1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
30 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use util::transaction_utils;
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
42 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
43 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
48 use core::convert::TryFrom;
50 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", debug_assertions))]
52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
56 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
63 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
66 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
68 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
70 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
71 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
72 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
73 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
74 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
75 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
77 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
81 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
82 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
83 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
84 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
87 enum InboundHTLCState {
88 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
89 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
90 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
91 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
92 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
93 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
94 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
95 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
96 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
97 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
98 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
99 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
100 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
101 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
102 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
104 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
105 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
106 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
107 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
108 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
109 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
110 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
111 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
112 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
113 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
114 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
115 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
116 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
117 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
119 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
120 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
121 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
122 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
123 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
124 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
125 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
126 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
128 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
129 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
131 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
132 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
133 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
134 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
135 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
136 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
137 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
138 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
141 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
145 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
146 state: InboundHTLCState,
149 enum OutboundHTLCState {
150 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
151 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
152 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
153 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
154 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
155 /// money back (though we won't), and,
156 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
157 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
158 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
159 /// we'll never get out of sync).
160 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
161 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
162 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
164 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
165 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
166 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
167 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
168 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
169 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
170 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
171 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
172 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
173 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
174 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
175 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
176 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
177 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
178 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
181 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
185 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
186 state: OutboundHTLCState,
190 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
191 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
192 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
196 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
198 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
201 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
206 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
210 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
211 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
212 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
213 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
214 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
215 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
216 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
218 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
219 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
220 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
221 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
222 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
223 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
224 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
226 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
227 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
228 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
230 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
231 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
232 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
233 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
234 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
235 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
237 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
238 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
240 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
241 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
242 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
243 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
244 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
245 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
246 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
247 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
248 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
250 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
251 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
252 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
253 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
254 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
255 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
256 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
257 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
258 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
259 /// us their shutdown.
260 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
261 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
262 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
263 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
265 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
266 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
268 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
270 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
271 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
272 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
273 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
274 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
275 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
276 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
277 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
279 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
281 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
283 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
287 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
293 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
296 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
297 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
298 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
301 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
302 struct HTLCCandidate {
304 origin: HTLCInitiator,
308 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
316 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
317 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
318 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
319 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
320 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
321 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
322 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
323 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
324 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
325 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
326 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
329 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
331 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
333 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
334 htlc_value_msat: u64,
335 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
340 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
341 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
342 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
343 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
344 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
346 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
347 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
348 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
349 htlc_value_msat: u64,
350 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
351 /// in the holding cell).
352 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
354 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
355 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
359 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
360 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
361 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
362 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
363 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
364 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
365 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
366 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
367 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
368 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
369 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
371 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
373 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
375 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
376 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
377 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
380 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
381 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
382 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
383 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
384 pub(crate) config: ChannelConfig,
385 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
386 config: ChannelConfig,
390 channel_id: [u8; 32],
392 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
393 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
395 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
397 holder_signer: Signer,
398 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
399 destination_script: Script,
401 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
402 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
403 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
405 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
406 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
407 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
408 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
409 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
410 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
412 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
413 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
414 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
415 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
416 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
417 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
419 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
421 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
422 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
423 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
424 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
425 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
427 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
428 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
429 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
431 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
432 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
433 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
434 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
435 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
436 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
437 // commitment_signed.
438 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
439 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
440 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
441 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
442 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
443 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
444 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
445 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
446 update_time_counter: u32,
449 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
450 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
451 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
452 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
453 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
454 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
456 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
458 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
459 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
460 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
461 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
463 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
465 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
467 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
469 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
471 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
472 //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
473 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
474 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
475 // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
476 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
477 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
479 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
481 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
482 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
483 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
485 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
487 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
488 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
490 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
491 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
492 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
494 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
496 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
498 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
500 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
501 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
502 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
504 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
505 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
506 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
507 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
508 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
509 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
510 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
511 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
513 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
514 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
515 /// funding_locked *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
516 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the funding_locked
517 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
519 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
520 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
522 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
523 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
524 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
525 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
526 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
527 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
528 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
529 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
532 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
533 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
535 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
536 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
537 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
541 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
544 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
546 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
548 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
550 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
552 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
554 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
556 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
557 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
558 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
559 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
560 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
561 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
562 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
563 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
564 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
566 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
567 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
568 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
569 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
570 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
572 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
573 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
574 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
575 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
578 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
581 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
582 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
584 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
585 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
586 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
591 macro_rules! secp_check {
592 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
595 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
600 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
601 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
602 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
603 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
606 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
609 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
610 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
611 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
612 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
616 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
617 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
618 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
620 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
621 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
622 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
624 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
625 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
627 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
628 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
629 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
631 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
632 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
634 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
635 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
636 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
639 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
641 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
642 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
644 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
645 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
648 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
649 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
650 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
656 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
658 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
659 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
661 channel_value_satoshis,
663 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
666 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
667 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
669 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
670 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
671 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
673 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
674 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
675 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
676 pending_update_fee: None,
677 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
678 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
679 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
680 update_time_counter: 1,
682 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
684 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
685 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
686 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
687 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
688 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
690 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
691 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
692 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
693 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
695 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
697 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
698 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
699 short_channel_id: None,
701 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
702 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
703 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
704 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
705 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
706 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
707 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
708 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
709 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
711 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
713 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
714 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
715 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
716 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
717 counterparty_parameters: None,
718 funding_outpoint: None
720 funding_transaction: None,
722 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
723 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
724 counterparty_node_id,
726 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
728 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
730 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
732 announcement_sigs: None,
734 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
735 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
736 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
737 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
739 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
741 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
742 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
746 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
747 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
749 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
750 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
751 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
753 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 2;
754 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
755 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
760 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
761 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
762 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
763 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
764 F::Target: FeeEstimator
766 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
767 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
768 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
769 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
770 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
771 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
772 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
773 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
775 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
777 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
778 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
781 // Check sanity of message fields:
782 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
783 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
785 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
786 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
788 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
789 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
790 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
792 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
793 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
795 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
796 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
798 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
799 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
800 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
802 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
804 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
805 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
806 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
808 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
809 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
811 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
812 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
815 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
816 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
817 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
819 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
820 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
822 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
823 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
825 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
826 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
828 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
829 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
831 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
832 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
834 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
835 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
838 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
840 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
841 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
842 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
843 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
846 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
847 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
849 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
851 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
852 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
853 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
855 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
856 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
858 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
859 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
862 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
863 // for full fee payment
864 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
865 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
866 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
867 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
870 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
871 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
872 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
876 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
877 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
878 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
879 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
880 if script.len() == 0 {
883 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), their_features)) {
884 Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
885 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))),
889 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
890 &OptionalField::Absent => {
891 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
896 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
897 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
900 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
901 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
902 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
906 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
907 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
911 config: local_config,
913 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
914 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
917 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
920 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
921 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
923 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
924 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
925 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
927 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
928 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
929 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
930 pending_update_fee: None,
931 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
932 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
933 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
934 update_time_counter: 1,
936 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
938 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
939 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
940 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
941 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
942 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
944 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
945 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
946 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
947 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
949 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
951 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
952 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
953 short_channel_id: None,
955 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
956 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
957 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
958 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
959 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
960 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
961 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
962 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
963 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
964 minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
966 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
968 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
969 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
970 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
971 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
972 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
973 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
974 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
976 funding_outpoint: None
978 funding_transaction: None,
980 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
981 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
982 counterparty_node_id,
984 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
986 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
988 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
990 announcement_sigs: None,
992 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
993 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
994 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
995 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
997 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
999 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1000 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1006 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1007 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1008 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1009 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1010 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1012 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1013 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1014 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1015 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1016 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1017 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1018 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1019 /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
1020 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
1021 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the fourth return value, but not the third, and
1022 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the fourth return value.
1024 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, u32, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1025 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1026 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1027 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1029 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1030 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1031 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1032 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1034 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1035 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1036 if match update_state {
1037 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1038 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1039 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1040 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1041 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1043 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1047 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1048 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1049 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1050 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1052 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1053 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1054 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1056 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1057 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1058 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1059 transaction_output_index: None
1064 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1065 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1066 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1067 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1068 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1069 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1070 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1072 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1073 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1076 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1077 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1078 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1079 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1081 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1082 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1088 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1089 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1090 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1091 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1092 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1093 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1094 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1098 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1099 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1101 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1103 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1104 if generated_by_local {
1105 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1106 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1115 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1116 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1117 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1118 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1119 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1120 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1121 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1125 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1126 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1128 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1130 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
1131 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1133 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
1134 if !generated_by_local {
1135 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1143 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1144 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1145 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1146 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1147 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1148 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1149 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1150 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1152 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1154 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1155 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1156 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1157 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1159 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1161 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1162 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1163 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1164 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1167 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1168 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1169 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1171 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1174 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1175 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1177 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1178 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1183 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1184 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1189 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1191 let channel_parameters =
1192 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1193 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1194 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1199 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1202 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1203 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1204 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1205 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1207 (tx, feerate_per_kw, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1211 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1212 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1213 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1214 // outside of those situations will fail.
1215 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1219 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1224 1 + // script length (0)
1228 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1229 2 + // witness marker and flag
1230 1 + // witness element count
1231 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1232 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1233 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1234 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1235 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1236 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1238 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1239 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1240 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1246 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1248 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1250 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1251 script_sig: Script::new(),
1252 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1253 witness: Vec::new(),
1258 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1259 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1260 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1261 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1263 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1264 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1265 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1267 if value_to_self < 0 {
1268 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1269 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1270 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1271 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1272 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1275 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1276 txouts.push((TxOut {
1277 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1278 value: value_to_remote as u64
1282 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1283 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1284 txouts.push((TxOut {
1285 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1286 value: value_to_self as u64
1290 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1292 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1293 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1294 outputs.push(out.0);
1302 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1305 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1306 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1310 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1311 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1312 /// our counterparty!)
1313 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1314 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1315 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1316 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1317 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1318 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1319 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1321 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1325 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1326 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1327 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1328 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1329 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1330 //may see payments to it!
1331 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1332 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1333 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1335 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1338 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1339 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1340 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1341 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1342 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1345 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1346 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1347 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1348 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1350 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1351 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1353 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1355 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1357 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1358 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1359 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1361 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1362 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1363 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1364 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1365 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1367 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1368 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1369 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1371 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1372 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1374 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1377 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1378 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1382 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1386 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1387 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1388 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1389 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1390 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1391 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1394 // Now update local state:
1396 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1397 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1398 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1399 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1400 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1401 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1402 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1406 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1407 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1408 match pending_update {
1409 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1410 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1411 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1412 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1413 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1414 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1415 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1418 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1419 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1420 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1421 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1422 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1423 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1424 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1430 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1431 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1432 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1434 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1435 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1436 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1438 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1439 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1442 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1443 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1445 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1446 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1448 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1449 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1452 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1455 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1456 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1457 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1458 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1463 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1464 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1465 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1466 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1467 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1470 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1471 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1472 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1473 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1474 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1476 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1477 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1478 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1482 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1483 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1484 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1485 /// before we fail backwards.
1486 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1487 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1488 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1489 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1490 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1492 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1494 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1495 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1496 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1498 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1499 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1500 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1502 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1503 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1504 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1506 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1511 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1512 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1518 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1519 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1520 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1521 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1522 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1526 // Now update local state:
1527 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1528 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1529 match pending_update {
1530 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1531 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1532 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1533 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1537 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1538 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1539 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1540 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1546 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1547 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1548 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1554 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1556 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1557 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1560 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1561 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1562 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1567 // Message handlers:
1569 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1570 // Check sanity of message fields:
1571 if !self.is_outbound() {
1572 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1574 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1575 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1577 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1578 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1580 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1581 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1583 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1584 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1586 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1587 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1588 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1590 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1591 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1592 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1594 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1595 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1596 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1598 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1599 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1601 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1602 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1605 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1606 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1607 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1609 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1610 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1612 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1613 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1615 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1616 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1618 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1619 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1621 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1622 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1624 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1625 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1627 if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
1628 // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
1629 // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
1631 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
1634 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1635 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1636 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1637 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1638 if script.len() == 0 {
1641 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), their_features)) {
1642 Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
1643 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))),
1647 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1648 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1649 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1654 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1655 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1656 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
1657 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1658 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1659 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
1661 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1662 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1663 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1664 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1665 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1666 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1669 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1670 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1671 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1674 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1675 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1677 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1682 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1683 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1685 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1686 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).0;
1688 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1689 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1690 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1691 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1692 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
1693 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
1694 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
1695 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1696 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1699 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1700 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
1702 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1703 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1704 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1705 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1707 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1708 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1710 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1711 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1714 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1715 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1718 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1719 if self.is_outbound() {
1720 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1722 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1723 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1724 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1726 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1728 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1729 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1730 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1731 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1734 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1735 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1736 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
1737 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1738 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1740 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1742 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1743 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1744 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1747 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1748 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1749 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1753 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1754 initial_commitment_tx,
1757 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1758 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1761 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1763 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1764 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1765 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1766 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1767 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1768 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1769 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1770 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1771 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1773 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1775 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1777 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1778 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1779 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1780 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1782 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1784 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1785 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1787 }, channel_monitor))
1790 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1791 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1792 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1793 if !self.is_outbound() {
1794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1796 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1797 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1799 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1800 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1801 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1802 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1805 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1807 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1808 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
1809 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1810 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1812 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1813 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1815 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1816 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).0;
1818 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1819 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1820 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1821 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1822 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1827 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1828 initial_commitment_tx,
1831 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1832 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1836 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1837 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1838 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1839 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1840 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1841 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1842 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1843 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1844 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1845 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1847 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1849 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1851 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1852 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1853 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1854 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1856 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1858 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1861 pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1862 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1863 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
1864 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
1867 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1869 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1870 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1871 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1872 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1873 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1874 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1875 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1876 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1877 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1878 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1879 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1880 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1881 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1882 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1884 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1887 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1890 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1891 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1893 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1898 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1899 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1900 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1901 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1902 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1903 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1904 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1907 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1908 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1909 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1910 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1911 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1912 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1914 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1915 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1921 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1922 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1923 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1924 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1925 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1926 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1927 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1930 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1931 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1932 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1933 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1934 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1935 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1937 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1938 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1942 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1943 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1944 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1945 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1946 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1947 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1949 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1950 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1957 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1958 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1959 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1960 /// corner case properly.
1961 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1962 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1964 cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1965 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1966 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1967 - Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64 * 1000,
1969 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1970 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1971 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
1976 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1977 (Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
1978 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1981 // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1982 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1983 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1984 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1985 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1986 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1989 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1990 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1991 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1993 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1994 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1996 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1997 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1999 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2000 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2002 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2003 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2007 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2008 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2014 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2015 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2016 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2019 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2020 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2021 included_htlcs += 1;
2024 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2025 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2029 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2030 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2031 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2032 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2033 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2034 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2039 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2041 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2042 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2047 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2048 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2052 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2053 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2054 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2057 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2058 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2060 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2061 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2062 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2064 total_pending_htlcs,
2065 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2066 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2067 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2069 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2070 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2071 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2073 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2075 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2080 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2081 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2082 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2084 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2085 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2087 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2088 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2090 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2091 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2093 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2094 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2098 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2099 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2105 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2106 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2107 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2108 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2109 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2110 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2113 included_htlcs += 1;
2116 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2117 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2120 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2121 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2123 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2124 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2125 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2130 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2131 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2132 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2135 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2136 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2138 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2139 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2141 total_pending_htlcs,
2142 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2143 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2144 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2146 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2147 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2148 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2150 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2152 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2157 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2158 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2159 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2160 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2161 if local_sent_shutdown {
2162 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
2164 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2165 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2166 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2167 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2169 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2170 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2172 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2173 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2175 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2176 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2178 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2179 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2182 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2183 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2184 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2187 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2188 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2189 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2191 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2192 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2193 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2194 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2195 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2196 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2197 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2198 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2199 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2200 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2201 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2203 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2204 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2205 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
2206 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2207 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
2208 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2212 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2213 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2214 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2215 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2216 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2217 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2218 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2222 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2223 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2224 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2225 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2226 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2227 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2228 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2232 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2233 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2234 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2235 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2236 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2240 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2241 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2242 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2243 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2244 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2246 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2247 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2250 let chan_reserve_msat =
2251 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2252 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2253 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2256 if !self.is_outbound() {
2257 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2258 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2259 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2260 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2261 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2262 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2263 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2264 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2265 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2266 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2267 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2268 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2269 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2270 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2271 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2274 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2275 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2276 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2277 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2281 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2282 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2284 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2285 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2288 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2289 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2290 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2294 // Now update local state:
2295 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2296 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2297 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2298 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2299 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2300 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2301 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2306 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2308 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2309 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2310 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2311 match check_preimage {
2313 Some(payment_hash) =>
2314 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2319 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2321 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2322 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2324 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2325 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2330 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2333 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2334 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2335 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2337 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2338 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2341 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2342 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2345 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2346 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2347 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2349 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2350 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2353 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2357 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2358 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2359 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2361 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2362 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2365 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2369 pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2370 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2373 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2374 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2376 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2377 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2379 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2380 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2383 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2385 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2387 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw) = {
2388 let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2389 let commitment_txid = {
2390 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2391 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2392 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2394 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2395 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2396 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2397 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2398 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2399 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2403 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.3.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2404 (commitment_tx.2, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid, commitment_tx.1)
2407 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2408 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2409 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2410 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2412 if update_fee { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); }
2413 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2415 let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2416 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2417 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2420 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2422 if self.is_outbound() {
2423 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2424 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2425 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2426 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2427 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2428 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2429 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2430 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2431 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2432 assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2438 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2439 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2442 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2443 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2444 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2445 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2446 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw,
2447 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc,
2448 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2450 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2451 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2452 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2453 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2454 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2455 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2456 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2458 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2460 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2464 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2467 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2468 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2469 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2472 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2473 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2475 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2476 let mut need_commitment = false;
2477 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
2478 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2479 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2480 need_commitment = true;
2484 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2485 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2486 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2487 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2488 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2489 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2493 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2494 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2495 Some(forward_info.clone())
2497 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2498 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2499 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2500 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2501 need_commitment = true;
2504 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2505 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2506 Some(fail_reason.take())
2508 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2509 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2510 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2511 need_commitment = true;
2515 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2516 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2517 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2518 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2520 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2521 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2522 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2523 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2524 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2525 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2526 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2527 // includes the right HTLCs.
2528 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2529 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2530 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2531 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2532 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2533 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2535 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2536 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2537 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2538 // re-send the message on restoration)
2539 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2542 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2543 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2544 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2545 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2546 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2547 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2548 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2549 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2550 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2552 } else if !need_commitment {
2553 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2554 } else { (None, None) };
2556 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2557 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2559 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2560 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2561 per_commitment_secret,
2562 next_per_commitment_point,
2563 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2566 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2567 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2568 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2569 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2570 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
2571 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2572 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
2573 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
2576 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2577 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2578 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2579 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2580 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2581 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
2582 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2584 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2585 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2586 updates: Vec::new(),
2589 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2590 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2591 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2592 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2593 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2594 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2595 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2596 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2597 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2598 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2599 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2600 // to rebalance channels.
2601 match &htlc_update {
2602 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2603 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2604 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2607 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2608 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
2609 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2610 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2611 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2612 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2613 // into the holding cell without ever being
2614 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2615 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2616 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2619 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2625 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2626 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
2627 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
2628 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
2629 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
2630 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
2631 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
2632 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2633 (msg, monitor_update)
2634 } else { unreachable!() };
2635 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2636 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2638 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2639 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
2640 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
2641 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
2642 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
2643 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
2644 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
2645 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
2646 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
2649 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2651 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2658 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2659 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2661 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
2662 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2663 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
2664 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2665 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2666 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2672 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2673 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2674 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2675 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2676 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2678 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
2679 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
2680 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
2682 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2684 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2686 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2689 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2691 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2695 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2696 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2697 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2698 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2699 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2700 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2701 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2704 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2705 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2707 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2708 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2710 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2711 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2714 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2715 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2716 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2720 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2721 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2722 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2723 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2724 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2725 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2726 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2727 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2728 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2731 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2733 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2734 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2737 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2738 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2739 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2740 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2741 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2742 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2743 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2744 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2748 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2749 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2750 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2751 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2752 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2753 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2754 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2755 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2757 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2758 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2759 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2760 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2761 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2762 let mut require_commitment = false;
2763 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2766 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2767 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2768 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2770 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2771 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2772 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2773 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2774 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2775 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2780 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2781 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2782 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2783 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2784 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2786 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2787 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2792 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2793 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2795 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2799 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2800 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2802 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2803 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2804 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2805 require_commitment = true;
2806 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2807 match forward_info {
2808 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2809 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2810 require_commitment = true;
2812 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2813 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2814 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2816 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2817 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2818 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2822 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2823 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2824 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2825 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2831 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2832 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2833 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2834 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2836 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2837 Some(fail_reason.take())
2839 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2840 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2841 require_commitment = true;
2845 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2847 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2848 match update_state {
2849 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
2850 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
2851 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
2852 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2853 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2855 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
2856 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
2857 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2858 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
2859 require_commitment = true;
2860 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2861 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2866 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2867 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2868 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2869 if require_commitment {
2870 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2871 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2872 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2873 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2874 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2875 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2876 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2877 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2878 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2880 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2881 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2882 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2883 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2886 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2887 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2888 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2889 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2890 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2892 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2893 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2894 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2897 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2898 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2899 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2900 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2902 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2904 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2905 if require_commitment {
2906 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2908 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2909 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2910 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2911 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2913 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
2914 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2915 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2916 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2917 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2919 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2922 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2924 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2925 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2932 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2933 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2934 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2935 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2936 if !self.is_outbound() {
2937 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2939 if !self.is_usable() {
2940 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2942 if !self.is_live() {
2943 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2946 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
2947 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2951 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2952 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
2954 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2955 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2960 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2961 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2962 Some(update_fee) => {
2963 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2964 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2970 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
2971 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
2973 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2975 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2976 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2977 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2978 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2981 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2982 // will be retransmitted.
2983 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2985 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2986 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2988 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2989 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2990 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2991 // this HTLC accordingly
2992 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2995 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2996 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2997 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2998 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3001 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3002 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3003 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3004 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3005 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3006 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3011 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3013 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3014 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3015 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3016 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3020 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3021 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3022 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3023 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3024 // the update upon reconnection.
3025 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3029 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3030 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3033 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
3034 /// updates are partially paused.
3035 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
3036 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
3037 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
3038 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
3039 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
3040 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
3041 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
3042 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
3043 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
3044 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3045 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
3046 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3047 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
3050 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3051 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3052 /// to the remote side.
3053 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
3054 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3055 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3057 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
3058 self.funding_transaction.take()
3061 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
3062 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
3063 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
3064 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
3065 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
3066 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
3067 assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3068 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
3069 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3070 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3071 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3072 next_per_commitment_point,
3076 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
3077 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3078 let mut failures = Vec::new();
3079 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3081 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3082 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3083 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3084 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3087 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3088 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3090 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3091 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3094 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3095 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3096 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3097 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3098 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3099 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3100 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3101 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
3104 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3105 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3107 if self.is_outbound() {
3108 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3110 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3111 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3113 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3114 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3115 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3119 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3120 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3121 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3122 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3123 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3124 per_commitment_secret,
3125 next_per_commitment_point,
3129 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3130 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3131 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3132 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3133 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3135 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3136 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3137 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3138 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3139 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3140 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3141 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3142 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3143 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3148 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3149 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3151 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3152 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3153 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3154 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3155 reason: err_packet.clone()
3158 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3159 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3160 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3161 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3162 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3163 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3166 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3167 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3168 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3169 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3170 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3177 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3178 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3179 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3180 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3184 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3185 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3186 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3187 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3188 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3189 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3193 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3194 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3195 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3196 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3197 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3198 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3199 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3203 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3204 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3208 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3209 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3210 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3211 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3212 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3213 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3214 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3217 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3218 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
3219 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
3223 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3227 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3228 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3229 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3231 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3232 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3233 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3234 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3235 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3239 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3240 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
3241 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
3242 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3243 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
3246 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3247 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3250 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
3251 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3252 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3253 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3254 next_per_commitment_point,
3255 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3258 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3259 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3260 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
3262 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3263 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3264 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3267 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3273 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3274 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3275 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3276 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3277 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3279 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3280 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3281 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3282 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3283 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3284 next_per_commitment_point,
3288 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3289 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3290 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3292 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3295 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3296 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3297 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3298 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3300 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3301 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3302 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3303 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3304 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3306 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3307 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3311 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3313 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3314 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3315 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3317 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3320 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3321 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3322 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3325 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3331 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3332 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3334 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3335 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3336 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3340 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3341 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3342 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3344 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3345 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3346 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3348 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3349 let sig = self.holder_signer
3350 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3352 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3353 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3355 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3356 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3357 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3358 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3359 signature: sig.unwrap(),
3363 pub fn shutdown<F: Deref, K: Deref>(
3364 &mut self, fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
3365 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3367 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3368 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
3370 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3371 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3373 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3374 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3375 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3376 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3377 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3379 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3380 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3381 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3384 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3386 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match ShutdownScript::try_from((msg.scriptpubkey.clone(), their_features)) {
3387 Ok(script) => script.into_inner(),
3388 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex()))),
3391 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3392 if Some(&shutdown_scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3393 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", shutdown_scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3396 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3399 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
3400 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
3401 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3402 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3404 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
3407 assert!(send_shutdown);
3408 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
3409 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
3410 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
3412 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3417 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3419 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3420 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3422 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
3423 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3424 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3425 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3426 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
3427 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3431 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
3432 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3433 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3434 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3438 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3439 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3440 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3441 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3442 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3443 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3445 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3446 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3453 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3454 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3456 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3459 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3460 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3461 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3462 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3464 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3466 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3467 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3468 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3469 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3470 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3472 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3473 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3475 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3476 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3478 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3481 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3482 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3484 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3485 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3487 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3488 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3490 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3491 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3493 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3494 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3497 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3498 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3499 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3500 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3502 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3504 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3507 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3508 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3509 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3510 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3511 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3515 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3516 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3517 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3518 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3519 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3520 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3521 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3522 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3523 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3524 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3525 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3529 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3530 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3531 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3532 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3533 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3534 let sig = self.holder_signer
3535 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3536 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3537 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3538 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3539 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3540 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3541 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3547 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3548 if self.is_outbound() {
3549 let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3550 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3551 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3552 if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3553 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3556 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3559 min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3561 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3562 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3563 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3564 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3567 propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3570 let sig = self.holder_signer
3571 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3572 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3573 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3574 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3575 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3577 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3578 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3580 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3581 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3582 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3584 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3587 // Public utilities:
3589 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3593 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
3597 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3598 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3599 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3603 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3604 /// is_usable() returns true).
3605 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3606 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3607 self.short_channel_id
3610 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3611 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3612 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3613 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3616 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3617 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3620 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3621 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3624 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
3625 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
3626 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
3629 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3630 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3633 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3634 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3635 self.counterparty_node_id
3638 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3640 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3641 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3644 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3645 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3647 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3648 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3649 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3650 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3652 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3656 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3657 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3658 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3661 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3662 self.channel_value_satoshis
3665 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3666 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3669 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3670 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3673 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3674 self.config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
3677 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3681 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3682 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
3683 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
3684 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
3685 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
3686 // which are near the dust limit.
3687 cmp::max(2530, self.feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
3690 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3691 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3694 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3695 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3698 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3699 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3703 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3708 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3710 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3711 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3712 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
3713 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3714 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3715 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3717 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3719 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3727 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3728 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3732 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3733 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3734 self.update_time_counter
3737 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3738 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3741 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3742 self.config.announced_channel
3745 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3746 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3749 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3750 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3751 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
3752 self.config.forwarding_fee_base_msat
3755 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3756 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3757 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3760 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3761 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3762 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3763 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3764 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3767 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3768 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3769 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3770 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3771 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
3774 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3775 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3776 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3777 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3780 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3781 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3782 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3785 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3786 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3787 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3788 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3789 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3790 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3795 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
3796 self.channel_update_status
3799 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
3800 self.channel_update_status = status;
3803 fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3804 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3808 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3809 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3810 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3813 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
3817 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3818 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3819 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3821 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3822 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3823 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3825 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3826 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3828 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3829 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3831 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3835 if need_commitment_update {
3836 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3837 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3838 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3839 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3840 next_per_commitment_point,
3843 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3849 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
3850 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
3851 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
3852 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
3853 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3854 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3855 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3856 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3857 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
3858 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
3859 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3860 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3861 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3862 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3863 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3864 if self.is_outbound() {
3865 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3866 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3867 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3868 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3869 // channel and move on.
3870 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3871 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3873 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3874 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3875 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3876 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
3879 if self.is_outbound() {
3880 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3881 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3882 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3883 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3884 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3885 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3889 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
3890 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
3891 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3892 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3893 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3897 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
3898 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
3899 // may have already happened for this block).
3900 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3901 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3902 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
3905 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3906 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3907 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3908 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3909 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3910 data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
3919 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
3920 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
3921 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3922 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3924 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3925 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3928 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3930 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
3931 -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3932 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3933 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
3934 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3936 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3937 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
3938 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3946 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
3948 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3949 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3950 return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
3953 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3954 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
3955 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
3956 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3957 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3958 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
3959 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
3960 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
3961 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
3964 // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
3965 // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
3966 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
3967 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
3968 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap() as i64 / 2 {
3969 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3970 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3971 data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations),
3976 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3979 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
3980 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
3981 /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
3982 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3983 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
3984 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
3985 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
3986 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
3987 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
3988 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
3989 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
3990 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
3991 match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
3992 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
3993 assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
3994 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4000 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4005 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4006 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4008 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
4009 if !self.is_outbound() {
4010 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
4012 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
4013 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
4016 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4017 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4020 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4021 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4025 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4026 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4027 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
4028 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4029 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4030 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4031 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4032 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
4033 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4034 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4035 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4036 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4037 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4038 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4039 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4040 first_per_commitment_point,
4041 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
4042 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4043 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4044 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4049 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
4050 if self.is_outbound() {
4051 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
4053 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4054 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
4056 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4057 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4060 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4061 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4063 msgs::AcceptChannel {
4064 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4065 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4066 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4067 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4068 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4069 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
4070 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4071 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4072 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4073 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4074 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4075 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4076 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4077 first_per_commitment_point,
4078 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4079 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4080 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4085 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
4086 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4087 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4088 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
4089 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4090 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
4093 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
4094 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
4095 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
4096 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
4097 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
4098 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
4099 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
4100 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4101 if !self.is_outbound() {
4102 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
4104 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4105 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
4107 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
4108 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4109 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4110 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
4113 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
4114 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
4116 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
4119 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
4120 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4125 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
4127 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
4129 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
4130 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
4131 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
4133 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
4134 temporary_channel_id,
4135 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
4136 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
4141 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
4142 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
4143 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
4144 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4145 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4147 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
4148 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
4150 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4151 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
4152 if !self.config.announced_channel {
4153 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4155 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
4156 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
4158 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
4159 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
4162 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
4164 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4165 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
4167 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4168 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
4169 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
4170 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
4171 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
4172 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4175 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
4176 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4181 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4183 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4184 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
4185 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
4187 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
4188 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4189 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4190 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4191 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4192 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4193 contents: announcement,
4196 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4200 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4201 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4202 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4203 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4204 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
4206 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4208 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4209 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4210 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4211 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4213 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4215 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4216 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4219 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4221 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
4224 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4225 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4226 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
4227 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
4229 Err(_) => return None,
4231 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4232 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
4233 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4238 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4239 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4240 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4241 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4242 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4243 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4244 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4245 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4246 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4247 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4248 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4249 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4250 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4251 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4252 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4253 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4254 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4255 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4256 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
4259 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4260 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4261 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
4262 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4265 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4266 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4267 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4268 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4269 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4270 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4271 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4272 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4274 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4275 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4276 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4277 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4278 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4279 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4280 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4281 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4282 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4284 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4290 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4292 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
4293 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
4295 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
4297 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
4298 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
4300 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
4301 /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
4304 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
4306 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
4307 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
4308 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4309 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
4311 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
4312 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
4313 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
4316 if amount_msat == 0 {
4317 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4320 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4321 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4324 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
4325 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4326 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4327 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4328 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4329 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4330 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4331 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
4334 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4335 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4336 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4337 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4339 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4340 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4341 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4344 if !self.is_outbound() {
4345 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4346 let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
4347 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
4348 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4349 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4350 if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4351 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4355 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
4356 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
4357 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4358 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4359 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
4360 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4364 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4365 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
4366 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4367 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4368 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
4369 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4373 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
4374 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
4375 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
4378 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4379 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4380 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4381 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4383 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4384 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4387 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4388 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4389 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
4390 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4391 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4394 // Now update local state:
4395 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4396 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4401 onion_routing_packet,
4406 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4407 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4409 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4411 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4415 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4416 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4417 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4421 onion_routing_packet,
4423 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4428 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4429 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4430 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4431 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4432 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4433 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4434 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4436 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4437 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4439 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4440 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4442 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4443 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4445 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4446 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4447 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4448 have_updates = true;
4450 if have_updates { break; }
4452 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4453 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4454 have_updates = true;
4456 if have_updates { break; }
4459 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4461 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4463 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4464 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4465 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4466 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4468 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4469 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4470 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4472 if let Some(state) = new_state {
4476 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4477 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4478 Some(fail_reason.take())
4480 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4483 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4484 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
4485 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
4486 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4487 self.pending_update_fee = None;
4490 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4492 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4493 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4494 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4495 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4496 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4497 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4499 Err(e) => return Err(e),
4502 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4503 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4504 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4505 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4506 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4507 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4508 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4509 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4512 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4513 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4516 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4517 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4518 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4519 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4520 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
4521 let feerate_per_kw = counterparty_commitment_tx.1;
4522 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4523 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4525 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4527 if !self.is_outbound() {
4528 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4529 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4530 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4531 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4532 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4533 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4534 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4535 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4536 let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.2);
4537 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4544 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.3.len());
4545 for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.3.iter() {
4549 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4550 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4552 htlc_signatures = res.1;
4554 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
4555 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4556 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4557 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4559 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4560 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
4561 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4562 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4563 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4564 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4568 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4569 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4572 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.3)))
4575 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4576 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4577 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4579 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4580 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4581 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4582 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4583 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4589 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4590 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4591 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4594 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4595 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4596 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4598 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4599 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4600 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4601 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4607 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4608 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4609 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
4610 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4611 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4612 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4613 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4616 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4617 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4618 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4620 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4621 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4624 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4625 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4626 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4629 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4632 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4633 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4634 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
4636 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4641 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4642 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4643 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4645 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4647 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4649 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4650 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4651 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4652 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4653 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4654 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4658 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
4659 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4660 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4663 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4664 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4665 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4666 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4667 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4669 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4670 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4677 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4680 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4681 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4682 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4683 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4684 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4685 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4686 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4687 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4688 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4689 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4690 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4692 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4693 // return them to fail the payment.
4694 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4695 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4697 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4698 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4703 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4704 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4705 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4706 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4707 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4708 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4709 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4710 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4711 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4712 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4713 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4714 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4715 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4720 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4721 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4722 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4726 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
4727 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4729 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
4735 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4736 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4737 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4738 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4739 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4741 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4742 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4743 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4744 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4750 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4751 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4752 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4753 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4754 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4755 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4760 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4761 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4762 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4765 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4767 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4769 // Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
4770 // deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
4771 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4772 self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4773 self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
4774 self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4776 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4777 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4778 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4780 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4782 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4783 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4784 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
4785 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
4786 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4787 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4789 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
4790 // deserialized from that format.
4791 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
4792 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
4793 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
4795 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4797 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4798 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4799 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4801 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4802 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4803 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4804 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4807 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4808 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4809 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4812 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4813 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4814 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4815 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4817 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4818 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4820 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4822 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4824 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4826 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4829 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4831 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4836 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4837 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4838 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4839 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4840 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4841 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4842 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4844 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4846 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4848 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4851 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
4852 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
4853 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
4856 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4858 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4860 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4862 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4867 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4868 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4870 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4872 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4873 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4874 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4875 source.write(writer)?;
4876 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4878 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4880 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4881 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4883 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4885 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4886 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4891 match self.resend_order {
4892 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4893 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4896 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4897 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4898 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4900 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4901 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4902 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4903 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4906 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4907 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4908 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4909 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4910 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4913 if self.is_outbound() {
4914 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
4915 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4916 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed, drop it.
4917 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
4919 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
4921 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4923 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4924 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4925 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4926 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4928 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4929 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4931 feerate.write(writer)?;
4935 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4938 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4939 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
4940 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4942 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4943 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4944 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4946 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4947 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4949 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4950 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4951 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4953 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4954 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4956 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4959 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4960 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4961 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4963 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4966 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4967 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
4969 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4970 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4971 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4973 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4975 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4977 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
4979 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4980 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4981 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4982 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
4983 htlc.write(writer)?;
4986 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
4987 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
4988 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
4989 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
4990 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
4991 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
4992 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
4994 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
4995 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
4996 (5, self.config, required),
4997 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5004 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
5005 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
5006 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5007 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5008 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5010 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5012 let mut config = Some(ChannelConfig::default());
5014 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
5015 config.as_mut().unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
5016 config.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
5017 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
5018 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5020 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
5021 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5024 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5025 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
5026 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5028 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5030 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5031 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
5032 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
5033 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
5034 let mut data = [0; 1024];
5035 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
5036 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
5037 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
5039 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
5041 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
5042 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
5043 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
5046 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
5048 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5049 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5050 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5052 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5053 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5054 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
5055 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5056 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5057 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5058 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5059 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5060 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5061 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
5062 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5063 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5064 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5065 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5070 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5071 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5072 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
5073 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5074 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5075 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5076 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5077 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5078 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5079 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5080 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5081 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5082 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5083 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
5084 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5085 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5090 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5091 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
5092 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
5093 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5094 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5095 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5096 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5097 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5098 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5099 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5101 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
5102 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
5103 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5105 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
5106 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5107 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5109 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5113 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5114 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5115 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5116 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5119 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
5120 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
5121 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
5123 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5124 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5125 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
5126 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5129 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5130 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5131 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
5132 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5135 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
5137 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
5139 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5140 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5141 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
5142 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
5144 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5146 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
5147 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5150 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
5151 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
5152 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5154 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5155 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5156 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5157 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
5159 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5160 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5162 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5163 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5165 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5166 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5167 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
5169 let mut minimum_depth = None;
5171 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5172 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5174 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5175 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5178 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5180 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5181 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5182 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
5183 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
5185 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5188 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
5189 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
5191 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5193 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5194 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5196 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5197 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
5199 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
5201 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5202 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
5203 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5205 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5206 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
5207 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
5211 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
5212 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
5213 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
5215 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
5221 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
5222 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5223 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
5224 (1, minimum_depth, option),
5225 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5226 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
5227 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5230 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5231 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5236 config: config.unwrap(),
5240 channel_value_satoshis,
5242 latest_monitor_update_id,
5245 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5248 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5249 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5252 pending_inbound_htlcs,
5253 pending_outbound_htlcs,
5254 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
5258 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
5259 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
5260 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
5261 monitor_pending_forwards,
5262 monitor_pending_failures,
5265 holding_cell_update_fee,
5266 next_holder_htlc_id,
5267 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
5268 update_time_counter,
5271 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5272 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5273 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5274 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5276 last_sent_closing_fee,
5278 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
5279 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
5282 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
5283 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5284 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5285 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5286 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
5287 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5288 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
5291 counterparty_forwarding_info,
5293 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
5294 funding_transaction,
5296 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
5297 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
5298 counterparty_node_id,
5300 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5304 channel_update_status,
5308 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5309 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5310 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5311 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5313 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5315 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5316 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
5323 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
5324 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
5325 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
5326 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
5327 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
5328 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5329 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5330 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
5332 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
5333 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
5334 use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
5335 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
5336 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
5337 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
5338 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
5340 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
5341 use chain::BestBlock;
5342 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
5343 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
5344 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
5345 use util::config::UserConfig;
5346 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
5347 use util::errors::APIError;
5348 use util::test_utils;
5349 use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
5350 use util::logger::Logger;
5351 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
5352 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
5353 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
5354 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
5355 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5356 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5357 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
5358 use core::num::NonZeroU8;
5362 struct TestFeeEstimator {
5365 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
5366 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
5372 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
5373 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
5374 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
5378 signer: InMemorySigner,
5380 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
5381 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
5383 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
5384 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
5385 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5386 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5387 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
5388 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
5391 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
5392 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5393 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5394 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
5397 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
5400 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
5401 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
5402 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
5405 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
5406 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
5410 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
5411 let features = InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
5412 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
5413 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(NonZeroU8::new(16).unwrap(), &[0, 40]).unwrap();
5415 let seed = [42; 32];
5416 let network = Network::Testnet;
5417 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5418 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
5419 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
5422 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 };
5423 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5424 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5425 let config = UserConfig::default();
5426 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config) {
5427 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
5428 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
5430 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
5431 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
5435 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
5436 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
5438 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
5439 let original_fee = 253;
5440 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
5441 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5442 let seed = [42; 32];
5443 let network = Network::Testnet;
5444 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5446 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5447 let config = UserConfig::default();
5448 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5450 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
5451 // same as the old fee.
5452 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
5453 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5454 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
5458 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
5459 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
5460 // dust limits are used.
5461 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5462 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5463 let seed = [42; 32];
5464 let network = Network::Testnet;
5465 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5467 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
5468 // they have different dust limits.
5470 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5471 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5472 let config = UserConfig::default();
5473 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5475 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5476 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
5477 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5478 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5479 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5481 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
5482 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5483 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5484 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5485 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
5487 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
5488 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
5489 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5491 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
5492 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
5493 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
5494 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5497 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5499 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
5500 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
5501 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
5502 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5503 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5505 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5506 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5510 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5511 // the dust limit check.
5512 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5513 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5514 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5515 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5517 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5518 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5519 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5520 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5521 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5522 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5523 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5527 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5528 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5529 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5530 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5531 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5532 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5533 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5534 let seed = [42; 32];
5535 let network = Network::Testnet;
5536 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5538 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5539 let config = UserConfig::default();
5540 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5542 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5543 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5545 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5546 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5547 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5548 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5549 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5550 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5552 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5553 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5554 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5555 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5556 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5558 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5560 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5561 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5562 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5563 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5564 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5566 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5567 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5568 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5569 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5570 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5574 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5575 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5576 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5577 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5578 let seed = [42; 32];
5579 let network = Network::Testnet;
5580 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5581 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5582 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5584 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5586 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5587 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5588 let config = UserConfig::default();
5589 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5591 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5592 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5593 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5594 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5596 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5597 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5598 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5600 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5601 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5602 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5603 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5605 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5606 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5607 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5609 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5610 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5612 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5613 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5614 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5615 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5616 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5617 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5618 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5619 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5620 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5625 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5627 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5628 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5629 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5630 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5631 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5632 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5633 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5640 fn channel_update() {
5641 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5642 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5643 let seed = [42; 32];
5644 let network = Network::Testnet;
5645 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5646 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5648 // Create a channel.
5649 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5650 let config = UserConfig::default();
5651 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5652 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5653 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5654 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5656 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5657 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5658 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5660 short_channel_id: 0,
5663 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5664 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5665 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5667 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5668 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5670 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5672 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5674 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5675 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5676 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5677 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5679 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5680 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5681 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5683 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5688 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5689 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5690 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5691 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5692 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5694 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5696 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5697 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5698 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5699 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5700 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5702 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5703 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5708 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5709 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5710 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5712 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5713 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5714 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5715 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5716 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5717 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
5719 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5721 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5722 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5723 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5724 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5725 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5726 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5728 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5729 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5730 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5731 selected_contest_delay: 144
5733 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5734 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5736 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5737 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5739 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5740 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5742 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5743 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5745 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5746 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5747 // build_commitment_transaction.
5748 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5749 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5750 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5751 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5752 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5754 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5755 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5756 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5758 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5759 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
5761 let htlcs = res.3.drain(..)
5762 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5766 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5767 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5768 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5769 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5770 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5771 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5773 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5774 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5775 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5776 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5778 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5779 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5780 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5782 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5784 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5785 commitment_tx.clone(),
5786 counterparty_signature,
5787 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5788 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5789 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5791 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5792 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5794 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5795 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5796 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5798 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5799 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5802 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5804 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5805 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
5806 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
5807 &htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
5808 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5809 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5810 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5812 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5815 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5816 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5817 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5821 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5824 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5825 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5827 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5828 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5829 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5830 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5831 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5832 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5833 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5835 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5839 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5840 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5842 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5843 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5844 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5846 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5847 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5849 amount_msat: 1000000,
5851 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5852 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5854 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5857 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5858 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5860 amount_msat: 2000000,
5862 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5863 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5865 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5868 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5869 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5871 amount_msat: 2000000,
5873 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5874 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5875 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5877 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5880 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5881 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5883 amount_msat: 3000000,
5885 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5886 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5887 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5889 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5892 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5893 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5895 amount_msat: 4000000,
5897 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5898 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5900 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5904 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5905 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5906 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5908 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5909 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5910 "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", {
5913 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5914 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5915 "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" },
5918 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5919 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5920 "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" },
5923 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5924 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5925 "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" },
5928 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5929 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5930 "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" },
5933 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5934 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5935 "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" }
5938 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5939 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5940 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5942 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5943 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5944 "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", {
5947 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5948 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5949 "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" },
5952 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5953 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5954 "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" },
5957 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5958 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5959 "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" },
5962 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5963 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5964 "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" },
5967 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5968 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5969 "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" }
5972 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5973 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5974 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5976 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5977 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5978 "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", {
5981 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5982 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5983 "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" },
5986 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5987 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5988 "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" },
5991 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5992 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5993 "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" },
5996 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5997 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5998 "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" }
6001 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6002 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6003 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
6005 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
6006 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
6007 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
6010 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
6011 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
6012 "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" },
6015 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
6016 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
6017 "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" },
6020 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
6021 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
6022 "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" },
6025 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
6026 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
6027 "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" }
6030 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6031 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6032 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
6034 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
6035 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
6036 "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", {
6039 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
6040 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
6041 "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" },
6044 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
6045 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
6046 "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" },
6049 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
6050 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
6051 "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" }
6054 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6055 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6056 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
6058 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
6059 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
6060 "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", {
6063 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
6064 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
6065 "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" },
6068 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
6069 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
6070 "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" },
6073 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
6074 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
6075 "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" }
6078 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6079 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6080 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
6082 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
6083 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
6084 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
6087 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
6088 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
6089 "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" },
6092 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
6093 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
6094 "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" }
6097 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6098 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6099 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
6101 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
6102 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
6103 "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", {
6106 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
6107 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
6108 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
6111 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
6112 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
6113 "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" }
6116 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6117 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6118 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
6120 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
6121 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
6122 "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", {
6125 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
6126 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
6127 "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" }
6130 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6131 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6132 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
6134 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
6135 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
6136 "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", {
6139 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
6140 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
6141 "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" }
6144 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6145 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6146 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
6148 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
6149 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
6150 "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", {});
6152 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6153 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6154 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
6156 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
6157 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
6158 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
6160 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6161 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6162 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
6164 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6165 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6166 "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", {});
6168 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
6169 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6170 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
6172 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6173 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6174 "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", {});
6176 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
6177 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
6178 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
6179 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
6180 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6181 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6183 amount_msat: 2000000,
6185 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6186 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6188 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6191 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
6192 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6193 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6195 amount_msat: 5000000,
6197 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6198 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6199 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6201 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6204 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6205 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6207 amount_msat: 5000000,
6209 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6210 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6211 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6213 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6217 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
6218 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
6219 "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", {
6222 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
6223 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
6224 "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" },
6226 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
6227 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
6228 "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" },
6230 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
6231 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
6232 "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" }
6237 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
6238 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
6240 let mut seed = [0; 32];
6241 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
6242 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6243 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
6245 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
6246 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6247 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
6249 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
6250 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
6252 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
6253 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
6255 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
6256 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
6257 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
6261 fn test_key_derivation() {
6262 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
6263 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6265 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6266 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6268 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
6269 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
6271 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
6272 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
6274 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6275 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
6277 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6278 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
6280 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6281 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
6283 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6284 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());