                                  "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", {});
8097
8098                 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8099                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8100                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8101                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8102
8103                 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8104                                  "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8105                                  "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", {});
8106
8107                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8108                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8109                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8110                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8111
8112                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8113                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8114                                  "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", {});
8115
8116                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8117                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8118                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8119
8120                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8121                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8122                                  "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", {});
8123
8124                 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8125                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8126                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8127                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8128
8129                 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8130                                  "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8131                                  "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", {});
8132
8133                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8134                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8135                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8136                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8137
8138                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8139                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8140                                  "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", {});
8141
8142                 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8143                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8144                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8145                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8146                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8147                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8148                                 htlc_id: 1,
8149                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
8150                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
8151                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8152                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8153                         };
8154                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8155                         out
8156                 });
8157                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8158                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8159                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8160                                 htlc_id: 6,
8161                                 amount_msat: 5000001,
8162                                 cltv_expiry: 506,
8163                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8164                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8165                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8166                         };
8167                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8168                         out
8169                 });
8170                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8171                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8172                                 htlc_id: 5,
8173                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
8174                                 cltv_expiry: 505,
8175                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8176                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8177                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8178                         };
8179                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8180                         out
8181                 });
8182
8183                 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8184                                  "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8185                                  "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", {
8186
8187                                   { 0,
8188                                   "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8189                                   "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8190                                   "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" },
8191                                   { 1,
8192                                   "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8193                                   "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8194                                   "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" },
8195                                   { 2,
8196                                   "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8197                                   "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8198                                   "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
8199                 } );
8200
8201                 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8202                                  "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8203                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aad9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b7601473044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c72501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8204
8205                                   { 0,
8206                                   "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8207                                   "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8208                                   "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" },
8209                                   { 1,
8210                                   "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8211                                   "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8212                                   "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" },
8213                                   { 2,
8214                                   "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8215                                   "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8216                                   "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" }
8217                 } );
8218         }
8219
8220         #[test]
8221         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8222                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8223
8224                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8225                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8226                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8227                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8228
8229                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8230                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8231                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8232
8233                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8234                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8235
8236                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8237                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8238
8239                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8240                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8241                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8242         }
8243
8244         #[test]
8245         fn test_key_derivation() {
8246                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8247                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8248
8249                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8250                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8251
8252                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8253                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8254
8255                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8256                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8257
8258                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8259                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8260
8261                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8262                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8263
8264                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8265                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8266
8267                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8268                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8269         }
8270
8271         #[test]
8272         fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8273                 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8274                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8275                 let seed = [42; 32];
8276                 let network = Network::Testnet;
8277                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8278                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8279
8280                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8281                 let config = UserConfig::default();
8282                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8283                         node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8284
8285                 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8286                 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8287
8288                 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8289                 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8290                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8291                 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8292                         node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8293                         &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8294                 assert!(res.is_ok());
8295         }
8296
8297         #[cfg(anchors)]
8298         #[test]
8299         fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8300                 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8301                 // resulting `channel_type`.
8302                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8303                 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8304                 let network = Network::Testnet;
8305                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8306                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8307
8308                 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8309                 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8310
8311                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8312                 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8313
8314                 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8315                 // need to signal it.
8316                 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8317                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8318                         &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8319                         &config, 0, 42
8320                 ).unwrap();
8321                 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8322
8323                 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8324                 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8325                 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8326
8327                 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8328                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8329                         &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8330                 ).unwrap();
8331
8332                 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8333                 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8334                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8335                         &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8336                         &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8337                 ).unwrap();
8338
8339                 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8340                 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8341         }
8342
8343         #[cfg(anchors)]
8344         #[test]
8345         fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8346                 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8347                 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8348                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8349                 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8350                 let network = Network::Testnet;
8351                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8352                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8353
8354                 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8355                 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8356
8357                 let config = UserConfig::default();
8358
8359                 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8360                 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8361                 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8362                 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8363                 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8364
8365                 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8366                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8367                         &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8368                 ).unwrap();
8369
8370                 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8371                 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8372                 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8373
8374                 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8375                 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8376                 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8377                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8378                         &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8379                         &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8380                 );
8381                 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8382         }
8383
8384         #[cfg(anchors)]
8385         #[test]
8386         fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8387                 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8388                 // it is rejected.
8389                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8390                 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8391                 let network = Network::Testnet;
8392                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8393                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8394
8395                 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8396                 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8397
8398                 let config = UserConfig::default();
8399
8400                 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8401                 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8402                 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8403                 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8404                 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8405                 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8406                 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8407                 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8408
8409                 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8410                 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8411                 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8412                 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8413                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8414                         &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8415                 ).unwrap();
8416
8417                 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8418                 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8419
8420                 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8421                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8422                         &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8423                         &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8424                 );
8425                 assert!(res.is_err());
8426
8427                 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8428                 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8429                 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8430                 // LDK.
8431                 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8432                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8433                         10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8434                 ).unwrap();
8435
8436                 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8437
8438                 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8439                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8440                         &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8441                         &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8442                 ).unwrap();
8443
8444                 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8445                 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8446
8447                 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8448                         &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8449                 );
8450                 assert!(res.is_err());
8451         }
8452 }