1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
230 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
231 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
232 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
236 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
238 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
239 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
240 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
243 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
248 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
253 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
254 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
255 /// move on to ChannelReady.
256 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
257 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
258 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
260 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
261 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
262 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
263 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
264 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
265 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
266 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
268 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
269 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
270 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
275 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
276 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
277 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
279 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
280 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
282 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
283 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
284 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
285 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
286 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
287 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
288 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
289 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
290 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
292 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
293 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
294 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
295 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
296 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
297 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
298 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
299 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
300 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
301 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
302 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
303 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
306 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
308 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
310 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
312 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
314 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
315 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
319 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
323 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
325 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
326 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
327 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
328 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
329 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
331 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
332 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
334 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
336 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
337 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
339 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
340 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
341 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
342 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
343 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
344 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
346 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
347 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
349 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
350 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
351 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
352 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
353 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
355 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
356 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
358 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
359 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
361 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
362 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
363 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
364 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
370 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
371 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
373 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
375 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
380 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
381 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
383 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
385 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
390 macro_rules! secp_check {
391 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
399 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
400 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
401 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
402 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
403 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
404 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
405 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
406 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
408 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
410 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
412 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
416 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
418 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
419 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
420 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
422 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
423 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
425 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
426 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
427 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
428 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
429 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
431 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
432 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
436 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
442 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
445 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
446 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
448 holding_cell_msat: u64,
449 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
452 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
453 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
454 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
455 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
456 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
457 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
458 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
459 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
461 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
464 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
465 struct HTLCCandidate {
467 origin: HTLCInitiator,
471 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
479 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
481 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
483 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 htlc_value_msat: u64,
485 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
490 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
491 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
492 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
493 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
494 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
496 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
497 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
499 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
502 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
506 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
507 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
508 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
509 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
510 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
511 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
512 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
513 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
514 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
515 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
516 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
519 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
520 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
521 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
526 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
529 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
531 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
532 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
533 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
534 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
535 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
536 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
539 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
540 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
541 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
542 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
543 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
544 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
545 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
546 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
547 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
548 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
549 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
550 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
551 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
552 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
553 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
555 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
556 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
557 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
558 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
560 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
561 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
562 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
563 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
565 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
566 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
567 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
568 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
569 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
571 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
572 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
573 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
574 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
576 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
577 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
578 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
580 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
581 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
582 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
583 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
584 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
586 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
587 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
590 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
591 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
593 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
594 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
597 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
598 (0, update, required),
601 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
602 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
603 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
605 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
606 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
607 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
608 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
610 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
614 channel_id: [u8; 32],
615 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
618 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
619 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
621 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
622 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
623 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
625 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
626 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
627 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
628 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
630 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
631 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
633 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
635 holder_signer: Signer,
636 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
637 destination_script: Script,
639 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
640 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
641 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
643 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
644 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
645 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
646 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
647 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
648 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
650 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
651 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
652 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
653 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
654 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
655 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
657 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
659 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
660 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
661 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
663 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
664 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
665 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
666 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
667 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
668 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
669 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
671 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
673 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
674 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
675 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
676 // HTLCs with similar state.
677 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
678 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
679 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
680 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
681 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
682 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
683 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
684 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
685 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
688 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
689 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
690 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
692 update_time_counter: u32,
694 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
695 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
696 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
697 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
698 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
699 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
701 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
702 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
704 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
705 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
706 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
707 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
709 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
710 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
712 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
714 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
716 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
717 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
718 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
719 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
720 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
721 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
723 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
724 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
725 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
726 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
727 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
729 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
730 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
731 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
732 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
733 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
734 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
735 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
736 channel_creation_height: u32,
738 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
741 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
743 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
746 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
748 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
753 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
755 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
756 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
759 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
761 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
763 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
764 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
766 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
768 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
769 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
770 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
772 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
774 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
775 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
777 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
778 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
779 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
781 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
783 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
785 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
786 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
787 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
788 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
790 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
791 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
792 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
794 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
795 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
796 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
798 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
799 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
800 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
801 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
802 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
803 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
804 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
805 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
807 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
808 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
809 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
810 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
811 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
813 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
814 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
816 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
817 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
818 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
819 /// unblock the state machine.
821 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
822 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
823 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
825 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
826 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
827 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
829 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
830 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
831 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
832 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
833 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
834 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
835 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
836 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
838 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
839 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
841 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
842 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
843 // the channel's funding UTXO.
845 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
846 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
847 // associated channel mapping.
849 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
850 // to store all of them.
851 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
853 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
854 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
855 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
856 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
857 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
859 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
860 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
862 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
863 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
865 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
866 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
867 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
869 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
870 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
871 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
874 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
875 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
876 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
877 self.update_time_counter
880 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
881 self.latest_monitor_update_id
884 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
885 self.config.announced_channel
888 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
889 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
892 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
893 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
894 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
895 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
898 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
899 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
900 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
903 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
904 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
905 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
906 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
907 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
910 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
911 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
912 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
913 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
915 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
916 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
918 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
919 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
921 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
922 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
924 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
927 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
928 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
929 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
930 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
932 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
933 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
934 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
935 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
938 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
939 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
940 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
941 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
942 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
947 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
951 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
953 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
954 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
955 self.temporary_channel_id
958 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
962 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
963 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
964 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
968 /// Gets the channel's type
969 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
973 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
974 /// is_usable() returns true).
975 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
976 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
977 self.short_channel_id
980 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
981 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
982 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
985 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
986 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
987 self.outbound_scid_alias
990 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
991 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
992 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
993 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
994 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
997 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
998 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
999 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1000 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1003 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1004 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1005 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1008 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1009 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1010 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1011 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1015 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1018 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1019 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1022 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1023 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1026 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1027 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1028 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1031 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1032 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1035 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1036 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1037 self.counterparty_node_id
1040 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1041 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1042 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1045 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1046 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1047 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1050 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1051 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1053 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1054 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1055 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1056 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1058 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1062 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1063 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1064 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1067 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1068 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1069 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1072 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1073 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1074 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1076 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1077 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1082 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1083 self.channel_value_satoshis
1086 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1087 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1090 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1091 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1094 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1095 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1096 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1098 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1099 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1100 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1101 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1102 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1104 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1108 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1109 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1110 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1113 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1114 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1115 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1118 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1119 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1120 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1123 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1124 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1125 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1128 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1129 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1130 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1133 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1134 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1135 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1138 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1139 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1140 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1141 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1142 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1145 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1147 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1148 self.prev_config = None;
1152 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1153 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1157 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1158 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1159 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1160 let did_channel_update =
1161 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1162 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1163 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1164 if did_channel_update {
1165 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1166 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1167 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1168 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1170 self.config.options = *config;
1174 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1175 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1176 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1179 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1180 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1181 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1182 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1183 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1185 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1186 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1187 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1188 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1189 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1190 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1191 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1193 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1194 where L::Target: Logger
1196 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1197 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1198 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1200 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1201 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1202 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1203 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1205 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1206 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1207 if match update_state {
1208 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1209 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1210 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1211 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1212 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1214 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1218 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1219 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1220 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1221 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1223 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1224 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1225 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1227 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1228 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1229 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1230 transaction_output_index: None
1235 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1236 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1237 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1238 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1239 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1242 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1244 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1245 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1246 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1248 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1249 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1252 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1253 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1256 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1258 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1259 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1260 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1262 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1263 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1269 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1270 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1271 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1272 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1273 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1274 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1275 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1279 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1280 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1282 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1284 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1285 if generated_by_local {
1286 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1287 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1296 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1298 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1299 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1300 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1301 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1302 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1303 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1304 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1307 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1308 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1309 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1310 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1314 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1315 preimages.push(preimage);
1319 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1320 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1322 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1324 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1325 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1327 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1328 if !generated_by_local {
1329 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1337 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1338 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1339 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1340 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1341 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1342 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1343 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1344 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1346 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1348 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1349 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1350 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1351 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1353 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1355 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1356 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1357 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1358 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1361 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1362 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1363 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1364 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1366 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1369 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1370 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1371 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1372 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1374 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1377 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1378 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1383 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1384 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1389 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1391 let channel_parameters =
1392 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1393 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1394 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1401 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1404 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1405 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1406 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1407 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1409 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1410 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1411 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1419 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1420 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1426 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1427 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1428 /// our counterparty!)
1429 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1430 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1431 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1432 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1433 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1434 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1435 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1437 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1441 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1442 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1443 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1444 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1445 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1446 //may see payments to it!
1447 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1448 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1449 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1451 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1454 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1455 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1456 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1457 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1458 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1461 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1462 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1465 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1469 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1470 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1471 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1472 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1473 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1474 // which are near the dust limit.
1475 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1476 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1477 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1478 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1479 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1481 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1482 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1484 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1487 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1488 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1489 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1492 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1493 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1495 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1496 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1497 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1498 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1499 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1500 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1501 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1504 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1507 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1508 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1509 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1511 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1512 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1513 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1514 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1515 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1516 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1518 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1519 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1525 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1526 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1528 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1529 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1530 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1531 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1532 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1533 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1534 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1537 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1540 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1541 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1542 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1544 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1545 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1546 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1547 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1548 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1549 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1551 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1552 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1556 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1557 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1558 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1559 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1560 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1561 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1562 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1564 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1565 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1567 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1574 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1575 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1576 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1577 /// corner case properly.
1578 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1579 -> AvailableBalances
1580 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1582 let context = &self;
1583 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1584 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1585 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1587 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1588 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1589 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1590 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1593 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1595 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1596 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1598 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1600 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1602 if context.is_outbound() {
1603 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1604 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1606 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1607 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1609 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1610 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1611 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1612 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1615 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1616 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1617 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1618 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1620 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1621 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1622 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1623 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1624 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1625 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1626 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1627 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1628 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1629 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1631 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1634 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1635 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1636 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1637 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1638 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1641 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1642 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1644 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1645 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1646 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1648 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1649 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1650 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1651 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1655 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1657 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1658 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1659 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1660 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1661 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1662 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1663 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1665 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1666 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1668 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1669 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1670 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1672 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1673 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1674 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1675 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1676 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1679 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1680 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1681 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1682 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1683 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1684 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1687 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1688 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1689 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1691 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1695 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1696 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1698 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1699 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1703 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1704 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1705 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1706 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1708 outbound_capacity_msat,
1709 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1710 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1715 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1716 let context = &self;
1717 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1720 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1721 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1723 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1724 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1726 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1727 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1729 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1730 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1731 let context = &self;
1732 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1734 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1737 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1738 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1740 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1741 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1743 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1744 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1746 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1747 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1751 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1752 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1758 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1759 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1760 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1763 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1764 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1765 included_htlcs += 1;
1768 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1769 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1773 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1774 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1775 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1776 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1777 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1778 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1783 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1785 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1786 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1791 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1792 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1796 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1797 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1798 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1801 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1802 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1804 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1805 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1806 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1808 total_pending_htlcs,
1809 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1810 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1811 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1813 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1814 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1815 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1817 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1819 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1824 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1825 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1827 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1828 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1830 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1831 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1833 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1834 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1835 let context = &self;
1836 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1838 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1841 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1842 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1844 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1845 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1847 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1848 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1850 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1851 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1855 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1856 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1862 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1863 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1864 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1865 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1866 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1867 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1870 included_htlcs += 1;
1873 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1874 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1877 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1878 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1880 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1881 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1882 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1887 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1888 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1889 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1892 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1893 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1895 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1896 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1898 total_pending_htlcs,
1899 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1900 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1901 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1903 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1904 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1905 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1907 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1909 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1914 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1915 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1916 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1917 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1923 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1924 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1925 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1926 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1927 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1928 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1929 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1930 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1931 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1932 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1933 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1935 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1936 // return them to fail the payment.
1937 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1938 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1939 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1941 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1942 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1947 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1948 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1949 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1950 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1951 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1952 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1953 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1954 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1955 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1956 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1957 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1958 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1959 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1964 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1965 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1966 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1970 // Internal utility functions for channels
1972 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1973 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1974 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1976 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1978 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1979 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1980 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1982 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1985 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1987 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1990 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1991 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1992 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1994 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1996 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1997 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1998 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1999 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2000 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2003 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2004 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2005 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2006 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2007 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2008 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2009 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2012 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2013 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2015 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2016 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2019 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2020 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2021 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2022 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2023 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2024 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2027 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2028 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2029 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
2032 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2033 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2034 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2035 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2038 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2039 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2041 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2042 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2043 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2047 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2048 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2049 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2050 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2052 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2053 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2054 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2055 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2056 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2057 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2058 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2059 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2061 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2062 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2063 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2064 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2065 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2066 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2067 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2068 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2070 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2071 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2075 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2081 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2082 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2083 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2084 // outside of those situations will fail.
2085 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2089 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2094 1 + // script length (0)
2098 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2099 2 + // witness marker and flag
2100 1 + // witness element count
2101 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2102 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2103 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2104 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2105 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2106 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2108 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2109 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2110 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2116 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2117 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2118 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2119 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2121 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2122 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2123 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2125 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2126 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2127 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2128 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2129 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2130 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2133 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2134 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2137 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2138 value_to_holder = 0;
2141 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2142 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2143 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2144 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2146 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2147 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2150 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2151 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2154 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2157 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2158 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2160 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2162 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2163 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2164 where L::Target: Logger {
2165 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2166 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2167 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2168 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2169 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2170 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2171 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2172 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2176 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2177 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2178 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2179 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2181 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2182 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2184 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2186 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2188 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2189 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2190 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2192 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2193 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2194 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2195 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2196 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2198 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2199 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2200 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2202 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2203 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2205 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2208 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2209 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2213 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2217 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2218 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2219 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2220 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2221 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2222 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2225 // Now update local state:
2227 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2228 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2229 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2230 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2231 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2232 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2233 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2237 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2238 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2239 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2240 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2241 // do not not get into this branch.
2242 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2243 match pending_update {
2244 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2245 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2246 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2247 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2248 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2249 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2250 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2253 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2254 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2255 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2256 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2257 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2258 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2259 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2265 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2266 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2267 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2269 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2270 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2271 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2273 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2274 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2277 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2278 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2280 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2281 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2283 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2284 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2287 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2290 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2291 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2292 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2293 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2298 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2299 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2300 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2301 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2302 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2303 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2304 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2305 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2306 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2307 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2308 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2309 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2310 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2311 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2312 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2314 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2315 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2316 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2317 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2318 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2321 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2322 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2323 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2329 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2330 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2332 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2336 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2337 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2338 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2339 /// before we fail backwards.
2341 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2342 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2343 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2344 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2345 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2346 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2347 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2350 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2351 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2352 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2353 /// before we fail backwards.
2355 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2356 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2357 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2358 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2359 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2360 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2361 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2363 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2365 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2366 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2367 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2369 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2370 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2371 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2373 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2374 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2375 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2377 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2382 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2383 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2389 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2390 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2391 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2392 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2393 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2397 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2398 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2399 force_holding_cell = true;
2402 // Now update local state:
2403 if force_holding_cell {
2404 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2405 match pending_update {
2406 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2407 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2408 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2409 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2413 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2414 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2415 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2416 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2422 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2423 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2424 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2430 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2432 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2433 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2436 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2437 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2438 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2443 // Message handlers:
2445 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2446 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2447 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2448 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2449 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2451 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2454 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2455 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2457 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2458 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2460 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2461 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2462 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2463 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2466 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2468 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2469 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2470 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2471 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2473 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2474 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2476 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2477 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2479 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2480 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2481 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2482 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2483 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2484 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2488 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2489 initial_commitment_tx,
2492 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2493 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2496 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2497 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2500 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2501 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2502 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2503 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2504 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2505 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2506 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2507 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2508 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2509 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2510 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2511 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2513 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2515 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2517 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2518 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2519 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2520 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2522 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2524 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2525 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2529 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2530 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2532 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2533 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2534 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2535 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2537 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2540 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2541 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2542 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2545 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2546 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2547 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2548 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2549 // when routing outbound payments.
2550 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2554 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2556 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2557 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2558 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2559 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2560 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2561 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2562 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2563 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2564 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2566 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2567 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2568 let expected_point =
2569 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2570 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2572 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2573 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2574 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2575 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2576 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2577 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2579 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2580 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2581 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2582 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2583 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2585 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2586 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2593 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2594 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2596 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2598 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2601 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2602 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2603 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2604 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2605 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2606 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2608 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2609 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2610 if local_sent_shutdown {
2611 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2613 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2614 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2615 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2616 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2618 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2619 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2621 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2622 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2624 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2625 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2627 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2628 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2631 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2632 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2633 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2634 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2636 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2637 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2639 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2640 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2641 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2642 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2643 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2644 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2645 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2646 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2647 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2648 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2649 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2651 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2652 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2653 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2654 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2655 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2656 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2660 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2661 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2664 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2665 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2666 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2668 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2669 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2670 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2671 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2672 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2673 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2674 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2678 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2679 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2680 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2681 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2682 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2683 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2684 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2688 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2689 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2690 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2691 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2692 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2693 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2696 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2697 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2698 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2699 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2700 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2702 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2703 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2706 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2707 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2710 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2711 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2712 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2713 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2714 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2715 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2716 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2717 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2718 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2719 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2720 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2721 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2722 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2723 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2724 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2725 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2728 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2729 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2730 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2731 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2732 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2735 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2736 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2738 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2739 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2742 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2743 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2744 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2748 // Now update local state:
2749 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2750 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2751 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2752 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2753 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2754 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2755 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2760 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2762 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2763 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2764 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2765 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2766 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2767 None => fail_reason.into(),
2768 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2769 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2770 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2771 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2773 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2777 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2778 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2779 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2780 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2782 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2783 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2788 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2791 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2792 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2793 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2795 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2796 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2799 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2802 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2803 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2804 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2806 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2807 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2810 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2814 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2815 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2816 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2818 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2819 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2822 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2826 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2827 where L::Target: Logger
2829 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2830 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2832 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2835 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2836 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2839 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2841 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2843 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2844 let commitment_txid = {
2845 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2846 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2847 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2849 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2850 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2851 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2852 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2853 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2854 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2858 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2860 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2861 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2862 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2863 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2866 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2867 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2868 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2872 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2874 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2875 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2876 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2877 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2878 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2879 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2880 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2881 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2882 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2883 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2884 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2890 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2891 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2894 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2895 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2896 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2897 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2898 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2899 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2900 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2901 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2902 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2903 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2904 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2905 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2906 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2909 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2910 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2911 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2912 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2913 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2914 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2915 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2917 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2918 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2919 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2920 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2921 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2922 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2923 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2924 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2926 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2927 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2930 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2932 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2933 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2934 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2937 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2940 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2941 commitment_stats.tx,
2943 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2944 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2945 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2948 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2949 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2951 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2952 let mut need_commitment = false;
2953 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2954 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2955 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2956 need_commitment = true;
2960 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2961 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2962 Some(forward_info.clone())
2964 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2965 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2966 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2967 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2968 need_commitment = true;
2971 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2972 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2973 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2974 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2975 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2976 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2977 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2978 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2979 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2980 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2981 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2982 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2983 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2984 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
2986 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
2988 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2989 need_commitment = true;
2993 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2994 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2995 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2996 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2997 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2998 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3000 nondust_htlc_sources,
3004 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3005 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3006 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3007 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3009 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3010 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3011 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3012 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3013 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3014 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3015 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3016 // includes the right HTLCs.
3017 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3018 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3019 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3020 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3021 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3022 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3024 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3025 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3026 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3029 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3030 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3031 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3032 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3033 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3034 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3035 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3036 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3037 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3041 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3042 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3043 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3044 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3047 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3048 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3049 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3050 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3051 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3052 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3053 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3055 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3056 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3057 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3058 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3061 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3062 /// for our counterparty.
3063 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3064 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3065 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3066 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3068 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3069 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3070 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3071 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3073 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3074 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3075 updates: Vec::new(),
3078 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3079 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3080 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3081 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3082 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3083 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3084 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3085 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3086 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3087 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3088 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3089 // to rebalance channels.
3090 match &htlc_update {
3091 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3092 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3093 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3095 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3096 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3098 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3101 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3102 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3103 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3104 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3105 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3106 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3107 // into the holding cell without ever being
3108 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3109 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3110 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3113 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3119 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3120 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3121 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3122 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3123 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3124 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3125 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3126 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3127 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3128 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3129 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3130 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3132 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3133 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3134 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3135 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3136 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3137 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3138 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3139 // for a full revocation before failing.
3140 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3141 update_fail_count += 1;
3144 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3146 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3153 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3154 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3156 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3157 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3162 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3163 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3164 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3165 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3166 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3168 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3169 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3170 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3172 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3173 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3179 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3180 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3181 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3182 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3183 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3184 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3185 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3186 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3187 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3189 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3190 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3192 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3193 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3195 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3196 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3199 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3201 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3202 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3207 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3208 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3209 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3210 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3211 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3212 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3213 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3214 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3218 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3220 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3221 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3224 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3225 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3227 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3229 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3230 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3231 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3232 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3233 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3234 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3235 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3236 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3240 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3241 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3242 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3243 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3244 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3245 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3246 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3247 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3248 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3250 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3251 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3254 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3255 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3256 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3257 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3258 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3259 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3260 let mut require_commitment = false;
3261 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3264 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3265 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3266 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3268 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3269 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3270 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3271 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3272 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3273 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3278 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3279 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3280 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3281 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3282 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3284 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3285 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3286 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3291 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3292 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3294 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3298 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3299 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3301 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3302 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3303 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3304 require_commitment = true;
3305 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3306 match forward_info {
3307 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3308 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3309 require_commitment = true;
3311 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3312 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3313 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3315 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3316 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3317 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3321 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3322 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3323 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3324 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3330 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3331 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3332 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3333 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3335 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3336 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3337 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3338 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3339 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3340 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3341 require_commitment = true;
3345 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3347 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3348 match update_state {
3349 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3350 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3351 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3352 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3353 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3355 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3356 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3357 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3358 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3359 require_commitment = true;
3360 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3361 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3366 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3367 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3368 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3369 if require_commitment {
3370 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3371 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3372 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3373 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3374 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3375 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3376 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3377 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3378 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3380 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3381 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3382 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3383 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3384 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3387 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3388 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3389 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3390 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3391 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3392 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3394 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3395 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3397 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3398 if require_commitment {
3399 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3401 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3402 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3403 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3404 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3406 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3407 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3408 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3409 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3411 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3412 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3413 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3419 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3420 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3421 /// commitment update.
3422 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3423 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3424 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3426 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3427 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3430 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3431 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3432 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3433 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3435 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3436 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3437 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3438 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3439 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3440 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3441 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3443 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3444 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3446 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3447 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3449 if !self.context.is_live() {
3450 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3453 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3454 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3455 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3456 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3457 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3458 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3459 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3460 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3461 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3462 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3466 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3467 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3468 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3469 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3470 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3471 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3474 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3475 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3479 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3480 force_holding_cell = true;
3483 if force_holding_cell {
3484 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3488 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3489 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3491 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3492 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3497 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3498 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3500 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3502 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3503 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3504 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3505 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3509 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3510 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3511 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3515 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3516 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3519 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3520 // will be retransmitted.
3521 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3522 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3523 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3525 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3526 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3528 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3529 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3530 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3531 // this HTLC accordingly
3532 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3535 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3536 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3537 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3538 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3541 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3542 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3543 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3544 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3545 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3546 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3551 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3553 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3554 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3555 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3556 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3560 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3561 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3562 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3563 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3564 // the update upon reconnection.
3565 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3569 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3571 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3572 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3575 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3576 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3577 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3578 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3579 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3580 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3581 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3583 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3584 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3585 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3586 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3587 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3588 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3589 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3591 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3592 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3593 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3594 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3595 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3596 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3597 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3600 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3601 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3602 /// to the remote side.
3603 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3604 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3605 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3606 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3609 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3611 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3612 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3614 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3615 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3616 // first received the funding_signed.
3617 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3618 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3619 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3621 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3622 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3623 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3624 funding_broadcastable = None;
3627 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3628 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3629 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3630 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3631 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3632 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3633 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3634 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3635 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3636 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3637 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3638 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3639 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3640 next_per_commitment_point,
3641 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3645 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3647 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3648 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3649 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3650 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3651 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3652 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3654 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3655 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3656 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3657 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3658 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3659 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3663 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3664 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3666 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3667 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3668 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3671 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3672 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3673 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3674 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3675 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3676 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3677 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3678 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3679 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3683 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3684 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3686 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3687 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3689 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3690 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3692 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3693 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3695 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3696 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3697 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3698 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3699 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3700 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3701 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3702 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3703 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3704 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3705 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3706 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3707 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3708 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3710 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3711 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3712 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3718 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3719 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3720 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3721 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3722 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3723 per_commitment_secret,
3724 next_per_commitment_point,
3726 next_local_nonce: None,
3730 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3731 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3732 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3733 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3734 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3736 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3737 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3738 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3739 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3740 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3741 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3742 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3743 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3744 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3745 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3750 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3751 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3753 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3754 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3755 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3756 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3757 reason: err_packet.clone()
3760 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3761 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3762 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3763 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3764 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3765 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3768 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3769 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3770 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3771 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3772 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3779 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3780 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3781 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3782 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3786 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3787 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3788 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3789 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3790 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3791 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3795 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3796 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3798 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3799 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3800 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3801 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3802 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3803 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3804 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3805 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3808 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3810 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3811 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3812 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3813 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3814 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3817 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3818 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3819 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3822 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3823 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3824 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3825 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3826 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3827 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3829 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3830 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3831 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3832 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3833 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3836 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3837 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3838 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3839 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3840 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3841 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3842 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3843 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3847 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3848 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3849 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3850 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3852 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3856 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3857 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3858 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3859 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3861 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3862 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3863 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3864 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3865 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3869 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3871 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3872 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3873 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3874 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3875 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3878 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3879 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3880 channel_ready: None,
3881 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3882 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3883 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3887 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3888 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3889 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3890 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3891 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3892 next_per_commitment_point,
3893 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3895 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3896 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3897 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3901 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3902 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3903 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3905 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3906 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3907 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3910 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3913 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3916 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3917 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3918 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3919 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3920 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3921 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3922 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3924 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3926 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3927 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3928 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3929 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3930 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3931 next_per_commitment_point,
3932 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3936 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3937 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3938 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3940 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3943 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3944 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3945 raa: required_revoke,
3946 commitment_update: None,
3947 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3949 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3950 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3951 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3953 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3956 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3957 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3958 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3959 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3960 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3961 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3964 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3965 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3966 raa: required_revoke,
3967 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3968 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3972 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3976 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3977 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3978 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3979 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3981 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3983 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3985 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3986 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3987 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3988 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3989 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3990 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3992 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3993 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3994 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3995 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3996 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3998 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3999 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4000 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4001 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4004 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4005 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4006 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4007 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4008 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4009 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4010 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4011 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4012 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4013 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4014 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4015 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4016 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4017 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4018 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4020 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4023 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4024 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4027 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4028 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4029 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4030 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4031 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4032 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4035 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4036 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4037 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4038 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4039 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4040 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4041 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4043 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4049 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4050 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4051 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4052 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4054 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4055 return Ok((None, None));
4058 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4059 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4060 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4062 return Ok((None, None));
4065 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4067 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4068 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4069 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4070 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4072 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4073 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4074 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4076 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4077 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4078 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4079 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4081 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4082 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4083 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4088 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4089 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4091 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4092 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4095 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4096 /// within our expected timeframe.
4098 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4099 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4100 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4103 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4106 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4107 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4110 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4111 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4112 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4113 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4115 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4116 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4118 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4119 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4120 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4121 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4122 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4124 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4125 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4126 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4129 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4131 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4132 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4135 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4136 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4137 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4140 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4143 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4144 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4145 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4146 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4148 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4151 assert!(send_shutdown);
4152 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4153 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4154 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4156 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4157 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4159 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4164 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4166 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4167 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4169 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4170 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4171 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4172 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4173 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4174 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4177 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4178 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4180 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4181 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4182 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4183 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4187 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4188 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4189 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4190 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4191 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4192 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4194 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4195 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4202 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4203 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4205 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4208 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4209 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4211 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4213 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4214 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4215 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4216 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4217 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4218 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4219 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4220 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4221 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4223 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4224 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4227 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4231 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4232 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4233 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4234 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4236 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4239 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4240 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4242 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4243 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4245 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4246 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4249 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4250 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4253 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4254 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4255 return Ok((None, None));
4258 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4259 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4260 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4261 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4263 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4265 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4268 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4269 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4270 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4271 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4272 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4276 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4277 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4282 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4283 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4284 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4285 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4286 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4287 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4288 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4292 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4294 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4295 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4296 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4297 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4299 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4302 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4303 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4304 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4306 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4307 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4308 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4309 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4313 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4314 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4315 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4316 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4318 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4319 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4320 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4326 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4327 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4328 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4330 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4331 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4333 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4334 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4337 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4338 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4339 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4340 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4341 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4343 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4344 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4345 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4347 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4348 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4351 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4352 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4353 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4354 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4355 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4356 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4357 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4358 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4360 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4363 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4364 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4365 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4366 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4368 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4372 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4373 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4374 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4375 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4377 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4383 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4384 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4385 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4386 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4387 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4388 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4389 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4391 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4392 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4395 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4397 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4398 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4404 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4405 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4406 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4407 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4408 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4409 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4410 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4412 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4413 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4420 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4421 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4424 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4425 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4428 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4429 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4433 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4434 &self.context.holder_signer
4438 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4440 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4441 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4442 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4443 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4444 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4445 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4447 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4449 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4457 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4458 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4462 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4463 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4464 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4465 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4468 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4469 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4470 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4471 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4474 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4475 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4476 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4477 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4478 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4479 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4482 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4483 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4484 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4485 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4486 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4487 if !release_monitor {
4488 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4497 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4498 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4501 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4502 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4503 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4505 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4506 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4507 if self.context.channel_state &
4508 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4509 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4510 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4511 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4512 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4515 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4516 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4517 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4518 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4519 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4520 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4522 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4523 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4524 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4526 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4527 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4528 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4529 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4530 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4531 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4537 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4538 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4539 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4542 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4543 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4544 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4547 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4548 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4549 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4552 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4553 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4554 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4555 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4556 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4557 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4562 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4563 self.context.channel_update_status
4566 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4567 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4568 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4571 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4573 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4574 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4575 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4579 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4580 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4581 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4584 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4588 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4589 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4590 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4592 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4593 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4594 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4596 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4597 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4600 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4601 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4602 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4603 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4604 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4605 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4606 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4607 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4608 self.context.channel_state);
4610 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4614 if need_commitment_update {
4615 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4616 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4617 let next_per_commitment_point =
4618 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4619 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4620 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4621 next_per_commitment_point,
4622 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4626 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4632 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4633 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4634 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4635 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4636 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4637 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4638 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4640 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4643 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4644 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4645 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4646 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4647 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4648 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4649 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4650 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4651 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4652 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4653 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4654 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4655 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4656 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4657 // channel and move on.
4658 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4659 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4661 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4662 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4663 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4665 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4666 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4667 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4668 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4669 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4670 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4671 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4675 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4676 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4677 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4678 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4679 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4683 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4684 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4685 // may have already happened for this block).
4686 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4687 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4688 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4689 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4692 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4693 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4694 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4695 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4703 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4704 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4705 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4706 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4708 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4709 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4712 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4714 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4715 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4716 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4717 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4719 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4722 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4725 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4726 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4727 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4728 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4730 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4733 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4734 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4735 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4737 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4738 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4740 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4741 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4742 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4750 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4752 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4753 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4754 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4756 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4757 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4760 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4761 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4762 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4763 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4764 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4765 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4766 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4767 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4768 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4771 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4772 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4773 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4774 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4776 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4777 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4778 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4780 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4781 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4782 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4783 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4785 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4786 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4787 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4788 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4789 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4790 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4791 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4794 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4795 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4797 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4800 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4801 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4802 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4803 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4804 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4805 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4806 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4807 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4808 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4809 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4810 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4811 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4812 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4813 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4814 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4815 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4816 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4822 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4827 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4828 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4830 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4831 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4832 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4833 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4835 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4838 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4839 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4840 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4841 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4842 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4843 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4845 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4846 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4849 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4850 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4851 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4852 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4854 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4855 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4857 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4858 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4859 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4860 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4861 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4862 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4868 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4869 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4870 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4871 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4873 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4876 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4880 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4884 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4885 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4889 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4893 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4894 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4897 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4901 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4903 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4908 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4910 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4915 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4917 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4918 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4919 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4920 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4921 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4925 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4927 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4928 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4929 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4930 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4931 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4932 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4933 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4935 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4936 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4937 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4938 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4939 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4940 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4941 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4942 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4943 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4944 contents: announcement,
4947 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4951 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4952 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4953 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4954 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4955 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4956 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4957 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4958 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4960 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4962 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4963 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4964 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4965 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4967 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4968 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4969 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4970 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4973 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4974 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4975 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4976 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4979 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4982 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4983 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4984 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4985 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
4986 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4987 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4990 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
4992 Err(_) => return None,
4994 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
4995 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5000 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5001 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5002 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5003 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5004 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5005 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5006 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5007 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5008 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5009 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5010 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5011 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5012 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5013 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5014 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5015 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5018 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5021 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5022 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5023 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5024 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5025 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5026 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5027 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5028 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5029 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5031 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5032 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5033 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5034 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5035 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5036 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5037 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5038 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5039 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5041 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5042 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5043 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5044 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5045 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5046 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5047 next_funding_txid: None,
5052 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5054 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5055 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5056 /// commitment update.
5058 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5059 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5060 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5061 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5062 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5063 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5064 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5067 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5068 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5069 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5071 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5072 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5077 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5078 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5080 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5082 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5083 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5085 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5086 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5087 /// regenerate them.
5089 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5090 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5092 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5093 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5094 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5095 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5096 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5097 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5098 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5100 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5101 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5103 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5104 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5105 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5108 if amount_msat == 0 {
5109 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5112 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5113 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5114 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5115 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5118 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5119 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5120 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5123 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5124 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5125 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5126 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5127 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5128 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5129 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5130 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5133 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5134 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5135 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5136 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5137 else { "to peer" });
5139 if need_holding_cell {
5140 force_holding_cell = true;
5143 // Now update local state:
5144 if force_holding_cell {
5145 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5150 onion_routing_packet,
5156 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5157 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5159 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5161 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5166 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5167 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5168 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5172 onion_routing_packet,
5175 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5180 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5181 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5182 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5183 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5185 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5186 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5187 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5189 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5190 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5194 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5195 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5196 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5197 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5198 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5199 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5200 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5203 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5204 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5205 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5206 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5207 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5208 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5211 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5213 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5214 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5215 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5217 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5218 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5221 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5222 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5223 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5224 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5225 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5226 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5227 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5228 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5231 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5235 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5236 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5237 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5238 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5240 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5242 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5243 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5244 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5245 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5246 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5247 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5248 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5249 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5250 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5251 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5252 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5258 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5261 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5262 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5263 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5264 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5265 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5266 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5268 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5269 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5270 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5271 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5274 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5275 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5279 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5280 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5282 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5284 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5285 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5286 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5287 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5289 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5290 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5291 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5292 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5293 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5294 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5298 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5299 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5303 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5304 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5307 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5308 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5310 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5311 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5312 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5313 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5314 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5315 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5316 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5317 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5319 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5320 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5321 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5324 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5325 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5326 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5332 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5333 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5334 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5336 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5337 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5338 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5339 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5345 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5346 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5348 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5349 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5350 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5351 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5352 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5353 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5354 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5355 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5356 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5359 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5360 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5361 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5363 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5364 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5367 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5368 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5370 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5371 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5372 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5375 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5376 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5377 let mut chan_closed = false;
5378 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5382 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5384 None if !chan_closed => {
5385 // use override shutdown script if provided
5386 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5387 Some(script) => script,
5389 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5390 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5391 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5392 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5396 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5397 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5399 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5405 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5406 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5407 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5408 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5410 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5412 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5414 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5415 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5416 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5417 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5418 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5419 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5422 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5423 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5425 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5426 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5427 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5430 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5431 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5432 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5433 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5434 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5436 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5437 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5444 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5445 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5447 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5450 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5451 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5452 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5454 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5455 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5459 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5463 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5464 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5465 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5468 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5469 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5470 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5471 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5472 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5473 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5474 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5475 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5476 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5478 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5479 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5480 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5481 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5483 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5484 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5486 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5487 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5489 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5490 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5491 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5493 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5494 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5496 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5497 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5498 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5499 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5500 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5503 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5504 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5506 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5508 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5509 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5510 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5511 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5514 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5515 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5517 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5518 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5519 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5520 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5524 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5525 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5526 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5530 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5531 Ok(script) => script,
5532 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5535 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5538 context: ChannelContext {
5541 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5542 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5543 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5544 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5549 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5551 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5552 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5553 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5554 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5556 channel_value_satoshis,
5558 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5561 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5564 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5565 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5568 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5569 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5570 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5571 pending_update_fee: None,
5572 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5573 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5574 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5575 update_time_counter: 1,
5577 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5579 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5580 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5581 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5582 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5583 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5584 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5586 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5587 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5588 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5589 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5591 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5592 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5593 closing_fee_limits: None,
5594 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5596 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5598 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5599 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5600 short_channel_id: None,
5601 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5603 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5604 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5605 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5606 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5607 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5608 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5609 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5610 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5611 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5612 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5613 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5614 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5616 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5618 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5619 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5620 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5621 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5622 counterparty_parameters: None,
5623 funding_outpoint: None,
5624 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5626 funding_transaction: None,
5628 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5629 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5630 counterparty_node_id,
5632 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5634 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5636 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5637 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5639 announcement_sigs: None,
5641 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5642 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5643 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5644 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5646 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5647 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5649 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5650 outbound_scid_alias,
5652 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5653 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5655 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5656 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5661 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5666 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5667 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5668 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5669 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5670 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5671 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5674 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5675 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5676 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5677 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5678 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5679 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5680 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5681 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5682 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5683 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5684 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5686 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5687 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5689 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5690 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5691 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5692 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5695 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5696 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5698 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5701 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5702 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5703 return Err((self, e));
5707 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5709 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5711 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5712 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5713 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5715 let channel = Channel {
5716 context: self.context,
5719 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5720 temporary_channel_id,
5721 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5722 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5725 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5727 next_local_nonce: None,
5731 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5732 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5733 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5734 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5735 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5736 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5737 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5738 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5739 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5740 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5743 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5744 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5745 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5746 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5747 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5748 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5754 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5755 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5756 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5757 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5758 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5759 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5760 // We've exhausted our options
5763 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5764 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5767 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5768 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5769 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5770 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5772 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5773 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5774 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5775 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5776 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5778 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5780 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5781 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5784 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5785 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5786 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5788 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5789 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5792 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5793 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5796 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5797 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5801 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5802 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5803 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5804 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5805 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5806 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5807 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5808 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5809 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5810 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5811 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5812 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5813 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5814 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5815 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5816 first_per_commitment_point,
5817 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5818 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5819 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5820 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5822 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5827 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5828 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5830 // Check sanity of message fields:
5831 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5832 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5834 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5835 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5837 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5838 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5840 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5841 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5843 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5844 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5846 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5847 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5848 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5850 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5851 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5852 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5854 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5855 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5856 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5858 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5859 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5861 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5862 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5865 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5866 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5867 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5869 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5870 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5872 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5873 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5875 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5876 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5878 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5879 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5881 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5882 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5884 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5885 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5888 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5889 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5890 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5892 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5893 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5895 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5896 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5897 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5899 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
5900 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
5903 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5904 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5905 &Some(ref script) => {
5906 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5907 if script.len() == 0 {
5910 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5911 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5913 Some(script.clone())
5916 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5918 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5923 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5924 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5925 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5926 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5927 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5929 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5930 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5932 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5935 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5936 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5937 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5938 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5939 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5940 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5943 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5944 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5945 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5948 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5949 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5951 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5952 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5958 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5959 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5960 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5963 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5964 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5965 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5966 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5967 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5968 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5969 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5970 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5971 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5972 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5973 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5974 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5977 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
5979 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
5980 // support this channel type.
5981 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
5982 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
5983 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
5986 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
5987 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
5988 // `static_remote_key`.
5989 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
5990 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
5992 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
5993 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
5994 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
5996 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
5997 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
5999 channel_type.clone()
6001 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6002 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6003 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6008 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6009 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6010 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6011 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6012 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6013 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6014 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6015 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6016 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6019 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6020 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6023 // Check sanity of message fields:
6024 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6025 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6027 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6028 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6030 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6031 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6033 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6034 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6035 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6037 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6038 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6040 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6043 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6045 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6046 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6047 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6049 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6050 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6052 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6053 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6056 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6057 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6058 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6060 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6061 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6063 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6064 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6066 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6067 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6069 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6070 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6072 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6073 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6075 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6076 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6079 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6081 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6082 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6087 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6088 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6089 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6090 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6091 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6093 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6094 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6096 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6097 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6098 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6100 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6101 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6104 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6105 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6106 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6107 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6108 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6109 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6112 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6113 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6114 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6115 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6116 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6119 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6120 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6121 &Some(ref script) => {
6122 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6123 if script.len() == 0 {
6126 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6127 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6129 Some(script.clone())
6132 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6134 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6139 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6140 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6141 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6142 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6146 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6147 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6152 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6153 Ok(script) => script,
6154 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6157 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6158 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6161 context: ChannelContext {
6164 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6165 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6167 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6172 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6174 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6175 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6176 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6177 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6180 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6183 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6186 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6187 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6188 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6190 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6191 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6192 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6193 pending_update_fee: None,
6194 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6195 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6196 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6197 update_time_counter: 1,
6199 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6201 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6202 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6203 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6204 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6205 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6206 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6208 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6209 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6210 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6211 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6213 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6214 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6215 closing_fee_limits: None,
6216 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6218 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6220 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6221 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6222 short_channel_id: None,
6223 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6225 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6226 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6227 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6228 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6229 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6230 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6231 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6232 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6233 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6234 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6235 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6236 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6237 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6239 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6241 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6242 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6243 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6244 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6245 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6246 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6247 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6249 funding_outpoint: None,
6250 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6252 funding_transaction: None,
6254 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6255 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6256 counterparty_node_id,
6258 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6260 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6262 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6263 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6265 announcement_sigs: None,
6267 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6268 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6269 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6270 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6272 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6273 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6275 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6276 outbound_scid_alias,
6278 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6279 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6281 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6282 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6287 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6294 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6295 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6298 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6299 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6300 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6301 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6304 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6305 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6307 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6308 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6309 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6310 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6312 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6313 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6315 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6316 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6318 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6319 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6322 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6323 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6325 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6328 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6329 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6330 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6332 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6333 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6334 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6335 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6337 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6338 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6339 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6340 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6341 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6342 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6343 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6344 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6345 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6346 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6347 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6348 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6349 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6350 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6351 first_per_commitment_point,
6352 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6353 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6354 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6356 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6358 next_local_nonce: None,
6362 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6363 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6365 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6367 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6368 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6371 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6372 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6374 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6375 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6377 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6378 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6379 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6380 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6381 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6382 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6383 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6384 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6385 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6388 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6389 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6391 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6392 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6393 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6394 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6396 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6397 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6399 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6400 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6403 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6404 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6405 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6407 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6410 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6411 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6413 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6414 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6415 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6417 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6419 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6420 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6422 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6423 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6424 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6425 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6428 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6429 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6430 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6431 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6432 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6434 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6436 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6437 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6438 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6441 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6442 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6443 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6447 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6448 initial_commitment_tx,
6451 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6452 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6455 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6456 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6459 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6461 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6462 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6463 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6464 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6465 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6466 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6467 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6468 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6469 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6470 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6471 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6473 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6475 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6477 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6478 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6479 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6480 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6482 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6484 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6485 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6486 let mut channel = Channel {
6487 context: self.context,
6489 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6490 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6491 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6493 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6497 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6498 }, channel_monitor))
6502 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6503 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6505 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6511 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6512 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6513 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6514 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6515 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6517 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6518 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6519 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6520 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6526 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6527 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6528 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6529 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6530 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6531 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6536 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6537 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6538 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6539 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6541 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6542 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6543 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6544 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6549 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6550 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6551 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6552 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6553 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6554 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6559 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6560 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6561 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6564 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6566 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6567 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6568 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6569 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6570 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6572 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6573 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6574 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6575 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6577 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6578 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6579 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6581 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6583 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6584 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6585 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6586 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6587 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6588 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6590 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6591 // deserialized from that format.
6592 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6593 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6594 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6596 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6598 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6599 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6600 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6602 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6603 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6604 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6605 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6608 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6609 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6610 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6613 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6614 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6615 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6616 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6618 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6619 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6621 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6623 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6625 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6627 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6630 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6632 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6637 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6638 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6640 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6641 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6642 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6643 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6644 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6645 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6646 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6648 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6650 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6652 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6655 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6656 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6657 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6660 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6662 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6663 preimages.push(preimage);
6665 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6666 reason.write(writer)?;
6668 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6670 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6671 preimages.push(preimage);
6673 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6674 reason.write(writer)?;
6677 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6678 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6679 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6681 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6682 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6683 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6687 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6688 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6689 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6691 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6692 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6696 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6697 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6698 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6699 source.write(writer)?;
6700 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6702 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6703 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6704 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6706 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6707 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6709 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6711 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6712 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6714 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6716 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6717 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6722 match self.context.resend_order {
6723 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6724 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6727 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6728 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6729 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6731 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6732 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6733 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6734 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6737 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6738 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6739 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6740 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6741 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6744 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6745 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6746 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6747 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6749 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6750 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6751 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6753 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6755 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6756 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6757 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6758 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6760 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6761 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6762 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6763 // consider the stale state on reload.
6766 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6767 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6768 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6770 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6771 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6772 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6774 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6775 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6777 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6778 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6779 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6781 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6782 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6784 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6787 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6788 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6789 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6791 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6794 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6795 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6797 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6798 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6799 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6801 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6803 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6805 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6807 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6808 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6809 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6810 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6811 htlc.write(writer)?;
6814 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6815 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6816 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6818 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6819 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6821 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6822 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6823 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6824 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6825 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6826 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6827 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6829 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6830 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6831 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6832 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6833 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6835 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6836 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6838 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6839 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6840 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6841 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6843 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6845 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6846 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6847 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6848 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6849 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6850 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6851 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6853 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6854 (2, chan_type, option),
6855 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6856 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6857 (5, self.context.config, required),
6858 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6859 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6860 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
6861 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6862 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
6863 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6864 (15, preimages, required_vec),
6865 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6866 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6867 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6868 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6869 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6870 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6871 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6872 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6873 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6874 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6875 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6882 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6883 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6885 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6886 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6888 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6889 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6890 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6892 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6893 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6894 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6895 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6897 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6899 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6900 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6901 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6902 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6903 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6905 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6906 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6909 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6910 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6911 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6913 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6915 let mut keys_data = None;
6917 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6918 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6919 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6920 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6921 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6922 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6923 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6924 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6925 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6926 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6930 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6931 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6932 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6935 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6937 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6938 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6939 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6941 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6943 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6944 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6945 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6946 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6947 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6948 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6949 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6950 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6951 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6952 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6953 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6954 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6955 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6960 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6961 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6962 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6963 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6964 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6965 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6966 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6967 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6968 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6969 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6970 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6971 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6973 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6974 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6977 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6978 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6981 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6982 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6984 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6986 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6990 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6991 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6992 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6993 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6994 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6995 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6996 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6997 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6998 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6999 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7000 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7002 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7003 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7004 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7006 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7007 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7008 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7010 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7014 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7015 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7016 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7017 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7020 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7021 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7022 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7024 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7025 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7026 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7027 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7030 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7031 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7032 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7033 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7036 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7038 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7040 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7041 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7042 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7043 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7045 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7046 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7047 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7048 // consider the stale state on reload.
7049 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7052 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7053 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7054 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7056 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7059 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7060 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7061 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7063 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7064 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7065 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7066 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7068 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7069 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7071 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7072 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7074 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7075 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7076 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7078 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7080 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7081 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7083 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7084 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7087 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7089 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7090 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7091 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7092 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7094 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7097 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7098 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7100 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7102 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7103 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7105 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7106 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7108 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7110 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7111 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7112 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7114 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7115 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7116 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7120 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7121 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7122 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7124 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7130 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7131 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7132 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7133 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7134 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7135 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7136 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7137 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7138 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7139 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7141 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7142 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7143 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7144 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7145 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7146 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7147 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7149 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7150 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7151 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7152 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7154 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7156 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7157 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7159 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7160 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7161 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7162 (2, channel_type, option),
7163 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7164 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7165 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7166 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7167 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7168 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7169 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7170 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7171 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7172 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7173 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7174 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7175 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7176 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7177 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7178 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7179 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7180 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7181 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7182 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7183 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7186 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7187 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7188 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7189 // required channel parameters.
7190 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7191 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7192 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7194 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7196 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7197 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7198 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7199 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7202 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7203 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7204 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7206 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7207 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7209 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7210 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7215 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7216 if iter.next().is_some() {
7217 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7221 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7222 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7223 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7224 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7225 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7228 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7229 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7230 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7232 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7233 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7235 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7236 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7237 // separate u64 values.
7238 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7240 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7242 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7243 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7244 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7245 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7247 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7248 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7250 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7251 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7252 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7253 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7254 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7257 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7258 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7262 context: ChannelContext {
7265 config: config.unwrap(),
7269 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7270 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7271 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7274 temporary_channel_id,
7276 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7278 channel_value_satoshis,
7280 latest_monitor_update_id,
7283 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7286 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7287 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7290 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7291 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7292 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7293 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7297 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7298 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7299 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7300 monitor_pending_forwards,
7301 monitor_pending_failures,
7302 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7305 holding_cell_update_fee,
7306 next_holder_htlc_id,
7307 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7308 update_time_counter,
7311 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7312 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7313 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7314 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7316 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7317 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7318 closing_fee_limits: None,
7319 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7321 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7323 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7324 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7326 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7328 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7329 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7330 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7331 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7332 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7333 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7334 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7335 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7336 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7339 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7341 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7342 funding_transaction,
7344 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7345 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7346 counterparty_node_id,
7348 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7352 channel_update_status,
7353 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7357 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7358 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7359 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7360 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7362 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7363 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7365 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7366 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7367 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7369 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7370 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7372 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7373 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7375 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7378 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7387 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7388 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7389 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7390 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7391 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7393 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7394 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7395 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7396 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7397 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7398 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7399 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7400 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7401 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7402 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7403 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7404 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7405 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7406 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7407 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7408 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7409 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7410 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7411 use crate::util::test_utils;
7412 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7413 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7414 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7415 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7416 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7417 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7418 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7419 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7420 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7421 use crate::prelude::*;
7423 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7426 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7427 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7433 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7434 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7435 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7436 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7440 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7441 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7442 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7443 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7444 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7445 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7446 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7450 signer: InMemorySigner,
7453 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7454 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7457 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7458 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7460 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7461 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7464 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7468 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7470 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7471 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7472 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7473 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7474 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7477 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7478 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7479 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7480 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7484 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7485 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7486 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7490 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7491 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7492 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7493 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7495 let seed = [42; 32];
7496 let network = Network::Testnet;
7497 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7498 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7499 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7502 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7503 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7504 let config = UserConfig::default();
7505 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7506 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7507 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7509 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7510 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7514 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7515 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7517 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7518 let original_fee = 253;
7519 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7520 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7521 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7522 let seed = [42; 32];
7523 let network = Network::Testnet;
7524 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7526 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7527 let config = UserConfig::default();
7528 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7530 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7531 // same as the old fee.
7532 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7533 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7534 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7538 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7539 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7540 // dust limits are used.
7541 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7542 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7543 let seed = [42; 32];
7544 let network = Network::Testnet;
7545 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7546 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7547 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7549 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7550 // they have different dust limits.
7552 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7553 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7554 let config = UserConfig::default();
7555 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7557 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7558 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7559 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7560 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7561 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7563 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7564 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7565 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7566 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7567 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7569 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7570 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7571 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7572 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7574 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7575 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7576 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7578 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7579 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7581 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7582 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7583 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7585 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7586 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7587 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7588 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7591 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7593 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7594 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7595 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7596 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7597 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7598 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7599 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7600 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7601 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7603 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7606 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7607 // the dust limit check.
7608 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7609 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7610 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7611 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7613 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7614 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7615 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7616 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7617 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7618 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7619 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7623 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7624 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7625 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7626 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7627 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7628 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7629 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7630 let seed = [42; 32];
7631 let network = Network::Testnet;
7632 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7634 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7635 let config = UserConfig::default();
7636 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7638 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7639 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7641 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7642 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7643 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7644 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7645 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7646 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7648 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7649 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7650 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7651 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7652 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7654 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7656 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7657 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7658 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7659 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7660 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7662 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7663 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7664 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7665 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7666 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7670 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7671 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7672 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7673 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7674 let seed = [42; 32];
7675 let network = Network::Testnet;
7676 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7677 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7678 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7680 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7682 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7683 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7684 let config = UserConfig::default();
7685 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7687 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7688 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7689 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7690 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7692 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7693 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7694 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7696 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7697 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7698 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7699 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7701 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7702 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7703 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7705 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7706 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7708 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7709 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7710 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7711 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7712 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7713 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7714 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7716 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7718 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7719 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7720 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7721 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7722 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7726 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7727 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7728 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7729 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7730 let seed = [42; 32];
7731 let network = Network::Testnet;
7732 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7733 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7734 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7736 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7737 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7738 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7739 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7740 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7741 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7742 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7743 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7745 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7746 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7747 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7748 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7749 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7750 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7752 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7753 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7754 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7755 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7757 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7759 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7760 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7761 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7762 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7763 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7764 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7766 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7767 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7768 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7769 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7771 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7772 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7773 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7774 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7775 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7777 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7778 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7780 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7781 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7782 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7784 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7785 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7786 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7787 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7788 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7790 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7791 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7793 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7794 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7795 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7799 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7801 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7802 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7803 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7805 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7806 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7807 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7808 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7810 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7811 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7812 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7814 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7816 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7817 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7820 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7821 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7822 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7823 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7824 let seed = [42; 32];
7825 let network = Network::Testnet;
7826 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7827 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7828 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7831 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7832 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7833 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7835 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7836 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7838 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7839 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7840 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7842 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7843 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7845 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7847 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7848 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7850 // Channel Negotiations failed
7851 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7852 assert!(result.is_err());
7857 fn channel_update() {
7858 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7859 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7860 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7861 let seed = [42; 32];
7862 let network = Network::Testnet;
7863 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7864 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7865 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7867 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7868 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7869 let config = UserConfig::default();
7870 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7872 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7873 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7874 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7875 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7876 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7878 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7879 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7880 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7881 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7882 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7884 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7885 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7886 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7887 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7889 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7890 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7891 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7893 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7894 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7896 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7897 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7898 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7900 short_channel_id: 0,
7903 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7904 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7905 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7907 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7908 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7910 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7912 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7914 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7915 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7916 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7917 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7919 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7920 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7921 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7923 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7927 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7929 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7930 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7931 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7932 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7933 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7934 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7935 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7936 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7937 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7938 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7939 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7940 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7941 use crate::sync::Arc;
7943 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7944 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7945 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7946 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7948 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7950 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7951 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7952 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7953 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7954 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7956 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7957 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7963 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7964 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7965 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7967 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7968 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7969 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7970 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7971 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7972 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7974 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7976 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7977 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7978 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7979 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7980 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7981 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7983 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7984 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7985 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7986 selected_contest_delay: 144
7988 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7989 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7991 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7992 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7994 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7995 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7997 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7998 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8000 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8001 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8002 // build_commitment_transaction.
8003 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8004 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8005 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8006 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8007 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8009 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8010 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8011 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8012 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8016 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8017 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8018 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8019 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8023 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8024 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8025 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8027 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8028 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8030 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8031 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8033 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8035 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8036 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8037 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8038 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8039 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8040 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8041 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8043 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8044 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8045 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8046 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8048 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8049 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8050 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8052 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8054 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8055 commitment_tx.clone(),
8056 counterparty_signature,
8057 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8058 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8059 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8061 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8062 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8064 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8065 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8066 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8068 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8069 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8072 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8073 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8075 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8076 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8077 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8078 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8079 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8080 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8081 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8082 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8084 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8087 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8088 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8089 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8093 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8096 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8097 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8098 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8100 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8101 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8102 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8103 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8104 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8105 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8106 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8107 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8109 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8113 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8114 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8115 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8116 "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", {});
8118 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8119 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8121 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8122 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8123 "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", {});
8125 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8126 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8127 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8128 "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", {});
8130 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8131 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8133 amount_msat: 1000000,
8135 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8136 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8138 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8141 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8142 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8144 amount_msat: 2000000,
8146 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8147 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8149 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8152 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8153 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8155 amount_msat: 2000000,
8157 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8158 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8159 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8160 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8162 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8165 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8166 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8168 amount_msat: 3000000,
8170 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8171 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8172 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8173 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8175 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8178 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8179 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8181 amount_msat: 4000000,
8183 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8184 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8186 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8190 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8191 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8192 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8194 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8195 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8196 "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", {
8199 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8200 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8201 "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" },
8204 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8205 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8206 "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" },
8209 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8210 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8211 "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" },
8214 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8215 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8216 "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" },
8219 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8220 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8221 "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" }
8224 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8225 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8226 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8228 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8229 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8230 "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", {
8233 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8234 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8235 "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" },
8238 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8239 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8240 "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" },
8243 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8244 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8245 "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" },
8248 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8249 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8250 "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" },
8253 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8254 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8255 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8258 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8259 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8260 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8262 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8263 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8264 "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", {
8267 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8268 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8269 "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" },
8272 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8273 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8274 "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" },
8277 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8278 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8279 "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" },
8282 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8283 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8284 "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" }
8287 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8288 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8289 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8290 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8292 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8293 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8294 "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", {
8297 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8298 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8299 "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" },
8302 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8303 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8304 "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" },
8307 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8308 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8309 "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" },
8312 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8313 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8314 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8317 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8318 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8319 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8320 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8322 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8323 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8324 "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", {
8327 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8328 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8329 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8332 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8333 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8334 "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" },
8337 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8338 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8339 "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" },
8342 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8343 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8344 "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" }
8347 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8348 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8349 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8351 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8352 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8353 "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", {
8356 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8357 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8358 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8361 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8362 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8363 "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" },
8366 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8367 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8368 "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" }
8371 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8372 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8373 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8375 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8376 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8377 "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", {
8380 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8381 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8382 "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" },
8385 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8386 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8387 "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" },
8390 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8391 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8392 "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" }
8395 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8396 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8397 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8399 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8400 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8401 "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", {
8404 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8405 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8406 "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" },
8409 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8410 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8411 "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" }
8414 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8415 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8416 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8417 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8418 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8419 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8421 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8422 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8423 "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", {
8426 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8427 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8428 "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" },
8431 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8432 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8433 "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" }
8436 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8437 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8438 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8439 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8440 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8442 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8443 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8444 "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", {
8447 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8448 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8449 "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" },
8452 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8453 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8454 "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" }
8457 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8458 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8459 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8461 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8462 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8463 "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", {
8466 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8467 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8468 "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" }
8471 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8472 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8473 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8474 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8475 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8477 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8478 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8479 "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", {
8482 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8483 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8484 "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" }
8487 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8488 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8489 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8490 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8491 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8493 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8494 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8495 "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", {
8498 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8499 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8500 "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" }
8503 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8504 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8505 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8506 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8508 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8509 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8510 "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", {});
8512 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8513 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8514 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8515 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8516 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8518 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8519 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8520 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ad0886a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd01483045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b9501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8522 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8523 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8524 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8525 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8526 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8528 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8529 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8530 "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", {});
8532 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8533 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8534 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8536 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8537 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8538 "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", {});
8540 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8541 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8542 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8543 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8544 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8546 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8547 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8548 "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", {});
8550 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8551 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8552 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8553 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8554 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8556 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8557 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8558 "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", {});
8560 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8561 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8562 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8563 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8564 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8565 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8567 amount_msat: 2000000,
8569 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8570 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8572 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8575 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8576 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8577 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8579 amount_msat: 5000001,
8581 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8582 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8583 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8584 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8586 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8589 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8590 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8592 amount_msat: 5000000,
8594 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8595 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8596 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8597 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8599 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8603 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8604 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8605 "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", {
8608 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8609 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8610 "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" },
8612 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8613 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8614 "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" },
8616 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8617 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8618 "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" }
8621 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8622 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8623 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8624 "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", {
8627 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8628 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8629 "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" },
8631 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8632 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8633 "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" },
8635 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8636 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8637 "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" }
8642 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8643 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8645 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8646 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8647 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8648 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8650 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8651 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8652 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8654 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8655 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8657 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8658 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8660 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8661 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8662 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8666 fn test_key_derivation() {
8667 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8668 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8670 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8671 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8673 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8674 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8676 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8677 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8679 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8680 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8682 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8683 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8685 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8686 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8688 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8689 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8693 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8694 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8695 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8696 let seed = [42; 32];
8697 let network = Network::Testnet;
8698 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8699 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8701 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8702 let config = UserConfig::default();
8703 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8704 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8706 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8707 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8709 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8710 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8711 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8712 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8713 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8714 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8715 assert!(res.is_ok());
8719 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8720 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8721 // resulting `channel_type`.
8722 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8723 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8724 let network = Network::Testnet;
8725 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8726 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8728 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8729 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8731 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8732 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8734 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8735 // need to signal it.
8736 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8737 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8738 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8741 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8743 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8744 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8745 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8747 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8748 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8749 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8752 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8753 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8754 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8755 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8756 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8759 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8760 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8764 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8765 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8766 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8767 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8768 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8769 let network = Network::Testnet;
8770 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8771 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8773 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8774 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8776 let config = UserConfig::default();
8778 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8779 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8780 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8781 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8782 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8784 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8785 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8786 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8789 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8790 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8791 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8793 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8794 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8795 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8796 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8797 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8798 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8800 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8804 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8805 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8807 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8808 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8809 let network = Network::Testnet;
8810 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8811 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8813 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8814 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8816 let config = UserConfig::default();
8818 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8819 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8820 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8821 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8822 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8823 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8824 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8825 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8827 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8828 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8829 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8830 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8831 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8832 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8835 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8836 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8838 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8839 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8840 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8841 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8843 assert!(res.is_err());
8845 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8846 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8847 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8849 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8850 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8851 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8854 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8856 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8857 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8858 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8859 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8862 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8863 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8865 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8866 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8868 assert!(res.is_err());