1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
170 enum OutboundHTLCState {
171 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
172 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
173 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
174 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
175 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
176 /// money back (though we won't), and,
177 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
178 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
179 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
180 /// we'll never get out of sync).
181 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
182 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
183 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
185 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
186 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
187 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
192 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
193 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
195 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
196 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
197 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
198 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
199 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
203 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
204 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
206 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
207 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
210 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
213 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
214 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
219 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
220 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
228 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
229 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 state: OutboundHTLCState,
236 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
237 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
242 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
243 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
247 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
250 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
251 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
252 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
255 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
260 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
265 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
269 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
270 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
271 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
272 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
273 struct $flag_type(u32);
278 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
281 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
283 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
286 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
289 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
290 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
293 Ok($flag_type(flags))
298 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
301 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
304 impl core::ops::Not for $flag_type {
306 fn not(self) -> Self::Output { Self(!self.0) }
308 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
310 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
312 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
313 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
315 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
317 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
319 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
320 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
323 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
324 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
326 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
327 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
328 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
330 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
332 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
333 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
335 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
337 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
339 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
340 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
342 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
343 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
345 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
346 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
351 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
354 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
355 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
356 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
357 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
358 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
359 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
360 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
361 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
362 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
363 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
364 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
365 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
366 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
367 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
371 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
373 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
374 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED),
375 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
376 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
377 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS),
378 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
379 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
380 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT),
381 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
382 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT)
387 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
388 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
389 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
390 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
391 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
392 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
397 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
398 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
399 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
400 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
401 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY),
402 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
403 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
404 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY),
405 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
406 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
407 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)
412 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
413 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
414 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
415 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
416 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
417 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
418 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE)
422 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
424 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
425 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
426 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
427 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
428 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
430 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
431 /// funding transaction to confirm.
432 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
433 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
435 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
436 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
437 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
441 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
442 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
444 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
447 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.is_set($state_flag.into()),
456 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags |= $state_flag,
458 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
462 fn $clear(&mut self) {
465 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags &= !($state_flag),
467 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
471 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, FUNDED_STATES) => {
472 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
474 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, $state: ident) => {
475 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [$state]);
480 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
482 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
483 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
485 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
486 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
487 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
488 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
489 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
490 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
491 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
492 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
500 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
502 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
503 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
504 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
505 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
506 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
510 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
511 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
514 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
515 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
518 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
520 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
521 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
522 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
526 fn should_force_holding_cell(&self) -> bool {
528 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
529 flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) ||
530 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) ||
531 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
533 debug_assert!(false, "The holding cell is only valid within ChannelReady");
539 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected,
540 FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED, FUNDED_STATES);
541 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress,
542 FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, FUNDED_STATES);
543 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent,
544 FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
545 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent,
546 FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
547 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready,
548 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
549 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready,
550 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
551 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch,
552 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH, AwaitingChannelReady);
553 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke,
554 ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, ChannelReady);
557 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
559 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
561 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
562 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
563 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
564 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
568 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
570 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
572 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
574 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
575 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
576 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
577 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
578 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
580 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
581 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
583 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
585 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
586 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
588 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
589 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
590 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
591 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
592 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
593 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
595 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
596 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
598 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
599 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
600 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
601 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
602 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
604 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
605 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
607 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
608 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
610 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
611 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
612 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
613 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
619 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
620 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
622 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
623 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
624 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
629 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
630 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
632 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
633 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
634 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
639 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
641 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
642 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
645 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
646 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
647 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
648 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
649 self.logger.log(record)
653 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
654 where L::Target: Logger {
655 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
656 where S::Target: SignerProvider
660 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
661 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
666 macro_rules! secp_check {
667 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
670 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
675 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
676 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
677 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
678 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
679 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
680 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
681 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
682 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
684 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
686 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
688 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
692 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
694 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
695 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
696 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
698 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
699 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
701 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
702 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
703 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
704 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
705 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
707 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
708 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
712 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
718 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
721 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
722 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
723 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
724 holding_cell_msat: u64,
725 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
728 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
729 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
730 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
731 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
732 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
733 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
734 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
735 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
736 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
737 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
738 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
741 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
742 struct HTLCCandidate {
744 origin: HTLCInitiator,
748 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
756 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
758 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
760 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
761 htlc_value_msat: u64,
762 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
767 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
768 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
769 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
770 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
771 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
773 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
774 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
775 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
776 htlc_value_msat: u64,
778 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
779 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
783 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
784 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
785 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
786 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
787 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
788 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
789 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
790 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
791 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
792 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
793 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
796 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
798 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
799 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
800 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
801 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
804 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
805 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
806 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
807 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
808 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
809 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
810 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
811 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
814 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
816 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
817 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
818 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
819 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
820 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
821 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
822 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
823 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
824 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
825 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
826 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
827 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
828 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
829 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
830 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
833 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
834 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
835 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
836 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
837 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
838 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
839 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
840 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
841 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
842 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
843 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
844 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
845 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
846 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
847 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
849 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
850 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
851 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
852 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
854 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
855 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
856 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
857 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
859 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
860 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
861 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
862 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
863 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
865 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
866 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
867 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
868 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
870 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
871 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
872 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
874 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
875 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
876 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
877 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
878 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
880 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
881 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
884 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
885 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
887 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
888 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
889 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
890 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
892 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
893 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
895 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
896 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
899 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
900 (0, update, required),
903 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
904 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
905 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
906 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
907 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
911 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
912 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
913 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
915 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
917 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
918 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
919 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
923 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
925 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
926 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
927 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
932 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
933 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
934 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
935 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
936 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
938 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
939 /// in a timely manner.
940 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
943 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
944 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
945 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
947 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
948 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
949 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
950 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
954 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
955 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
956 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
958 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
959 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
960 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
961 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
963 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
967 /// The current channel ID.
968 channel_id: ChannelId,
969 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
970 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
971 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
972 channel_state: ChannelState,
974 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
975 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
977 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
978 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
979 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
981 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
982 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
983 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
984 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
986 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
987 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
989 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
991 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
992 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
993 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
995 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
996 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
997 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
999 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1000 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1001 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1002 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1003 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1004 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1006 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1007 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1008 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1009 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1010 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1011 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1013 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1015 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1016 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1017 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1019 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1020 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1021 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1022 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1023 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1024 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1025 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1027 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1028 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1029 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1031 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1032 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1033 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1034 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1035 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1036 /// outbound or inbound.
1037 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1039 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1041 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1042 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1043 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1044 // HTLCs with similar state.
1045 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1046 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1047 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1048 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1049 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1050 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1051 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1052 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1053 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1054 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1056 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1057 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1058 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1060 update_time_counter: u32,
1062 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1063 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1064 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1065 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1066 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1067 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1069 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1070 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1072 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1073 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1074 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1075 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1077 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1078 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1080 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1082 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1084 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1085 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1086 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1087 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1088 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1090 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1091 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1093 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1094 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1095 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1097 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1098 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1099 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1100 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1101 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1102 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1103 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1104 channel_creation_height: u32,
1106 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1109 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1111 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1114 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1116 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1119 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1121 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1123 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1124 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1127 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1129 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1131 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1132 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1134 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1136 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1137 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1138 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1140 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1142 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1143 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1144 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1146 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1147 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1148 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1150 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1152 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1154 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1155 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1156 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1157 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1159 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1160 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1161 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1163 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1164 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1165 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1167 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1168 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1169 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1170 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1171 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1172 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1173 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1174 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1176 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1177 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1178 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1179 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1180 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1182 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1183 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1185 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1186 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1187 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1188 /// unblock the state machine.
1190 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1191 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1192 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1194 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1195 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1196 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1198 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1199 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1200 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1201 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1202 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1203 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1204 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1205 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1207 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1208 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1210 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1211 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1212 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1214 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1215 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1216 // associated channel mapping.
1218 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1219 // to store all of them.
1220 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1222 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1223 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1224 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1225 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1226 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1228 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1229 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1231 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1232 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1234 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1235 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1236 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1238 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1239 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1240 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1243 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1244 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1245 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1246 self.update_time_counter
1249 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1250 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1253 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1254 self.config.announced_channel
1257 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1258 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1261 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1262 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1263 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1264 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1267 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1268 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1269 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1272 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1273 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1274 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1275 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1276 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1277 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1278 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1281 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1282 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1283 match self.channel_state {
1284 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1285 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1286 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1287 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1288 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1289 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1290 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1292 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1294 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1295 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1299 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1300 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1301 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1302 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1303 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1304 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1307 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1308 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1309 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1313 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1314 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1315 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1316 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1317 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1320 // Public utilities:
1322 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1326 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1328 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1329 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1330 self.temporary_channel_id
1333 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1337 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1338 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1339 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1343 /// Gets the channel's type
1344 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1348 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1350 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1351 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1352 self.short_channel_id
1355 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1356 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1357 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1360 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1361 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1362 self.outbound_scid_alias
1365 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1367 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1368 return &self.holder_signer
1371 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1372 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1373 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1374 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1375 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1376 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1379 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1380 /// get_funding_created.
1381 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1382 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1385 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1386 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1387 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1388 if conf_height > 0 {
1395 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1396 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1397 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1400 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1401 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1402 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1403 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1407 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1410 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1411 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1414 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1415 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1418 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1419 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1420 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1423 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1424 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1427 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1428 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1429 self.counterparty_node_id
1432 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1433 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1434 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1437 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1438 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1439 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1442 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1443 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1445 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1446 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1447 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1448 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1450 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1454 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1455 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1456 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1459 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1460 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1461 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1464 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1465 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1466 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1468 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1469 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1474 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1475 self.channel_value_satoshis
1478 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1479 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1482 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1483 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1486 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1487 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1488 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1490 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1491 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1492 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1493 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1494 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1496 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1500 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1501 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1502 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1505 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1506 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1507 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1510 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1511 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1512 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1515 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1516 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1517 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1520 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1521 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1522 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1525 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1526 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1527 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1530 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1531 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1532 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1533 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1534 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1537 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1539 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1540 self.prev_config = None;
1544 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1545 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1549 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1550 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1551 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1552 let did_channel_update =
1553 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1554 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1555 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1556 if did_channel_update {
1557 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1558 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1559 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1560 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1562 self.config.options = *config;
1566 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1567 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1568 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1569 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1570 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1573 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1574 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1575 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1576 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1577 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1579 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1580 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1581 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1582 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1583 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1584 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1585 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1587 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1588 where L::Target: Logger
1590 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1591 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1592 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1594 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1595 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1596 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1597 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1599 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1600 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1601 if match update_state {
1602 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1603 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1604 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1605 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1606 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1608 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1612 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1613 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1614 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1616 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1618 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1619 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1620 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1622 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1623 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1624 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1625 transaction_output_index: None
1630 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1631 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1632 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1633 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1634 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1637 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1639 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1640 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1641 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1643 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1644 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1647 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1648 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1651 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1653 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1654 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1655 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1657 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1658 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1664 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1666 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1667 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1668 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1669 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1670 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1671 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1672 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1676 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1677 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1679 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1681 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1682 if generated_by_local {
1683 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1684 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1685 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1695 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1697 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1698 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1699 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1700 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1701 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1702 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1703 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1706 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1707 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1708 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1709 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1713 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1714 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1718 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1719 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1721 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1723 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1724 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1726 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1727 if !generated_by_local {
1728 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1736 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1737 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1738 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1739 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1740 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1741 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1742 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1743 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1745 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1747 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1748 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1749 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1750 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1752 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1754 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1755 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1756 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1757 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1760 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1761 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1762 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1763 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1765 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1768 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1769 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1770 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1771 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1773 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1776 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1777 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1782 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1783 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1788 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1790 let channel_parameters =
1791 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1792 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1793 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1800 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1803 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1804 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1805 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1806 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1808 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1809 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1810 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1818 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1819 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1820 inbound_htlc_preimages,
1821 outbound_htlc_preimages,
1826 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1827 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1828 /// our counterparty!)
1829 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1830 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1831 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1832 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1833 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1834 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1835 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1837 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1841 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1842 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1843 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1844 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1845 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1846 //may see payments to it!
1847 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1848 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1849 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1851 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1854 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1855 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1856 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1857 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1858 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1861 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1862 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1865 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1869 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1870 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1871 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1872 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1873 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1874 // which are near the dust limit.
1875 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1876 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1877 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1878 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1879 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1881 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1882 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1884 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1887 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1888 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1889 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1892 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1893 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1895 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1896 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1897 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1898 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1899 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1900 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1901 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1904 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1907 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1908 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1909 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1911 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1912 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1913 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1914 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1915 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1916 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1918 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1919 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1925 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1926 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1928 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1929 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1930 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1931 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1932 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1933 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1934 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1937 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1940 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1941 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1942 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1944 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1945 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1946 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1947 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1948 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1949 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1951 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1952 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1956 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1957 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1958 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1959 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1960 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1961 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1962 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1964 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1965 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1967 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1974 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1975 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1976 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1977 /// corner case properly.
1978 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1979 -> AvailableBalances
1980 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1982 let context = &self;
1983 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1984 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1985 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1987 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1988 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1989 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1990 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1993 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1995 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1996 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1998 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2000 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2002 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2003 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2007 if context.is_outbound() {
2008 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2009 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2011 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2012 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2014 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2015 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2016 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2017 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2020 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2021 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2022 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2023 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2024 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2025 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2026 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2029 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2030 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2031 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2032 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2033 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2034 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2035 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2036 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2037 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2038 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2039 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2041 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2044 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2045 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2046 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2047 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2048 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2051 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2052 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2054 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2055 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2056 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2058 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2059 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2060 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2061 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2065 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2067 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2068 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2069 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2070 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2071 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2072 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2073 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2075 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2076 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2078 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2079 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2080 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2082 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2083 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2084 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2085 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2086 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2089 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2090 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2091 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2092 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2093 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2094 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2097 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2098 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2099 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2101 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2105 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2106 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2108 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2109 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2113 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2114 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2115 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2116 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2118 outbound_capacity_msat,
2119 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2120 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2125 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2126 let context = &self;
2127 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2130 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2131 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2133 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2134 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2136 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2137 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2139 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2140 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2141 let context = &self;
2142 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2144 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2147 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2148 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2150 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2151 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2153 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2154 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2156 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2157 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2161 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2162 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2168 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2169 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2170 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2173 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2174 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2175 included_htlcs += 1;
2178 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2179 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2183 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2184 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2185 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2186 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2187 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2188 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2193 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2195 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2196 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2201 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2202 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2206 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2207 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2208 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2211 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2212 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2214 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2215 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2216 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2218 total_pending_htlcs,
2219 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2220 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2221 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2223 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2224 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2225 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2227 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2229 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2234 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2235 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2237 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2238 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2240 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2241 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2243 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2244 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2245 let context = &self;
2246 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2248 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2251 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2252 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2254 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2255 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2257 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2258 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2260 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2261 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2265 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2266 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2272 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2273 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2274 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2275 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2276 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2277 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2280 included_htlcs += 1;
2283 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2284 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2287 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2288 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2290 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2291 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2292 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2297 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2298 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2299 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2302 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2303 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2305 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2306 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2308 total_pending_htlcs,
2309 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2310 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2311 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2313 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2314 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2315 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2317 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2319 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2324 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2325 match self.channel_state {
2326 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2327 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2328 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
2329 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
2339 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2341 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2342 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2345 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2347 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2348 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2349 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2353 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2354 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2355 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2358 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2360 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2361 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2364 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2365 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2366 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2367 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2368 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2369 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
2370 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2371 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2372 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2373 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2374 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2376 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2377 // return them to fail the payment.
2378 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2379 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2380 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2382 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2383 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2388 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2389 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2390 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2391 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2392 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2393 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2394 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2395 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2396 let generate_monitor_update = match self.channel_state {
2397 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => true,
2400 if generate_monitor_update {
2401 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2402 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2403 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2404 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
2405 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2409 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2410 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
2412 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2413 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2417 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2418 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2419 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2420 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
2421 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2422 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2423 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
2424 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
2428 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2429 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2430 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2431 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2433 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2434 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2435 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2436 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2438 match &self.holder_signer {
2439 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2440 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2441 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2442 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2443 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2446 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2450 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2451 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
2452 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
2454 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
2455 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2456 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2458 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2459 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2460 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2463 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2464 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2466 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2473 // Internal utility functions for channels
2475 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2476 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2477 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2479 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2481 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2482 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2483 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2485 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2488 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2490 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2493 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2494 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2495 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2497 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2499 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2500 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2501 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2502 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2503 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2506 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2507 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2508 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2509 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2510 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2511 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2512 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2515 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2516 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2518 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2519 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2522 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2523 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2524 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2525 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2526 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2527 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2530 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2531 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2532 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2533 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2536 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2537 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2539 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2540 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2541 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2545 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
2546 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
2547 trait FailHTLCContents {
2548 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
2549 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
2550 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
2551 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
2553 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
2554 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
2555 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2556 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
2558 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2559 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
2561 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2562 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
2565 impl FailHTLCContents for (u16, [u8; 32]) {
2566 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC; // (failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
2567 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2568 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2571 failure_code: self.0,
2572 sha256_of_onion: self.1
2575 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2576 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(
2577 InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((self.1, self.0))
2580 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2581 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
2583 failure_code: self.0,
2584 sha256_of_onion: self.1
2589 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
2590 fn name() -> &'static str;
2592 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2593 fn name() -> &'static str {
2597 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2598 fn name() -> &'static str {
2599 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
2603 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2604 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2605 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2607 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2608 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2609 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2610 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2612 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2613 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2615 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2617 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2618 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2619 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2620 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2622 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2623 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2627 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2633 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2634 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2635 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2636 // outside of those situations will fail.
2637 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2641 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2646 1 + // script length (0)
2650 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2651 2 + // witness marker and flag
2652 1 + // witness element count
2653 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2654 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2655 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2656 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2657 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2658 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2660 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2661 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2662 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2668 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2669 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2670 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2671 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2673 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2674 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2675 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2677 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2678 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2679 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2680 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2681 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2682 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2685 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2686 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2689 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2690 value_to_holder = 0;
2693 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2694 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2695 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2696 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2698 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2699 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2702 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2703 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2706 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2709 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2710 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2712 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2714 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2715 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2716 where L::Target: Logger {
2717 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2718 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2719 assert!(self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell());
2720 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2721 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2722 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2723 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2724 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2728 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2729 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2730 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2731 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2733 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2734 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2737 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2738 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2739 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2741 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2742 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2743 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2744 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2745 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2746 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2747 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2749 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2750 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2751 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2753 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2754 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2756 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2759 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2760 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2764 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2768 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2769 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2770 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2771 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2772 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2773 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2776 // Now update local state:
2778 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2779 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2780 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2781 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2782 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2783 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
2784 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2785 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2789 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2790 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2791 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2792 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2793 // do not not get into this branch.
2794 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2795 match pending_update {
2796 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2797 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2798 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2799 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2800 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2801 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2802 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2805 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2806 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2808 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2809 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2810 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2811 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2812 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2813 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2819 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
2820 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2821 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2823 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2824 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2825 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2827 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2828 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2831 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2832 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2834 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2835 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2837 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2838 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2841 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2844 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2845 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2846 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2847 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2852 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2853 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2854 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2855 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2856 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2857 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2858 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2859 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2860 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2861 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2862 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2863 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2864 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2865 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2866 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2868 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2869 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2870 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2871 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2872 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2875 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2876 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2877 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2883 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2884 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2886 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2890 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2891 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2892 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2893 /// before we fail backwards.
2895 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2896 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2897 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2898 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2899 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2900 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2901 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2904 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
2905 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
2907 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
2908 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
2909 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
2910 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2911 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (failure_code, sha256_of_onion), true, logger)
2912 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2915 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2916 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2917 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2918 /// before we fail backwards.
2920 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2921 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2922 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2923 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
2924 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
2926 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2927 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2928 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2931 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2932 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2933 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2935 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2936 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2937 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2939 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2940 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2941 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2943 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2948 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2949 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2955 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2956 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2957 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2958 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2959 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2963 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2964 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2965 force_holding_cell = true;
2968 // Now update local state:
2969 if force_holding_cell {
2970 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2971 match pending_update {
2972 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2973 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2974 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2975 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2979 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2980 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2982 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2983 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2984 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2990 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2991 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_packet.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
2995 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
2996 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
2998 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2999 htlc.state = err_packet.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
3002 Ok(Some(err_packet.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3005 // Message handlers:
3006 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3007 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3008 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3009 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3010 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3011 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3012 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3015 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3017 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3019 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3020 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3021 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3022 debug_assert!(matches!(
3023 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3025 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3026 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3029 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3030 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3032 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3033 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3034 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3035 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3037 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3040 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3041 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3042 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3045 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3046 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3047 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3048 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3049 // when routing outbound payments.
3050 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3054 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3055 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3056 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3057 match &self.context.channel_state {
3058 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3059 let flags = *flags & !FundedStateFlags::ALL;
3060 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3061 if flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3062 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3063 check_reconnection = true;
3064 } else if (flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3065 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3066 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3067 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3068 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3070 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3071 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3074 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3075 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3076 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3078 if check_reconnection {
3079 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3080 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3081 let expected_point =
3082 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3083 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3085 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3086 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3087 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3088 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3089 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3090 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3092 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3093 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3094 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3095 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3096 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3098 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3099 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3104 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3105 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3107 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3109 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3112 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3113 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3114 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3115 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3116 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3117 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3119 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3120 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3122 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3123 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3124 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3126 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3127 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3130 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3131 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3133 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3134 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3136 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3139 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3143 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3144 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3145 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3146 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3148 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3149 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3152 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3153 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3154 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3155 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3156 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3157 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3158 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3159 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3160 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3161 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3162 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3164 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3165 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3166 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3167 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3168 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3169 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3173 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3174 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3177 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3178 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3179 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3181 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3182 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3183 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3184 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3185 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3186 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3187 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3191 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3192 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3193 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3194 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3195 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3196 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3197 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3201 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3202 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3203 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3204 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3205 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3206 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3209 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3210 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3212 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3213 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3214 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3216 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3217 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3221 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3224 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3225 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3229 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3230 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3234 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3235 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3236 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3237 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3238 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3239 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3240 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3241 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3242 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3244 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3245 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3246 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3247 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3248 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3251 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3252 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3253 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3254 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3255 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3258 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3259 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3261 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3265 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3266 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3267 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3271 // Now update local state:
3272 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3273 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3274 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3275 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3276 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3277 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3278 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3283 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3285 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3286 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3287 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3288 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3289 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3290 None => fail_reason.into(),
3291 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3292 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3293 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3294 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3296 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3300 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3301 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3302 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3303 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3305 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3306 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3311 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3314 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3315 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3316 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3318 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3319 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3322 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3325 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3326 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3329 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3333 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3337 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3338 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3339 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3341 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3342 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3345 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3349 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3350 where L::Target: Logger
3352 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3355 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3356 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3358 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3359 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3362 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3364 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3366 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3367 let commitment_txid = {
3368 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3369 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3370 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3372 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3373 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3374 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3375 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3376 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3377 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3381 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3383 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3384 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3385 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3386 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3389 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3390 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3391 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3392 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3395 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3397 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3398 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3399 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3400 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3401 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3402 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3403 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3404 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3405 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3406 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3407 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3413 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3414 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3417 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3418 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3419 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3420 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3421 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3422 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3423 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3424 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3425 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3426 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3427 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3428 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3429 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3432 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3433 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3434 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3435 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3436 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3437 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3438 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3440 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3441 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3442 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3443 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3444 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3445 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3446 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3447 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3449 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3450 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3453 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3455 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3456 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3457 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3460 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3463 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3464 commitment_stats.tx,
3466 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3467 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3468 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3471 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3472 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3474 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3475 let mut need_commitment = false;
3476 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3477 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3478 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3479 need_commitment = true;
3483 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3484 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3485 Some(forward_info.clone())
3487 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3488 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3489 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3490 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3491 need_commitment = true;
3494 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3495 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3496 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3497 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3498 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3499 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3500 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3501 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3502 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3503 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3504 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3505 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3506 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3507 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3509 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3511 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3512 need_commitment = true;
3516 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3517 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3518 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3519 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3520 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3521 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3522 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3524 nondust_htlc_sources,
3528 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3529 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3530 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3531 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3532 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3534 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3535 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3536 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3537 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3538 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3539 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3540 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3541 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3542 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3543 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3544 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3545 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3546 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3547 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3549 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3550 &self.context.channel_id);
3551 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3554 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3555 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3556 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3557 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3558 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3559 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3560 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3561 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3562 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3566 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3567 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3568 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3569 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3572 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3573 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3574 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3575 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3576 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3577 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3578 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3580 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && !self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
3581 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3582 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3585 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3586 /// for our counterparty.
3587 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3588 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3589 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3590 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3592 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3593 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3594 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3595 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3597 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3598 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3599 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3600 updates: Vec::new(),
3603 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3604 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3605 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3606 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3607 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3608 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3609 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3610 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3611 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3612 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3613 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3614 // to rebalance channels.
3615 match &htlc_update {
3616 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3617 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3618 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3620 match self.send_htlc(
3621 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3622 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3624 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3627 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3628 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3629 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3630 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3631 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3632 // into the holding cell without ever being
3633 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3634 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3635 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3638 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3644 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3645 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3646 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3647 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3648 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3649 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3650 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3651 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3652 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3653 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3654 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3655 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3657 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3658 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3659 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3660 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3661 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3662 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3663 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3664 // for a full revocation before failing.
3665 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3666 update_fail_count += 1;
3669 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3671 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3676 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
3677 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (failure_code, sha256_of_onion), false, logger) {
3678 Ok(update_fail_malformed_opt) => {
3679 debug_assert!(update_fail_malformed_opt.is_some()); // See above comment
3680 update_fail_count += 1;
3683 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3685 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3692 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3693 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3695 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3696 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3701 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3702 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3703 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3704 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3705 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3707 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3708 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3709 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3711 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3712 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3718 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3719 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3720 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3721 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3722 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3723 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3724 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3725 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3726 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3728 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3729 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3731 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3732 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3734 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3735 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3738 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3740 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3741 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3742 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3746 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3747 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3748 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3749 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3750 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3751 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3752 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3753 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3754 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3757 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3759 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3760 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3763 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3764 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3765 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3766 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3768 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3770 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3775 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3776 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3777 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3778 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3779 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3780 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3781 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3782 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3783 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3787 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3788 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3789 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3790 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3791 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
3792 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3793 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3794 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3795 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3797 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3798 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3801 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3802 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3803 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3804 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3805 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3806 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3807 let mut require_commitment = false;
3808 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3811 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3812 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3813 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3814 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3816 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3817 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3818 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3819 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3820 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3821 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3823 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3827 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3828 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3829 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3830 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3831 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3833 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3834 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3835 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3840 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3841 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3843 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3847 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3848 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3850 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3851 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3852 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3853 require_commitment = true;
3854 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3855 match forward_info {
3856 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3857 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3858 require_commitment = true;
3860 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3861 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3862 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3864 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3865 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3866 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3870 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3871 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3872 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3873 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3879 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3880 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3881 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3882 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3883 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3885 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3886 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3887 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3888 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3889 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3890 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3891 require_commitment = true;
3895 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3897 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3898 match update_state {
3899 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3900 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3901 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3902 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3903 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3904 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3906 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3907 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3908 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3909 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3910 require_commitment = true;
3911 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3912 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3917 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3918 let release_state_str =
3919 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3920 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3921 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3922 if !release_monitor {
3923 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3924 update: monitor_update,
3926 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3928 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3933 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3934 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3935 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3936 if require_commitment {
3937 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3938 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3939 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3940 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3942 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3943 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3944 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3945 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3946 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3948 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3949 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3950 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3951 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3952 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3955 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3956 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3957 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3958 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3959 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3960 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3962 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3963 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3965 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3966 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3968 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3969 if require_commitment {
3970 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3972 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3973 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3974 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3975 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3977 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3978 &self.context.channel_id(),
3979 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3982 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3983 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3985 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3986 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3988 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3989 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3995 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3996 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3997 /// commitment update.
3998 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3999 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4000 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4002 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4003 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4006 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4007 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4008 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4009 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4011 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4012 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4013 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4014 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4015 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4016 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4017 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4019 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4020 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4022 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4023 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4025 if !self.context.is_live() {
4026 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4029 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4030 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4031 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4032 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4033 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4034 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4035 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4036 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4037 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4038 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4042 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4043 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4044 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4045 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4046 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4047 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4050 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4051 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4055 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4056 force_holding_cell = true;
4059 if force_holding_cell {
4060 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4064 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4065 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4067 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4068 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4073 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4074 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4076 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4078 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4079 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4080 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4081 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4085 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4086 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4087 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4091 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4092 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4095 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4096 // will be retransmitted.
4097 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4098 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4099 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4101 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4102 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4104 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4105 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4106 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4107 // this HTLC accordingly
4108 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4111 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4112 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4113 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4114 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4117 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4118 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4119 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4120 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4121 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4122 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4127 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4129 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4130 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4131 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4132 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4136 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4137 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4138 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4139 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4140 // the update upon reconnection.
4141 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4145 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4147 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4148 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4152 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4153 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4154 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4155 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4156 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4157 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4158 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4160 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4161 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4162 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4163 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4164 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4165 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4166 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4168 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4169 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4170 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4171 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4172 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4173 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4174 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4177 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4178 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4179 /// to the remote side.
4180 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4181 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4182 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4183 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4186 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4188 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4189 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4191 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4192 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4193 // first received the funding_signed.
4194 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4195 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4196 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4197 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
4199 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4201 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4202 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4203 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4204 funding_broadcastable = None;
4207 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4208 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4209 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4210 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4211 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4212 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4213 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4214 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4215 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4216 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4217 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4218 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4219 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4220 next_per_commitment_point,
4221 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4225 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4227 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4228 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4229 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4230 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4231 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4232 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4234 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4235 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4236 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4237 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4238 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4239 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4243 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4244 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4246 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4247 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4249 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4250 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4253 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4254 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4255 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4256 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4257 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4258 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4259 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4260 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4261 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4265 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4266 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4268 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4271 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4272 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4274 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4276 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4277 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4278 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4279 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4280 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4281 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4282 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4283 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4284 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4285 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4287 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4289 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4290 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4291 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4297 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4299 #[cfg(async_signing)]
4300 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4301 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4302 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4304 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4305 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4307 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4308 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4311 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4312 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4313 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4314 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4316 SignerResumeUpdates {
4323 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4324 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4325 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4326 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4327 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4328 per_commitment_secret,
4329 next_per_commitment_point,
4331 next_local_nonce: None,
4335 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4336 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4337 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4338 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4339 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4340 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4342 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4343 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4344 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4345 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4346 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4347 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4348 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4349 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4350 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4351 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4352 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4357 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4358 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4360 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4361 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4362 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4363 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4364 reason: err_packet.clone()
4367 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4368 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4369 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4370 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4371 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4372 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4375 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4376 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4377 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4378 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4379 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4386 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4387 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4388 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4389 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4393 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4394 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4395 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4396 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4397 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4398 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4399 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4403 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
4404 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
4406 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
4407 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4408 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4409 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4414 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4415 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4420 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4421 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4422 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4423 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4424 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4425 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4426 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4431 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4432 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4434 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4435 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4436 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4437 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4438 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4439 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4440 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4441 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4444 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4446 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4447 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4448 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4449 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4450 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4453 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4454 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4455 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4458 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4459 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4460 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4461 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4462 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4463 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4464 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4466 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4467 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4468 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4469 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4470 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4473 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4474 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4475 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4476 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4477 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4478 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4479 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4480 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4484 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4485 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4486 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4487 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4488 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4489 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4490 our_commitment_transaction
4494 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4495 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4496 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4497 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4499 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4501 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4503 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4504 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4505 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4506 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4507 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4508 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4510 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4511 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4512 channel_ready: None,
4513 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4514 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4515 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4519 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4520 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4521 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4522 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4523 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4524 next_per_commitment_point,
4525 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4527 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4528 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4529 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4533 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4534 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4535 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4537 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4538 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4539 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4542 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4545 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4546 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4547 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4548 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4549 our_commitment_transaction
4553 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4554 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4555 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4556 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4557 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4558 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4559 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4561 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4563 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4564 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4565 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4566 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4567 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4568 next_per_commitment_point,
4569 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4573 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4574 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4575 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4577 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4580 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4581 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4582 raa: required_revoke,
4583 commitment_update: None,
4584 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4586 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4587 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4588 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4590 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4593 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4594 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4595 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4596 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4597 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4598 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4601 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4602 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4603 raa: required_revoke,
4604 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4605 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4608 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4609 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4610 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4611 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4612 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4615 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4616 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4617 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4618 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4623 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4624 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4625 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4626 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4628 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4630 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4632 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4633 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4634 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4635 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4636 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4637 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4638 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4639 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4641 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4642 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4643 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4644 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4645 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4647 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4648 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4649 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4650 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4653 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4654 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4655 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4656 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4657 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4658 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4659 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4660 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4661 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4662 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4663 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4664 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4665 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4666 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4667 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4669 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4672 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4673 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4676 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4677 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4678 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4679 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4680 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4681 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4684 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4685 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4686 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4687 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4688 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4689 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4690 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4692 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4698 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4699 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4700 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4701 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4703 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4704 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4705 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4706 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4707 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4708 return Ok((None, None, None));
4711 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4712 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4713 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4715 return Ok((None, None, None));
4718 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4719 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4720 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4721 return Ok((None, None, None));
4724 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4726 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4727 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4728 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4729 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4731 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4732 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4734 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4735 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4737 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4738 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4739 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4740 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4742 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4743 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4744 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4748 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4754 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4755 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4757 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4758 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4761 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4762 /// within our expected timeframe.
4764 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4765 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4766 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4769 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4772 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4773 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4777 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4778 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4780 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4781 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4783 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4784 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4785 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4786 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4787 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4789 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4790 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4791 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4794 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4796 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4797 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4800 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4801 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4802 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4805 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4808 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4809 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4810 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4811 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
4813 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4816 assert!(send_shutdown);
4817 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4818 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4819 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4821 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4822 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4824 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4829 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4831 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
4832 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4834 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4835 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4836 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4837 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4838 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4839 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4840 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4843 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4844 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4846 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4847 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4848 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4849 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4853 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4854 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4855 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4856 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4857 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4858 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4860 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4861 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4868 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
4869 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4871 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4874 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4875 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4877 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4879 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4880 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4881 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4882 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4883 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4884 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4885 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4886 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4887 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4889 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4890 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4893 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4897 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4898 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4899 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4900 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4902 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
4903 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4905 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4906 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4908 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4909 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4911 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4912 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4915 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4916 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4919 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4920 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4921 return Ok((None, None, None));
4924 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4925 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4926 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4927 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4929 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4931 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4934 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4935 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4936 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4937 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4938 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4942 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4943 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4944 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4948 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4949 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4950 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4951 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4952 closure_reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure,
4953 monitor_update: None,
4954 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4955 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4956 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4957 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
4958 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
4959 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4960 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
4961 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
4963 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4964 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4965 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4966 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4970 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4972 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4973 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4974 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4975 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4977 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4980 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4981 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4983 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4984 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4985 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4986 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4987 closure_reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure,
4988 monitor_update: None,
4989 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4990 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4991 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4992 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
4993 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
4994 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4995 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
4996 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
4998 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4999 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5000 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5001 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5006 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5007 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5008 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5009 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5011 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5012 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5013 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5015 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5017 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5024 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5025 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5026 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5028 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5029 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5031 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5032 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5035 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5036 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5037 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5038 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5039 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5041 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5043 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5045 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5046 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5049 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5050 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5051 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5052 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5053 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5054 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5055 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5056 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5058 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5061 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5062 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5063 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5064 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5066 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5070 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5071 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5072 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5073 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5075 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5081 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5082 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5083 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5084 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5085 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5086 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5087 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5089 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5090 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5093 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5095 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5096 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5102 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5103 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5104 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5105 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5106 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5107 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5108 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5110 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5111 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5118 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5119 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5122 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5123 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5126 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5127 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5131 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5132 &self.context.holder_signer
5136 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5138 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5139 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5140 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5141 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5142 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5143 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5145 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5147 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5155 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5156 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5160 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5161 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5162 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5163 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5166 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5167 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5168 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5169 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5172 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5173 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5174 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5175 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5176 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5177 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5180 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5181 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5182 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5183 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5184 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5185 if !release_monitor {
5186 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5195 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5196 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5199 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5200 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5201 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5203 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5204 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5206 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5207 if (flags & !(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)).is_empty()
5209 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5210 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5211 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5214 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5215 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5216 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5217 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5218 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5219 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5221 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5222 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5223 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5225 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5226 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5227 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5228 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5229 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5230 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5236 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5237 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5238 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5239 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5242 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5243 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5244 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5247 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5248 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5249 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5252 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5253 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5254 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5255 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5256 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5259 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5260 self.context.channel_update_status
5263 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5264 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5265 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5268 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5270 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5271 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5272 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5276 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5277 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5278 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5281 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5285 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5286 // channel_ready yet.
5287 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5291 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5292 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5293 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if (f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL).is_empty()) {
5294 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5296 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5297 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5298 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5300 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5301 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5304 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5305 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5307 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5308 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5309 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5310 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5311 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5312 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5313 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5314 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5316 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5320 if need_commitment_update {
5321 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5322 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5323 let next_per_commitment_point =
5324 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5325 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5326 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5327 next_per_commitment_point,
5328 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5332 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5338 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5339 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5340 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5341 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5342 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5343 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5344 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5346 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5349 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5350 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5351 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5352 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5353 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5354 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5355 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5356 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5357 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5358 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5359 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5360 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5361 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5362 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5363 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5364 // channel and move on.
5365 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5366 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5368 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5369 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5370 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5372 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5373 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5374 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5375 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5376 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5377 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5378 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5379 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5384 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5385 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5386 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5387 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5388 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5391 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5392 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5393 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5394 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5395 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5396 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5399 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5400 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5401 // may have already happened for this block).
5402 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5403 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5404 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5405 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5408 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5409 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5410 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5411 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5419 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5420 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5421 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5422 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5424 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5425 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5428 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5430 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5431 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5432 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5433 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5435 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5438 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5441 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5442 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5443 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5444 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5446 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5449 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5450 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5451 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5453 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5454 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5456 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5457 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5458 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5466 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5468 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5469 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5470 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5472 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5473 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5476 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5477 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5478 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5479 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5480 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5481 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5482 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5483 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5486 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5487 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5488 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5489 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5491 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5492 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5493 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5495 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5496 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5497 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5498 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5500 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5501 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5502 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5503 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5504 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5505 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5506 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5509 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5510 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5512 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5515 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5516 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5517 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5518 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5519 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5520 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5521 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5522 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5523 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5524 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5525 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5526 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5527 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5528 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5529 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5530 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5531 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5537 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5542 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5543 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5545 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5546 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5547 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5548 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5550 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5553 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5555 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5556 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5557 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5558 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5559 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5560 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5562 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5563 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5566 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5567 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5568 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5569 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5570 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5571 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5573 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5574 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5577 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5578 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5579 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5580 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5581 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5587 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5588 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5589 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5590 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5592 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5595 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5599 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5603 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5604 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5608 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5612 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5613 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5616 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5620 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5622 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5627 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5628 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5629 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5631 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5636 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5638 None => return None,
5641 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5643 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5644 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5646 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5647 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5650 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5656 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5658 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5659 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5660 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5661 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5662 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5663 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5664 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5666 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5667 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5668 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5669 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5670 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5671 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5672 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5673 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5674 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5675 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5676 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5677 contents: announcement,
5680 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5685 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5689 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5690 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5691 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5692 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5693 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5694 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5695 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5696 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5698 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5700 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5701 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5702 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5703 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5705 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5706 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5707 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5708 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5711 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5712 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5713 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5714 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5717 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5720 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5721 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5722 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5723 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5724 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5725 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5728 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5730 Err(_) => return None,
5732 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5733 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5738 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5739 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5740 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5741 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
5742 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5743 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5744 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5745 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5746 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5747 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5748 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5749 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5750 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5751 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5752 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5753 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5756 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5759 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5760 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5761 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5762 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5763 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5764 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5765 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5766 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5767 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5769 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5770 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5771 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5772 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5773 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5774 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5775 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5776 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5777 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
5779 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5780 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5781 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5782 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5783 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5784 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5785 next_funding_txid: None,
5790 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5792 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5793 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5794 /// commitment update.
5796 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5797 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5798 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5799 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5800 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5801 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5802 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5805 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5806 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5807 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5809 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5810 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5815 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5816 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5818 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5820 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5821 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5823 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5824 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5825 /// regenerate them.
5827 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5828 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5830 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5831 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5832 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5833 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5834 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5835 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5836 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5837 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5839 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5840 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
5841 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5843 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5845 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5846 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5847 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5850 if amount_msat == 0 {
5851 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5854 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5855 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5856 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5857 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5860 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5861 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5862 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5865 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5866 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5867 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5868 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5869 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5870 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5871 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5872 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5875 let need_holding_cell = self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell();
5876 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5877 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5878 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5879 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5880 else { "to peer" });
5882 if need_holding_cell {
5883 force_holding_cell = true;
5886 // Now update local state:
5887 if force_holding_cell {
5888 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5893 onion_routing_packet,
5900 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5901 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5903 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5905 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5911 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5912 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5913 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5917 onion_routing_packet,
5921 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5926 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5927 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5928 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5929 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5931 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5932 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5933 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5935 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5936 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5940 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5941 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5942 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5943 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5944 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5945 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5946 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5949 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5950 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5951 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5952 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5953 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5954 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5957 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5959 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5960 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5961 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5962 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5963 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5965 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5966 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5969 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5970 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5971 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5972 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5973 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5974 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5975 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5976 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5977 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5978 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5979 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5980 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5983 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5987 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5988 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5989 where L::Target: Logger
5991 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5992 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5993 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5995 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5997 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5998 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5999 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6000 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6001 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6002 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6003 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6004 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6005 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6006 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
6007 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6013 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6016 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6017 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6018 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6019 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6020 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6021 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6023 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6024 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6025 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6027 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6028 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6029 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6032 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6033 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6037 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
6038 &commitment_stats.tx,
6039 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
6040 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
6041 &self.context.secp_ctx,
6042 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6044 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6046 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6047 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6048 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6049 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6051 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6052 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6053 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6054 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
6055 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
6056 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6060 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6061 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6065 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6066 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6068 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6074 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6075 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6077 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6078 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6079 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6080 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6081 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6082 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6083 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6084 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6086 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6087 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6088 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6091 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6092 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6093 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6099 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6101 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6102 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6103 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6104 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6105 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6107 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6109 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6115 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6116 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6117 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6118 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6119 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6121 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6122 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6123 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6126 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6127 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6129 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6130 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6132 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6133 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6135 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6136 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6137 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6140 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6143 // use override shutdown script if provided
6144 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6145 Some(script) => script,
6147 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6148 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6149 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6150 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6154 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6155 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6157 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6162 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6163 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6164 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6165 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6167 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6168 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6169 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6170 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6171 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6172 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6173 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6176 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6177 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6179 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6180 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6181 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6184 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6185 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6186 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6187 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6188 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6190 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6191 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6198 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6199 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6201 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6204 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6205 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6206 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6208 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6209 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6213 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6217 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6218 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6219 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6220 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6223 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6224 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6225 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6226 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6227 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6228 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6229 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6230 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6232 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6233 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6234 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6235 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6237 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6238 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6240 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6241 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6243 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6244 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6245 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6247 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6248 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6250 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6251 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6252 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6253 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6254 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6257 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6258 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6260 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6261 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6263 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6265 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6267 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6268 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6269 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6270 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6273 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6274 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6276 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6277 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6278 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6279 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6283 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6284 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6285 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6289 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6290 Ok(script) => script,
6291 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6294 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6297 context: ChannelContext {
6300 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6301 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6302 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6303 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6308 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6310 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6311 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6312 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6313 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6315 channel_value_satoshis,
6317 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6319 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6320 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6323 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6324 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6327 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6328 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6329 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6330 pending_update_fee: None,
6331 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6332 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6333 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6334 update_time_counter: 1,
6336 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6338 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6339 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6340 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6341 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6342 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6343 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6345 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6346 signer_pending_funding: false,
6348 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6349 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6350 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6351 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6353 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6354 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6355 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6356 closing_fee_limits: None,
6357 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6359 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6360 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6361 short_channel_id: None,
6362 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6364 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6365 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6366 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6367 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6368 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6369 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6370 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6371 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6372 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6373 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6374 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6375 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6377 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6379 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6380 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6381 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6382 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6383 counterparty_parameters: None,
6384 funding_outpoint: None,
6385 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6387 funding_transaction: None,
6388 is_batch_funding: None,
6390 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6391 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6392 counterparty_node_id,
6394 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6396 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6398 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6399 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6401 announcement_sigs: None,
6403 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6404 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6405 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6406 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6408 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6409 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6411 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6412 outbound_scid_alias,
6414 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6415 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6417 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6418 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6423 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6425 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6429 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6430 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6431 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6432 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6433 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6434 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6435 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6436 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6437 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6439 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6444 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6445 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6446 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6449 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6450 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6451 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6452 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6455 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6457 next_local_nonce: None,
6461 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6462 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6463 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6464 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6465 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6466 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6467 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6468 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6469 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6470 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6471 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6474 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6475 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6477 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6479 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6480 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6481 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6482 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6485 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6486 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6488 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6490 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6491 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6493 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6494 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6495 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6496 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6497 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6498 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6501 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6502 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6504 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6505 if funding_created.is_none() {
6506 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
6507 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
6509 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
6510 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6511 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6512 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6520 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6521 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6522 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6523 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6524 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6525 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6526 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6527 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6528 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6529 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6532 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6533 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6534 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6535 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6536 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6537 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6543 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6544 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6545 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6546 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6547 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6548 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6550 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6552 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6554 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6555 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6560 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6561 // We've exhausted our options
6564 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6565 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6568 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6569 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6570 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6571 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6573 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6574 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6575 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6576 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6577 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6578 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6580 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6582 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6583 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6586 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6587 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6588 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6590 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6591 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6594 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6595 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6598 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6599 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6603 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6604 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6605 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6606 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6607 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6608 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6609 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6610 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6611 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6612 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6613 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6614 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6615 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6616 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6617 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6618 first_per_commitment_point,
6619 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6620 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6621 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6622 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6624 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6629 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6630 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6632 // Check sanity of message fields:
6633 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6634 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6636 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6637 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6639 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6640 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6642 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6643 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6645 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6646 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6648 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6649 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6650 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6652 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6653 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6654 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6656 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6657 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6658 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6660 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6661 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6663 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6664 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6667 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6668 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6669 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6671 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6672 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6674 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6675 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6677 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6678 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6680 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6681 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6683 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6684 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6686 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6687 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6690 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6691 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6692 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6694 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6695 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6697 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6698 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6699 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6701 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6702 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6705 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6706 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6707 &Some(ref script) => {
6708 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6709 if script.len() == 0 {
6712 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6713 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6715 Some(script.clone())
6718 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6720 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6725 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6726 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6727 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6728 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6729 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6731 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6732 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6734 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6737 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6738 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6739 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6740 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6741 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6742 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6745 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6746 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6747 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6750 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6751 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6753 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6754 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6756 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6761 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
6762 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
6763 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
6764 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6765 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
6769 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6770 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
6772 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
6773 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
6775 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6776 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6777 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6778 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6781 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6783 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6784 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6785 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6786 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6788 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6789 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6791 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6792 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
6794 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6795 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6796 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6797 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
6798 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6799 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
6803 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6804 initial_commitment_tx,
6807 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6808 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6812 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
6813 if validated.is_err() {
6814 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6817 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6818 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
6819 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6820 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6821 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6822 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6823 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6824 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6825 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6826 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
6827 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6828 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6830 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6831 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6832 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
6833 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6834 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6835 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
6836 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6837 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6839 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
6840 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
6841 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
6843 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
6845 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6846 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6848 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6850 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
6852 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6853 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6854 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
6857 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
6859 #[cfg(async_signing)]
6860 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6861 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
6862 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
6863 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
6868 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6869 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6870 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6871 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6874 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6875 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6876 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6877 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6878 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6879 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6880 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6881 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6882 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6883 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6884 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6887 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
6888 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6890 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6891 // support this channel type.
6892 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6893 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6894 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6897 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6898 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6899 // `static_remote_key`.
6900 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6901 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6903 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6904 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6905 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6907 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6908 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6910 channel_type.clone()
6912 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6913 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6914 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6919 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6920 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6921 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6922 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6923 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6924 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6925 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6926 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6927 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6930 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6931 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6934 // Check sanity of message fields:
6935 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6936 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6938 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6939 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6941 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6942 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6944 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6945 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6946 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6948 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6949 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6951 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6952 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6954 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
6956 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6957 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6958 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6960 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6961 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6963 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6964 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6967 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6968 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6969 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6971 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6972 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6974 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6975 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6977 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6978 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6980 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6981 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6983 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6984 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6986 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6987 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6990 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6992 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6993 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6994 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6998 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6999 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7000 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7001 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7002 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7004 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
7005 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
7007 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7008 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
7009 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
7011 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
7012 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7015 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
7016 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
7017 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7018 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
7022 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
7023 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
7024 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
7025 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
7028 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
7029 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
7030 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
7031 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7032 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
7035 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7036 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7037 &Some(ref script) => {
7038 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7039 if script.len() == 0 {
7042 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
7045 Some(script.clone())
7048 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7050 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7055 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
7056 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7057 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
7058 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
7062 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7063 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
7064 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
7068 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
7069 Ok(script) => script,
7070 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
7073 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7074 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7076 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
7079 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
7083 context: ChannelContext {
7086 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
7087 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
7089 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
7094 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7096 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
7097 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
7098 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7099 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7101 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7104 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
7106 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7107 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7110 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7111 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7112 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
7114 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7115 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7116 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7117 pending_update_fee: None,
7118 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7119 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7120 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7121 update_time_counter: 1,
7123 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7125 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7126 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7127 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7128 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7129 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7130 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7132 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7133 signer_pending_funding: false,
7135 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7136 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7137 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7138 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7140 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7141 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7142 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7143 closing_fee_limits: None,
7144 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7146 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7147 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7148 short_channel_id: None,
7149 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7151 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7152 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7153 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7154 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7155 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7156 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7157 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7158 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7159 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7160 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7161 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7162 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7165 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7167 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7168 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7169 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7170 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7171 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7172 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7173 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7175 funding_outpoint: None,
7176 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7178 funding_transaction: None,
7179 is_batch_funding: None,
7181 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7182 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7183 counterparty_node_id,
7185 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7187 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7189 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7190 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7192 announcement_sigs: None,
7194 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7195 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7196 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7197 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7199 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7200 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7202 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7203 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7205 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7206 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7208 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7209 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
7214 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7216 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7222 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7223 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7225 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7226 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7227 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7228 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7231 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7232 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7234 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7236 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7237 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7240 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7243 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7244 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7245 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7247 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7248 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7249 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7250 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7252 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7253 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7254 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7255 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7256 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7257 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7258 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7259 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7260 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7261 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7262 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7263 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7264 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7265 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7266 first_per_commitment_point,
7267 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7268 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7269 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7271 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7273 next_local_nonce: None,
7277 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7278 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7280 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7282 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7283 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7286 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7287 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7289 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7290 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7291 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7292 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7293 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7294 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7295 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7296 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7297 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7298 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7299 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7301 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7304 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7305 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7306 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7310 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7311 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7314 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7315 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7317 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7318 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7320 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7322 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7323 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7324 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7325 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7328 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7329 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7330 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7331 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7332 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7334 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7336 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7337 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7338 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7341 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7342 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7343 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7347 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7348 initial_commitment_tx,
7351 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7352 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7355 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7356 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7359 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7361 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7362 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
7363 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7364 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7366 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7368 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7369 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7370 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7371 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7372 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7373 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7374 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7375 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7376 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7377 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7378 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7380 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
7381 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7382 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7383 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7384 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7385 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7386 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7388 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7389 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7391 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7392 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7393 let mut channel = Channel {
7394 context: self.context,
7396 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7397 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7399 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7403 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7404 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7406 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7412 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7413 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7414 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7415 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7416 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7418 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7419 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7420 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7421 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7427 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7428 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7429 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7430 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7431 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7432 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7437 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7438 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7439 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7440 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7442 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7443 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7444 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7445 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7450 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7451 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7452 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7453 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7454 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7455 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7460 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7461 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7462 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7465 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7467 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7468 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7469 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7470 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7471 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7473 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7474 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7475 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7476 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7478 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7480 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7481 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7482 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7484 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7486 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7488 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7490 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7491 // deserialized from that format.
7492 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7493 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7494 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7496 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7498 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7499 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7500 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7502 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7503 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7504 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7505 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7508 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7509 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7510 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7513 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7514 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7515 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7516 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7518 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7519 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7521 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7523 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7525 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7527 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7530 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7532 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7537 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7538 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7539 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7541 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7542 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7543 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7544 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7545 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7546 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7547 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7549 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7551 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7553 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7556 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7557 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7558 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7561 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7563 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7564 preimages.push(preimage);
7566 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7567 reason.write(writer)?;
7569 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7571 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7572 preimages.push(preimage);
7574 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7575 reason.write(writer)?;
7578 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7579 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7582 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7583 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7584 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
7585 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
7586 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7587 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7589 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7590 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7591 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7594 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7595 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7596 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7597 source.write(writer)?;
7598 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7600 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7601 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7603 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7605 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7606 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7608 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7610 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7611 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7613 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
7614 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
7616 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
7617 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
7618 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
7620 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
7622 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7623 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
7628 match self.context.resend_order {
7629 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7630 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7633 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7634 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7635 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7637 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7638 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7639 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7640 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7643 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7644 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7645 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7646 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7647 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7650 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7651 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7652 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7653 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7655 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7656 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7657 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7659 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7661 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7662 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7663 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7664 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7666 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7667 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7668 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7669 // consider the stale state on reload.
7672 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7673 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7674 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7676 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7677 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7678 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7680 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7681 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7683 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7684 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7685 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7687 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7688 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7690 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7693 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7694 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7695 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7697 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7700 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7701 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7703 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7704 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7705 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7707 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7709 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7711 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7713 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7714 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7715 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7716 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7717 htlc.write(writer)?;
7720 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7721 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7722 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7724 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7725 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7727 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7728 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7729 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7730 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7731 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7732 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7733 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7735 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7736 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7737 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7738 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7739 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7741 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7742 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7744 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7745 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7746 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7747 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7749 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7751 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7752 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7753 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7754 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7755 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7756 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7757 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7759 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7760 (2, chan_type, option),
7761 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7762 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7763 (5, self.context.config, required),
7764 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7765 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7766 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7767 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7768 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7769 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7770 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7771 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7772 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7773 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7774 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7775 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7776 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7777 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7778 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7779 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7780 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7781 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7782 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7783 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7784 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7785 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
7792 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7793 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7795 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7796 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7798 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7799 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7800 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7802 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7803 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7804 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7805 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7807 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7809 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7810 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7811 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7812 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7813 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7815 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7816 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7819 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7820 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7821 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7823 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7825 let mut keys_data = None;
7827 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7828 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7829 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7830 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7831 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7832 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7833 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7834 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7835 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7836 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7840 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7841 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7842 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7845 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7847 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7848 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7849 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7851 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7853 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7854 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7855 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7856 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7857 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7858 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7859 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7860 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7861 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7862 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7863 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7864 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7865 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7870 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7871 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7872 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7873 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7874 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7875 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7876 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7877 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7878 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7879 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7880 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7881 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7883 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7884 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7887 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7888 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7891 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7892 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7894 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7896 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7897 blinding_point: None,
7901 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7902 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7903 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7904 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7905 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7906 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7907 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7908 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7909 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7910 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7911 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7912 blinding_point: None,
7914 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7915 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7916 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7918 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7919 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7920 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7922 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7926 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7927 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7928 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7929 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7932 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7933 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7934 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7936 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7937 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7938 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7939 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7942 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7943 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7944 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7945 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7948 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7950 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7952 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7953 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7954 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7955 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7957 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7958 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7959 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7960 // consider the stale state on reload.
7961 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7964 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7965 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7966 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7968 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7971 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7972 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7973 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7975 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7976 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7977 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7978 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7980 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7981 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7983 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7984 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7986 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7987 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7988 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7990 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7992 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7993 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7995 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7996 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7999 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8001 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8002 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8003 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8004 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8006 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8009 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8010 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8012 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8014 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8015 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8017 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8018 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8020 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8022 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8023 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
8024 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8026 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8027 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8028 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8032 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8033 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8034 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8036 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8042 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8043 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8044 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8045 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8046 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8047 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8048 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8049 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8050 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8051 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8053 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8054 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8055 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8056 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8057 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8058 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8059 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8061 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8062 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8063 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8064 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8066 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8068 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8069 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8071 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8073 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8074 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8076 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8078 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8079 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8080 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8081 (2, channel_type, option),
8082 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8083 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8084 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8085 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8086 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8087 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8088 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8089 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8090 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8091 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8092 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8093 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8094 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8095 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8096 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8097 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8098 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8099 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8100 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8101 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8102 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8103 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8104 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8105 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8106 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8109 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8110 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8111 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8112 // required channel parameters.
8113 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8114 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8116 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8118 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8119 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8120 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8121 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8124 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8125 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8126 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8128 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8129 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8131 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8132 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8137 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8138 if iter.next().is_some() {
8139 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8143 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8144 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8145 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8146 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8147 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8150 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8151 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8152 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8154 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8155 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8157 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8158 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8159 // separate u64 values.
8160 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8162 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8164 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8165 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8166 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8167 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8169 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8170 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8172 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8173 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8174 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8175 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8176 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8179 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8180 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8182 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8183 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8184 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8185 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8187 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8188 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8190 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8191 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8192 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8193 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8194 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8197 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8198 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8201 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8202 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8203 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8204 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8205 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8206 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8209 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8210 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8211 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8213 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8218 context: ChannelContext {
8221 config: config.unwrap(),
8225 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8226 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8227 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8230 temporary_channel_id,
8232 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8234 channel_value_satoshis,
8236 latest_monitor_update_id,
8238 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8239 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8242 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8243 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8246 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8247 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8248 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8249 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8253 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8254 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8255 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8256 monitor_pending_forwards,
8257 monitor_pending_failures,
8258 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8260 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8261 signer_pending_funding: false,
8264 holding_cell_update_fee,
8265 next_holder_htlc_id,
8266 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8267 update_time_counter,
8270 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8271 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8272 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8273 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8275 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8276 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8277 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8278 closing_fee_limits: None,
8279 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8281 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8282 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8284 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8286 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8287 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8288 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8289 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8290 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8291 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8292 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8293 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8294 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8297 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8299 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8300 funding_transaction,
8303 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8304 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8305 counterparty_node_id,
8307 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8311 channel_update_status,
8312 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8316 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8317 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8318 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8319 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8321 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8322 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8324 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8325 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8326 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8328 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8329 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8331 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8332 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8334 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8337 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8346 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8347 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8348 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8349 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8350 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8351 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
8352 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8353 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8354 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8355 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8356 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8357 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8358 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8359 use crate::ln::msgs;
8360 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8361 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8362 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8363 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8364 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8365 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8366 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8367 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8368 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8369 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8370 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8371 use crate::util::test_utils;
8372 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8373 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8374 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8375 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8376 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8377 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8378 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8379 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8380 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8381 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8382 use crate::prelude::*;
8384 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8387 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8388 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8394 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8395 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8396 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8397 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8401 signer: InMemorySigner,
8404 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8405 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8408 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8409 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8411 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8413 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8414 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8417 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8421 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8423 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8424 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8425 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8426 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8427 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8430 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8431 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8432 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8433 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8437 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8438 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8439 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8443 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8444 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8445 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8446 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8449 let seed = [42; 32];
8450 let network = Network::Testnet;
8451 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8452 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8453 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8456 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8457 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8458 let config = UserConfig::default();
8459 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8460 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8461 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8463 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8464 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8468 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8469 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8471 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8472 let original_fee = 253;
8473 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8474 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8475 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8476 let seed = [42; 32];
8477 let network = Network::Testnet;
8478 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8480 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8481 let config = UserConfig::default();
8482 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8484 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8485 // same as the old fee.
8486 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8487 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8488 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8492 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8493 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8494 // dust limits are used.
8495 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8496 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8497 let seed = [42; 32];
8498 let network = Network::Testnet;
8499 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8500 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8501 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8503 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8504 // they have different dust limits.
8506 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8507 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8508 let config = UserConfig::default();
8509 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8511 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8512 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8513 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8514 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8515 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8517 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8518 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8519 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8520 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8521 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8523 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8524 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8525 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8526 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8528 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8529 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8530 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8532 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8533 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8534 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8536 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8537 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8538 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8540 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8541 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8542 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8543 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8546 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8548 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8549 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8550 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8551 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8552 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8553 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8554 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8555 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8556 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8558 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8559 blinding_point: None,
8562 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8563 // the dust limit check.
8564 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8565 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8566 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8567 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8569 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8570 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8571 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8572 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8573 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8574 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8575 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8579 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8580 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8581 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8582 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8583 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8584 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8585 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8586 let seed = [42; 32];
8587 let network = Network::Testnet;
8588 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8590 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8591 let config = UserConfig::default();
8592 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8594 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8595 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8597 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8598 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8599 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8600 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8601 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8602 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8604 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8605 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8606 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8607 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8608 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8610 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8612 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8613 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8614 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8615 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8616 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8618 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8619 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8620 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8621 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8622 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8626 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8627 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8628 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8629 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8630 let seed = [42; 32];
8631 let network = Network::Testnet;
8632 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8633 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8634 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8636 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8638 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8639 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8640 let config = UserConfig::default();
8641 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8643 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8644 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8645 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8646 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8648 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8649 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8650 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8652 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8653 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8654 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8655 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8657 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8658 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8659 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8661 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8662 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8663 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8665 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8666 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8667 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8668 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8669 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8670 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8671 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8673 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8675 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8676 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8677 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8678 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8679 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8683 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8684 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8685 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8686 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8687 let seed = [42; 32];
8688 let network = Network::Testnet;
8689 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8690 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8691 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8693 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8694 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8695 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8696 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8697 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8698 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8699 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8700 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8702 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8703 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8704 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8705 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8706 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8707 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8709 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8710 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8711 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8712 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8714 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8716 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8717 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8718 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8719 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8720 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8721 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8723 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8724 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8725 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8726 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8728 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8729 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8730 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8731 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8732 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8734 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8735 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8737 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8738 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8739 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8741 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8742 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8743 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8744 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8745 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8747 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8748 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8750 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8751 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8752 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8756 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8758 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8759 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8760 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8762 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8763 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8764 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8765 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8767 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8768 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8769 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8771 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8773 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8774 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8777 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8778 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8779 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8780 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8781 let seed = [42; 32];
8782 let network = Network::Testnet;
8783 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8784 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8785 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8788 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8789 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8790 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8792 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8793 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8795 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8796 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8797 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8799 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8800 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8802 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8804 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8805 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8807 // Channel Negotiations failed
8808 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8809 assert!(result.is_err());
8814 fn channel_update() {
8815 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8816 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8817 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8818 let seed = [42; 32];
8819 let network = Network::Testnet;
8820 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8821 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8822 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8824 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8825 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8826 let config = UserConfig::default();
8827 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8829 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8830 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8831 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8832 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8833 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8835 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8836 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8837 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8838 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8839 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8841 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8842 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8843 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8844 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8846 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8847 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8848 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8850 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8851 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8852 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8854 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8855 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8856 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8858 short_channel_id: 0,
8861 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8862 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8863 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8865 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8866 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8868 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8870 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8872 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8873 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8874 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8875 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8877 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8878 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8879 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8881 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8884 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8888 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
8889 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
8891 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8892 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8893 let seed = [42; 32];
8894 let network = Network::Testnet;
8895 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8897 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8898 let config = UserConfig::default();
8899 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
8900 let outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8901 let mut chan = Channel { context: outbound_chan.context };
8903 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8905 hops: vec![RouteHop {
8906 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
8907 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
8908 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
8912 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
8913 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
8914 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8916 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
8919 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8921 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8922 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8923 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8924 blinding_point: None,
8926 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
8927 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
8929 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
8932 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
8935 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
8937 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8940 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8941 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8942 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
8944 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
8945 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
8948 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8949 blinding_point: None,
8951 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8952 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
8955 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8956 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
8958 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8959 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
8961 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
8964 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
8965 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
8966 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
8967 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
8968 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
8969 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8970 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
8971 } = &mut dummy_add {
8972 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
8973 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
8975 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
8976 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
8977 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
8979 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
8982 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
8984 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
8985 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
8986 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
8987 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
8988 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
8989 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
8990 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
8991 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
8994 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8996 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8997 use bitcoin::sighash;
8998 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8999 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9000 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9001 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9002 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9003 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9004 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9005 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9006 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9007 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9008 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9009 use crate::sync::Arc;
9010 use core::str::FromStr;
9011 use hex::DisplayHex;
9013 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9014 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9015 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9016 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9018 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9020 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9021 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9022 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9023 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9024 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9026 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9027 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9033 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9034 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9035 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9037 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9038 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9039 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9040 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9041 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9042 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9044 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9046 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9047 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9048 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9049 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9050 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9051 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9053 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9054 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9055 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9056 selected_contest_delay: 144
9058 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9059 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9061 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9062 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9064 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9065 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9067 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9068 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9070 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9071 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9072 // build_commitment_transaction.
9073 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9074 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9075 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9076 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9077 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9079 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9080 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9081 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9082 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9086 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9087 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9088 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9089 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9093 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9094 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9095 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9097 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9098 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9100 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9101 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9103 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9105 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9106 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9107 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9108 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9109 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9110 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9111 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9113 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9114 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9115 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9116 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9118 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9119 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9120 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9122 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9124 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9125 commitment_tx.clone(),
9126 counterparty_signature,
9127 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9128 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9129 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9131 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9132 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9134 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9135 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9136 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9138 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9139 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9142 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9143 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9145 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9146 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9147 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9148 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9149 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9150 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9151 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9152 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9154 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9157 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9158 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9159 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9163 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9166 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9167 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9168 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9169 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9170 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9171 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9173 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9174 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9175 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9176 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9178 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9179 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9180 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9181 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9182 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9184 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9185 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9186 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9187 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9188 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9189 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9191 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9195 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9196 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9197 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9198 "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", {});
9200 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9201 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9203 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9204 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9205 "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", {});
9207 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9208 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9209 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9210 "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", {});
9212 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9213 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9215 amount_msat: 1000000,
9217 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9218 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9220 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9223 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9224 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9226 amount_msat: 2000000,
9228 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9229 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9231 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9234 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9235 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9237 amount_msat: 2000000,
9239 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9240 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9241 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9242 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9243 blinding_point: None,
9245 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9248 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9249 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9251 amount_msat: 3000000,
9253 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9254 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9255 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9256 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9257 blinding_point: None,
9259 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9262 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9263 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9265 amount_msat: 4000000,
9267 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9268 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9270 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9274 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9275 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9276 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9278 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9279 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9280 "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", {
9283 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9284 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9285 "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" },
9288 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9289 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9290 "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" },
9293 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9294 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9295 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b02000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d4335201483045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
9298 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9299 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9300 "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" },
9303 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9304 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9305 "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" }
9308 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9309 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9310 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9312 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9313 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9314 "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", {
9317 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9318 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9319 "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" },
9322 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9323 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9324 "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" },
9327 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9328 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9329 "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" },
9332 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9333 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9334 "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" },
9337 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9338 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9339 "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" }
9342 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9343 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9344 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9346 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9347 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9348 "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", {
9351 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9352 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9353 "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" },
9356 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9357 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9358 "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" },
9361 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9362 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9363 "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" },
9366 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9367 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9368 "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" }
9371 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9372 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9373 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9374 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9376 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9377 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9378 "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", {
9381 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9382 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9383 "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" },
9386 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9387 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9388 "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" },
9391 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9392 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9393 "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" },
9396 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9397 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9398 "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" }
9401 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9402 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9403 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9404 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9406 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9407 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9408 "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", {
9411 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9412 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9413 "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" },
9416 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9417 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9418 "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" },
9421 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9422 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9423 "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" },
9426 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9427 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9428 "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" }
9431 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9432 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9433 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9435 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9436 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9437 "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", {
9440 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9441 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9442 "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" },
9445 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9446 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9447 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff010000000000000000015c060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546014830450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
9450 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9451 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9452 "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" }
9455 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9456 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9457 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9459 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9460 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9461 "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", {
9464 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9465 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9466 "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" },
9469 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9470 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9471 "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" },
9474 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9475 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9476 "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" }
9479 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9480 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9481 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9483 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9484 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9485 "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", {
9488 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9489 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9490 "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" },
9493 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9494 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9495 "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" }
9498 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9499 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9500 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9501 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9502 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9503 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9505 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9506 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9507 "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", {
9510 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9511 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9512 "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" },
9515 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9516 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9517 "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" }
9520 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9521 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9522 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9523 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9524 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9526 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9527 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9528 "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", {
9531 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9532 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9533 "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" },
9536 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9537 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9538 "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" }
9541 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9542 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9543 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9545 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9546 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9547 "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", {
9550 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9551 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9552 "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" }
9555 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9556 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9557 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9558 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9559 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9561 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9562 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9563 "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", {
9566 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9567 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9568 "02000000000101542562b326c08e3a076d9cfca2be175041366591da334d8d513ff1686fd95a6002000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c83483045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
9571 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9572 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9573 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9574 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9575 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9577 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9578 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9579 "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", {
9582 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9583 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9584 "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" }
9587 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9588 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9589 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9590 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9592 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9593 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9594 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
9596 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9597 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9598 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9599 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9600 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9602 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9603 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9604 "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", {});
9606 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9607 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9608 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9609 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9610 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9612 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9613 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9614 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
9616 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9617 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9618 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9620 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9621 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9622 "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", {});
9624 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9625 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9626 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9627 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9628 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9630 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9631 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9632 "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", {});
9634 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9635 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9636 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9637 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9638 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9640 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9641 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9642 "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", {});
9644 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9645 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9646 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9647 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9648 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9649 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9651 amount_msat: 2000000,
9653 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9654 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9656 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9659 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9660 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9661 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9663 amount_msat: 5000001,
9665 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9666 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9667 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9668 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9669 blinding_point: None,
9671 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9674 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9675 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9677 amount_msat: 5000000,
9679 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9680 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9681 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9682 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9683 blinding_point: None,
9685 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9689 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9690 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9691 "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", {
9694 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9695 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9696 "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" },
9698 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9699 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9700 "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" },
9702 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9703 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9704 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
9707 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9708 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9709 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9710 "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", {
9713 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9714 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9715 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c402000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c28347304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
9717 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9718 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9719 "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" },
9721 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9722 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9723 "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" }
9728 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9729 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9731 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9732 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9733 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9734 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9736 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9737 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9738 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9740 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9741 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9743 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9744 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9746 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9747 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9748 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9752 fn test_key_derivation() {
9753 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9754 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9756 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9757 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9759 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9760 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9762 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9763 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9765 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9766 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9768 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9769 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9771 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9772 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9776 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9777 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9778 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9779 let seed = [42; 32];
9780 let network = Network::Testnet;
9781 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9782 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9784 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9785 let config = UserConfig::default();
9786 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9787 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9789 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9790 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9792 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9793 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9794 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9795 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9796 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9797 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9798 assert!(res.is_ok());
9802 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9803 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9804 // resulting `channel_type`.
9805 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9806 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9807 let network = Network::Testnet;
9808 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9809 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9811 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9812 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9814 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9815 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9817 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9818 // need to signal it.
9819 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9820 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9821 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9822 &config, 0, 42, None
9824 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9826 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9827 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9828 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9830 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9831 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9832 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9836 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9837 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9838 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9839 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9840 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9843 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9844 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9848 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9849 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9850 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9851 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9852 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9853 let network = Network::Testnet;
9854 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9855 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9857 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9858 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9860 let config = UserConfig::default();
9862 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9863 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9864 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9865 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9866 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9868 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9869 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9870 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9874 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9875 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9876 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9878 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9879 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9880 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9881 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9882 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9883 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9885 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9889 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9890 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9892 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9893 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9894 let network = Network::Testnet;
9895 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9896 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9898 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9899 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9901 let config = UserConfig::default();
9903 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9904 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9905 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9906 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9907 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9908 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9909 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9910 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9912 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9913 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9914 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9915 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9916 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9917 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9921 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9922 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9924 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9925 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9926 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9927 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9929 assert!(res.is_err());
9931 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9932 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9933 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9935 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9936 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9937 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9940 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9942 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9943 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9944 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9945 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9948 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9949 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9951 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9952 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9954 assert!(res.is_err());
9958 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9959 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9960 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9961 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9962 let seed = [42; 32];
9963 let network = Network::Testnet;
9964 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9965 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9966 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9968 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9969 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9970 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9971 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9973 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9974 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9975 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9980 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9990 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9991 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9992 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9997 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9998 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10004 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10007 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10008 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10009 &accept_channel_msg,
10010 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10011 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10014 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10015 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10016 let tx = Transaction {
10018 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10022 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10025 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10028 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10029 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10030 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10031 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10032 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10033 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10037 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10038 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10046 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10047 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10048 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10049 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10051 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10052 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10059 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10060 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10061 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10062 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10063 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10065 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10066 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10067 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10075 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10076 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10079 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10080 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10081 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10082 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());