1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
74 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
225 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
228 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
229 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
230 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
234 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
236 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
237 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
238 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
241 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
246 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
250 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
251 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
252 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
253 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
254 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
255 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
256 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
258 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
259 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
260 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
261 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
262 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
263 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
264 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
266 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
267 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
268 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
270 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
271 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
272 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
273 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
274 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
275 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
277 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
278 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
280 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
281 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
282 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
283 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
284 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
285 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
286 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
287 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
288 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
290 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
291 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
292 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
293 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
294 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
295 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
296 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
297 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
298 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
299 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
300 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
301 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
303 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
304 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
306 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
308 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
310 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
311 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
312 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
313 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
317 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
319 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
323 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
324 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
325 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
326 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
327 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
329 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
330 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
332 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
334 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
335 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
337 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
338 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
339 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
340 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
341 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
342 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
344 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
345 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
347 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
348 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
349 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
350 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
351 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
353 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
354 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
356 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
357 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
359 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
360 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
361 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
362 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
368 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
369 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
371 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
372 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
373 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
378 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
379 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
381 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
382 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
383 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
388 macro_rules! secp_check {
389 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
392 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
397 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
398 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
399 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
400 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
401 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
402 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
403 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
404 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
406 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
408 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
410 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
414 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
416 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
417 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
418 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
420 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
421 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
423 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
424 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
425 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
426 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
427 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
429 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
430 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
434 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
440 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
443 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
444 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
445 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
446 holding_cell_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
450 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
451 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
452 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
453 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
454 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
455 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
456 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
457 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
458 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
459 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
462 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
463 struct HTLCCandidate {
465 origin: HTLCInitiator,
469 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
477 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
479 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
481 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
482 htlc_value_msat: u64,
483 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
488 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
489 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
490 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
491 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
492 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
494 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
495 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
496 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
497 htlc_value_msat: u64,
499 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
500 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
504 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
505 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
506 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
507 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
508 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
509 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
510 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
511 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
512 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
513 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
514 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
517 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
518 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
519 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
520 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
521 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
522 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
523 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
524 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
527 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
529 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
530 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
531 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
532 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
533 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
534 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
537 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
538 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
539 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
540 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
541 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
542 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
543 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
544 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
545 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
546 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
547 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
548 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
549 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
550 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
551 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
553 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
554 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
555 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
556 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
558 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
559 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
560 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
561 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
563 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
564 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
565 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
566 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
567 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
569 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
570 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
571 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
572 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
574 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
575 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
576 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
578 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
579 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
580 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
581 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
582 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
584 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
585 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
588 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
589 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
591 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
592 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
593 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
594 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
596 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
597 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
600 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
601 (0, update, required),
604 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
605 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
606 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
607 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
608 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
610 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
611 /// in a timely manner.
612 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
615 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
616 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
617 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
619 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
620 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
621 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
622 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
626 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
627 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
628 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
630 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
631 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
632 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
633 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
635 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
639 channel_id: [u8; 32],
640 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
643 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
644 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
646 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
647 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
648 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
650 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
651 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
652 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
653 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
655 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
656 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
658 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
660 holder_signer: Signer,
661 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
662 destination_script: Script,
664 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
665 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
666 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
668 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
669 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
670 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
671 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
672 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
673 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
675 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
676 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
677 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
678 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
679 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
680 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
682 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
684 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
685 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
686 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
688 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
689 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
690 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
691 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
692 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
693 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
694 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
696 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
698 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
699 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
700 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
701 // HTLCs with similar state.
702 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
703 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
704 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
705 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
706 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
707 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
708 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
709 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
710 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
713 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
714 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
715 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
717 update_time_counter: u32,
719 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
720 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
721 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
722 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
723 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
724 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
726 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
727 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
729 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
730 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
731 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
732 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
734 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
735 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
737 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
739 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
741 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
742 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
743 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
744 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
745 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
746 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
747 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
748 channel_creation_height: u32,
750 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
753 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
755 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
758 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
760 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
763 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
765 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
767 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
768 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
771 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
773 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
775 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
776 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
778 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
780 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
781 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
782 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
784 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
786 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
787 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
789 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
790 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
791 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
793 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
795 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
797 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
798 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
799 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
800 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
802 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
803 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
804 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
806 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
807 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
808 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
810 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
811 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
812 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
813 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
814 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
815 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
816 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
817 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
819 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
820 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
821 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
822 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
823 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
825 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
826 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
828 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
829 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
830 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
831 /// unblock the state machine.
833 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
834 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
835 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
837 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
838 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
839 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
841 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
842 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
843 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
844 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
845 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
846 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
847 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
848 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
850 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
851 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
853 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
854 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
855 // the channel's funding UTXO.
857 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
858 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
859 // associated channel mapping.
861 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
862 // to store all of them.
863 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
865 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
866 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
867 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
868 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
869 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
871 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
872 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
874 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
875 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
877 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
878 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
879 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
881 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
882 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
883 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
886 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
887 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
888 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
889 self.update_time_counter
892 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
893 self.latest_monitor_update_id
896 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
897 self.config.announced_channel
900 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
901 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
904 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
905 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
906 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
907 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
910 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
911 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
912 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
915 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
916 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
917 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
918 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
919 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
922 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
923 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
924 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
925 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
927 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
928 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
930 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
931 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
933 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
934 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
936 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
939 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
940 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
941 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
942 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
944 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
945 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
946 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
947 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
950 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
951 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
952 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
953 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
954 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
959 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
963 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
965 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
966 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
967 self.temporary_channel_id
970 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
974 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
975 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
976 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
980 /// Gets the channel's type
981 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
985 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
987 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
988 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
989 self.short_channel_id
992 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
993 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
994 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
997 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
998 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
999 self.outbound_scid_alias
1002 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1003 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1004 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1005 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1006 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1007 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1010 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1011 /// get_funding_created.
1012 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1013 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1016 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1017 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1018 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1021 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1022 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1023 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1024 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1028 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1031 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1032 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1035 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1036 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1039 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1040 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1041 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1044 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1045 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1048 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1049 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1050 self.counterparty_node_id
1053 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1054 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1055 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1058 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1059 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1060 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1063 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1064 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1066 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1067 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1068 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1069 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1071 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1075 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1076 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1077 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1080 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1081 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1082 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1085 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1086 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1087 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1089 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1090 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1095 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1096 self.channel_value_satoshis
1099 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1100 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1103 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1104 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1107 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1108 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1109 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1111 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1112 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1113 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1114 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1115 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1117 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1121 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1122 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1123 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1126 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1127 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1128 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1131 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1132 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1133 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1136 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1137 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1138 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1141 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1142 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1143 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1146 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1147 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1148 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1151 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1152 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1153 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1154 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1155 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1158 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1160 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1161 self.prev_config = None;
1165 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1166 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1170 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1171 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1172 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1173 let did_channel_update =
1174 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1175 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1176 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1177 if did_channel_update {
1178 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1179 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1180 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1181 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1183 self.config.options = *config;
1187 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1188 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1189 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1192 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1193 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1194 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1195 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1196 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1198 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1199 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1200 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1201 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1202 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1203 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1204 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1206 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1207 where L::Target: Logger
1209 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1210 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1211 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1213 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1214 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1215 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1216 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1218 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1219 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1220 if match update_state {
1221 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1222 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1223 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1224 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1225 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1227 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1231 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1232 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1233 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1234 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1236 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1237 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1238 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1240 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1241 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1242 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1243 transaction_output_index: None
1248 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1249 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1250 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1251 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1252 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1255 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1257 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1258 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1259 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1261 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1262 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1265 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1266 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1269 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1271 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1272 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1273 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1275 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1276 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1282 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1283 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1284 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1285 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1286 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1287 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1288 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1292 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1293 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1295 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1297 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1298 if generated_by_local {
1299 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1300 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1309 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1311 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1312 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1313 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1314 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1315 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1316 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1317 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1320 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1321 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1322 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1323 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1327 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1328 preimages.push(preimage);
1332 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1333 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1335 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1337 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1338 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1340 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1341 if !generated_by_local {
1342 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1350 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1351 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1352 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1353 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1354 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1355 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1356 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1357 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1359 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1361 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1362 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1363 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1364 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1366 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1368 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1369 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1370 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1371 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1374 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1375 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1376 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1377 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1379 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1382 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1383 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1384 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1385 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1387 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1390 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1391 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1396 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1397 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1402 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1404 let channel_parameters =
1405 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1406 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1407 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1414 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1417 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1418 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1419 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1420 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1422 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1423 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1424 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1432 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1433 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1439 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1440 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1441 /// our counterparty!)
1442 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1443 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1444 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1445 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1446 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1447 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1448 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1450 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1454 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1455 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1456 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1457 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1458 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1459 //may see payments to it!
1460 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1461 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1462 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1464 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1467 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1468 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1469 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1470 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1471 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1474 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1475 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1478 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1482 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1483 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1484 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1485 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1486 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1487 // which are near the dust limit.
1488 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1489 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1490 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1491 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1492 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1494 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1495 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1497 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1500 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1501 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1502 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1505 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1506 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1508 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1509 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1510 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1511 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1512 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1513 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1514 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1517 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1520 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1521 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1522 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1524 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1525 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1526 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1527 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1528 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1529 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1531 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1532 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1538 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1539 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1541 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1542 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1543 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1544 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1545 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1546 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1547 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1550 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1553 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1554 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1555 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1557 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1558 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1559 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1560 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1561 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1562 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1564 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1565 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1569 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1570 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1571 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1572 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1573 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1574 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1575 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1577 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1578 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1580 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1587 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1588 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1589 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1590 /// corner case properly.
1591 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1592 -> AvailableBalances
1593 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1595 let context = &self;
1596 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1597 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1598 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1600 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1601 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1603 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1605 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1607 if context.is_outbound() {
1608 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1609 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1611 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1612 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1614 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1615 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1616 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1617 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1620 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1621 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1622 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1623 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1625 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1626 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1627 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1628 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1629 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1630 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1631 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1632 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1633 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1634 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1636 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1639 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1640 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1641 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1642 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1643 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1646 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1647 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1649 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1650 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1651 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1653 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1654 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1655 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1656 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1660 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1662 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1663 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1664 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1665 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1666 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1667 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1668 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1670 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1671 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1673 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1674 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1675 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1677 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1678 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1679 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1680 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1681 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1684 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1685 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1686 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1687 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1688 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1689 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1692 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1693 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1694 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1696 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1700 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1701 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1703 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1704 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1708 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1709 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1710 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1711 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1713 outbound_capacity_msat,
1714 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1715 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1719 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1720 let context = &self;
1721 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1724 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1725 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1727 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1728 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1730 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1731 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1733 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1734 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1735 let context = &self;
1736 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1738 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1741 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1742 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1744 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1745 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1747 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1748 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1750 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1751 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1755 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1756 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1762 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1763 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1764 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1767 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1768 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1769 included_htlcs += 1;
1772 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1773 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1777 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1778 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1779 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1780 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1781 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1782 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1787 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1789 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1790 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1795 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1796 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1800 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1801 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1802 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1805 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1806 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1808 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1809 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1810 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1812 total_pending_htlcs,
1813 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1814 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1815 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1817 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1818 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1819 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1821 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1823 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1828 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1829 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1831 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1832 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1834 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1835 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1837 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1838 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1839 let context = &self;
1840 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1842 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1845 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1846 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1848 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1849 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1851 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1852 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1854 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1855 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1859 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1860 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1866 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1867 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1868 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1869 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1870 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1871 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1874 included_htlcs += 1;
1877 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1878 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1881 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1882 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1884 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1885 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1886 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1891 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1892 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1893 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1896 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1897 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1899 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1900 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1902 total_pending_htlcs,
1903 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1904 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1905 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1907 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1908 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1909 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1911 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1913 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1918 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1919 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1920 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1921 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1927 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1928 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1929 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1930 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1931 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1932 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1933 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1934 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1935 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1936 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1937 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1939 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1940 // return them to fail the payment.
1941 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1942 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1943 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1945 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1946 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1951 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1952 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1953 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1954 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1955 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1956 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1957 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1958 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1959 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1960 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1961 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1962 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1963 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1968 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1969 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1970 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1974 // Internal utility functions for channels
1976 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1977 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1978 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1980 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1982 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1983 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1984 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1986 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1989 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1991 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1994 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1995 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1996 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1998 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2000 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2001 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2002 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2003 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2004 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2007 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2008 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2009 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2010 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2011 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2012 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2013 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2016 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2017 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2019 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2020 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2023 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2024 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2025 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2026 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2027 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2028 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2031 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2032 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2033 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_funding_signed on an
2036 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2037 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2038 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2039 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2042 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2043 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2045 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2046 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2047 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2051 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2052 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2053 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2054 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2055 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2057 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2058 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2059 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2060 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2061 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2062 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2063 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2064 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2065 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2066 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2067 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2071 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2072 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2073 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2074 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2075 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2076 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2078 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2080 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2081 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2082 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2083 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2084 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2085 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2086 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2087 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2089 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2090 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2094 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2100 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2101 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2102 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2103 // outside of those situations will fail.
2104 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2108 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2113 1 + // script length (0)
2117 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2118 2 + // witness marker and flag
2119 1 + // witness element count
2120 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2121 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2122 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2123 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2124 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2125 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2127 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2128 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2129 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2135 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2136 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2137 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2138 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2140 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2141 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2142 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2144 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2145 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2146 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2147 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2148 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2149 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2152 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2153 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2156 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2157 value_to_holder = 0;
2160 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2161 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2162 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2163 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2165 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2166 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2169 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2170 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2173 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2176 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2177 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2179 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2181 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2182 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2183 where L::Target: Logger {
2184 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2185 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2186 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2187 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2188 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2189 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2190 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2191 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2195 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2196 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2197 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2198 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2200 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2201 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2203 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2205 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2207 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2208 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2209 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2211 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2212 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2213 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2214 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2215 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2217 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2218 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2219 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2221 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2222 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2224 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2227 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2228 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2232 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2236 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2237 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2238 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2239 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2240 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2241 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2244 // Now update local state:
2246 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2247 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2248 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2249 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2250 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2251 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2252 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2256 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2257 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2258 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2259 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2260 // do not not get into this branch.
2261 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2262 match pending_update {
2263 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2264 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2265 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2266 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2267 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2268 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2269 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2272 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2273 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2274 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2275 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2276 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2277 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2278 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2284 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2285 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2286 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2288 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2289 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2290 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2292 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2293 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2296 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2297 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2299 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2300 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2302 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2303 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2306 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2309 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2310 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2311 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2312 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2317 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2318 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2319 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2320 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2321 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2322 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2323 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2324 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2325 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2326 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2327 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2328 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2329 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2330 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2331 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2333 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2334 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2335 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2336 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2337 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2340 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2341 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2342 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2348 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2349 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2351 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2355 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2356 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2357 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2358 /// before we fail backwards.
2360 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2361 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2362 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2363 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2364 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2365 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2366 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2369 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2370 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2371 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2372 /// before we fail backwards.
2374 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2375 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2376 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2377 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2378 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2379 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2380 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2382 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2384 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2385 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2386 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2388 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2389 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2390 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2392 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2393 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2394 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2396 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2401 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2402 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2408 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2409 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2410 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2411 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2412 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2416 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2417 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2418 force_holding_cell = true;
2421 // Now update local state:
2422 if force_holding_cell {
2423 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2424 match pending_update {
2425 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2426 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2427 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2428 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2432 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2433 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2434 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2435 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2441 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2442 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2443 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2449 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2451 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2452 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2455 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2456 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2457 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2462 // Message handlers:
2464 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2465 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2466 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2467 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2468 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2470 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2473 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2474 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2476 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2479 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2480 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2481 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2482 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2485 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2487 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2488 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2489 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2490 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2492 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2493 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2495 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2496 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2498 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2499 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2500 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2501 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2502 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2503 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2507 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2508 initial_commitment_tx,
2511 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2512 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2515 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2516 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2519 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2520 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2521 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2522 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2523 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2524 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2525 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2526 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2527 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2528 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2529 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2530 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2532 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2534 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2536 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2537 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2538 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2539 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2541 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2543 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2544 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2548 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2549 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2551 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2552 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2553 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2554 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2556 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2559 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2560 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2561 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2564 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2565 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2566 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2567 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2568 // when routing outbound payments.
2569 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2573 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2575 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2576 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2577 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2578 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2579 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2580 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2581 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2582 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2583 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2585 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2586 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2587 let expected_point =
2588 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2589 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2591 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2592 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2593 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2594 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2595 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2596 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2598 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2599 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2600 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2601 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2602 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2604 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2605 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2609 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2612 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2613 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2615 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2617 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2620 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2621 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2622 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2623 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2624 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2625 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2627 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2628 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2629 if local_sent_shutdown {
2630 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2632 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2633 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2634 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2635 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2637 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2638 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2640 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2641 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2643 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2646 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2647 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2650 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2651 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2652 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2653 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2655 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2656 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2658 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2659 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2660 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2661 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2662 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2663 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2664 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2665 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2666 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2667 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2668 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2670 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2671 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2672 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2673 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2674 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2675 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2679 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2680 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2683 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2684 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2685 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2687 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2688 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2689 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2690 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2691 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2692 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2693 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2697 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2698 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2699 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2700 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2701 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2702 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2703 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2707 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2708 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2709 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2710 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2711 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2712 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2715 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2716 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2717 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2718 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2719 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2721 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2725 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2726 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2729 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2730 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2731 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2732 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2733 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2734 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2735 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2736 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2737 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2738 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2739 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2740 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2741 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2742 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2743 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2744 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2747 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2748 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2749 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2750 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2751 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2754 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2755 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2757 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2758 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2761 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2762 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2763 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2767 // Now update local state:
2768 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2769 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2770 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2771 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2772 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2773 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2774 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2779 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2781 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2782 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2783 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2784 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2785 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2786 None => fail_reason.into(),
2787 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2788 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2789 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2790 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2792 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2796 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2797 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2798 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2799 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2801 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2802 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2807 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2810 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2811 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2814 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2815 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2818 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2821 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2822 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2825 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2829 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2833 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2834 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2835 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2837 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2838 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2841 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2845 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2846 where L::Target: Logger
2848 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2849 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2851 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2854 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2858 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2860 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2862 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2863 let commitment_txid = {
2864 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2865 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2866 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2868 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2869 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2870 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2871 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2872 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2877 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2879 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2880 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2881 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2882 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2885 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2886 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2887 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2888 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2891 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2893 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2894 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2895 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2896 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2897 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2898 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2899 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2900 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2901 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2902 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2903 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2909 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2910 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2913 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2914 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2915 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2916 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2917 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2918 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2919 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2920 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2921 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2922 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2923 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2924 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2925 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2928 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2929 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2930 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2931 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2932 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2933 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2934 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2936 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2937 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2938 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2939 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2940 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2941 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2942 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2943 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2945 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2946 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2949 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2951 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2952 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2953 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2956 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2959 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2960 commitment_stats.tx,
2962 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2963 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2964 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2967 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2968 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2970 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2971 let mut need_commitment = false;
2972 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2973 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2974 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2975 need_commitment = true;
2979 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2980 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2981 Some(forward_info.clone())
2983 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2984 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2985 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2986 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2987 need_commitment = true;
2990 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2991 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2992 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2993 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2994 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2995 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2996 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2997 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2998 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2999 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3000 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3001 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3002 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3003 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3005 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3007 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3008 need_commitment = true;
3012 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3013 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3014 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3015 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3016 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3017 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3019 nondust_htlc_sources,
3023 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3024 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3025 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3026 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3028 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3029 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3030 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3031 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3032 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3033 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3034 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3035 // includes the right HTLCs.
3036 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3037 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3038 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3039 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3040 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3041 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3043 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3044 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3045 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3048 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3049 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3050 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3051 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3052 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3053 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3054 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3055 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3056 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3060 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3061 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3062 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3063 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3066 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3067 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3068 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3069 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3070 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3071 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3072 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3074 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3075 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3076 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3077 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3080 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3081 /// for our counterparty.
3082 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3083 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3084 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3085 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3087 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3088 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3089 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3090 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3092 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3093 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3094 updates: Vec::new(),
3097 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3098 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3099 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3100 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3101 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3102 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3103 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3104 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3105 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3106 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3107 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3108 // to rebalance channels.
3109 match &htlc_update {
3110 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3111 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3112 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3114 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3115 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3117 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3120 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3121 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3122 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3123 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3124 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3125 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3126 // into the holding cell without ever being
3127 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3128 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3129 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3132 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3138 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3139 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3140 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3141 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3142 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3143 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3144 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3145 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3146 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3147 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3148 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3149 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3151 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3152 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3153 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3154 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3155 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3156 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3157 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3158 // for a full revocation before failing.
3159 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3160 update_fail_count += 1;
3163 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3165 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3172 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3173 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3175 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3176 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3181 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3182 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3183 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3184 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3185 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3187 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3188 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3189 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3191 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3192 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3198 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3199 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3200 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3201 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3202 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3203 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3204 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3205 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3206 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3208 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3211 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3214 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3218 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3220 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3221 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3226 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3227 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3228 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3229 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3230 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3231 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3232 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3233 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3237 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3239 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3240 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3243 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3244 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3246 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3248 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3249 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3250 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3251 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3252 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3253 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3254 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3255 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3259 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3260 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3261 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3262 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3263 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3264 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3265 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3266 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3267 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3269 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3270 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3273 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3274 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3275 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3276 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3277 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3278 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3279 let mut require_commitment = false;
3280 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3283 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3284 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3285 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3287 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3288 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3289 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3290 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3291 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3292 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3297 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3298 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3299 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3300 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3301 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3303 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3304 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3305 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3310 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3311 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3313 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3317 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3318 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3320 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3321 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3322 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3323 require_commitment = true;
3324 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3325 match forward_info {
3326 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3327 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3328 require_commitment = true;
3330 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3331 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3332 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3334 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3335 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3336 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3340 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3341 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3342 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3343 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3349 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3350 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3351 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3352 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3354 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3355 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3356 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3357 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3358 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3359 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3360 require_commitment = true;
3364 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3366 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3367 match update_state {
3368 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3369 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3370 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3371 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3372 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3374 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3375 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3376 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3377 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3378 require_commitment = true;
3379 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3380 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3385 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3386 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3387 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3388 if require_commitment {
3389 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3390 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3391 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3392 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3393 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3394 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3395 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3396 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3397 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3399 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3400 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3401 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3402 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3403 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3406 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3407 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3408 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3409 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3410 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3411 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3413 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3414 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3416 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3417 if require_commitment {
3418 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3420 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3421 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3422 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3423 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3425 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3426 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3427 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3428 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3430 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3431 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3432 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3438 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3439 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3440 /// commitment update.
3441 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3442 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3443 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3445 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3446 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3449 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3450 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3451 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3452 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3454 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3455 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3456 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3457 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3458 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3459 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3460 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3462 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3463 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3465 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3466 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3468 if !self.context.is_live() {
3469 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3472 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3473 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3474 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3475 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3476 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3477 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3478 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3479 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3480 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3481 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3485 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3486 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3487 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3488 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3489 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3490 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3493 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3494 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3498 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3499 force_holding_cell = true;
3502 if force_holding_cell {
3503 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3507 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3508 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3510 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3511 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3516 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3517 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3519 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3521 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3522 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3523 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3524 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3528 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3529 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3530 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3534 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3535 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3538 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3539 // will be retransmitted.
3540 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3541 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3542 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3544 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3545 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3547 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3548 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3549 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3550 // this HTLC accordingly
3551 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3554 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3555 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3556 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3557 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3560 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3561 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3562 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3563 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3564 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3565 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3570 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3572 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3573 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3574 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3575 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3579 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3580 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3581 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3582 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3583 // the update upon reconnection.
3584 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3588 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3590 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3591 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3594 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3595 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3596 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3597 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3598 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3599 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3600 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3602 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3603 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3604 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3605 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3606 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3607 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3608 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3610 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3611 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3612 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3613 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3614 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3615 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3616 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3619 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3620 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3621 /// to the remote side.
3622 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3623 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3624 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3625 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3628 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3630 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3631 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3633 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3634 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3635 // first received the funding_signed.
3636 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3637 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3638 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3640 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3641 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3642 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3643 funding_broadcastable = None;
3646 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3647 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3648 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3649 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3650 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3651 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3652 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3653 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3654 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3655 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3656 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3657 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3658 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3659 next_per_commitment_point,
3660 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3664 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3666 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3667 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3668 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3669 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3670 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3671 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3673 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3674 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3675 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3676 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3677 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3678 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3682 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3683 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3685 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3686 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3687 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3690 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3691 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3692 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3693 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3694 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3695 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3696 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3697 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3698 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3702 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3703 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3705 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3706 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3708 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3709 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3711 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3712 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3714 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3715 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3716 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3717 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3718 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3719 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3720 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3721 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3722 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3723 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3724 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3725 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3726 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3727 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3729 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3730 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3731 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3737 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3738 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3739 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3740 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3741 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3742 per_commitment_secret,
3743 next_per_commitment_point,
3745 next_local_nonce: None,
3749 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3750 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3751 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3752 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3753 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3755 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3756 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3757 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3758 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3759 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3760 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3761 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3762 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3763 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3764 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3769 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3770 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3772 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3773 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3774 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3775 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3776 reason: err_packet.clone()
3779 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3780 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3781 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3782 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3783 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3784 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3787 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3788 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3789 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3790 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3791 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3798 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3799 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3800 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3801 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3805 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3806 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3807 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3808 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3809 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3810 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3814 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3815 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3816 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3817 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3818 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3819 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3820 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3825 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3826 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3828 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3829 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3830 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3831 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3832 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3833 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3834 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3835 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3838 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3840 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3841 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3842 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3843 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3847 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3848 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3849 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3852 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3853 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3854 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3855 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3856 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3857 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3859 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3860 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3861 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3862 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3863 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3866 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3867 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3868 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3869 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3870 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3871 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3872 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3873 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3877 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3878 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3879 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3880 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3882 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3886 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3887 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3888 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3889 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3891 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
3893 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3895 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3896 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3897 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3898 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3899 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3900 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3902 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3903 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3904 channel_ready: None,
3905 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3906 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3907 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3911 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3912 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3913 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3914 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3915 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3916 next_per_commitment_point,
3917 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3919 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3920 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3921 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3925 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3926 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3927 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3929 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3930 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3931 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3934 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3937 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3940 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3941 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3942 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3943 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3944 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3945 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3946 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3948 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3950 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3951 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3952 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3953 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3954 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3955 next_per_commitment_point,
3956 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3960 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3961 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3962 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3964 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3967 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3968 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3969 raa: required_revoke,
3970 commitment_update: None,
3971 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3973 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3974 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3975 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3977 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3980 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3981 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3982 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3983 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3984 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3985 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3988 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3989 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3990 raa: required_revoke,
3991 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3992 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3996 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4000 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4001 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4002 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4003 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4005 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4007 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4009 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4010 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4011 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4012 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4013 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4014 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4016 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4017 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4018 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4019 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4020 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4022 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4023 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4024 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4025 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4028 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4029 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4030 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4031 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4032 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4033 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4034 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4035 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4036 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4037 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4038 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4039 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4040 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4041 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4042 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4044 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4047 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4048 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4051 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4052 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4053 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4054 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4055 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4056 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4059 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4060 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4061 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4062 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4063 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4064 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4065 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4067 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4073 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4074 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4075 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4076 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4078 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4079 return Ok((None, None));
4082 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4083 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4084 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4086 return Ok((None, None));
4089 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4091 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4092 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4093 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4094 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4096 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4097 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4098 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4100 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4101 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4102 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4103 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4105 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4106 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4107 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4112 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4113 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4115 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4116 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4119 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4120 /// within our expected timeframe.
4122 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4123 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4124 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4127 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4130 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4131 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4134 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4135 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4136 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4137 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4139 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4142 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4143 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4144 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4145 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4146 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4148 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4149 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4150 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4153 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4155 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4156 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4159 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4160 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4161 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4164 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4167 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4168 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4169 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4170 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4172 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4175 assert!(send_shutdown);
4176 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4177 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4178 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4180 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4181 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4183 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4188 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4190 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4191 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4193 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4194 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4195 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4196 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4197 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4198 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4201 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4202 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4204 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4205 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4206 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4207 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4211 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4212 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4213 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4214 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4215 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4216 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4218 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4219 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4226 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4227 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4229 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4232 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4233 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4235 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4237 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4238 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4239 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4240 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4241 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4242 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4243 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4244 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4245 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4247 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4248 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4251 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4255 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4256 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4257 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4258 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4260 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4263 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4266 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4267 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4269 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4273 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4277 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4278 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4279 return Ok((None, None));
4282 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4283 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4284 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4285 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4287 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4289 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4292 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4293 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4294 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4295 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4296 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4300 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4301 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4306 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4307 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4308 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4309 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4310 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4311 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4312 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4316 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4318 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4319 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4320 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4321 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4323 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4326 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4327 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4328 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4330 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4331 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4332 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4333 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4337 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4338 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4339 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4340 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4342 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4343 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4344 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4350 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4351 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4352 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4354 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4355 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4357 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4358 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4361 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4362 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4363 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4364 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4365 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4367 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4368 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4369 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4371 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4372 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4375 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4376 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4377 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4378 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4379 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4380 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4381 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4382 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4384 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4387 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4388 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4389 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4390 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4392 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4396 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4397 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4398 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4399 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4401 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4407 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4408 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4409 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4410 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4411 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4412 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4413 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4415 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4416 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4419 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4421 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4422 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4428 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4429 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4430 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4431 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4432 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4433 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4434 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4436 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4437 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4444 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4445 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4448 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4449 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4452 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4453 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4457 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4458 &self.context.holder_signer
4462 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4464 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4465 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4466 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4467 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4468 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4469 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4471 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4473 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4481 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4482 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4486 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4487 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4488 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4489 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4492 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4493 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4494 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4495 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4498 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4499 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4500 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4501 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4502 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4503 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4506 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4507 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4508 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4509 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4510 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4511 if !release_monitor {
4512 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4521 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4522 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4525 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4526 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4527 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4529 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4530 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4531 if self.context.channel_state &
4532 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4533 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4534 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4535 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4536 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4539 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4540 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4541 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4542 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4543 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4544 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4546 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4547 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4548 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4550 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4551 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4552 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4553 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4554 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4555 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4561 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4562 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4563 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4566 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4567 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4568 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4571 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4572 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4573 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4576 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4577 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4578 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4579 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4580 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4581 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4586 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4587 self.context.channel_update_status
4590 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4591 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4592 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4595 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4597 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4598 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4599 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4603 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4604 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4605 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4608 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4612 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4613 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4614 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4616 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4617 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4618 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4620 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4621 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4624 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4625 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4626 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4627 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4628 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4629 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4630 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4631 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4632 self.context.channel_state);
4634 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4638 if need_commitment_update {
4639 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4640 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4641 let next_per_commitment_point =
4642 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4643 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4644 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4645 next_per_commitment_point,
4646 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4650 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4656 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4657 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4658 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4659 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4660 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4661 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4662 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4664 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4667 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4668 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4669 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4670 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4671 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4672 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4673 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4674 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4675 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4676 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4677 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4678 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4679 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4680 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4681 // channel and move on.
4682 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4683 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4685 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4686 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4687 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4689 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4690 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4691 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4692 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4693 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4694 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4695 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4699 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4700 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4701 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4702 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4703 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4707 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4708 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4709 // may have already happened for this block).
4710 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4711 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4712 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4713 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4716 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4717 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4718 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4719 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4727 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4728 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4729 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4730 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4732 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4733 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4736 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4738 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4739 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4740 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4741 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4743 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4746 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4749 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4750 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4751 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4752 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4754 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4757 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4758 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4759 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4761 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4762 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4764 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4765 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4766 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4774 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4776 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4777 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4778 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4780 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4781 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4784 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4785 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4786 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4787 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4788 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4789 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4790 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4791 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4792 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4795 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4796 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4797 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4798 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4800 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4801 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4802 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4804 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4805 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4806 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4807 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4809 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4810 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4811 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4812 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4813 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4814 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4815 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4818 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4819 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4821 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4824 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4825 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4826 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4827 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4828 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4829 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4830 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4831 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4832 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4833 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4834 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4835 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4836 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4837 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4838 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4839 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4840 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4846 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4851 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4852 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4854 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4855 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
4856 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4857 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4859 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4862 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4864 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
4865 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4866 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4867 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4868 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4869 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4871 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4872 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4875 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4876 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4877 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4878 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4879 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4880 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4882 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4883 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4886 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4887 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4888 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4889 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4890 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4896 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4897 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4898 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4899 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4901 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4904 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4908 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4912 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4913 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4917 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4921 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4922 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4925 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4929 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4931 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4936 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4938 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4943 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
4945 None => return None,
4948 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4950 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4951 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4953 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4954 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4958 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4960 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4961 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4962 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4963 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4964 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4965 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4966 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4968 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4969 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4970 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4971 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4972 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4973 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4974 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4975 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4976 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4977 contents: announcement,
4980 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4984 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4985 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4986 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4987 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4988 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4989 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4990 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4991 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4993 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4995 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4996 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4997 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4998 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5000 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5001 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5002 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5003 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5006 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5007 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5008 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5009 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5012 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5015 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5016 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5017 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5018 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5019 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5020 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5023 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5025 Err(_) => return None,
5027 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5028 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5033 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5034 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5035 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5036 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5037 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5038 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5039 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5040 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5041 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5042 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5043 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5044 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5045 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5046 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5047 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5048 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5051 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5054 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5055 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5056 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5057 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5058 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5059 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5060 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5061 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5062 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5064 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5065 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5066 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5067 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5068 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5069 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5070 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5071 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5072 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5074 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5075 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5076 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5077 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5078 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5079 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5080 next_funding_txid: None,
5085 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5087 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5088 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5089 /// commitment update.
5091 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5092 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5093 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5094 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5095 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5096 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5097 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5100 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5101 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5102 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5104 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5105 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5110 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5111 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5113 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5115 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5116 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5118 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5119 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5120 /// regenerate them.
5122 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5123 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5125 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5126 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5127 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5128 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5129 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5130 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5131 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5133 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5134 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5136 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5137 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5138 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5141 if amount_msat == 0 {
5142 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5145 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5146 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5147 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5148 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5151 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5152 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5153 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5156 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5157 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5158 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5159 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5160 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5161 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5162 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5163 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5166 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5167 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5168 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5169 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5170 else { "to peer" });
5172 if need_holding_cell {
5173 force_holding_cell = true;
5176 // Now update local state:
5177 if force_holding_cell {
5178 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5183 onion_routing_packet,
5189 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5190 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5192 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5194 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5199 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5200 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5201 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5205 onion_routing_packet,
5208 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5213 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5214 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5215 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5216 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5218 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5219 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5220 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5222 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5223 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5227 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5228 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5229 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5230 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5231 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5232 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5233 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5236 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5237 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5238 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5239 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5240 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5241 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5244 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5246 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5247 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5248 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5250 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5251 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5254 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5255 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5256 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5257 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5258 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5259 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5260 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5261 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5264 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5268 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5269 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5270 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5271 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5273 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5275 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5276 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5277 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5278 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5279 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5280 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5281 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5282 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5283 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5284 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5285 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5291 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5294 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5295 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5296 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5297 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5298 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5299 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5301 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5302 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5303 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5304 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5307 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5308 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5312 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5313 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5315 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5317 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5318 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5319 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5320 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5322 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5323 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5324 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5325 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5326 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5327 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5331 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5332 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5336 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5337 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5340 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5341 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5343 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5344 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5345 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5346 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5347 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5348 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5349 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5350 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5352 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5353 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5354 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5357 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5358 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5359 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5365 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5366 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5367 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5369 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5370 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5371 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5372 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5378 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5379 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5381 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5382 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5383 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5384 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5385 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5386 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5387 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5388 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5389 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5392 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5393 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5394 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5396 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5397 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5400 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5401 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5403 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5404 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5405 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5408 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5409 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5410 let mut chan_closed = false;
5411 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5415 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5417 None if !chan_closed => {
5418 // use override shutdown script if provided
5419 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5420 Some(script) => script,
5422 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5423 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5424 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5425 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5429 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5430 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5432 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5438 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5439 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5440 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5441 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5443 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5445 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5447 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5448 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5449 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5450 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5451 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5452 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5455 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5456 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5458 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5459 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5460 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5463 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5464 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5465 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5466 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5467 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5469 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5470 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5477 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5478 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5480 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5483 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5484 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5485 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5487 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5488 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5492 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5496 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5497 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5498 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5499 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5502 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5503 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5504 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5505 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5506 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5507 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5508 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5509 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5510 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5512 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5513 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5514 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5515 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5517 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5518 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5520 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5521 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5523 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5524 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5525 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5527 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5528 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5530 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5531 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5532 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5533 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5534 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5537 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5538 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5540 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5541 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5543 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5545 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5547 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5548 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5549 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5550 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5553 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5554 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5556 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5557 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5558 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5559 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5563 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5564 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5565 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5569 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5570 Ok(script) => script,
5571 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5574 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5577 context: ChannelContext {
5580 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5581 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5582 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5583 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5588 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5590 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5591 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5592 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5593 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5595 channel_value_satoshis,
5597 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5600 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5603 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5604 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5607 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5608 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5609 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5610 pending_update_fee: None,
5611 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5612 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5613 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5614 update_time_counter: 1,
5616 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5618 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5619 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5620 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5621 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5622 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5623 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5625 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5626 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5627 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5628 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5630 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5631 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5632 closing_fee_limits: None,
5633 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5635 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5636 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5637 short_channel_id: None,
5638 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5640 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5641 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5642 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5643 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5644 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5645 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5646 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5647 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5648 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5649 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5650 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5651 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5653 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5655 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5656 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5657 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5658 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5659 counterparty_parameters: None,
5660 funding_outpoint: None,
5661 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5663 funding_transaction: None,
5665 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5666 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5667 counterparty_node_id,
5669 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5671 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5673 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5674 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5676 announcement_sigs: None,
5678 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5679 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5680 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5681 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5683 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5684 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5686 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5687 outbound_scid_alias,
5689 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5690 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5692 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5693 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5698 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5700 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5704 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5705 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5706 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5707 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5708 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5709 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5712 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5713 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5714 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5715 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5716 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5717 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5718 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5719 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5720 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5721 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5722 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5724 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5725 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5727 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5728 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5729 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5730 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5733 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5734 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5736 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5739 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5740 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5741 return Err((self, e));
5745 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5747 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5749 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5750 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5751 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5753 let channel = Channel {
5754 context: self.context,
5757 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5758 temporary_channel_id,
5759 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5760 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5763 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5765 next_local_nonce: None,
5769 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5770 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5771 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5772 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5773 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5774 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5775 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5776 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5777 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5778 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5781 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5782 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5783 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5784 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5785 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5786 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5792 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5793 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5794 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5795 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5796 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5797 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5799 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5801 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5802 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5803 // We've exhausted our options
5806 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5807 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5810 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5811 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5812 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5813 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5815 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5816 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5817 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5818 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5819 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5820 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5822 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5824 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5825 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5828 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5829 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5830 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5832 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5833 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5836 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5837 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5840 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5841 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5845 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5846 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5847 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5848 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5849 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5850 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5851 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5852 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5853 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5854 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5855 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5856 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5857 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5858 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5859 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5860 first_per_commitment_point,
5861 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5862 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5863 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5864 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5866 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5871 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5872 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5874 // Check sanity of message fields:
5875 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5878 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5879 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5881 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5882 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5884 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5885 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5887 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5888 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5890 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5891 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5892 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5894 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5895 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5896 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5898 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5899 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5900 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5902 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5903 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5905 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5906 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5909 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5910 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5911 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5913 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5914 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5916 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5917 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5919 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5920 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5922 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5923 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5925 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5926 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5928 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5929 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5932 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5933 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5934 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5936 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5937 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5939 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5940 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5941 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5943 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
5944 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
5947 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5948 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5949 &Some(ref script) => {
5950 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5951 if script.len() == 0 {
5954 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5955 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5957 Some(script.clone())
5960 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5967 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5968 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5969 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5970 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5971 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5973 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5974 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5976 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5979 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5980 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5981 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5982 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5983 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5984 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5987 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5988 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5989 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5992 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5993 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5995 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5996 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6002 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6003 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
6004 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
6005 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6008 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
6009 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6010 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6011 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6012 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6013 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6014 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6015 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6016 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
6017 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6018 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6019 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6022 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6024 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6025 // support this channel type.
6026 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6027 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6028 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6031 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6032 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6033 // `static_remote_key`.
6034 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6035 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6037 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6038 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6039 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6041 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6042 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6044 channel_type.clone()
6046 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6047 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6048 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6053 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6054 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6055 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6056 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6057 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6058 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6059 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6060 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6061 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6064 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6065 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6068 // Check sanity of message fields:
6069 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6070 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6072 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6073 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6075 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6076 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6078 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6079 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6080 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6082 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6083 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6085 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6086 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6088 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6090 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6091 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6092 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6094 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6095 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6097 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6098 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6101 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6102 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6103 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6105 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6108 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6109 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6111 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6112 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6114 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6115 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6117 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6118 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6120 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6121 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6124 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6126 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6127 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6132 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6133 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6134 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6135 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6136 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6138 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6139 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6141 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6142 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6143 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6145 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6146 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6149 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6150 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6151 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6152 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6153 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6154 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6157 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6158 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6159 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6160 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6161 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6164 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6165 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6166 &Some(ref script) => {
6167 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6168 if script.len() == 0 {
6171 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6172 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6174 Some(script.clone())
6177 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6184 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6185 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6186 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6187 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6191 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6192 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6193 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6197 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6198 Ok(script) => script,
6199 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6202 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6203 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6205 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6208 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6212 context: ChannelContext {
6215 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6216 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6218 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6223 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6225 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6226 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6227 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6228 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6231 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6234 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6237 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6238 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6239 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6241 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6242 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6243 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6244 pending_update_fee: None,
6245 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6246 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6247 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6248 update_time_counter: 1,
6250 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6252 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6253 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6254 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6255 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6256 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6257 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6259 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6260 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6261 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6262 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6264 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6265 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6266 closing_fee_limits: None,
6267 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6269 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6270 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6271 short_channel_id: None,
6272 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6274 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6275 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6276 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6277 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6278 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6279 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6280 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6281 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6282 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6283 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6284 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6285 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6288 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6290 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6291 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6292 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6293 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6294 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6295 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6296 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6298 funding_outpoint: None,
6299 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6301 funding_transaction: None,
6303 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6304 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6305 counterparty_node_id,
6307 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6309 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6311 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6312 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6314 announcement_sigs: None,
6316 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6317 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6318 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6319 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6321 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6322 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6324 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6325 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6327 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6328 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6330 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6331 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6336 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6338 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6344 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6345 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6347 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6348 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6349 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6350 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6352 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6353 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6355 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6356 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6359 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6362 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6363 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6364 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6366 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6367 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6368 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6369 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6371 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6372 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6373 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6374 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6375 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6376 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6377 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6378 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6379 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6380 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6381 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6382 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6383 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6384 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6385 first_per_commitment_point,
6386 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6387 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6388 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6390 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6392 next_local_nonce: None,
6396 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6397 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6399 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6401 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6402 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6405 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6406 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6408 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6409 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6411 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6412 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6413 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6414 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6415 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6416 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6417 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6418 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6419 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6422 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6423 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6425 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6426 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6427 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6428 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6430 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6431 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6433 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6434 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6437 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6438 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6439 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6441 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6444 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6445 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6447 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6448 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6449 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6451 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6453 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6454 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6455 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6456 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6459 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6460 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6461 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6462 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6463 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6465 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6467 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6468 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6469 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6472 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6473 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6474 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6478 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6479 initial_commitment_tx,
6482 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6483 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6486 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6487 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6490 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6492 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6493 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6494 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6495 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6496 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6497 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6498 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6499 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6500 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6501 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6502 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6504 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6506 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6508 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6509 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6510 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6511 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6513 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6515 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6516 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6517 let mut channel = Channel {
6518 context: self.context,
6520 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6521 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6522 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6524 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6528 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6529 }, channel_monitor))
6533 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6534 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6536 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6542 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6543 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6544 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6545 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6546 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6548 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6549 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6550 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6551 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6557 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6558 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6559 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6560 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6561 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6562 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6567 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6568 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6569 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6570 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6572 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6573 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6574 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6575 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6580 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6581 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6582 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6583 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6584 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6585 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6590 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6591 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6592 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6595 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6597 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6598 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6599 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6600 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6601 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6603 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6604 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6605 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6606 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6608 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6609 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6610 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6612 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6614 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6615 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6616 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6617 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6618 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6619 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6621 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6622 // deserialized from that format.
6623 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6624 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6625 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6627 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6629 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6630 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6631 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6633 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6634 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6635 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6636 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6639 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6640 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6641 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6644 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6645 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6646 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6647 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6649 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6650 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6652 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6654 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6656 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6658 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6661 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6663 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6668 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6669 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6671 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6672 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6673 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6674 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6675 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6676 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6677 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6679 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6681 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6683 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6686 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6687 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6688 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6691 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6693 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6694 preimages.push(preimage);
6696 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6697 reason.write(writer)?;
6699 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6701 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6702 preimages.push(preimage);
6704 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6705 reason.write(writer)?;
6708 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6709 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6710 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6712 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6713 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6714 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6718 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6719 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6720 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6722 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6723 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6727 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6728 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6729 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6730 source.write(writer)?;
6731 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6733 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6734 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6735 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6737 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6738 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6740 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6742 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6743 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6745 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6747 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6748 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6753 match self.context.resend_order {
6754 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6755 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6758 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6759 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6760 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6762 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6763 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6764 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6765 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6768 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6769 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6770 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6771 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6772 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6775 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6776 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6777 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6778 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6780 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6781 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6782 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6784 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6786 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6787 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6788 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6789 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6791 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6792 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6793 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6794 // consider the stale state on reload.
6797 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6798 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6799 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6801 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6802 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6803 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6805 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6806 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6808 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6809 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6810 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6812 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6813 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6815 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6818 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6819 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6820 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6822 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6825 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6826 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6828 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6829 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6830 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6832 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6834 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6836 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6838 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6839 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6840 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6841 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6842 htlc.write(writer)?;
6845 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6846 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6847 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6849 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6850 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6852 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6853 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6854 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6855 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6856 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6857 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6858 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6860 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6861 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6862 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6863 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6864 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6866 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6867 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6869 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6870 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6871 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6872 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6874 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6876 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6877 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6878 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6879 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6880 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6881 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6882 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6884 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6885 (2, chan_type, option),
6886 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6887 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6888 (5, self.context.config, required),
6889 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6890 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6891 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
6892 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6893 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
6894 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6895 (15, preimages, required_vec),
6896 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6897 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6898 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6899 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6900 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6901 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6902 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6903 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6904 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6905 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6906 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6913 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6914 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6916 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6917 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6919 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6920 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6921 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6923 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6924 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6925 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6926 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6928 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6930 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6931 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6932 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6933 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6934 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6936 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6937 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6940 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6941 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6942 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6944 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6946 let mut keys_data = None;
6948 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6949 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6950 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6951 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6952 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6953 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6954 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6955 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6956 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6957 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6961 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6962 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6963 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6966 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6968 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6969 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6970 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6972 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6974 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6975 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6976 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6977 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6978 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6979 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6980 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6981 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6982 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6983 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6984 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6985 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6986 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6991 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6992 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6993 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6994 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6995 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6996 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6997 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6998 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6999 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7000 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7001 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7002 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7004 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7005 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7008 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7009 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7012 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7013 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7015 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7017 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7021 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7022 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7023 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7024 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7025 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7026 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7027 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7028 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7029 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7030 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7031 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7033 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7034 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7035 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7037 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7038 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7039 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7041 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7045 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7046 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7047 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7048 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7051 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7052 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7053 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7055 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7056 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7057 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7058 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7061 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7062 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7063 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7064 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7067 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7069 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7071 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7072 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7073 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7074 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7076 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7077 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7078 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7079 // consider the stale state on reload.
7080 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7083 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7084 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7085 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7087 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7090 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7091 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7092 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7094 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7095 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7096 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7097 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7099 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7100 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7102 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7103 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7105 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7106 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7107 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7109 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7111 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7112 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7114 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7115 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7118 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7120 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7121 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7122 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7123 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7125 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7128 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7129 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7131 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7133 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7134 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7136 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7137 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7139 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7141 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7142 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7143 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7145 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7146 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7147 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7151 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7152 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7153 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7155 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7161 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7162 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7163 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7164 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7165 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7166 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7167 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7168 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7169 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7170 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7172 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7173 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7174 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7175 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7176 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7177 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7178 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7180 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7181 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7182 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7183 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7185 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7187 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7188 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7190 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7191 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7192 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7193 (2, channel_type, option),
7194 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7195 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7196 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7197 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7198 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7199 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7200 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7201 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7202 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7203 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7204 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7205 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7206 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7207 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7208 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7209 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7210 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7211 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7212 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7213 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7214 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7217 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7218 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7219 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7220 // required channel parameters.
7221 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7222 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7223 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7225 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7227 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7228 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7229 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7230 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7233 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7234 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7235 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7237 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7238 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7240 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7241 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7246 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7247 if iter.next().is_some() {
7248 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7252 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7253 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7254 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7255 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7256 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7259 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7260 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7261 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7263 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7264 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7266 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7267 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7268 // separate u64 values.
7269 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7271 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7273 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7274 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7275 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7276 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7278 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7279 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7281 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7282 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7283 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7284 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7285 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7288 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7289 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7293 context: ChannelContext {
7296 config: config.unwrap(),
7300 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7301 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7302 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7305 temporary_channel_id,
7307 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7309 channel_value_satoshis,
7311 latest_monitor_update_id,
7314 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7317 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7318 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7321 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7322 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7323 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7324 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7328 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7329 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7330 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7331 monitor_pending_forwards,
7332 monitor_pending_failures,
7333 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7336 holding_cell_update_fee,
7337 next_holder_htlc_id,
7338 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7339 update_time_counter,
7342 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7343 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7344 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7345 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7347 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7348 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7349 closing_fee_limits: None,
7350 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7352 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7353 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7355 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7357 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7358 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7359 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7360 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7361 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7362 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7363 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7364 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7365 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7368 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7370 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7371 funding_transaction,
7373 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7374 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7375 counterparty_node_id,
7377 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7381 channel_update_status,
7382 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7386 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7387 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7388 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7389 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7391 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7392 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7394 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7395 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7396 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7398 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7399 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7401 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7402 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7404 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7407 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7416 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7417 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7418 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7419 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7420 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7422 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7423 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7424 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7425 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7426 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7427 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7428 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7429 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7430 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7431 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7432 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7433 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7434 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7435 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7436 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7437 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7438 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7439 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7440 use crate::util::test_utils;
7441 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7442 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7443 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7444 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7445 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7446 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7447 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7448 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7449 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7450 use crate::prelude::*;
7452 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7455 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7456 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7462 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7463 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7464 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7465 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7469 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7470 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7471 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7472 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7473 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7474 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(
7475 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7476 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7480 signer: InMemorySigner,
7483 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7484 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7487 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7488 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7490 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7491 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7494 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7498 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7500 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7501 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7502 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7503 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7504 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7507 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7508 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7509 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7510 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7514 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7515 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7516 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7520 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7521 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7522 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7523 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7525 let seed = [42; 32];
7526 let network = Network::Testnet;
7527 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7528 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7529 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7532 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7533 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7534 let config = UserConfig::default();
7535 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7536 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7537 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7539 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7540 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7544 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7545 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7547 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7548 let original_fee = 253;
7549 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7550 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7551 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7552 let seed = [42; 32];
7553 let network = Network::Testnet;
7554 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7556 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7557 let config = UserConfig::default();
7558 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7560 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7561 // same as the old fee.
7562 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7563 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7564 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7568 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7569 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7570 // dust limits are used.
7571 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7572 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7573 let seed = [42; 32];
7574 let network = Network::Testnet;
7575 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7576 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7577 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7579 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7580 // they have different dust limits.
7582 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7583 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7584 let config = UserConfig::default();
7585 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7587 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7588 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7589 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7590 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7591 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7593 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7594 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7595 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7596 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7597 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7599 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7600 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7601 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7602 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7604 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7605 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7606 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7608 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7609 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7611 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7612 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7613 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7615 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7616 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7617 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7618 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7621 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7623 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7624 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7625 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7626 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7627 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7628 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7629 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7630 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7631 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7633 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7636 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7637 // the dust limit check.
7638 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7639 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7640 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7641 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7643 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7644 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7645 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7646 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7647 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7648 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7649 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7653 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7654 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7655 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7656 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7657 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7658 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7659 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7660 let seed = [42; 32];
7661 let network = Network::Testnet;
7662 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7664 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7665 let config = UserConfig::default();
7666 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7668 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7669 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7671 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7672 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7673 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7674 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7675 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7676 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7678 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7679 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7680 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7681 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7682 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7684 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7686 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7687 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7688 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7689 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7690 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7692 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7693 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7694 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7695 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7696 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7700 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7701 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7702 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7703 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7704 let seed = [42; 32];
7705 let network = Network::Testnet;
7706 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7707 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7708 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7710 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7712 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7713 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7714 let config = UserConfig::default();
7715 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7717 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7718 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7719 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7720 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7722 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7723 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7724 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7726 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7727 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7728 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7729 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7731 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7732 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7733 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7735 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7736 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7738 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7739 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7740 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7741 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7742 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7743 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7744 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7746 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7748 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7749 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7750 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7751 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7752 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7756 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7757 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7758 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7759 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7760 let seed = [42; 32];
7761 let network = Network::Testnet;
7762 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7763 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7764 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7766 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7767 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7768 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7769 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7770 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7771 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7772 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7773 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7775 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7776 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7777 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7778 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7779 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7780 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7782 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7783 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7784 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7785 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7787 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7789 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7790 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7791 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7792 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7793 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7794 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7796 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7797 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7798 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7799 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7801 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7802 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7803 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7804 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7805 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7807 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7808 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7810 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7811 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7812 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7814 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7815 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7816 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7817 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7818 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7820 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7821 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7823 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7824 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7825 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7829 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7831 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7832 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7833 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7835 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7836 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7837 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7838 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7840 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7841 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7842 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7844 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7846 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7847 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7850 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7851 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7852 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7853 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7854 let seed = [42; 32];
7855 let network = Network::Testnet;
7856 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7857 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7858 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7861 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7862 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7863 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7865 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7866 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7868 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7869 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7870 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7872 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7873 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7875 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7877 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7878 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7880 // Channel Negotiations failed
7881 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
7882 assert!(result.is_err());
7887 fn channel_update() {
7888 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7889 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7890 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7891 let seed = [42; 32];
7892 let network = Network::Testnet;
7893 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7894 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7895 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7897 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7898 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7899 let config = UserConfig::default();
7900 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7902 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7903 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7904 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7905 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7906 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7908 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7909 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7910 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7911 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7912 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7914 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7915 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7916 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7917 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7919 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7920 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7921 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7923 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7924 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7926 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7927 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7928 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7930 short_channel_id: 0,
7933 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7934 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7935 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7937 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7938 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7940 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7942 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7944 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7945 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7946 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7947 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7949 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7950 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7951 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7953 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7957 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7959 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7960 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7961 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7962 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7963 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7964 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7965 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7966 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7967 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7968 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7969 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7970 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7971 use crate::sync::Arc;
7973 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7974 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7975 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7976 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7978 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7980 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7981 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7982 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7983 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7984 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7986 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7987 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7993 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7994 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7995 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7997 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7998 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7999 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8000 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8001 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8002 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8004 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8006 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8007 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8008 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8009 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8010 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8011 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8013 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8014 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8015 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8016 selected_contest_delay: 144
8018 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8019 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8021 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8022 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8024 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8025 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8027 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8028 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8030 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8031 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8032 // build_commitment_transaction.
8033 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8034 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8035 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8036 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8037 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8039 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8040 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8041 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8042 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8046 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8047 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8048 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8049 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8053 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8054 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8055 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8057 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8058 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8060 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8061 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8063 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8065 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8066 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8067 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8068 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8069 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8070 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8071 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8073 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8074 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8075 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8076 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8078 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8079 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8080 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8082 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8084 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8085 commitment_tx.clone(),
8086 counterparty_signature,
8087 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8088 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8089 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8091 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8092 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8094 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8095 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8096 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8098 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8099 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8102 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8103 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8105 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8106 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8107 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8108 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8109 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8110 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8111 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8112 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8114 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8117 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8118 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8119 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8123 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8126 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8127 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8128 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8130 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8131 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8132 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8133 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8134 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8135 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8136 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8137 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8139 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8143 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8144 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8145 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8146 "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", {});
8148 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8149 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8151 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8152 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8153 "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", {});
8155 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8156 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8157 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8158 "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", {});
8160 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8161 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8163 amount_msat: 1000000,
8165 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8166 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8168 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8171 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8172 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8174 amount_msat: 2000000,
8176 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8177 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8179 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8182 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8183 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8185 amount_msat: 2000000,
8187 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8188 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8189 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8190 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8192 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8195 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8196 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8198 amount_msat: 3000000,
8200 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8201 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8202 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8203 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8205 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8208 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8209 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8211 amount_msat: 4000000,
8213 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8214 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8216 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8220 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8221 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8222 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8224 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8225 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8226 "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", {
8229 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8230 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8231 "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" },
8234 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8235 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8236 "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" },
8239 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8240 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8241 "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" },
8244 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8245 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8246 "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" },
8249 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8250 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8251 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8254 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8255 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8256 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8258 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8259 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8260 "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", {
8263 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8264 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8265 "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" },
8268 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8269 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8270 "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" },
8273 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8274 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8275 "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" },
8278 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8279 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8280 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c6401483045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8283 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8284 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8285 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8288 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8289 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8290 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8292 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8293 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8294 "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", {
8297 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8298 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8299 "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" },
8302 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8303 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8304 "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" },
8307 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8308 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8309 "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" },
8312 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8313 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8314 "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" }
8317 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8318 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8319 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8320 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8322 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8323 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8324 "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", {
8327 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8328 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8329 "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" },
8332 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8333 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8334 "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" },
8337 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8338 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8339 "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" },
8342 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8343 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8344 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8347 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8348 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8349 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8350 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8352 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8353 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8354 "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", {
8357 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8358 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8359 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8362 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8363 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8364 "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" },
8367 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8368 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8369 "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" },
8372 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8373 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8374 "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" }
8377 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8378 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8379 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8381 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8382 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8383 "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", {
8386 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8387 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8388 "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" },
8391 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8392 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8393 "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" },
8396 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8397 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8398 "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" }
8401 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8402 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8403 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8405 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8406 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8407 "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", {
8410 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8411 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8412 "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" },
8415 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8416 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8417 "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" },
8420 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8421 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8422 "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" }
8425 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8426 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8427 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8429 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8430 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8431 "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", {
8434 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8435 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8436 "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" },
8439 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8440 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8441 "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" }
8444 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8445 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8446 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8447 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8448 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8449 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8451 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8452 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8453 "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", {
8456 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8457 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8458 "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" },
8461 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8462 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8463 "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" }
8466 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8467 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8468 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8469 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8470 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8472 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8473 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8474 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8477 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8478 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8479 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8482 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8483 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8484 "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" }
8487 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8488 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8489 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8491 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8492 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8493 "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", {
8496 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8497 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8498 "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" }
8501 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8502 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8503 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8504 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8505 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8507 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8508 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8509 "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", {
8512 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8513 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8514 "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" }
8517 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8518 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8519 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8520 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8521 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8523 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8524 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8525 "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", {
8528 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8529 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8530 "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" }
8533 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8534 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8535 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8536 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8538 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8539 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8540 "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", {});
8542 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8543 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8544 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8545 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8546 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8548 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8549 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8550 "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", {});
8552 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8553 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8554 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8555 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8556 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8558 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8559 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8560 "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", {});
8562 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8563 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8564 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8566 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8567 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8568 "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", {});
8570 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8571 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8572 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8573 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8574 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8576 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8577 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8578 "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", {});
8580 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8581 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8582 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8583 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8584 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8586 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8587 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8588 "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", {});
8590 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8591 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8592 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8593 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8594 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8595 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8597 amount_msat: 2000000,
8599 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8600 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8602 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8605 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8606 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8607 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8609 amount_msat: 5000001,
8611 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8612 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8613 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8614 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8616 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8619 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8620 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8622 amount_msat: 5000000,
8624 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8625 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8626 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8627 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8629 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8633 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8634 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8635 "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", {
8638 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8639 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8640 "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" },
8642 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8643 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8644 "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" },
8646 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8647 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8648 "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" }
8651 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8652 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8653 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8654 "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", {
8657 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8658 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8659 "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" },
8661 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8662 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8663 "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" },
8665 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8666 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8667 "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" }
8672 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8673 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8675 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8676 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8677 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8678 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8680 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8681 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8682 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8684 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8685 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8687 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8688 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8690 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8691 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8692 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8696 fn test_key_derivation() {
8697 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8698 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8700 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8701 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8703 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8704 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8706 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8707 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8709 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8710 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8712 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8713 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8715 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8716 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8718 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8719 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8723 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8724 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8725 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8726 let seed = [42; 32];
8727 let network = Network::Testnet;
8728 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8729 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8731 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8732 let config = UserConfig::default();
8733 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8734 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8736 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8737 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8739 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8740 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8741 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8742 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8743 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8744 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8745 assert!(res.is_ok());
8749 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8750 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8751 // resulting `channel_type`.
8752 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8753 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8754 let network = Network::Testnet;
8755 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8756 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8758 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8759 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8761 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8762 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8764 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8765 // need to signal it.
8766 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8767 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8768 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8771 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8773 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8774 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8775 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8777 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8778 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8779 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8782 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8783 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8784 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8785 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8786 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8789 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8790 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8794 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8795 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8796 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8797 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8798 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8799 let network = Network::Testnet;
8800 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8801 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8803 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8804 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8806 let config = UserConfig::default();
8808 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8809 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8810 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8811 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8812 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8814 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8815 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8816 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8819 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8820 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8821 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8823 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8824 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8825 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8826 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8827 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8828 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8830 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8834 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8835 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8837 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8838 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8839 let network = Network::Testnet;
8840 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8841 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8843 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8844 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8846 let config = UserConfig::default();
8848 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8849 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8850 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8851 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8852 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8853 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8854 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8855 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8857 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8858 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8859 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8860 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8861 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8862 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8865 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8866 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8868 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8869 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8870 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8871 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8873 assert!(res.is_err());
8875 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8876 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8877 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8879 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8880 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8881 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8884 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8886 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8887 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8888 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8889 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8892 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8893 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8895 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8896 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8898 assert!(res.is_err());