1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
74 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
225 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
228 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
229 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
230 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
234 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
236 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
237 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
238 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
241 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
246 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
250 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
251 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
252 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
253 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
254 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
255 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
256 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
258 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
259 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
260 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
261 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
262 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
263 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
264 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
266 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
267 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
268 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
270 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
271 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
272 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
273 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
274 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
275 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
277 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
278 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
280 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
281 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
282 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
283 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
284 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
285 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
286 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
287 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
288 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
290 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
291 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
292 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
293 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
294 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
295 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
296 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
297 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
298 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
299 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
300 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
301 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
303 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
304 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
306 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
308 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
310 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
311 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
312 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
313 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
317 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
319 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
323 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
324 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
325 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
326 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
327 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
329 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
330 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
332 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
334 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
335 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
337 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
338 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
339 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
340 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
341 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
342 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
344 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
345 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
347 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
348 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
349 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
350 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
351 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
353 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
354 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
356 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
357 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
359 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
360 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
361 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
362 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
368 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
369 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
371 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
372 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
373 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
378 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
379 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
381 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
382 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
383 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
388 macro_rules! secp_check {
389 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
392 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
397 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
398 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
399 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
400 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
401 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
402 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
403 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
404 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
406 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
408 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
410 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
414 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
416 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
417 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
418 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
420 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
421 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
423 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
424 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
425 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
426 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
427 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
429 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
430 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
434 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
440 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
443 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
444 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
445 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
446 holding_cell_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
450 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
451 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
452 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
453 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
454 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
455 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
456 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
457 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
458 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
459 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
462 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
463 struct HTLCCandidate {
465 origin: HTLCInitiator,
469 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
477 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
479 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
481 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
482 htlc_value_msat: u64,
483 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
488 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
489 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
490 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
491 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
492 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
494 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
495 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
496 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
497 htlc_value_msat: u64,
499 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
500 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
504 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
505 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
506 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
507 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
508 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
509 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
510 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
511 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
512 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
513 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
514 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
517 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
518 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
519 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
520 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
521 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
522 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
523 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
524 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
527 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
529 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
530 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
531 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
532 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
533 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
534 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
537 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
538 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
539 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
540 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
541 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
542 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
543 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
544 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
545 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
546 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
547 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
548 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
549 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
550 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
551 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
553 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
554 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
555 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
556 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
558 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
559 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
560 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
561 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
563 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
564 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
565 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
566 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
567 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
569 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
570 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
571 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
572 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
574 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
575 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
576 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
578 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
579 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
580 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
581 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
582 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
584 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
585 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
588 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
589 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
591 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
592 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
593 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
594 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
596 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
597 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
600 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
601 (0, update, required),
604 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
605 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
606 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
607 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
608 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
610 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
611 /// in a timely manner.
612 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
615 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
616 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
617 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
619 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
620 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
621 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
622 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
626 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
627 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
628 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
630 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
631 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
632 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
633 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
635 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
639 channel_id: [u8; 32],
640 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
643 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
644 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
646 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
647 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
648 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
650 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
651 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
652 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
653 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
655 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
656 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
658 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
660 holder_signer: Signer,
661 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
662 destination_script: Script,
664 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
665 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
666 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
668 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
669 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
670 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
671 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
672 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
673 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
675 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
676 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
677 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
678 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
679 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
680 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
682 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
684 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
685 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
686 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
688 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
689 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
690 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
691 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
692 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
693 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
694 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
696 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
698 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
699 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
700 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
701 // HTLCs with similar state.
702 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
703 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
704 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
705 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
706 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
707 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
708 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
709 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
710 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
713 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
714 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
715 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
717 update_time_counter: u32,
719 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
720 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
721 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
722 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
723 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
724 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
726 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
727 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
729 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
730 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
731 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
732 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
734 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
735 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
737 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
739 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
741 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
742 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
743 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
744 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
745 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
746 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
747 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
748 channel_creation_height: u32,
750 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
753 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
755 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
758 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
760 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
763 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
765 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
767 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
768 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
771 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
773 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
775 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
776 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
778 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
780 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
781 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
782 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
784 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
786 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
787 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
789 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
790 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
791 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
793 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
795 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
797 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
798 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
799 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
800 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
802 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
803 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
804 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
806 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
807 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
808 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
810 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
811 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
812 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
813 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
814 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
815 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
816 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
817 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
819 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
820 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
821 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
822 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
823 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
825 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
826 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
828 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
829 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
830 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
831 /// unblock the state machine.
833 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
834 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
835 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
837 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
838 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
839 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
841 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
842 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
843 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
844 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
845 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
846 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
847 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
848 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
850 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
851 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
853 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
854 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
855 // the channel's funding UTXO.
857 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
858 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
859 // associated channel mapping.
861 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
862 // to store all of them.
863 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
865 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
866 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
867 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
868 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
869 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
871 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
872 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
874 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
875 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
877 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
878 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
879 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
881 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
882 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
883 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
886 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
887 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
888 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
889 self.update_time_counter
892 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
893 self.latest_monitor_update_id
896 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
897 self.config.announced_channel
900 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
901 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
904 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
905 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
906 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
907 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
910 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
911 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
912 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
915 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
916 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
917 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
918 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
919 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
922 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
923 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
924 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
925 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
927 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
928 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
930 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
931 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
933 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
934 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
936 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
939 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
940 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
941 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
942 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
944 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
945 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
946 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
947 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
950 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
951 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
952 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
953 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
954 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
959 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
963 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
965 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
966 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
967 self.temporary_channel_id
970 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
974 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
975 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
976 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
980 /// Gets the channel's type
981 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
985 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
987 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
988 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
989 self.short_channel_id
992 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
993 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
994 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
997 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
998 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
999 self.outbound_scid_alias
1002 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1003 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1004 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1005 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1006 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1007 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1010 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1011 /// get_funding_created.
1012 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1013 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1016 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1017 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1018 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1021 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1022 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1023 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1024 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1028 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1031 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1032 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1035 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1036 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1039 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1040 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1041 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1044 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1045 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1048 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1049 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1050 self.counterparty_node_id
1053 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1054 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1055 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1058 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1059 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1060 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1063 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1064 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1066 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1067 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1068 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1069 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1071 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1075 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1076 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1077 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1080 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1081 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1082 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1085 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1086 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1087 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1089 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1090 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1095 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1096 self.channel_value_satoshis
1099 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1100 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1103 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1104 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1107 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1108 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1109 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1111 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1112 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1113 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1114 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1115 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1117 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1121 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1122 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1123 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1126 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1127 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1128 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1131 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1132 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1133 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1136 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1137 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1138 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1141 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1142 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1143 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1146 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1147 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1148 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1151 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1152 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1153 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1154 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1155 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1158 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1160 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1161 self.prev_config = None;
1165 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1166 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1170 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1171 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1172 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1173 let did_channel_update =
1174 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1175 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1176 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1177 if did_channel_update {
1178 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1179 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1180 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1181 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1183 self.config.options = *config;
1187 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1188 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1189 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1192 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1193 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1194 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1195 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1196 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1198 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1199 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1200 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1201 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1202 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1203 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1204 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1206 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1207 where L::Target: Logger
1209 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1210 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1211 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1213 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1214 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1215 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1216 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1218 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1219 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1220 if match update_state {
1221 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1222 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1223 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1224 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1225 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1227 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1231 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1232 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1233 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1234 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1236 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1237 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1238 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1240 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1241 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1242 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1243 transaction_output_index: None
1248 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1249 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1250 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1251 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1252 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1255 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1257 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1258 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1259 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1261 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1262 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1265 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1266 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1269 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1271 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1272 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1273 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1275 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1276 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1282 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1283 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1284 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1285 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1286 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1287 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1288 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1292 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1293 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1295 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1297 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1298 if generated_by_local {
1299 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1300 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1309 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1311 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1312 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1313 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1314 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1315 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1316 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1317 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1320 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1321 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1322 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1323 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1327 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1328 preimages.push(preimage);
1332 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1333 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1335 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1337 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1338 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1340 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1341 if !generated_by_local {
1342 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1350 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1351 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1352 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1353 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1354 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1355 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1356 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1357 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1359 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1361 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1362 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1363 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1364 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1366 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1368 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1369 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1370 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1371 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1374 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1375 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1376 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1377 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1379 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1382 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1383 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1384 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1385 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1387 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1390 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1391 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1396 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1397 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1402 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1404 let channel_parameters =
1405 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1406 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1407 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1414 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1417 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1418 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1419 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1420 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1422 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1423 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1424 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1432 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1433 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1439 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1440 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1441 /// our counterparty!)
1442 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1443 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1444 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1445 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1446 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1447 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1448 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1450 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1454 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1455 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1456 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1457 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1458 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1459 //may see payments to it!
1460 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1461 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1462 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1464 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1467 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1468 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1469 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1470 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1471 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1474 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1475 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1478 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1482 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1483 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1484 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1485 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1486 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1487 // which are near the dust limit.
1488 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1489 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1490 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1491 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1492 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1494 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1495 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1497 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1500 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1501 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1502 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1505 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1506 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1508 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1509 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1510 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1511 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1512 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1513 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1514 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1517 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1520 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1521 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1522 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1524 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1525 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1526 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1527 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1528 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1529 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1531 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1532 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1538 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1539 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1541 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1542 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1543 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1544 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1545 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1546 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1547 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1550 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1553 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1554 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1555 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1557 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1558 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1559 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1560 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1561 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1562 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1564 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1565 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1569 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1570 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1571 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1572 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1573 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1574 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1575 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1577 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1578 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1580 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1587 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1588 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1589 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1590 /// corner case properly.
1591 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1592 -> AvailableBalances
1593 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1595 let context = &self;
1596 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1597 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1598 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1600 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1601 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1603 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1605 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1607 if context.is_outbound() {
1608 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1609 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1611 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1612 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1614 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1615 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1616 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1617 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1620 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1621 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1622 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1623 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1625 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1626 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1627 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1628 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1629 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1630 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1631 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1632 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1633 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1634 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1636 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1639 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1640 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1641 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1642 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1643 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1646 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1647 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1649 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1650 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1651 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1653 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1654 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1655 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1656 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1660 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1662 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1663 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1664 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1665 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1666 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1667 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1668 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1670 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1671 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1673 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1674 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1675 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1677 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1678 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1679 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1680 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1681 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1684 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1685 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1686 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1687 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1688 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1689 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1692 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1693 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1694 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1696 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1700 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1701 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1703 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1704 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1708 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1709 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1710 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1711 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1713 outbound_capacity_msat,
1714 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1715 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1719 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1720 let context = &self;
1721 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1724 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1725 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1727 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1728 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1730 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1731 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1733 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1734 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1735 let context = &self;
1736 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1738 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1741 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1742 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1744 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1745 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1747 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1748 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1750 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1751 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1755 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1756 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1762 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1763 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1764 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1767 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1768 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1769 included_htlcs += 1;
1772 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1773 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1777 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1778 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1779 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1780 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1781 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1782 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1787 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1789 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1790 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1795 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1796 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1800 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1801 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1802 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1805 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1806 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1808 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1809 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1810 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1812 total_pending_htlcs,
1813 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1814 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1815 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1817 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1818 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1819 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1821 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1823 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1828 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1829 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1831 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1832 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1834 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1835 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1837 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1838 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1839 let context = &self;
1840 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1842 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1845 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1846 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1848 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1849 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1851 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1852 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1854 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1855 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1859 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1860 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1866 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1867 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1868 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1869 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1870 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1871 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1874 included_htlcs += 1;
1877 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1878 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1881 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1882 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1884 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1885 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1886 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1891 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1892 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1893 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1896 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1897 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1899 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1900 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1902 total_pending_htlcs,
1903 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1904 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1905 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1907 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1908 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1909 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1911 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1913 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1918 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1919 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1920 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1921 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1927 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1928 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1929 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1930 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1931 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1932 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1933 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1934 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1935 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1936 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1937 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1939 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1940 // return them to fail the payment.
1941 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1942 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1943 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1945 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1946 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1951 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1952 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1953 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1954 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1955 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1956 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1957 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1958 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1959 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1960 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1961 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1962 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1963 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1968 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1969 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1970 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1974 // Internal utility functions for channels
1976 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1977 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1978 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1980 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1982 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1983 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1984 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1986 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1989 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1991 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1994 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1995 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1996 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1998 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2000 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2001 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2002 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2003 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2004 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2007 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2008 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2009 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2010 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2011 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2012 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2013 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2016 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2017 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2019 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2020 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2023 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2024 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2025 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2026 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2027 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2028 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2031 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2032 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2033 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_funding_signed on an
2036 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2037 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2038 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2039 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2042 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2043 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2045 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2046 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2047 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2051 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2052 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2053 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2054 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2055 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2057 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2058 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2059 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2060 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2061 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2062 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2063 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2064 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2065 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2066 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2067 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2071 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2072 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2073 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2074 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2075 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2076 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2078 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2080 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2081 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2082 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2083 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2084 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2085 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2086 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2087 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2089 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2090 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2094 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2100 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2101 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2102 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2103 // outside of those situations will fail.
2104 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2108 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2113 1 + // script length (0)
2117 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2118 2 + // witness marker and flag
2119 1 + // witness element count
2120 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2121 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2122 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2123 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2124 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2125 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2127 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2128 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2129 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2135 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2136 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2137 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2138 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2140 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2141 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2142 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2144 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2145 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2146 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2147 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2148 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2149 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2152 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2153 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2156 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2157 value_to_holder = 0;
2160 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2161 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2162 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2163 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2165 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2166 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2169 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2170 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2173 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2176 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2177 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2179 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2181 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2182 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2183 where L::Target: Logger {
2184 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2185 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2186 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2187 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2188 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2189 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2190 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2191 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2195 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2196 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2197 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2198 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2200 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2201 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2203 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2205 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2207 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2208 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2209 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2211 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2212 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2213 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2214 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2215 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2217 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2218 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2219 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2221 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2222 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2224 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2227 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2228 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2232 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2236 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2237 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2238 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2239 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2240 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2241 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2244 // Now update local state:
2246 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2247 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2248 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2249 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2250 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2251 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2252 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2256 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2257 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2258 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2259 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2260 // do not not get into this branch.
2261 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2262 match pending_update {
2263 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2264 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2265 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2266 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2267 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2268 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2269 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2272 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2273 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2274 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2275 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2276 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2277 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2278 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2284 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2285 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2286 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2288 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2289 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2290 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2292 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2293 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2296 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2297 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2299 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2300 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2302 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2303 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2306 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2309 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2310 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2311 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2312 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2317 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2318 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2319 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2320 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2321 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2322 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2323 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2324 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2325 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2326 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2327 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2328 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2329 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2330 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2331 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2333 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2334 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2335 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2336 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2337 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2340 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2341 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2342 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2348 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2349 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2351 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2355 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2356 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2357 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2358 /// before we fail backwards.
2360 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2361 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2362 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2363 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2364 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2365 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2366 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2369 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2370 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2371 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2372 /// before we fail backwards.
2374 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2375 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2376 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2377 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2378 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2379 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2380 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2382 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2384 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2385 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2386 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2388 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2389 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2390 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2392 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2393 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2394 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2396 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2401 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2402 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2408 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2409 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2410 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2411 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2412 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2416 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2417 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2418 force_holding_cell = true;
2421 // Now update local state:
2422 if force_holding_cell {
2423 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2424 match pending_update {
2425 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2426 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2427 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2428 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2432 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2433 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2434 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2435 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2441 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2442 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2443 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2449 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2451 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2452 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2455 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2456 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2457 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2462 // Message handlers:
2464 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2465 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2466 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2467 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2468 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2470 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2473 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2474 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2476 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2479 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2480 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2481 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2482 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2485 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2487 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2488 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2489 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2490 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2492 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2493 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2495 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2496 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2498 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2499 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2500 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2501 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2502 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2503 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2507 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2508 initial_commitment_tx,
2511 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2512 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2515 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2516 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2519 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2520 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2521 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2522 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2523 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2524 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2525 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2526 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2527 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2528 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2529 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2530 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2532 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2534 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2536 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2537 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2538 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2539 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2541 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2543 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2544 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2548 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2549 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2551 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2552 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2553 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2554 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2556 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2559 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2560 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2561 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2564 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2565 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2566 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2567 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2568 // when routing outbound payments.
2569 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2573 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2575 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2576 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2577 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2578 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2579 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2580 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2581 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2582 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2583 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2585 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2586 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2587 let expected_point =
2588 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2589 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2591 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2592 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2593 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2594 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2595 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2596 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2598 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2599 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2600 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2601 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2602 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2604 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2605 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2609 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2612 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2613 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2615 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2617 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2620 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2621 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2622 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2623 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2624 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2625 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2627 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2628 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2629 if local_sent_shutdown {
2630 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2632 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2633 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2634 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2635 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2637 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2638 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2640 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2641 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2643 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2646 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2647 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2650 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2651 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2652 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2653 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2655 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2656 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2658 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2659 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2660 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2661 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2662 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2663 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2664 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2665 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2666 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2667 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2668 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2670 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2671 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2672 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2673 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2674 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2675 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2679 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2680 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2683 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2684 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2685 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2687 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2688 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2689 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2690 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2691 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2692 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2693 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2697 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2698 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2699 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2700 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2701 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2702 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2703 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2707 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2708 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2709 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2710 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2711 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2712 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2715 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2716 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2717 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2718 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2719 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2721 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2725 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2726 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2729 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2730 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2731 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2732 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2733 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2734 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2735 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2736 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2737 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2738 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2739 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2740 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2741 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2742 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2743 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2744 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2747 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2748 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2749 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2750 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2751 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2754 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2755 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2757 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2758 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2761 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2762 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2763 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2767 // Now update local state:
2768 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2769 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2770 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2771 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2772 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2773 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2774 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2779 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2781 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2782 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2783 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2784 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2785 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2786 None => fail_reason.into(),
2787 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2788 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2789 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2790 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2792 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2796 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2797 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2798 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2799 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2801 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2802 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2807 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2810 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2811 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2814 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2815 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2818 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2821 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2822 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2825 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2829 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2833 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2834 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2835 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2837 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2838 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2841 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2845 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2846 where L::Target: Logger
2848 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2849 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2851 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2854 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2858 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2860 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2862 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2863 let commitment_txid = {
2864 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2865 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2866 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2868 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2869 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2870 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2871 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2872 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2877 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2879 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2880 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2881 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2882 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2885 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2886 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2887 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2888 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2891 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2893 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2894 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2895 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2896 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2897 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2898 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2899 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2900 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2901 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2902 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2903 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2909 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2910 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2913 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2914 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2915 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2916 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2917 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2918 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2919 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2920 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2921 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2922 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2923 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2924 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2925 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2928 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2929 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2930 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2931 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2932 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2933 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2934 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2936 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2937 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2938 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2939 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2940 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2941 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2942 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2943 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2945 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2946 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2949 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2951 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2952 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2953 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2956 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2959 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2960 commitment_stats.tx,
2962 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2963 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2964 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2967 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2968 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2970 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2971 let mut need_commitment = false;
2972 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2973 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2974 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2975 need_commitment = true;
2979 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2980 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2981 Some(forward_info.clone())
2983 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2984 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2985 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2986 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2987 need_commitment = true;
2990 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2991 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2992 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2993 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2994 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2995 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2996 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2997 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2998 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2999 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3000 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3001 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3002 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3003 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3005 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3007 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3008 need_commitment = true;
3012 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3013 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3014 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3015 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3016 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3017 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3019 nondust_htlc_sources,
3023 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3024 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3025 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3026 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3028 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3029 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3030 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3031 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3032 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3033 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3034 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3035 // includes the right HTLCs.
3036 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3037 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3038 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3039 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3040 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3041 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3043 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3044 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3045 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3048 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3049 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3050 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3051 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3052 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3053 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3054 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3055 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3056 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3060 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3061 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3062 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3063 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3066 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3067 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3068 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3069 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3070 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3071 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3072 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3074 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3075 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3076 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3077 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3080 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3081 /// for our counterparty.
3082 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3083 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3084 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3085 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3087 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3088 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3089 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3090 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3092 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3093 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3094 updates: Vec::new(),
3097 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3098 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3099 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3100 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3101 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3102 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3103 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3104 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3105 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3106 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3107 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3108 // to rebalance channels.
3109 match &htlc_update {
3110 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3111 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3112 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3114 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3115 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3117 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3120 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3121 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3122 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3123 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3124 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3125 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3126 // into the holding cell without ever being
3127 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3128 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3129 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3132 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3138 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3139 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3140 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3141 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3142 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3143 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3144 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3145 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3146 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3147 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3148 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3149 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3151 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3152 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3153 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3154 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3155 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3156 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3157 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3158 // for a full revocation before failing.
3159 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3160 update_fail_count += 1;
3163 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3165 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3172 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3173 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3175 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3176 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3181 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3182 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3183 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3184 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3185 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3187 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3188 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3189 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3191 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3192 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3198 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3199 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3200 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3201 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3202 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3203 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3204 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3205 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3206 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3208 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3211 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3214 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3218 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3220 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3221 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3226 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3227 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3228 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3229 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3230 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3231 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3232 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3233 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3237 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3239 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3240 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3243 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3244 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3246 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3248 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3249 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3250 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3251 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3252 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3253 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3254 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3255 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3259 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3260 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3261 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3262 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3263 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3264 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3265 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3266 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3267 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3269 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3270 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3273 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3274 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3275 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3276 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3277 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3278 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3279 let mut require_commitment = false;
3280 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3283 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3284 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3285 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3287 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3288 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3289 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3290 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3291 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3292 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3297 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3298 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3299 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3300 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3301 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3303 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3304 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3305 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3310 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3311 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3313 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3317 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3318 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3320 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3321 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3322 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3323 require_commitment = true;
3324 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3325 match forward_info {
3326 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3327 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3328 require_commitment = true;
3330 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3331 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3332 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3334 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3335 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3336 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3340 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3341 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3342 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3343 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3349 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3350 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3351 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3352 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3354 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3355 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3356 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3357 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3358 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3359 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3360 require_commitment = true;
3364 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3366 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3367 match update_state {
3368 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3369 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3370 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3371 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3372 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3374 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3375 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3376 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3377 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3378 require_commitment = true;
3379 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3380 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3385 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3386 let release_state_str =
3387 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3388 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3389 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3390 if !release_monitor {
3391 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3392 update: monitor_update,
3394 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3396 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3401 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3402 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3403 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3404 if require_commitment {
3405 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3406 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3407 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3408 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3409 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3410 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3411 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3412 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3413 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3415 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3416 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3417 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3418 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3419 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3422 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3423 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3424 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3425 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3426 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3427 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3429 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3430 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), release_state_str);
3432 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3433 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3435 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3436 if require_commitment {
3437 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3439 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3440 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3441 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3442 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3444 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3445 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()),
3446 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3449 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3450 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3452 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3453 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), release_state_str);
3455 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3456 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3462 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3463 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3464 /// commitment update.
3465 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3466 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3467 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3469 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3470 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3473 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3474 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3475 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3476 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3478 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3479 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3480 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3481 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3482 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3483 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3484 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3486 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3487 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3489 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3490 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3492 if !self.context.is_live() {
3493 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3496 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3497 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3498 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3499 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3500 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3501 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3502 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3503 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3504 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3505 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3509 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3510 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3511 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3512 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3513 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3514 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3517 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3518 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3522 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3523 force_holding_cell = true;
3526 if force_holding_cell {
3527 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3531 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3532 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3534 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3535 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3540 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3541 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3543 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3545 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3546 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3547 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3548 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3552 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3553 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3554 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3558 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3559 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3562 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3563 // will be retransmitted.
3564 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3565 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3566 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3568 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3569 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3571 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3572 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3573 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3574 // this HTLC accordingly
3575 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3578 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3579 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3580 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3581 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3584 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3585 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3586 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3587 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3588 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3589 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3594 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3596 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3597 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3598 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3599 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3603 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3604 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3605 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3606 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3607 // the update upon reconnection.
3608 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3612 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3614 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3615 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3618 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3619 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3620 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3621 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3622 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3623 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3624 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3626 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3627 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3628 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3629 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3630 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3631 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3632 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3634 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3635 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3636 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3637 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3638 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3639 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3640 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3643 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3644 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3645 /// to the remote side.
3646 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3647 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3648 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3649 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3652 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3654 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3655 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3657 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3658 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3659 // first received the funding_signed.
3660 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3661 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3662 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3664 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3665 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3666 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3667 funding_broadcastable = None;
3670 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3671 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3672 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3673 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3674 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3675 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3676 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3677 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3678 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3679 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3680 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3681 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3682 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3683 next_per_commitment_point,
3684 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3688 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3690 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3691 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3692 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3693 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3694 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3695 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3697 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3698 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3699 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3700 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3701 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3702 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3706 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3707 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3709 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3710 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3711 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3714 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3715 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3716 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3717 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3718 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3719 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3720 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3721 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3722 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3726 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3727 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3729 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3730 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3732 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3733 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3735 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3736 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3738 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3739 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3740 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3741 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3742 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3743 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3744 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3745 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3746 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3747 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3748 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3749 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3750 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3751 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3753 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3754 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3755 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3761 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3762 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3763 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3764 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3765 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3766 per_commitment_secret,
3767 next_per_commitment_point,
3769 next_local_nonce: None,
3773 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3774 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3775 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3776 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3777 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3779 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3780 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3781 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3782 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3783 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3784 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3785 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3786 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3787 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3788 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3793 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3794 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3796 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3797 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3798 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3799 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3800 reason: err_packet.clone()
3803 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3804 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3805 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3806 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3807 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3808 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3811 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3812 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3813 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3814 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3815 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3822 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3823 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3824 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3825 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3829 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3830 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3831 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3832 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3833 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3834 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3838 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3839 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3841 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3842 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3843 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3844 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3845 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3846 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3847 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3848 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3851 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3853 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3854 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3855 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3856 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3857 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3860 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3861 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3862 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3865 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3866 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3867 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3868 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3869 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3870 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3872 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3873 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3874 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3875 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3876 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3879 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3880 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3881 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3882 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3883 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3884 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3885 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3886 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3890 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3891 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3892 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3893 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3895 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3899 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3900 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3901 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3902 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3904 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3905 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3906 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3907 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3908 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3912 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3914 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3915 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3916 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3917 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3918 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3919 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3921 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3922 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3923 channel_ready: None,
3924 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3925 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3926 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3930 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3931 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3932 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3933 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3934 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3935 next_per_commitment_point,
3936 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3938 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3939 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3940 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3944 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3945 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3946 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3948 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3949 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3950 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3953 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3956 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3959 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3960 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3961 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3962 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3963 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3964 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3965 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3967 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3969 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3970 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3971 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3972 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3973 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3974 next_per_commitment_point,
3975 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3979 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3980 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3981 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3983 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3986 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3987 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3988 raa: required_revoke,
3989 commitment_update: None,
3990 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3992 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3993 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3994 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3996 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3999 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4000 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4001 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4002 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4003 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4004 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4007 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4008 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4009 raa: required_revoke,
4010 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4011 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4015 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4019 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4020 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4021 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4022 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4024 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4026 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4028 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4029 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4030 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4031 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4032 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4033 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4035 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4036 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4037 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4038 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4039 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4041 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4042 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4043 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4044 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4047 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4048 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4049 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4050 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4051 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4052 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4053 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4054 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4055 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4056 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4057 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4058 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4059 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4060 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4061 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4063 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4066 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4067 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4070 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4071 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4072 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4073 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4074 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4075 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4078 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4079 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4080 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4081 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4082 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4083 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4084 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4086 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4092 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4093 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4094 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4095 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4097 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4098 return Ok((None, None));
4101 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4102 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4103 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4105 return Ok((None, None));
4108 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4110 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4111 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4112 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4113 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4115 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4116 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4117 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4119 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4120 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4121 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4122 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4124 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4125 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4126 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4131 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4132 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4134 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4135 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4138 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4139 /// within our expected timeframe.
4141 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4142 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4143 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4146 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4149 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4150 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4153 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4154 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4155 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4156 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4158 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4161 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4162 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4163 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4164 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4165 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4167 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4168 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4169 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4172 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4174 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4175 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4178 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4179 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4180 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4183 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4186 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4187 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4188 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4189 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4191 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4194 assert!(send_shutdown);
4195 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4196 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4197 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4199 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4200 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4202 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4207 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4209 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4210 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4212 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4213 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4214 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4215 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4216 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4217 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4220 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4221 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4223 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4224 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4225 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4226 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4230 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4231 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4232 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4233 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4234 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4235 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4237 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4238 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4245 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4246 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4248 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4251 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4252 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4254 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4256 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4257 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4258 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4259 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4260 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4261 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4262 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4263 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4264 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4266 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4267 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4270 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4274 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4275 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4276 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4277 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4279 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4280 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4282 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4285 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4288 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4289 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4292 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4293 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4296 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4297 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4298 return Ok((None, None));
4301 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4302 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4303 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4304 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4306 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4308 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4311 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4312 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4313 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4314 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4315 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4319 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4320 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4325 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4326 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4327 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4328 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4329 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4330 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4331 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4335 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4337 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4338 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4339 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4340 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4342 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4345 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4346 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4347 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4349 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4350 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4351 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4352 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4356 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4357 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4358 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4359 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4361 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4362 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4363 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4369 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4370 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4371 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4373 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4374 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4376 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4377 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4380 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4381 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4382 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4383 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4384 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4386 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4387 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4388 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4390 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4391 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4394 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4395 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4396 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4397 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4398 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4399 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4400 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4401 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4403 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4406 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4407 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4408 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4409 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4411 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4415 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4416 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4417 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4418 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4420 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4426 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4427 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4428 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4429 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4430 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4431 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4432 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4434 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4435 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4438 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4440 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4441 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4447 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4448 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4449 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4450 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4451 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4452 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4453 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4455 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4456 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4463 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4464 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4467 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4468 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4471 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4472 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4476 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4477 &self.context.holder_signer
4481 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4483 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4484 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4485 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4486 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4487 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4488 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4490 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4492 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4500 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4501 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4505 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4506 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4507 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4508 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4511 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4512 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4513 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4514 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4517 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4518 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4519 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4520 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4521 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4522 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4525 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4526 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4527 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4528 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4529 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4530 if !release_monitor {
4531 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4540 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4541 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4544 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4545 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4546 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4548 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4549 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4550 if self.context.channel_state &
4551 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4552 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4553 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4554 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4555 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4558 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4559 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4560 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4561 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4562 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4563 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4565 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4566 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4567 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4569 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4570 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4571 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4572 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4573 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4574 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4580 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4581 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4582 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4585 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4586 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4587 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4590 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4591 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4592 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4595 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4596 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4597 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4598 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4599 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4600 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4605 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4606 self.context.channel_update_status
4609 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4610 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4611 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4614 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4616 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4617 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4618 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4622 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4623 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4624 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4627 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4631 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4632 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4633 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4635 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4636 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4637 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4639 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4640 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4643 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4644 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4645 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4646 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4647 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4648 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4649 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4650 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4651 self.context.channel_state);
4653 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4657 if need_commitment_update {
4658 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4659 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4660 let next_per_commitment_point =
4661 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4662 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4663 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4664 next_per_commitment_point,
4665 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4669 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4675 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4676 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4677 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4678 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4679 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4680 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4681 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4683 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4686 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4687 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4688 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4689 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4690 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4691 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4692 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4693 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4694 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4695 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4696 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4697 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4698 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4699 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4700 // channel and move on.
4701 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4702 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4704 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4705 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4706 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4708 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4709 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4710 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4711 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4712 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4713 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4714 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4718 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4719 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4720 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4721 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4722 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4726 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4727 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4728 // may have already happened for this block).
4729 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4730 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4731 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4732 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4735 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4736 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4737 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4738 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4746 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4747 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4748 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4749 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4751 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4752 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4755 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4757 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4758 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4759 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4760 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4762 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4765 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4768 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4769 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4770 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4771 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4773 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4776 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4777 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4778 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4780 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4781 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4783 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4784 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4785 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4793 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4795 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4796 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4797 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4799 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4800 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4803 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4804 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4805 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4806 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4807 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4808 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4809 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4810 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4811 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4814 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4815 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4816 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4817 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4819 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4820 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4821 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4823 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4824 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4825 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4826 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4828 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4829 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4830 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4831 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4832 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4833 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4834 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4837 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4838 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4840 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4843 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4844 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4845 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4846 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4847 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4848 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4849 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4850 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4851 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4852 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4853 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4854 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4855 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4856 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4857 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4858 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4859 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4865 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4870 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4871 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4873 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4874 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
4875 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4876 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4878 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4881 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4883 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
4884 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4885 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4886 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4887 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4888 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4890 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4891 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4894 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4895 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4896 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4897 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4898 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4899 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4901 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4902 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4905 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4906 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4907 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4908 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4909 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4915 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4916 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4917 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4918 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4920 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4923 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4927 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4931 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4932 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4936 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4940 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4941 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4944 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4948 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4950 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4955 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4957 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4962 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
4964 None => return None,
4967 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4969 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4970 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4972 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4973 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4977 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4979 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4980 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4981 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4982 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4983 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4984 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4985 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4987 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4988 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4989 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4990 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4991 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4992 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4993 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4994 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4995 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4996 contents: announcement,
4999 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5003 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5004 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5005 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5006 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5007 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5008 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5009 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5010 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5012 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5014 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5016 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5017 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5019 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5020 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5021 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5022 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5025 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5026 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5027 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5028 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5031 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5034 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5035 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5036 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5037 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5038 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5039 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5042 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5044 Err(_) => return None,
5046 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5047 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5052 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5053 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5054 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5055 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5056 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5057 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5058 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5059 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5060 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5061 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5062 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5063 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5064 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5065 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5066 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5067 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5070 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5073 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5074 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5075 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5076 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5077 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5078 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5079 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5080 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5081 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5083 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5084 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5085 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5086 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5087 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5088 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5089 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5090 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5091 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5093 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5094 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5095 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5096 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5097 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5098 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5099 next_funding_txid: None,
5104 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5106 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5107 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5108 /// commitment update.
5110 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5111 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5112 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5113 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5114 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5115 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5116 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5119 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5120 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5121 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5123 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5124 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5129 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5130 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5132 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5134 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5135 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5137 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5138 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5139 /// regenerate them.
5141 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5142 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5144 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5145 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5146 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5147 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5148 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5149 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5150 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5152 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5153 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5155 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5156 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5157 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5160 if amount_msat == 0 {
5161 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5164 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5165 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5166 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5167 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5170 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5171 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5172 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5175 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5176 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5177 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5178 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5179 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5180 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5181 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5182 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5185 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5186 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5187 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5188 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5189 else { "to peer" });
5191 if need_holding_cell {
5192 force_holding_cell = true;
5195 // Now update local state:
5196 if force_holding_cell {
5197 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5202 onion_routing_packet,
5208 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5209 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5211 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5213 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5218 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5219 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5220 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5224 onion_routing_packet,
5227 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5232 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5233 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5234 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5235 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5237 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5238 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5239 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5241 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5242 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5246 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5247 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5248 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5249 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5250 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5251 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5252 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5255 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5256 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5257 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5258 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5259 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5260 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5263 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5265 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5266 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5267 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5269 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5270 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5273 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5274 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5275 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5276 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5277 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5278 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5279 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5280 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5283 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5287 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5288 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5289 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5290 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5292 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5294 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5295 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5296 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5297 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5298 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5299 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5300 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5301 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5302 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5303 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5304 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5310 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5313 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5314 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5315 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5316 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5317 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5318 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5320 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5321 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5322 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5323 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5326 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5327 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5331 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5332 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5334 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5336 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5337 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5338 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5339 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5341 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5342 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5343 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5344 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5345 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5346 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5350 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5351 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5355 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5356 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5359 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5360 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5362 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5363 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5364 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5365 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5366 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5367 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5368 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5369 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5371 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5372 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5373 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5376 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5377 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5378 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5384 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5385 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5388 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5389 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5390 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5391 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5397 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5398 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5400 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5401 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5402 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5403 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5404 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5405 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5406 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5407 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5408 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5411 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5412 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5413 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5415 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5416 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5419 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5420 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5422 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5423 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5424 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5427 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5428 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5429 let mut chan_closed = false;
5430 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5434 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5436 None if !chan_closed => {
5437 // use override shutdown script if provided
5438 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5439 Some(script) => script,
5441 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5442 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5443 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5444 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5448 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5449 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5451 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5457 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5458 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5459 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5460 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5462 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5464 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5466 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5467 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5468 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5469 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5470 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5471 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5474 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5475 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5477 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5478 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5479 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5482 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5483 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5484 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5485 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5486 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5488 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5489 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5496 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5497 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5499 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5502 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5503 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5504 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5506 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5507 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5511 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5515 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5516 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5517 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5518 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5521 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5522 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5523 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5524 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5525 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5526 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5527 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5528 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5529 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5531 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5532 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5533 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5534 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5536 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5537 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5539 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5540 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5542 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5543 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5544 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5546 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5547 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5549 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5550 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5551 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5552 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5553 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5556 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5557 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5559 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5560 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5562 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5564 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5566 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5567 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5568 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5569 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5572 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5573 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5575 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5576 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5577 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5578 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5582 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5583 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5584 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5588 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5589 Ok(script) => script,
5590 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5593 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5596 context: ChannelContext {
5599 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5600 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5601 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5602 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5607 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5609 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5610 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5611 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5612 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5614 channel_value_satoshis,
5616 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5619 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5622 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5623 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5626 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5627 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5628 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5629 pending_update_fee: None,
5630 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5631 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5632 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5633 update_time_counter: 1,
5635 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5637 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5638 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5639 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5640 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5641 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5642 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5644 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5645 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5646 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5647 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5649 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5650 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5651 closing_fee_limits: None,
5652 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5654 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5655 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5656 short_channel_id: None,
5657 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5659 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5660 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5661 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5662 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5663 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5664 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5665 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5666 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5667 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5668 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5669 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5670 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5672 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5674 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5675 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5676 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5677 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5678 counterparty_parameters: None,
5679 funding_outpoint: None,
5680 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5682 funding_transaction: None,
5684 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5685 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5686 counterparty_node_id,
5688 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5690 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5692 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5693 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5695 announcement_sigs: None,
5697 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5698 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5699 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5700 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5702 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5703 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5705 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5706 outbound_scid_alias,
5708 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5709 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5711 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5712 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5717 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5719 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5723 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5724 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5725 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5726 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5727 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5728 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5731 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5732 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5733 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5734 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5735 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5736 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5737 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5738 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5739 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5740 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5741 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5743 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5744 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5746 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5747 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5748 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5749 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5752 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5753 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5755 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5758 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5759 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5760 return Err((self, e));
5764 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5766 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5768 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5769 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5770 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5772 let channel = Channel {
5773 context: self.context,
5776 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5777 temporary_channel_id,
5778 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5779 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5782 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5784 next_local_nonce: None,
5788 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5789 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5790 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5791 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5792 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5793 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5794 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5795 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5796 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5797 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5800 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5801 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5802 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5803 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5804 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5805 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5811 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5812 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5813 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5814 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5815 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5816 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5818 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5820 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5821 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5822 // We've exhausted our options
5825 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5826 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5829 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5830 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5831 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5832 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5834 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5835 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5836 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5837 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5838 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5839 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5841 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5843 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5844 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5847 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5848 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5849 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5851 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5852 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5855 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5856 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5859 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5860 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5864 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5865 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5866 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5867 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5868 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5869 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5870 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5871 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5872 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5873 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5874 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5875 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5876 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5877 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5878 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5879 first_per_commitment_point,
5880 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5881 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5882 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5883 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5885 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5890 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5891 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5893 // Check sanity of message fields:
5894 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5895 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5897 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5898 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5900 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5901 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5903 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5904 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5906 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5907 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5909 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5910 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5911 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5913 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5914 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5915 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5917 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5918 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5919 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5921 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5922 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5924 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5925 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5928 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5929 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5930 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5932 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5933 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5935 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5936 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5938 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5939 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5941 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5942 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5944 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5945 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5947 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5948 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5951 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5952 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5953 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5955 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5956 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5958 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5959 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5960 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5962 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
5963 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
5966 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5967 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5968 &Some(ref script) => {
5969 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5970 if script.len() == 0 {
5973 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5974 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5976 Some(script.clone())
5979 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5981 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5986 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5987 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5988 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5989 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5990 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5992 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5993 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5995 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5998 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5999 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6000 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6001 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6002 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6003 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6006 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6007 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6008 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6011 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6012 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6014 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6015 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6021 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6022 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
6023 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
6024 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6027 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
6028 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6029 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6030 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6031 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6032 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6033 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6034 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6035 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
6036 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6037 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6038 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6041 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6043 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6044 // support this channel type.
6045 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6046 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6047 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6050 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6051 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6052 // `static_remote_key`.
6053 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6054 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6056 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6057 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6058 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6060 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6061 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6063 channel_type.clone()
6065 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6066 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6067 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6072 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6073 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6074 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6075 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6076 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6077 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6078 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6079 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6080 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6083 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6084 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6087 // Check sanity of message fields:
6088 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6091 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6092 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6094 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6097 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6098 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6099 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6101 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6102 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6104 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6105 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6107 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6109 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6110 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6113 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6116 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6117 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6120 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6121 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6124 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6125 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6127 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6128 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6130 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6131 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6133 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6134 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6136 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6137 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6139 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6143 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6145 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6146 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6151 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6152 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6153 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6154 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6155 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6157 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6158 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6160 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6161 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6162 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6164 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6165 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6168 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6169 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6170 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6171 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6172 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6173 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6176 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6177 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6178 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6179 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6183 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6184 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6185 &Some(ref script) => {
6186 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6187 if script.len() == 0 {
6190 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6191 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6193 Some(script.clone())
6196 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6198 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6203 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6204 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6205 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6206 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6210 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6211 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6216 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6217 Ok(script) => script,
6218 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6221 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6222 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6224 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6227 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6231 context: ChannelContext {
6234 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6235 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6237 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6242 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6244 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6245 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6246 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6247 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6250 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6253 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6256 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6257 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6258 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6260 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6261 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6262 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6263 pending_update_fee: None,
6264 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6265 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6266 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6267 update_time_counter: 1,
6269 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6271 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6272 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6273 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6274 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6275 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6276 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6278 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6279 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6280 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6281 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6283 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6284 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6285 closing_fee_limits: None,
6286 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6288 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6289 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6290 short_channel_id: None,
6291 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6293 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6294 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6295 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6296 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6297 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6298 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6299 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6300 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6301 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6302 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6303 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6304 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6307 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6309 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6310 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6311 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6312 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6313 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6314 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6315 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6317 funding_outpoint: None,
6318 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6320 funding_transaction: None,
6322 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6323 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6324 counterparty_node_id,
6326 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6328 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6330 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6331 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6333 announcement_sigs: None,
6335 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6336 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6337 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6338 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6340 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6341 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6343 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6344 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6346 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6347 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6349 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6350 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6355 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6357 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6363 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6364 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6366 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6367 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6368 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6369 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6371 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6372 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6374 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6375 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6378 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6381 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6382 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6383 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6385 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6386 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6387 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6388 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6390 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6391 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6392 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6393 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6394 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6395 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6396 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6397 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6398 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6399 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6400 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6401 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6402 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6403 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6404 first_per_commitment_point,
6405 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6406 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6407 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6409 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6411 next_local_nonce: None,
6415 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6416 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6418 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6420 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6421 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6424 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6425 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6427 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6428 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6430 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6431 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6432 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6433 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6434 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6435 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6436 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6437 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6438 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6441 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6442 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6444 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6445 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6446 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6447 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6449 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6450 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6452 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6453 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6456 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6457 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6458 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6460 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6463 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6464 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6466 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6467 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6468 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6470 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6472 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6473 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6474 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6475 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6478 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6479 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6480 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6481 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6482 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6484 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6486 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6487 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6488 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6491 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6492 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6493 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6497 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6498 initial_commitment_tx,
6501 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6502 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6505 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6506 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6509 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6511 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6512 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6513 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6514 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6515 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6516 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6517 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6518 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6519 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6520 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6521 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6523 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6525 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6527 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6528 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6529 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6530 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6532 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6534 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6535 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6536 let mut channel = Channel {
6537 context: self.context,
6539 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6540 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6541 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6543 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6547 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6548 }, channel_monitor))
6552 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6553 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6555 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6561 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6562 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6563 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6564 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6565 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6567 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6568 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6569 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6570 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6576 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6577 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6578 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6579 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6580 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6581 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6586 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6587 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6588 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6589 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6591 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6592 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6593 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6594 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6599 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6600 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6601 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6602 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6603 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6604 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6609 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6610 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6611 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6614 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6616 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6617 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6618 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6619 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6620 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6622 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6623 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6624 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6625 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6627 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6628 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6629 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6631 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6633 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6634 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6635 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6636 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6637 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6638 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6640 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6641 // deserialized from that format.
6642 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6643 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6644 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6646 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6648 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6649 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6650 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6652 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6653 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6654 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6655 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6658 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6659 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6660 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6663 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6664 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6665 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6666 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6668 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6669 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6671 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6673 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6675 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6677 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6680 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6682 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6687 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6688 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6690 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6691 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6692 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6693 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6694 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6695 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6696 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6698 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6700 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6702 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6705 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6706 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6707 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6710 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6712 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6713 preimages.push(preimage);
6715 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6716 reason.write(writer)?;
6718 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6720 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6721 preimages.push(preimage);
6723 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6724 reason.write(writer)?;
6727 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6728 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6729 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6731 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6732 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6733 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6737 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6738 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6739 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6741 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6742 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6746 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6747 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6748 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6749 source.write(writer)?;
6750 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6752 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6753 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6754 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6756 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6757 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6759 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6761 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6762 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6764 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6766 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6767 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6772 match self.context.resend_order {
6773 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6774 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6777 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6778 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6779 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6781 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6782 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6783 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6784 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6787 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6788 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6789 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6790 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6791 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6794 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6795 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6796 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6797 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6799 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6800 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6801 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6803 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6805 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6806 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6807 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6808 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6810 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6811 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6812 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6813 // consider the stale state on reload.
6816 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6817 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6818 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6820 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6821 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6822 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6824 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6825 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6827 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6828 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6829 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6831 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6832 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6834 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6837 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6838 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6839 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6841 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6844 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6845 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6847 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6848 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6849 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6851 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6853 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6855 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6857 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6858 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6859 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6860 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6861 htlc.write(writer)?;
6864 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6865 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6866 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6868 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6869 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6871 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6872 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6873 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6874 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6875 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6876 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6877 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6879 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6880 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6881 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6882 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6883 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6885 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6886 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6888 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6889 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6890 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6891 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6893 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6895 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6896 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6897 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6898 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6899 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6900 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6901 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6903 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6904 (2, chan_type, option),
6905 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6906 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6907 (5, self.context.config, required),
6908 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6909 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6910 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
6911 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6912 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
6913 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6914 (15, preimages, required_vec),
6915 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6916 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6917 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6918 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6919 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6920 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6921 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6922 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6923 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6924 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6925 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6932 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6933 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6935 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6936 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6938 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6939 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6940 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6942 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6943 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6944 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6945 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6947 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6949 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6950 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6951 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6952 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6953 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6955 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6956 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6959 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6960 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6961 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6963 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6965 let mut keys_data = None;
6967 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6968 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6969 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6970 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6971 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6972 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6973 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6974 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6975 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6976 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6980 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6981 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6982 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6985 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6987 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6988 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6989 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6991 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6993 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6994 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6995 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6996 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6997 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6998 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6999 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7000 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7001 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7002 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7003 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7004 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7005 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7010 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7011 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7012 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7013 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7014 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7015 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7016 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7017 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7018 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7019 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7020 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7021 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7023 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7024 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7027 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7028 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7031 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7032 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7034 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7036 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7040 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7041 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7042 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7043 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7044 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7045 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7046 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7047 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7048 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7049 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7050 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7052 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7053 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7054 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7056 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7057 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7058 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7060 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7064 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7065 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7066 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7067 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7070 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7071 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7072 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7074 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7075 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7076 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7077 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7080 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7081 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7082 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7083 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7086 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7088 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7090 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7091 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7092 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7093 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7095 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7096 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7097 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7098 // consider the stale state on reload.
7099 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7102 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7103 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7104 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7106 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7109 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7110 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7111 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7113 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7114 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7115 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7116 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7118 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7119 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7121 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7122 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7124 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7125 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7126 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7128 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7130 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7131 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7133 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7134 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7137 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7139 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7140 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7141 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7142 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7144 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7147 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7148 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7150 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7152 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7153 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7155 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7156 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7158 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7160 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7161 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7162 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7164 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7165 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7166 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7170 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7171 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7172 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7174 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7180 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7181 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7182 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7183 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7184 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7185 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7186 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7187 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7188 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7189 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7191 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7192 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7193 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7194 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7195 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7196 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7197 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7199 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7200 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7201 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7202 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7204 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7206 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7207 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7209 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7210 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7211 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7212 (2, channel_type, option),
7213 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7214 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7215 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7216 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7217 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7218 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7219 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7220 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7221 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7222 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7223 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7224 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7225 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7226 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7227 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7228 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7229 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7230 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7231 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7232 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7233 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7236 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7237 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7238 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7239 // required channel parameters.
7240 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7241 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7242 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7244 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7246 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7247 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7248 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7249 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7252 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7253 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7254 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7256 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7257 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7259 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7260 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7265 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7266 if iter.next().is_some() {
7267 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7271 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7272 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7273 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7274 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7275 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7278 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7279 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7280 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7282 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7283 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7285 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7286 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7287 // separate u64 values.
7288 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7290 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7292 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7293 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7294 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7295 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7297 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7298 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7300 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7301 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7302 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7303 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7304 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7307 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7308 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7312 context: ChannelContext {
7315 config: config.unwrap(),
7319 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7320 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7321 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7324 temporary_channel_id,
7326 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7328 channel_value_satoshis,
7330 latest_monitor_update_id,
7333 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7336 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7337 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7340 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7341 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7342 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7343 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7347 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7348 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7349 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7350 monitor_pending_forwards,
7351 monitor_pending_failures,
7352 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7355 holding_cell_update_fee,
7356 next_holder_htlc_id,
7357 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7358 update_time_counter,
7361 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7362 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7363 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7364 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7366 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7367 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7368 closing_fee_limits: None,
7369 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7371 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7372 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7374 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7376 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7377 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7378 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7379 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7380 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7381 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7382 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7383 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7384 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7387 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7389 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7390 funding_transaction,
7392 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7393 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7394 counterparty_node_id,
7396 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7400 channel_update_status,
7401 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7405 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7406 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7407 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7408 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7410 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7411 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7413 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7414 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7415 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7417 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7418 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7420 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7421 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7423 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7426 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7435 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7436 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7437 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7438 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7439 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7441 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7442 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7443 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7444 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7445 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7446 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7447 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7448 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7449 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7450 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7451 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7452 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7453 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7454 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7455 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7456 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7457 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7458 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7459 use crate::util::test_utils;
7460 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7461 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7462 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7463 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7464 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7465 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7466 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7467 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7468 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7469 use crate::prelude::*;
7471 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7474 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7475 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7481 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7482 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7483 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7484 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7488 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7489 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7490 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7491 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7492 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7493 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(
7494 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7495 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7499 signer: InMemorySigner,
7502 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7503 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7506 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7507 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7509 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7510 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7513 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7517 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7519 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7520 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7521 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7522 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7523 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7526 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7527 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7528 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7529 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7533 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7534 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7535 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7539 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7540 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7541 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7542 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7544 let seed = [42; 32];
7545 let network = Network::Testnet;
7546 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7547 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7548 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7551 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7552 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7553 let config = UserConfig::default();
7554 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7555 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7556 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7558 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7559 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7563 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7564 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7566 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7567 let original_fee = 253;
7568 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7569 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7570 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7571 let seed = [42; 32];
7572 let network = Network::Testnet;
7573 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7575 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7576 let config = UserConfig::default();
7577 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7579 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7580 // same as the old fee.
7581 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7582 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7583 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7587 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7588 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7589 // dust limits are used.
7590 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7591 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7592 let seed = [42; 32];
7593 let network = Network::Testnet;
7594 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7595 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7596 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7598 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7599 // they have different dust limits.
7601 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7602 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7603 let config = UserConfig::default();
7604 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7606 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7607 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7608 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7609 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7610 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7612 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7613 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7614 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7615 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7616 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7618 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7619 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7620 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7621 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7623 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7624 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7625 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7627 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7628 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7630 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7631 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7632 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7634 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7635 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7636 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7637 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7640 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7642 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7643 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7644 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7645 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7646 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7647 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7648 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7649 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7650 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7652 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7655 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7656 // the dust limit check.
7657 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7658 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7659 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7660 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7662 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7663 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7664 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7665 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7666 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7667 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7668 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7672 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7673 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7674 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7675 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7676 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7677 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7678 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7679 let seed = [42; 32];
7680 let network = Network::Testnet;
7681 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7683 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7684 let config = UserConfig::default();
7685 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7687 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7688 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7690 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7691 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7692 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7693 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7694 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7695 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7697 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7698 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7699 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7700 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7701 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7703 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7705 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7706 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7707 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7708 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7709 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7711 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7712 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7713 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7714 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7715 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7719 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7720 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7721 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7722 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7723 let seed = [42; 32];
7724 let network = Network::Testnet;
7725 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7726 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7727 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7729 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7731 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7732 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7733 let config = UserConfig::default();
7734 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7736 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7737 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7738 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7739 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7741 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7742 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7743 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7745 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7746 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7747 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7748 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7750 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7751 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7752 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7754 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7755 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7757 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7758 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7759 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7760 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7761 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7762 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7763 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7765 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7767 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7768 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7769 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7770 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7771 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7775 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7776 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7777 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7778 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7779 let seed = [42; 32];
7780 let network = Network::Testnet;
7781 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7782 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7783 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7785 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7786 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7787 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7788 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7789 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7790 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7791 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7792 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7794 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7795 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7796 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7797 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7798 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7799 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7801 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7802 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7803 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7804 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7806 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7808 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7809 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7810 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7811 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7812 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7813 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7815 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7816 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7817 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7818 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7820 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7821 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7822 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7823 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7824 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7826 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7827 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7829 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7830 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7831 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7833 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7834 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7835 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7836 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7837 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7839 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7840 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7842 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7843 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7844 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7848 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7850 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7851 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7852 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7854 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7855 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7856 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7857 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7859 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7860 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7861 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7863 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7865 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7866 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7869 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7870 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7871 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7872 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7873 let seed = [42; 32];
7874 let network = Network::Testnet;
7875 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7876 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7877 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7880 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7881 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7882 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7884 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7885 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7887 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7888 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7889 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7891 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7892 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7894 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7896 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7897 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7899 // Channel Negotiations failed
7900 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
7901 assert!(result.is_err());
7906 fn channel_update() {
7907 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7908 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7909 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7910 let seed = [42; 32];
7911 let network = Network::Testnet;
7912 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7913 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7914 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7916 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7917 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7918 let config = UserConfig::default();
7919 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7921 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7922 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7923 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7924 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7925 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7927 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7928 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7929 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7930 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7931 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7933 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7934 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7935 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7936 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7938 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7939 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7940 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7942 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7943 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7945 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7946 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7947 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7949 short_channel_id: 0,
7952 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7953 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7954 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7956 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7957 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7959 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7961 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7963 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7964 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7965 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7966 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7968 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7969 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7970 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7972 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7976 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7978 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7979 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7980 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7981 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7982 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7983 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7984 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7985 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7986 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7987 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7988 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7989 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7990 use crate::sync::Arc;
7992 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7993 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7994 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7995 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7997 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7999 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8000 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8001 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8002 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8003 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8005 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8006 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8012 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8013 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8014 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8016 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8017 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8018 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8019 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8020 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8021 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8023 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8025 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8026 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8027 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8028 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8029 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8030 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8032 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8033 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8034 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8035 selected_contest_delay: 144
8037 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8038 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8040 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8041 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8043 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8044 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8046 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8047 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8049 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8050 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8051 // build_commitment_transaction.
8052 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8053 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8054 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8055 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8056 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8058 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8059 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8060 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8061 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8065 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8066 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8067 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8068 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8072 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8073 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8074 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8076 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8077 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8079 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8080 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8082 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8084 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8085 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8086 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8087 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8088 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8089 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8090 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8092 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8093 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8094 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8095 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8097 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8098 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8099 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8101 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8103 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8104 commitment_tx.clone(),
8105 counterparty_signature,
8106 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8107 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8108 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8110 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8111 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8113 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8114 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8115 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8117 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8118 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8121 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8122 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8124 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8125 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8126 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8127 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8128 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8129 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8130 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8131 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8133 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8136 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8137 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8138 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8142 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8145 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8146 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8147 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8149 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8150 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8151 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8152 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8153 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8154 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8155 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8156 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8158 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8162 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8163 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8164 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8165 "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", {});
8167 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8168 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8170 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8171 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8172 "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", {});
8174 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8175 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8176 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8177 "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", {});
8179 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8180 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8182 amount_msat: 1000000,
8184 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8185 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8187 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8190 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8191 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8193 amount_msat: 2000000,
8195 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8196 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8198 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8201 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8202 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8204 amount_msat: 2000000,
8206 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8207 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8208 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8209 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8211 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8214 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8215 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8217 amount_msat: 3000000,
8219 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8220 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8221 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8222 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8224 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8227 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8228 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8230 amount_msat: 4000000,
8232 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8233 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8235 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8239 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8240 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8241 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8243 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8244 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8245 "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", {
8248 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8249 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8250 "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" },
8253 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8254 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8255 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8258 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8259 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8260 "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" },
8263 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8264 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8265 "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" },
8268 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8269 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8270 "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" }
8273 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8274 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8275 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8277 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8278 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8279 "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", {
8282 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8283 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8284 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
8287 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8288 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8289 "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" },
8292 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8293 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8294 "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" },
8297 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8298 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8299 "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" },
8302 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8303 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8304 "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" }
8307 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8308 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8309 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8311 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8312 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8313 "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", {
8316 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8317 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8318 "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" },
8321 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8322 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8323 "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" },
8326 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8327 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8328 "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" },
8331 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8332 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8333 "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" }
8336 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8337 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8338 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8339 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8341 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8342 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8343 "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", {
8346 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8347 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8348 "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" },
8351 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8352 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8353 "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" },
8356 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8357 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8358 "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" },
8361 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8362 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8363 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8366 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8367 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8368 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8369 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8371 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8372 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8373 "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", {
8376 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8377 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8378 "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" },
8381 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8382 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8383 "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" },
8386 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8387 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8388 "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" },
8391 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8392 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8393 "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" }
8396 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8397 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8398 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8400 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8401 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8402 "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", {
8405 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8406 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8407 "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" },
8410 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8411 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8412 "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" },
8415 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8416 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8417 "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" }
8420 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8421 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8422 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8424 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8425 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8426 "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", {
8429 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8430 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8431 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de84500148304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e015430101008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8434 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8435 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8436 "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" },
8439 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8440 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8441 "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" }
8444 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8445 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8446 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8448 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8449 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8450 "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", {
8453 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8454 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8455 "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" },
8458 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8459 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8460 "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" }
8463 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8464 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8465 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8466 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8467 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8468 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8470 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8471 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8472 "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", {
8475 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8476 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8477 "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" },
8480 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8481 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8482 "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" }
8485 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8486 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8487 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8488 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8489 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8491 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8492 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8493 "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", {
8496 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8497 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8498 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8501 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8502 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8503 "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" }
8506 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8507 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8508 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8510 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8511 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8512 "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", {
8515 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8516 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8517 "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" }
8520 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8521 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8522 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8523 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8524 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8526 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8527 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8528 "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", {
8531 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8532 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8533 "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" }
8536 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8537 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8538 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8539 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8540 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8542 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8543 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8544 "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", {
8547 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8548 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8549 "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" }
8552 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8553 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8554 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8555 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8557 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8558 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8559 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8561 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8562 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8563 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8564 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8565 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8567 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8568 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8569 "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", {});
8571 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8572 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8573 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8574 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8575 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8577 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8578 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8579 "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", {});
8581 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8582 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8583 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8585 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8586 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8587 "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", {});
8589 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8590 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8591 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8592 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8593 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8595 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8596 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8597 "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", {});
8599 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8600 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8601 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8602 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8603 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8605 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8606 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8607 "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", {});
8609 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8610 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8611 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8612 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8613 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8614 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8616 amount_msat: 2000000,
8618 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8619 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8621 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8624 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8625 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8626 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8628 amount_msat: 5000001,
8630 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8631 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8632 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8633 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8635 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8638 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8639 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8641 amount_msat: 5000000,
8643 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8644 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8645 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8646 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8648 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8652 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8653 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8654 "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", {
8657 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8658 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8659 "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" },
8661 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8662 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8663 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec01000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a01483045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
8665 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8666 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8667 "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" }
8670 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8671 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8672 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8673 "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", {
8676 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8677 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8678 "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" },
8680 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8681 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8682 "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" },
8684 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8685 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8686 "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" }
8691 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8692 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8694 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8695 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8696 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8697 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8699 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8700 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8701 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8703 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8704 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8706 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8707 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8709 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8710 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8711 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8715 fn test_key_derivation() {
8716 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8717 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8719 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8720 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8722 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8723 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8725 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8726 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8728 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8729 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8731 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8732 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8734 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8735 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8737 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8738 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8742 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8743 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8744 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8745 let seed = [42; 32];
8746 let network = Network::Testnet;
8747 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8748 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8750 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8751 let config = UserConfig::default();
8752 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8753 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8755 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8756 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8758 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8759 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8760 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8761 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8762 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8763 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8764 assert!(res.is_ok());
8768 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8769 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8770 // resulting `channel_type`.
8771 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8772 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8773 let network = Network::Testnet;
8774 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8775 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8777 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8778 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8780 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8781 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8783 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8784 // need to signal it.
8785 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8786 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8787 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8790 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8792 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8793 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8794 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8796 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8797 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8798 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8801 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8802 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8803 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8804 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8805 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8808 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8809 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8813 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8814 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8815 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8816 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8817 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8818 let network = Network::Testnet;
8819 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8820 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8822 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8823 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8825 let config = UserConfig::default();
8827 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8828 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8829 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8830 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8831 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8833 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8834 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8835 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8838 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8839 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8840 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8842 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8843 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8844 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8845 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8846 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8847 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8849 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8853 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8854 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8856 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8857 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8858 let network = Network::Testnet;
8859 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8860 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8862 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8863 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8865 let config = UserConfig::default();
8867 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8868 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8869 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8870 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8871 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8872 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8873 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8874 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8876 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8877 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8878 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8879 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8880 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8881 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8884 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8885 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8887 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8888 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8889 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8890 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8892 assert!(res.is_err());
8894 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8895 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8896 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8898 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8899 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8900 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8903 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8905 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8906 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8907 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8908 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8911 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8912 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8914 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8915 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8917 assert!(res.is_err());