1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
230 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
231 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
232 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
236 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
238 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
239 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
240 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
243 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
248 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
253 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
254 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
255 /// move on to ChannelReady.
256 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
257 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
258 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
260 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
261 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
262 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
263 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
264 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
265 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
266 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
268 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
269 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
270 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
275 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
276 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
277 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
279 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
280 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
282 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
283 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
284 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
285 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
286 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
287 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
288 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
289 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
290 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
292 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
293 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
294 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
295 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
296 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
297 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
298 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
299 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
300 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
301 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
302 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
303 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
306 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
308 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
310 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
312 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
314 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
315 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
319 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
323 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
325 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
326 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
327 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
328 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
329 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
331 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
332 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
334 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
336 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
337 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
339 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
340 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
341 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
342 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
343 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
344 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
346 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
347 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
349 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
350 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
351 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
352 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
353 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
355 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
356 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
358 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
359 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
361 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
362 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
363 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
364 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
370 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
371 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
373 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
375 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
380 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
381 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
383 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
385 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
390 macro_rules! secp_check {
391 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
399 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
400 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
401 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
402 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
403 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
404 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
405 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
406 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
408 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
410 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
412 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
416 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
418 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
419 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
420 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
422 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
423 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
425 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
426 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
427 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
428 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
429 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
431 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
432 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
436 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
442 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
445 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
446 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
448 holding_cell_msat: u64,
449 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
452 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
453 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
454 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
455 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
456 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
457 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
458 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
459 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
461 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
464 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
465 struct HTLCCandidate {
467 origin: HTLCInitiator,
471 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
479 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
481 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
483 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 htlc_value_msat: u64,
485 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
490 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
491 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
492 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
493 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
494 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
496 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
497 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
499 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
502 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
506 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
507 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
508 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
509 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
510 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
511 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
512 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
513 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
514 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
515 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
516 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
519 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
520 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
521 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
526 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
529 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
531 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
532 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
535 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
536 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
537 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
538 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
539 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
540 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
541 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
542 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
543 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
544 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
545 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
546 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
547 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
548 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
549 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
552 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
553 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
554 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
556 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
557 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
558 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
559 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
561 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
562 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
563 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
564 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
565 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
567 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
568 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
569 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
570 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
572 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
573 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
574 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
576 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
577 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
578 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
579 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
580 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
582 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
583 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
586 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
587 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
589 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
590 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
593 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
594 (0, update, required),
597 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
598 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
599 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
601 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
602 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
603 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
604 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
606 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
610 channel_id: [u8; 32],
611 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
614 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
615 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
617 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
618 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
619 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
621 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
622 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
623 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
624 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
626 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
627 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
629 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
631 holder_signer: Signer,
632 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
633 destination_script: Script,
635 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
636 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
637 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
639 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
640 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
641 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
642 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
643 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
644 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
646 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
647 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
648 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
649 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
650 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
651 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
653 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
655 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
656 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
657 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
659 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
660 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
661 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
662 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
663 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
664 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
665 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
667 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
669 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
670 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
671 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
672 // HTLCs with similar state.
673 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
674 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
675 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
676 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
677 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
678 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
679 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
680 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
681 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
684 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
685 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
686 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
688 update_time_counter: u32,
690 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
691 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
692 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
693 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
694 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
695 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
697 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
698 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
700 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
701 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
702 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
703 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
705 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
706 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
708 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
710 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
712 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
713 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
714 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
715 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
716 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
717 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
719 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
720 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
721 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
722 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
723 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
725 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
726 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
727 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
728 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
729 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
730 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
731 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
732 channel_creation_height: u32,
734 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
737 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
739 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
742 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
744 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
747 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
749 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
752 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
755 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
757 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
759 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
760 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
762 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
764 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
765 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
766 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
768 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
770 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
771 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
773 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
774 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
775 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
777 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
779 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
781 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
782 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
783 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
784 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
786 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
787 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
788 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
790 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
791 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
792 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
794 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
795 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
796 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
797 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
798 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
799 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
800 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
801 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
803 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
804 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
805 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
806 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
807 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
809 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
810 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
812 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
813 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
814 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
815 /// unblock the state machine.
817 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
818 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
819 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
821 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
822 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
823 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
825 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
826 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
827 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
828 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
829 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
830 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
831 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
832 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
834 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
835 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
837 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
838 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
839 // the channel's funding UTXO.
841 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
842 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
843 // associated channel mapping.
845 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
846 // to store all of them.
847 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
849 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
850 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
851 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
852 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
853 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
855 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
856 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
858 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
859 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
861 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
862 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
863 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
865 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
866 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
867 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
870 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
871 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
872 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
873 self.update_time_counter
876 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
877 self.latest_monitor_update_id
880 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
881 self.config.announced_channel
884 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
885 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
888 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
889 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
890 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
891 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
894 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
895 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
896 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
899 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
900 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
901 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
902 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
903 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
906 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
907 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
908 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
909 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
910 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
915 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
919 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
921 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
922 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
923 self.temporary_channel_id
926 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
930 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
931 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
932 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
936 /// Gets the channel's type
937 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
941 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
942 /// is_usable() returns true).
943 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
944 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
945 self.short_channel_id
948 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
949 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
950 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
953 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
954 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
955 self.outbound_scid_alias
958 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
959 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
960 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
961 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
962 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
965 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
966 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
967 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
968 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
971 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
972 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
973 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
976 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
977 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
978 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
979 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
983 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
986 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
987 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
990 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
991 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
994 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
995 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
996 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
999 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1000 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1003 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1004 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1005 self.counterparty_node_id
1008 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1009 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1010 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1013 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1014 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1015 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1018 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1019 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1021 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1022 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1023 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1024 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1026 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1030 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1031 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1032 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1035 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1036 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1037 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1040 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1041 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1042 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1044 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1045 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1050 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1051 self.channel_value_satoshis
1054 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1055 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1058 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1059 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1062 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1063 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
1066 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1067 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1068 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1071 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1072 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1073 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1076 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1077 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1078 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1081 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1082 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1083 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1086 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1087 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1088 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1091 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1092 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1093 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1096 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1097 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1098 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1099 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1100 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1103 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1105 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1106 self.prev_config = None;
1110 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1111 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1115 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1116 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1117 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1118 let did_channel_update =
1119 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1120 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1121 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1122 if did_channel_update {
1123 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1124 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1125 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1126 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1128 self.config.options = *config;
1132 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1133 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1134 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1137 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1138 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1139 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1140 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1141 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1143 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1144 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1145 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1146 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1147 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1148 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1149 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1151 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1152 where L::Target: Logger
1154 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1155 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1156 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1158 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1159 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1160 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1161 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1163 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1164 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1165 if match update_state {
1166 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1167 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1168 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1169 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1170 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1172 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1176 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1177 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1178 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1179 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1181 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1182 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1183 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1185 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1186 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1187 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1188 transaction_output_index: None
1193 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1194 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1195 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1196 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1197 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1200 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1202 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1203 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1204 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1206 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1207 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1210 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1211 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1214 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1216 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1217 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1218 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1220 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1221 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1227 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1228 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1229 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1230 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1231 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1232 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1233 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1237 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1238 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1240 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1242 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1243 if generated_by_local {
1244 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1245 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1254 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1256 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1257 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1258 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1259 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1260 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1261 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1262 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1265 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1266 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1267 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1268 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1272 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1273 preimages.push(preimage);
1277 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1278 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1280 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1282 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1283 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1285 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1286 if !generated_by_local {
1287 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1295 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1296 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1297 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1298 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1299 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1300 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1301 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1302 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1304 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1306 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1307 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1308 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1309 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1311 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1313 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1314 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1315 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1316 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1319 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1320 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1321 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1322 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1324 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1327 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1328 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1329 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1330 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1332 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1335 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1336 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1341 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1342 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1347 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1349 let channel_parameters =
1350 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1351 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1352 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1359 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1362 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1363 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1364 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1365 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1367 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1368 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1369 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1377 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1378 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1384 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1385 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1386 /// our counterparty!)
1387 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1388 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1389 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1390 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1391 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1392 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1393 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1395 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1399 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1400 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1401 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1402 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1403 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1404 //may see payments to it!
1405 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1406 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1407 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1409 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1412 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1413 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1414 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1415 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1416 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1419 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1420 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1423 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1427 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1428 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1429 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1430 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1431 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1432 // which are near the dust limit.
1433 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1434 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1435 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1436 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1437 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1439 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1440 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1442 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1445 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1446 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1447 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1450 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1451 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1453 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1454 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1455 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1456 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1457 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1458 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1459 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1462 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1465 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1466 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1467 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1469 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1470 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1471 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1472 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1473 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1474 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1476 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1477 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1483 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1484 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1486 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1487 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1488 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1489 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1490 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1491 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1492 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1495 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1498 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1499 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1500 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1502 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1503 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1504 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1505 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1506 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1507 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1509 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1510 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1514 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1515 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1516 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1517 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1518 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1519 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1520 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1522 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1523 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1525 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1532 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1533 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1534 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1535 /// corner case properly.
1536 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
1537 let context = &self;
1538 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1539 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1540 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1542 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1543 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1544 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1545 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1548 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1550 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1551 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1553 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1555 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1557 if context.is_outbound() {
1558 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1559 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1561 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1562 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1564 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1565 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1566 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1567 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1570 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1571 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1572 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1573 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1575 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1576 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1577 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1578 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1579 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1580 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1581 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1582 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1583 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1584 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1586 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1589 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1590 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1591 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1592 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1593 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1596 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1597 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1599 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1600 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1601 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1603 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1604 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1605 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1606 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1610 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1612 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1613 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1614 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1615 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1616 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1617 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1619 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1620 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1622 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1623 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1624 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1626 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1627 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1628 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1629 Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1630 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1633 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1634 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1635 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1636 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1637 context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1638 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1641 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1642 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1643 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1645 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1649 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1650 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1652 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1653 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1657 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1658 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1659 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1660 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1662 outbound_capacity_msat,
1663 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1664 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1669 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1670 let context = &self;
1671 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1674 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1675 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1677 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1678 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1680 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1681 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1683 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1684 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1685 let context = &self;
1686 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1688 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1691 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1692 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1694 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1695 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1697 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1698 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1700 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1701 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1705 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1706 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1712 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1713 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1714 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1717 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1718 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1719 included_htlcs += 1;
1722 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1723 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1727 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1728 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1729 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1730 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1731 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1732 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1737 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1739 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1740 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1745 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1746 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1750 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1751 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1752 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1755 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1756 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1758 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1759 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1760 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1762 total_pending_htlcs,
1763 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1764 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1765 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1767 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1768 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1769 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1771 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1773 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1778 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1779 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1781 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1782 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1784 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1785 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1787 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1788 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1789 let context = &self;
1790 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1792 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1795 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1796 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1798 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1799 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1801 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1802 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1804 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1805 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1809 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1810 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1816 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1817 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1818 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1819 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1820 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1821 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1824 included_htlcs += 1;
1827 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1828 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1831 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1832 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1834 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1835 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1836 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1841 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1842 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1843 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1846 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1847 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1849 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1850 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1852 total_pending_htlcs,
1853 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1854 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1855 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1857 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1858 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1859 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1861 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1863 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1868 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1869 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1870 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1871 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1877 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1878 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1879 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1880 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1881 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1882 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1883 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1884 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1885 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1886 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1887 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1889 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1890 // return them to fail the payment.
1891 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1892 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1893 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1895 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1896 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1901 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1902 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1903 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1904 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1905 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1906 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1907 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1908 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1909 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1910 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1911 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1912 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1913 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1918 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1919 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1920 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1924 // Internal utility functions for channels
1926 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1927 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1928 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1930 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1932 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1933 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1934 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1936 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1939 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1941 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1944 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1945 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1946 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1948 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1950 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1951 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1952 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1953 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1954 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1957 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1958 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1959 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1960 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1961 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1962 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1963 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1966 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1967 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1969 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1970 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1973 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1974 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1975 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1976 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1977 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1978 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1981 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1982 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1983 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
1986 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
1987 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
1988 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
1989 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
1992 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1993 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1995 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
1996 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1997 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2001 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2002 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2003 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2004 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2006 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2007 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2008 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2009 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2010 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2011 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2012 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2013 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2015 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2016 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2017 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2018 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2019 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2020 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2021 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2022 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2024 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2025 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2029 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2035 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2036 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2037 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2038 // outside of those situations will fail.
2039 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2043 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2048 1 + // script length (0)
2052 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2053 2 + // witness marker and flag
2054 1 + // witness element count
2055 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2056 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2057 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2058 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2059 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2060 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2062 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2063 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2064 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2070 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2071 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2072 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2073 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2075 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2076 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2077 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2079 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2080 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2081 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2082 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2083 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2084 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2087 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2088 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2091 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2092 value_to_holder = 0;
2095 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2096 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2097 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2098 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2100 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2101 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2104 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2105 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2108 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2111 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2112 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2114 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2116 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2117 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2118 where L::Target: Logger {
2119 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2120 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2121 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2122 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2123 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2124 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2125 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2126 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2130 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2131 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2132 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2133 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2135 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2136 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2138 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2140 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2142 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2143 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2144 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2146 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2147 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2148 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2149 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2150 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2152 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2153 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2154 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2156 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2157 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2159 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2162 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2163 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2167 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2171 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2172 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2173 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2174 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2175 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2176 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2179 // Now update local state:
2181 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2182 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2183 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2184 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2185 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2186 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2187 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2191 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2192 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2193 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2194 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2195 // do not not get into this branch.
2196 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2197 match pending_update {
2198 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2199 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2200 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2201 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2202 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2203 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2204 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2207 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2208 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2209 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2210 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2211 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2212 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2213 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2219 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2220 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2221 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2223 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2224 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2225 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2227 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2228 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2231 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2232 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2234 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2235 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2237 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2238 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2241 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2244 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2245 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2246 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2247 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2252 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2253 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2254 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2255 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2256 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2257 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2258 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2259 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2260 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2261 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2262 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2263 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2264 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2265 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2266 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2268 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2269 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2270 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2271 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2272 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2275 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2276 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2277 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2283 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2284 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2286 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2290 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2291 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2292 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2293 /// before we fail backwards.
2295 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2296 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2297 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2298 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2299 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2300 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2301 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2304 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2305 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2306 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2307 /// before we fail backwards.
2309 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2310 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2311 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2312 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2313 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2314 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2315 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2317 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2319 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2320 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2321 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2323 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2324 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2325 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2327 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2328 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2329 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2331 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2336 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2337 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2343 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2344 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2345 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2346 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2347 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2351 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2352 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2353 force_holding_cell = true;
2356 // Now update local state:
2357 if force_holding_cell {
2358 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2359 match pending_update {
2360 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2361 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2362 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2363 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2367 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2368 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2369 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2370 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2376 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2377 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2378 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2384 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2386 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2387 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2390 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2391 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2392 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2397 // Message handlers:
2399 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2400 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2401 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2402 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2403 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2405 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2408 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2409 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2411 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2412 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2414 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2415 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2416 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2417 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2420 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2422 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2423 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2424 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2425 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2427 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2428 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2430 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2431 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2433 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2434 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2435 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2436 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2437 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2438 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2442 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2443 initial_commitment_tx,
2446 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2447 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2450 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2451 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2454 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2455 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2456 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2457 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2458 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2459 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2460 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2461 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2462 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2463 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2464 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2465 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2467 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2469 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2471 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2472 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2473 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2474 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2476 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2478 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2479 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2483 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2484 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2486 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2487 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2488 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2489 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2491 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2494 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2495 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2496 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2499 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2500 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2501 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2502 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2503 // when routing outbound payments.
2504 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2508 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2510 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2511 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2512 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2513 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2514 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2515 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2516 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2517 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2518 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2520 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2521 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2522 let expected_point =
2523 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2524 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2526 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2527 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2528 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2529 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2530 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2531 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2533 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2534 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2535 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2536 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2537 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2539 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2540 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2544 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2547 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2548 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2550 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2552 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2555 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2556 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2557 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2558 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2559 if local_sent_shutdown {
2560 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2562 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2563 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2564 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2565 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2567 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2568 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2570 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2573 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2574 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2576 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2577 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2580 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2581 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2582 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2583 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2585 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2586 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2588 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2589 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2590 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2591 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2592 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2593 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2594 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2595 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2596 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2597 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2598 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2600 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2601 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2602 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2603 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2604 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2605 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2609 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2612 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2613 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2614 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2616 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2617 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2618 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2619 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2620 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2621 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2622 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2626 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2627 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2628 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2629 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2630 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2631 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2632 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2636 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2637 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2638 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2639 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2640 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2641 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2644 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2645 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2646 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2647 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2648 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2650 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2651 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2654 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2655 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2658 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2659 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2660 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2661 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2662 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2663 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2664 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2665 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2666 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2667 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2668 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2669 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2670 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2671 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2672 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2673 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2676 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2677 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2678 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2679 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2680 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2683 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2684 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2686 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2687 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2690 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2691 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2692 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2696 // Now update local state:
2697 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2698 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2699 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2700 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2701 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2702 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2703 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2708 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2710 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2711 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2712 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2713 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2714 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2715 None => fail_reason.into(),
2716 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2717 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2718 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2719 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2721 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2725 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2726 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2727 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2728 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2730 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2731 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2736 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2739 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2740 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2741 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2743 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2744 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2747 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2750 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2751 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2752 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2754 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2755 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2758 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2762 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2763 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2764 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2766 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2767 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2770 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2774 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2775 where L::Target: Logger
2777 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2778 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2780 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2781 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2783 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2784 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2787 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2789 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2791 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2792 let commitment_txid = {
2793 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2794 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2795 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2797 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2798 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2799 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2800 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2801 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2802 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2806 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2808 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2809 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2810 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2811 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2814 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2815 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2816 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2817 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2820 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2822 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2823 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2824 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2825 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2826 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2827 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2828 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2829 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2830 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2831 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2832 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2838 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2839 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2842 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2843 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2844 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2845 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2846 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2847 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2848 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2849 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2850 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2851 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2852 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2853 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2854 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2857 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2858 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2859 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2860 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2861 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2862 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2863 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2865 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2866 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2867 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2868 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2869 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2870 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2871 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2872 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2874 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2875 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2878 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2880 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2881 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2882 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2885 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2888 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2889 commitment_stats.tx,
2891 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2892 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2893 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2896 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2897 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2899 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2900 let mut need_commitment = false;
2901 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2902 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2903 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2904 need_commitment = true;
2908 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2909 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2910 Some(forward_info.clone())
2912 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2913 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2914 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2915 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2916 need_commitment = true;
2919 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2920 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2921 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2922 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2923 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2924 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2925 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2926 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2927 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2928 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2929 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2930 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2931 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2932 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
2934 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
2936 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2937 need_commitment = true;
2941 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2942 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2943 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2944 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2945 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2946 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
2948 nondust_htlc_sources,
2952 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2953 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2954 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2955 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2957 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
2958 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2959 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2960 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2961 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2962 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2963 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2964 // includes the right HTLCs.
2965 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2966 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2967 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2968 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2969 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2970 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2972 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2973 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2974 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
2977 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2978 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2979 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2980 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2981 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2982 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2983 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2984 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2985 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2989 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2990 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2991 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2992 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
2995 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2996 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2997 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2998 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
2999 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3000 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3001 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3002 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3005 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3006 /// for our counterparty.
3007 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3008 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3009 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3010 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3011 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3013 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3014 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3015 updates: Vec::new(),
3018 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3019 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3020 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3021 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3022 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3023 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3024 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3025 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3026 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3027 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3028 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3029 // to rebalance channels.
3030 match &htlc_update {
3031 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3032 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3033 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3035 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3036 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
3038 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3041 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3042 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3043 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3044 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3045 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3046 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3047 // into the holding cell without ever being
3048 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3049 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3050 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3053 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3059 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3060 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3061 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3062 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3063 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3064 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3065 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3066 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3067 (msg, monitor_update)
3068 } else { unreachable!() };
3069 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3070 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3072 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3073 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3074 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3075 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3076 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3077 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3078 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3079 // for a full revocation before failing.
3080 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3083 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3085 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3092 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3093 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3095 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3096 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3101 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3102 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3103 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3104 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3105 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3107 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3108 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3109 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3111 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3112 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3118 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3119 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3120 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3121 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3122 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3123 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3124 where L::Target: Logger,
3126 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3129 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3130 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3132 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3133 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3136 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3138 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3139 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3144 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3145 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3146 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3147 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3148 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3149 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3150 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3151 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3155 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3157 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3158 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3161 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3162 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3164 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3166 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3167 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3168 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3169 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3170 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3171 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3172 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3173 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3177 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3178 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3179 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3180 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3181 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3182 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3183 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3184 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3185 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3187 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3188 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3191 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3192 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3193 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3194 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3195 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3196 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3197 let mut require_commitment = false;
3198 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3201 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3202 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3203 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3205 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3206 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3207 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3208 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3209 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3210 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3215 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3216 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3217 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3218 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3219 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3221 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3222 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3223 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3228 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3229 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3231 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3235 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3236 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3238 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3239 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3240 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3241 require_commitment = true;
3242 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3243 match forward_info {
3244 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3245 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3246 require_commitment = true;
3248 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3249 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3250 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3252 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3253 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3254 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3258 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3259 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3260 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3261 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3267 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3268 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3269 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3270 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3272 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3273 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3274 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3275 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3276 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3277 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3278 require_commitment = true;
3282 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3284 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3285 match update_state {
3286 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3287 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3288 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3289 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3290 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3292 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3293 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3294 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3295 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3296 require_commitment = true;
3297 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3298 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3303 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3304 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3305 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3306 if require_commitment {
3307 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3308 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3309 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3310 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3311 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3312 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3313 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3314 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3315 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3317 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3318 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3319 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3320 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3321 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3324 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3325 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3326 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3327 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3328 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3329 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3331 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3332 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3334 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3335 if require_commitment {
3336 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3338 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3339 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3340 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3341 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3343 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3344 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3345 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3346 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3348 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3349 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3350 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3356 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3357 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3358 /// commitment update.
3359 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3360 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3361 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3364 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3365 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3366 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3367 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3369 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3370 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3371 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3372 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3373 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3375 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3376 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3378 if !self.context.is_live() {
3379 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3382 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3383 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3384 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3385 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3386 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3387 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3388 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3389 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3390 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3391 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3395 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3396 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3397 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3398 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3399 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3402 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3403 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3407 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3408 force_holding_cell = true;
3411 if force_holding_cell {
3412 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3416 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3417 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3419 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3420 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3425 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3426 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3428 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3430 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3431 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3432 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3433 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3437 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3438 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3439 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3443 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3444 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3447 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3448 // will be retransmitted.
3449 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3450 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3451 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3453 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3454 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3456 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3457 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3458 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3459 // this HTLC accordingly
3460 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3463 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3464 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3465 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3466 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3469 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3470 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3471 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3472 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3473 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3474 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3479 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3481 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3482 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3483 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3484 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3488 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3489 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3490 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3491 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3492 // the update upon reconnection.
3493 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3497 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3499 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3500 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3503 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3504 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3505 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3506 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3507 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3508 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3509 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3511 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3512 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3513 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3514 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3515 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3516 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3517 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3519 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3520 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3521 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3522 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3523 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3524 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3525 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3528 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3529 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3530 /// to the remote side.
3531 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3532 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3533 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3534 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3537 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3539 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3540 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3542 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3543 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3544 // first received the funding_signed.
3545 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3546 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3547 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3549 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3550 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3551 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3552 funding_broadcastable = None;
3555 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3556 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3557 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3558 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3559 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3560 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3561 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3562 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3563 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3564 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3565 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3566 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3567 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3568 next_per_commitment_point,
3569 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3573 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3575 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3576 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3577 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3578 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3579 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3580 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3582 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3583 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3584 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3585 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3586 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3587 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3591 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3592 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3594 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3595 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3596 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3599 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3600 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3601 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3602 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3603 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3604 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3605 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3606 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3607 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3611 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3612 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3614 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3615 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3617 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3618 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3620 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3621 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3623 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3624 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3625 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3626 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3627 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3628 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3629 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3630 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3631 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3632 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3633 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3634 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3635 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3637 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3638 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3639 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3645 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3646 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3647 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3648 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3649 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3650 per_commitment_secret,
3651 next_per_commitment_point,
3653 next_local_nonce: None,
3657 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3658 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3659 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3660 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3661 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3663 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3664 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3665 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3666 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3667 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3668 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3669 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3670 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3671 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3672 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3677 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3678 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3680 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3681 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3682 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3683 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3684 reason: err_packet.clone()
3687 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3688 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3689 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3690 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3691 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3692 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3695 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3696 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3697 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3698 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3699 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3706 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3707 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3708 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3709 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3713 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3714 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3715 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3716 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3717 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3718 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3722 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3723 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3725 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3726 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3727 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3728 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3729 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3730 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3731 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3732 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3735 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3737 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3738 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3739 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3740 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3741 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3744 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3745 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3746 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3749 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3750 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3751 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3752 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3753 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3754 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3756 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3757 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3758 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3759 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3760 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3763 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3764 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3765 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3766 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3767 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3768 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3769 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3770 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3774 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3775 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3776 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3777 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3779 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3783 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3784 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3785 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3786 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3788 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3789 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3790 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3791 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3792 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3796 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3798 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3799 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3800 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3801 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3802 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3803 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3805 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3806 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3807 channel_ready: None,
3808 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3809 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3810 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3814 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3815 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3816 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3817 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3818 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3819 next_per_commitment_point,
3820 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3822 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3823 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3824 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3828 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3829 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3830 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3832 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3833 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3834 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3837 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3840 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3843 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3844 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3845 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3846 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3847 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3848 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3849 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3851 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3853 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3854 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3855 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3856 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3857 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3858 next_per_commitment_point,
3859 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3863 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3864 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3865 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3867 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3870 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3871 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3872 raa: required_revoke,
3873 commitment_update: None,
3874 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3876 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3877 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3878 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3880 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3883 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3884 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3885 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3886 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3887 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3888 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3891 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3892 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3893 raa: required_revoke,
3894 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3895 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3899 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3903 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3904 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3905 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3906 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3908 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3910 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3912 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3913 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3914 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3915 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3916 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3917 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3919 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3920 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3921 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3922 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3923 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3925 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3926 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3927 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3928 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3931 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3932 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3933 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3934 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3935 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3936 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3937 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3938 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3939 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3940 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
3941 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3942 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3943 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3944 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3945 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3947 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3950 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3951 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3954 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3955 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3956 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3957 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3958 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3959 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3960 self.context.channel_state &
3961 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3962 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
3963 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
3964 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
3967 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
3968 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
3969 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
3970 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3971 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3972 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
3973 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
3975 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
3981 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3982 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3983 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3984 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3986 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3987 return Ok((None, None));
3990 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3991 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
3992 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
3994 return Ok((None, None));
3997 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
3999 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4000 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4001 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4002 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4004 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4005 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4006 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4008 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4009 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4010 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4011 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4013 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4014 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4015 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4020 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4021 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4023 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4024 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4027 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4028 /// within our expected timeframe.
4030 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4031 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4032 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4035 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4038 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4039 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4042 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4043 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4044 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4045 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4047 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4048 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4050 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4051 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4052 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4053 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4054 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4056 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4057 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4058 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4061 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4063 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4064 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4067 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4068 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4069 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4072 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4075 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4076 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4077 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4078 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4080 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4083 assert!(send_shutdown);
4084 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4085 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4086 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4088 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4091 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4096 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4098 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4099 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4101 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4102 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4103 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4104 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4105 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4106 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4109 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4110 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4112 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4113 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4114 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4115 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4119 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4120 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4121 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4122 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4123 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4124 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4126 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4127 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4134 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4135 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4137 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4140 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4141 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4143 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4145 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4146 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4147 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4148 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4149 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4150 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4151 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4152 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4153 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4155 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4156 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4159 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4163 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4164 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4165 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4166 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4168 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4169 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4171 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4172 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4174 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4177 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4178 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4181 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4185 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4186 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4187 return Ok((None, None));
4190 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4191 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4192 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4193 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4195 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4197 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4200 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4201 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4202 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4203 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4204 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4208 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4209 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4214 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4215 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4216 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4217 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4218 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4219 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4220 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4224 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4226 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4227 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4228 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4229 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4231 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4234 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4235 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4236 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4238 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4239 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4240 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4241 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4245 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4246 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4247 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4248 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4250 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4251 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4252 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4258 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4259 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4262 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4263 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4265 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4266 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4269 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4270 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4271 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4272 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4273 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4275 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4276 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4277 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4279 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4280 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4283 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4284 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4285 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4286 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4287 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4288 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4289 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4290 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4292 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4295 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4296 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4297 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4298 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4300 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4304 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4305 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4306 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4307 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4309 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4315 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4316 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4317 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4318 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4319 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4320 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4321 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4323 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4324 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4327 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4329 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4330 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4336 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4337 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4338 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4339 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4340 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4341 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4342 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4344 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4345 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4352 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4353 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4356 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4357 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4360 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4361 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4365 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4366 &self.context.holder_signer
4370 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4372 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4373 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4374 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4375 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4376 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4377 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4379 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4381 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4389 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4390 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4394 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4395 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4396 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4397 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4400 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4401 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4402 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4403 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4406 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4407 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4408 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4409 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4410 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4411 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4414 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4415 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4416 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4417 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4418 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4419 if !release_monitor {
4420 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4429 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4430 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4433 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4434 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4435 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4437 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4438 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4439 if self.context.channel_state &
4440 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4441 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4442 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4443 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4444 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4447 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4448 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4449 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4450 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4451 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4452 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4454 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4455 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4456 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4458 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4459 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4460 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4461 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4462 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4463 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4469 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4470 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4471 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4474 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4475 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4476 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4479 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4480 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4481 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4484 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4485 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4486 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4487 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4488 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4489 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4494 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4495 self.context.channel_update_status
4498 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4499 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4500 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4503 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4505 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4506 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4507 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4511 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4512 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4513 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4516 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4520 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4521 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4522 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4524 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4525 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4526 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4528 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4529 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4532 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4533 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4534 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4535 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4536 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4537 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4538 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4539 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4540 self.context.channel_state);
4542 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4546 if need_commitment_update {
4547 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4548 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4549 let next_per_commitment_point =
4550 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4551 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4552 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4553 next_per_commitment_point,
4554 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4558 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4564 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4565 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4566 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4567 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4568 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4569 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4570 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4572 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4575 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4576 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4577 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4578 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4579 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4580 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4581 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4582 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4583 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4584 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4585 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4586 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4587 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4588 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4589 // channel and move on.
4590 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4591 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4593 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4594 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4595 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4597 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4598 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4599 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4600 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4601 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4602 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4603 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4607 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4608 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4609 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4610 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4611 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4615 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4616 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4617 // may have already happened for this block).
4618 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4619 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4620 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4621 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4624 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4625 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4626 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4627 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4635 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4636 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4637 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4638 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4640 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4641 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4644 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4646 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4647 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4648 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4649 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4651 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4654 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4657 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4658 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4659 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4660 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4662 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4665 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4666 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4667 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4669 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4670 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4672 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4673 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4674 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4682 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4684 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4685 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4686 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4688 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4689 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4692 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4693 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4694 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4695 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4696 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4697 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4698 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4699 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4700 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4703 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4704 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4705 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4706 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4708 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4709 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4710 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4712 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4713 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4714 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4715 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4717 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4718 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4719 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4720 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4721 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4722 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4723 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4726 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4727 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4729 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4732 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4733 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4734 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4735 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4736 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4737 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4738 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4739 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4740 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4741 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4742 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4743 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4744 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4745 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4746 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4747 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4748 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4754 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4759 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4760 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4762 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4763 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4764 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4765 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4767 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4770 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4771 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4772 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4773 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4774 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4775 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4777 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4778 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4781 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4782 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4783 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4784 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4786 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4787 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4789 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4790 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4791 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4792 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4793 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4794 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4800 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4801 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4802 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4803 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4805 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4808 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4812 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4816 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4817 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4821 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4825 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4826 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4829 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4833 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4835 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4840 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4842 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4847 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4849 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4850 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4851 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4852 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4853 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4857 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4859 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4860 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4861 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4862 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4863 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4864 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4865 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4867 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4868 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4869 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4870 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4871 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4872 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4873 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4874 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4875 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4876 contents: announcement,
4879 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4883 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4884 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4885 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4886 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4887 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4888 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4889 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4890 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4892 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4894 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4895 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4896 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4897 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4899 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4900 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4901 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4902 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4905 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4906 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4907 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4908 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4911 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4914 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4915 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4916 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4917 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
4918 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4919 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4922 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
4924 Err(_) => return None,
4926 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
4927 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4932 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4933 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4934 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4935 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4936 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4937 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4938 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4939 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4940 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4941 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4942 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4943 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4944 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4945 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4946 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4947 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4950 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4953 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4954 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4955 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4956 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4957 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4958 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4959 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4960 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4961 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4963 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4964 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4965 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4966 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4967 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4968 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4969 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4970 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4971 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4973 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4974 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4975 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4976 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
4977 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
4978 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
4979 next_funding_txid: None,
4984 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4986 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4987 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4988 /// commitment update.
4990 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
4991 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(
4992 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
4993 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
4994 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4996 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
4997 skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
4998 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5000 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5001 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5006 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5007 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5009 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5011 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5012 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5014 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5015 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5016 /// regenerate them.
5018 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5019 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5021 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5022 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(
5023 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5024 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5025 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5026 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5027 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5028 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5030 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5031 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5032 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5035 if amount_msat == 0 {
5036 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5039 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
5040 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5041 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5042 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5045 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5046 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5047 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5050 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5051 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5052 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5053 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5054 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5055 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5056 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5057 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5060 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5061 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5062 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5063 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5064 else { "to peer" });
5066 if need_holding_cell {
5067 force_holding_cell = true;
5070 // Now update local state:
5071 if force_holding_cell {
5072 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5077 onion_routing_packet,
5083 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5084 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5086 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5088 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5093 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5094 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5095 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5099 onion_routing_packet,
5102 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5107 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5108 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5109 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5110 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5112 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5113 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5114 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5116 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5117 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5121 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5122 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5123 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5124 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5125 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5126 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5127 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5130 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5131 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5132 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5133 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5134 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5135 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5138 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5140 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5141 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5142 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5144 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5145 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5148 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5149 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5150 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5151 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5152 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5153 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5154 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5155 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5158 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5162 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5163 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5164 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5165 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5167 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5169 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5170 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5171 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5172 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5173 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5174 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5175 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5176 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5177 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5178 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5179 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5185 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5188 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5189 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5190 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5191 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5192 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5193 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5195 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5196 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5197 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5198 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5201 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5202 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5206 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5207 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5209 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5211 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5212 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5213 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5214 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5216 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5217 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5218 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5219 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5220 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5221 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5225 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5226 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5230 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5231 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5234 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5235 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5237 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5238 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5239 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(
5240 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5241 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5242 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5243 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5244 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger);
5245 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5248 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5249 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5250 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5256 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5257 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5258 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5260 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5261 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5262 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5263 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5269 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5270 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5272 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5273 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5274 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5275 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5276 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5277 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5278 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5279 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5280 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5283 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5284 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5285 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5287 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5288 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5291 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5292 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5294 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5295 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5296 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5299 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5300 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5301 let mut chan_closed = false;
5302 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5306 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5308 None if !chan_closed => {
5309 // use override shutdown script if provided
5310 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5311 Some(script) => script,
5313 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5314 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5315 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5316 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5320 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5321 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5323 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5329 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5330 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5331 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5332 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5334 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5336 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5338 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5339 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5340 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5341 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5342 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5343 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5346 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5347 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5349 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5350 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5351 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5354 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5355 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5356 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5357 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5358 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5360 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5361 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5368 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5369 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5371 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5374 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5375 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5376 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5378 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5379 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5383 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5387 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5388 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5389 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5392 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5393 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5394 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5395 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5396 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5397 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5398 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5399 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5400 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5402 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5403 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5404 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5405 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5407 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5408 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5410 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5411 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5413 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5414 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5415 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5417 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5418 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5420 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5421 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5422 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5423 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5424 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5427 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5428 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5430 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5432 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5433 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5434 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5435 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5438 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5439 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5441 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5442 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5443 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5444 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5448 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5449 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5450 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5454 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5455 Ok(script) => script,
5456 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5459 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5462 context: ChannelContext {
5465 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5466 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5467 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5468 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5473 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5475 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5476 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5477 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5478 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5480 channel_value_satoshis,
5482 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5485 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5488 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5489 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5492 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5493 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5494 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5495 pending_update_fee: None,
5496 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5497 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5498 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5499 update_time_counter: 1,
5501 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5503 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5504 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5505 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5506 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5507 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5508 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5510 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5511 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5512 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5513 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5515 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5516 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5517 closing_fee_limits: None,
5518 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5520 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5522 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5523 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5524 short_channel_id: None,
5525 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5527 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5528 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5529 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5530 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5531 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5532 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5533 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5534 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5535 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5536 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5537 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5538 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5540 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5542 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5543 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5544 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5545 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5546 counterparty_parameters: None,
5547 funding_outpoint: None,
5548 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5550 funding_transaction: None,
5552 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5553 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5554 counterparty_node_id,
5556 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5558 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5560 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5561 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5563 announcement_sigs: None,
5565 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5566 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5567 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5568 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5570 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5571 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5573 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5574 outbound_scid_alias,
5576 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5577 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5579 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5580 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5585 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5590 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5591 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5592 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5593 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5594 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5595 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5598 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5599 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5600 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5601 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5602 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5603 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5604 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5605 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5606 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5607 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5608 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5610 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5611 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5613 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5614 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5615 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5616 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5619 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5620 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5622 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5625 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5626 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5627 return Err((self, e));
5631 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5633 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5635 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5636 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5637 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5639 let channel = Channel {
5640 context: self.context,
5643 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5644 temporary_channel_id,
5645 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5646 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5649 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5651 next_local_nonce: None,
5655 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5656 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5657 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5658 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5659 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5660 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5661 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5662 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5663 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5664 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5667 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5668 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5669 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5670 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5671 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5672 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5678 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5679 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5680 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5681 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5682 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5683 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5684 // We've exhausted our options
5687 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5688 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5691 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5692 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5693 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5694 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5696 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5697 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5698 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5699 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5700 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5702 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5704 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5705 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5708 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5709 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5710 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5712 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5713 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5716 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5717 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5720 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5721 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5725 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5726 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5727 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5728 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5729 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5730 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5731 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5732 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5733 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5734 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5735 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5736 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5737 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5738 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5739 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5740 first_per_commitment_point,
5741 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5742 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5743 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5744 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5746 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5751 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5752 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5754 // Check sanity of message fields:
5755 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5756 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5758 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5759 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5761 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5762 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5764 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5765 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5767 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5768 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5770 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5771 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5772 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5774 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5775 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5776 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5778 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5779 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5780 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5782 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5783 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5785 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5786 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5789 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5790 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5791 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5793 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5794 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5796 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5797 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5799 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5800 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5802 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5803 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5805 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5806 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5808 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5809 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5812 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5813 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5814 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5816 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5817 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5819 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5820 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5821 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5823 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
5824 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
5827 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5828 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5829 &Some(ref script) => {
5830 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5831 if script.len() == 0 {
5834 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5835 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5837 Some(script.clone())
5840 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5842 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5847 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5848 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5849 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5850 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5851 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5853 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5854 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5856 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5859 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5860 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5861 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5862 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5863 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5864 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5867 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5868 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5869 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5872 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5873 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5875 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5876 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5882 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5883 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5884 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5887 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5888 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5889 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5890 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5891 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5892 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5893 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5894 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5895 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5896 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5897 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5898 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5901 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
5903 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
5904 // support this channel type.
5905 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
5906 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
5907 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
5910 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
5911 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
5912 // `static_remote_key`.
5913 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
5914 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
5916 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
5917 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
5918 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
5920 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
5921 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
5923 channel_type.clone()
5925 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5926 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5927 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5932 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
5933 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5934 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5935 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5936 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5937 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5938 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5939 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5940 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5943 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5944 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
5947 // Check sanity of message fields:
5948 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
5949 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5951 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5952 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
5954 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
5955 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5957 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5958 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
5959 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5961 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
5962 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5964 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5965 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5967 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
5969 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5970 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
5971 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
5973 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5974 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5976 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5977 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5980 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5981 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
5982 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
5984 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5985 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5987 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5988 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5990 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5991 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5993 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5994 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5996 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5997 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5999 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6003 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6005 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6006 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6011 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6012 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6013 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6014 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6017 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6018 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6020 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6021 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6022 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6024 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6025 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6028 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6029 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6030 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6031 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6032 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6036 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6037 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6038 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6039 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6040 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6043 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6044 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6045 &Some(ref script) => {
6046 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6047 if script.len() == 0 {
6050 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6051 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6053 Some(script.clone())
6056 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6058 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6063 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6064 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6065 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6066 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6070 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6071 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6072 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6076 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6077 Ok(script) => script,
6078 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6081 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6082 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6085 context: ChannelContext {
6088 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6089 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6091 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6096 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6098 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6099 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6100 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6101 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6104 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6107 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6110 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6111 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6112 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6114 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6115 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6116 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6117 pending_update_fee: None,
6118 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6119 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6120 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6121 update_time_counter: 1,
6123 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6125 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6126 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6127 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6128 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6129 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6130 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6132 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6133 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6134 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6135 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6137 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6138 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6139 closing_fee_limits: None,
6140 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6142 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6144 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6145 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6146 short_channel_id: None,
6147 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6149 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6150 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6151 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6152 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6153 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6154 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6155 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6156 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6157 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6158 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6159 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6160 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6161 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6163 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6165 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6166 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6167 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6168 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6169 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6170 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6171 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6173 funding_outpoint: None,
6174 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6176 funding_transaction: None,
6178 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6179 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6180 counterparty_node_id,
6182 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6184 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6186 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6187 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6189 announcement_sigs: None,
6191 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6192 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6193 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6194 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6196 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6197 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6199 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6200 outbound_scid_alias,
6202 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6203 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6205 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6206 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6211 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6218 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6219 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6222 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6223 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6224 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6225 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6228 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6229 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6231 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6232 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6233 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6234 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6236 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6237 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6239 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6240 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6242 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6243 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6246 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6247 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6249 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6252 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6253 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6254 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6256 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6257 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6258 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6259 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6261 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6262 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6263 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6264 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6265 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6266 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6267 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6268 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6269 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6270 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6271 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6272 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6273 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6274 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6275 first_per_commitment_point,
6276 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6277 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6278 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6280 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6282 next_local_nonce: None,
6286 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6287 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6289 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6291 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6292 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6295 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6296 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6298 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6299 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6301 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6302 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6303 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6304 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6305 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6306 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6307 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6308 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6309 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6312 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6313 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6315 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6316 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6317 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6318 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6320 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6321 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6323 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6324 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6327 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6328 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6329 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6331 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6334 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6335 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6337 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6338 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6339 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6341 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6343 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6344 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6346 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6347 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6348 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6349 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6352 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6353 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6354 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6355 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6356 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6358 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6360 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6361 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6362 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6365 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6366 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6367 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6371 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6372 initial_commitment_tx,
6375 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6376 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6379 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6380 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6383 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6385 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6386 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6387 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6388 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6389 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6390 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6391 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6392 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6393 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6394 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6395 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6397 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6399 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6401 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6402 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6403 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6404 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6406 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6408 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6409 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6410 let mut channel = Channel {
6411 context: self.context,
6413 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6414 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6415 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6417 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6421 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6422 }, channel_monitor))
6426 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6427 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6429 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6435 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6436 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6437 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6438 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6439 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6441 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6442 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6443 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6444 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6450 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6451 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6452 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6453 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6454 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6455 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6460 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6461 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6462 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6463 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6465 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6466 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6467 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6468 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6473 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6474 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6475 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6476 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6477 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6478 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6483 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6484 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6485 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6488 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6490 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6491 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6492 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6493 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6494 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6496 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6497 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6498 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6499 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6501 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6502 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6503 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6505 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6507 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6508 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6509 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6510 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6511 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6512 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6514 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6515 // deserialized from that format.
6516 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6517 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6518 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6520 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6522 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6523 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6524 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6526 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6527 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6528 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6529 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6532 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6533 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6534 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6537 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6538 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6539 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6540 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6542 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6543 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6545 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6547 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6549 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6551 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6554 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6556 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6561 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6562 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6564 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6565 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6566 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6567 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6568 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6569 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6570 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6572 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6574 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6576 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6579 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6580 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6581 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6584 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6586 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6587 preimages.push(preimage);
6589 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6590 reason.write(writer)?;
6592 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6594 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6595 preimages.push(preimage);
6597 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6598 reason.write(writer)?;
6601 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6602 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6603 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6605 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6606 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6607 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6611 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6612 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6613 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6615 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6616 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6620 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6621 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6622 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6623 source.write(writer)?;
6624 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6626 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6627 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6628 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6630 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6631 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6633 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6635 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6636 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6638 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6640 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6641 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6646 match self.context.resend_order {
6647 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6648 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6651 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6652 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6653 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6655 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6656 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6657 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6658 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6661 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6662 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6663 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6664 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6665 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6668 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6669 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6670 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6671 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6673 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6674 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6675 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6677 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6679 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6680 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6681 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6682 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6684 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6685 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6686 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6687 // consider the stale state on reload.
6690 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6691 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6692 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6694 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6695 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6696 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6698 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6699 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6701 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6702 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6703 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6705 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6706 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6708 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6711 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6712 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6713 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6715 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6718 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6719 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6721 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6722 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6723 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6725 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6727 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6729 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6731 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6732 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6733 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6734 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6735 htlc.write(writer)?;
6738 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6739 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6740 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6742 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6743 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6745 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6746 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6747 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6748 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6749 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6750 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6751 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6753 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6754 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6755 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6756 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6757 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6759 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6760 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6762 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6763 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6764 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6765 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6767 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6769 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6770 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6771 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6772 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6773 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6774 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6775 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6777 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6778 (2, chan_type, option),
6779 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6780 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6781 (5, self.context.config, required),
6782 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6783 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6784 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
6785 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6786 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
6787 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6788 (15, preimages, required_vec),
6789 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6790 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6791 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6792 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6793 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6794 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6795 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6796 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6797 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6798 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6799 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6806 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6807 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6809 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6810 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6812 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6813 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6814 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6816 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6817 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6818 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6819 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6821 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6823 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6824 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6825 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6826 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6827 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6829 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6830 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6833 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6834 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6835 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6837 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6839 let mut keys_data = None;
6841 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6842 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6843 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6844 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6845 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6846 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6847 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6848 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6849 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6850 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6854 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6855 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6856 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6859 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6861 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6862 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6863 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6865 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6867 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6868 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6869 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6870 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6871 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6872 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6873 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6874 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6875 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6876 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6877 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6878 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6879 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6884 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6885 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6886 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6887 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6888 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6889 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6890 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6891 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6892 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6893 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6894 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6895 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6897 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6898 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6901 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6902 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6905 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6906 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6908 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6910 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6914 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6915 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6916 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6917 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6918 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6919 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6920 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6921 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6922 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6923 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6924 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6926 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6927 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6928 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6930 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6931 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6932 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6934 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6938 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6939 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6940 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6941 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6944 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6945 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6946 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6948 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6949 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6950 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6951 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6954 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6955 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6956 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6957 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6960 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6962 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6964 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6965 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6966 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6967 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6969 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6970 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6971 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6972 // consider the stale state on reload.
6973 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6976 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6977 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6978 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6980 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6983 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6984 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6985 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6987 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6988 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6989 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6990 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6992 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6993 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6995 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6996 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6998 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6999 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7000 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7002 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7004 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7005 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7007 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7008 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7011 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7013 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7014 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7015 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7016 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7018 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7021 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7022 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7024 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7026 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7027 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7029 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7030 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7032 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7034 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7035 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7036 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7038 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7039 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7040 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7044 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7045 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7046 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7048 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7054 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7055 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7056 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7057 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7058 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7059 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7060 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7061 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7062 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7063 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7065 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7066 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7067 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7068 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7069 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7070 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7071 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7073 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7074 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7075 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7076 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7078 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7080 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7081 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7083 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7084 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7085 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7086 (2, channel_type, option),
7087 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7088 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7089 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7090 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7091 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7092 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7093 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7094 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7095 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7096 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7097 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7098 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7099 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7100 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7101 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7102 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7103 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7104 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7105 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7106 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7107 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7110 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7111 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7112 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7113 // required channel parameters.
7114 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7115 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7116 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7118 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7120 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7121 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7122 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7123 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7126 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7127 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7128 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7130 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7131 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7133 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7134 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7139 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7140 if iter.next().is_some() {
7141 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7145 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7146 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7147 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7148 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7149 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7152 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7153 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7154 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7156 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7157 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7159 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7160 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7161 // separate u64 values.
7162 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7164 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7166 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7167 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7168 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7169 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7171 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7172 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7174 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7175 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7176 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7177 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7178 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7181 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7182 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7186 context: ChannelContext {
7189 config: config.unwrap(),
7193 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7194 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7195 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7198 temporary_channel_id,
7200 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7202 channel_value_satoshis,
7204 latest_monitor_update_id,
7207 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7210 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7211 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7214 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7215 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7216 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7217 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7221 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7222 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7223 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7224 monitor_pending_forwards,
7225 monitor_pending_failures,
7226 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7229 holding_cell_update_fee,
7230 next_holder_htlc_id,
7231 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7232 update_time_counter,
7235 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7236 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7237 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7238 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7240 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7241 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7242 closing_fee_limits: None,
7243 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7245 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7247 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7248 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7250 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7252 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7253 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7254 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7255 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7256 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7257 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7258 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7259 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7260 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7263 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7265 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7266 funding_transaction,
7268 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7269 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7270 counterparty_node_id,
7272 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7276 channel_update_status,
7277 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7281 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7282 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7283 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7284 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7286 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7287 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7289 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7290 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7291 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7293 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7294 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7296 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7297 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7299 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7302 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7311 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7312 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7313 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7314 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7315 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7317 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7318 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7319 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7320 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7321 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7322 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7323 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7324 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7325 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7326 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7327 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7328 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7329 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7330 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7331 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7332 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7333 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7334 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7335 use crate::util::test_utils;
7336 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7337 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7338 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7339 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7340 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7341 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7342 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7343 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7344 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7345 use crate::prelude::*;
7347 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7350 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7351 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7357 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7358 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7359 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7360 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7364 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7365 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7366 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7367 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7368 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7369 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7370 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7374 signer: InMemorySigner,
7377 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7378 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7381 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7382 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7384 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7385 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7388 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7392 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7394 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7395 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7396 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7397 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7398 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7401 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7402 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7403 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7404 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7408 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7409 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7410 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7414 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7415 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7416 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7417 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7419 let seed = [42; 32];
7420 let network = Network::Testnet;
7421 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7422 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7423 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7426 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7427 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7428 let config = UserConfig::default();
7429 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7430 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7431 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7433 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7434 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7438 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7439 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7441 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7442 let original_fee = 253;
7443 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7444 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7445 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7446 let seed = [42; 32];
7447 let network = Network::Testnet;
7448 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7450 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7451 let config = UserConfig::default();
7452 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7454 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7455 // same as the old fee.
7456 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7457 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7458 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7462 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7463 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7464 // dust limits are used.
7465 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7466 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7467 let seed = [42; 32];
7468 let network = Network::Testnet;
7469 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7470 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7471 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7473 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7474 // they have different dust limits.
7476 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7477 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7478 let config = UserConfig::default();
7479 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7481 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7482 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7483 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7484 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7485 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7487 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7488 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7489 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7490 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7491 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7493 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7494 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7495 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7496 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7498 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7499 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7500 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7502 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7503 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7505 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7506 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7507 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7509 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7510 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7511 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7512 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7515 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7517 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7518 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7519 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7520 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7521 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7522 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7523 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7524 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7525 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7527 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7530 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7531 // the dust limit check.
7532 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7533 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7534 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7535 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7537 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7538 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7539 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7540 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7541 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7542 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7543 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7547 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7548 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7549 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7550 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7551 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7552 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7553 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7554 let seed = [42; 32];
7555 let network = Network::Testnet;
7556 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7558 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7559 let config = UserConfig::default();
7560 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7562 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7563 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7565 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7566 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7567 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7568 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7569 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7570 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7572 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7573 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7574 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7575 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7576 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7578 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7580 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7581 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7582 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7583 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7584 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7586 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7587 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7588 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7589 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7590 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7594 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7595 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7596 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7597 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7598 let seed = [42; 32];
7599 let network = Network::Testnet;
7600 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7601 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7602 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7604 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7606 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7607 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7608 let config = UserConfig::default();
7609 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7611 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7612 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7613 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7614 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7616 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7617 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7618 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7620 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7621 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7622 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7623 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7625 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7626 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7627 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7629 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7630 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7632 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7633 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7634 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7635 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7636 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7637 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7638 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7640 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7642 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7643 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7644 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7645 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7646 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7650 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7651 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7652 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7653 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7654 let seed = [42; 32];
7655 let network = Network::Testnet;
7656 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7657 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7658 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7660 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7661 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7662 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7663 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7664 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7665 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7666 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7667 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7669 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7670 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7671 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7672 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7673 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7674 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7676 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7677 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7678 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7679 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7681 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7683 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7684 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7685 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7686 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7687 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7688 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7690 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7691 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7692 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7693 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7695 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7696 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7697 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7698 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7699 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7701 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7702 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7704 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7705 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7706 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7708 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7709 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7710 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7711 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7712 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7714 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7715 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7717 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7718 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7719 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7723 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7725 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7726 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7727 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7729 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7730 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7731 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7732 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7734 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7735 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7736 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7738 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7740 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7741 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7744 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7745 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7746 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7747 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7748 let seed = [42; 32];
7749 let network = Network::Testnet;
7750 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7751 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7752 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7755 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7756 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7757 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7759 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7760 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7762 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7763 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7764 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7766 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7767 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7769 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7771 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7772 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7774 // Channel Negotiations failed
7775 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7776 assert!(result.is_err());
7781 fn channel_update() {
7782 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7783 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7784 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7785 let seed = [42; 32];
7786 let network = Network::Testnet;
7787 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7788 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7789 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7791 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7792 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7793 let config = UserConfig::default();
7794 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7796 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7797 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7798 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7799 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7800 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7802 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7803 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7804 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7805 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7806 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7808 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7809 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7810 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7811 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7813 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7814 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7815 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7817 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7818 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7820 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7821 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7822 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7824 short_channel_id: 0,
7827 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7828 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7829 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7831 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7832 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7834 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7836 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7838 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7839 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7840 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7841 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7843 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7844 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7845 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7847 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7851 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7853 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7854 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7855 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7856 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7857 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7858 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7859 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7860 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7861 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7862 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7863 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7864 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7865 use crate::sync::Arc;
7867 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7868 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7869 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7870 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7872 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7874 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7875 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7876 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7877 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7878 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7880 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7881 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7887 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7888 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7889 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7891 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7892 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7893 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7894 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7895 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7896 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7898 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7900 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7901 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7902 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7903 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7904 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7905 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7907 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7908 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7909 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7910 selected_contest_delay: 144
7912 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7913 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7915 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7916 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7918 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7919 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7921 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7922 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7924 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7925 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7926 // build_commitment_transaction.
7927 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7928 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7929 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7930 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7931 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7933 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7934 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7935 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7936 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
7940 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7941 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7942 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
7943 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
7947 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7948 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7949 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7951 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7952 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7954 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7955 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7957 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7959 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7960 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7961 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7962 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7963 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7964 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7965 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7967 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7968 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7969 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7970 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7972 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7973 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7974 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7976 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7978 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7979 commitment_tx.clone(),
7980 counterparty_signature,
7981 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7982 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7983 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7985 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7986 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7988 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7989 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7990 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7992 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7993 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7996 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7997 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7999 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8000 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8001 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8002 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8003 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8004 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8005 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8006 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8008 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8011 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8012 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8013 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8017 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8020 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8021 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8022 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8024 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8025 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8026 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8027 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8028 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8029 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8030 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8031 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8033 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8037 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8038 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8039 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8040 "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", {});
8042 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8043 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8045 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8046 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8047 "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", {});
8049 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8050 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8051 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8052 "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", {});
8054 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8055 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8057 amount_msat: 1000000,
8059 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8060 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8062 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8065 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8066 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8068 amount_msat: 2000000,
8070 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8071 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8073 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8076 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8077 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8079 amount_msat: 2000000,
8081 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8082 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8083 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8084 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8086 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8089 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8090 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8092 amount_msat: 3000000,
8094 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8095 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8096 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8097 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8099 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8102 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8103 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8105 amount_msat: 4000000,
8107 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8108 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8110 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8114 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8115 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8116 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8118 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8119 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8120 "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", {
8123 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8124 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8125 "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" },
8128 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8129 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8130 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8133 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8134 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8135 "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" },
8138 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8139 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8140 "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" },
8143 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8144 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8145 "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" }
8148 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8149 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8150 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8152 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8153 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8154 "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", {
8157 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8158 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8159 "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" },
8162 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8163 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8164 "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" },
8167 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8168 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8169 "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" },
8172 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8173 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8174 "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" },
8177 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8178 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8179 "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" }
8182 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8183 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8184 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8186 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8187 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8188 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8191 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8192 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8193 "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" },
8196 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8197 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8198 "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" },
8201 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8202 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8203 "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" },
8206 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8207 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8208 "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" }
8211 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8212 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8213 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8214 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8216 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8217 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8218 "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", {
8221 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8222 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8223 "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" },
8226 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8227 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8228 "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" },
8231 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8232 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8233 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320004000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c18347304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
8236 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8237 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8238 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8241 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8242 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8243 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8244 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8246 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8247 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8248 "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", {
8251 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8252 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8253 "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" },
8256 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8257 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8258 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8261 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8262 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8263 "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" },
8266 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8267 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8268 "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" }
8271 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8272 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8273 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8275 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8276 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8277 "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", {
8280 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8281 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8282 "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" },
8285 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8286 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8287 "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" },
8290 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8291 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8292 "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" }
8295 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8296 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8297 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8299 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8300 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8301 "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", {
8304 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8305 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8306 "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" },
8309 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8310 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8311 "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" },
8314 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8315 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8316 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b014830450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8319 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8320 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8321 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8323 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8324 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8325 "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", {
8328 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8329 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8330 "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" },
8333 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8334 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8335 "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" }
8338 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8339 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8340 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8341 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8342 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8343 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8345 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8346 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8347 "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", {
8350 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8351 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8352 "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" },
8355 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8356 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8357 "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" }
8360 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8361 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8362 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8363 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8364 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8366 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8367 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8368 "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", {
8371 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8372 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8373 "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" },
8376 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8377 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8378 "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" }
8381 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8382 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8383 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8385 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8386 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8387 "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", {
8390 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8391 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8392 "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" }
8395 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8396 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8397 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8398 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8399 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8401 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8402 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8403 "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", {
8406 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8407 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8408 "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" }
8411 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8412 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8413 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8414 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8415 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8417 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8418 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8419 "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", {
8422 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8423 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8424 "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" }
8427 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8428 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8429 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8430 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8432 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8433 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8434 "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", {});
8436 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8437 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8438 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8439 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8440 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8442 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8443 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8444 "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", {});
8446 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8447 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8448 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8449 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8450 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8452 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8453 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8454 "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", {});
8456 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8457 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8458 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8460 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8461 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8462 "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", {});
8464 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8465 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8466 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8467 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8468 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8470 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8471 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8472 "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", {});
8474 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8475 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8476 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8477 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8478 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8480 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8481 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8482 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8484 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8485 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8486 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8487 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8488 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8489 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8491 amount_msat: 2000000,
8493 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8494 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8496 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8499 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8500 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8501 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8503 amount_msat: 5000001,
8505 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8506 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8507 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8508 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8510 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8513 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8514 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8516 amount_msat: 5000000,
8518 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8519 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8520 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8521 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8523 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8527 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8528 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8529 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a69f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c0147304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8532 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8533 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8534 "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" },
8536 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8537 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8538 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec01000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a01483045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
8540 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8541 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8542 "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" }
8545 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8546 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8547 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8548 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aad9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b7601473044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c72501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8551 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8552 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
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8555 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8556 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8557 "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" },
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8560 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8561 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40400000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a183483045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568fa010000" }
8566 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8567 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8569 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8570 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8571 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8572 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8574 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8575 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8576 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8578 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8579 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8581 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8582 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8584 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8585 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8586 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8590 fn test_key_derivation() {
8591 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8592 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8594 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8595 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8597 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8598 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8600 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8601 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8603 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8604 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8606 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8607 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8609 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8610 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8612 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8613 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8617 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8618 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8619 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8620 let seed = [42; 32];
8621 let network = Network::Testnet;
8622 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8623 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8625 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8626 let config = UserConfig::default();
8627 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8628 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8630 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8631 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8633 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8634 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8635 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8636 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8637 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8638 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8639 assert!(res.is_ok());
8643 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8644 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8645 // resulting `channel_type`.
8646 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8647 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8648 let network = Network::Testnet;
8649 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8650 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8652 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8653 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8655 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8656 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8658 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8659 // need to signal it.
8660 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8661 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8662 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8665 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8667 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8668 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8669 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8671 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8672 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8673 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8676 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8677 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8678 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8679 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8680 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8683 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8684 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8688 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8689 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8690 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8691 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8692 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8693 let network = Network::Testnet;
8694 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8695 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8697 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8698 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8700 let config = UserConfig::default();
8702 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8703 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8704 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8705 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8706 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8708 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8709 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8710 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8713 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8714 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8715 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8717 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8718 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8719 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8720 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8721 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8722 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8724 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8728 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8729 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8731 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8732 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8733 let network = Network::Testnet;
8734 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8735 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8737 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8738 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8740 let config = UserConfig::default();
8742 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8743 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8744 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8745 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8746 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8747 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8748 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8749 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8751 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8752 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8753 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8754 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8755 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8756 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8759 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8760 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8762 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8763 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8764 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8765 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8767 assert!(res.is_err());
8769 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8770 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8771 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8773 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8774 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8775 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8778 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8780 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8781 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8782 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8783 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8786 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8787 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8789 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8790 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8792 assert!(res.is_err());