1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
170 enum OutboundHTLCState {
171 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
172 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
173 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
174 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
175 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
176 /// money back (though we won't), and,
177 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
178 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
179 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
180 /// we'll never get out of sync).
181 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
182 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
183 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
185 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
186 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
187 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
192 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
193 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
195 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
196 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
197 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
198 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
199 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
203 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
204 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
206 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
207 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
210 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
213 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
214 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
219 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
220 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
228 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
229 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 state: OutboundHTLCState,
236 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
237 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
242 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
243 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
247 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
250 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
251 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
252 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
255 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
260 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
265 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
269 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
270 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
271 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
272 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
273 struct $flag_type(u32);
278 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
281 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
283 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
286 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
289 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
290 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
293 Ok($flag_type(flags))
298 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
301 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
304 impl core::ops::Not for $flag_type {
306 fn not(self) -> Self::Output { Self(!self.0) }
308 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
310 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
312 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
313 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
315 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
317 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
319 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
320 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
323 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
324 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
326 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
327 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
328 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
330 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
332 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
333 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
335 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
337 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
339 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
340 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
342 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
343 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
345 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
346 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
351 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
354 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
355 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
356 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
357 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
358 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
359 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
360 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
361 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
362 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
363 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
364 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
365 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
366 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
367 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
371 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
373 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
374 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED),
375 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
376 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
377 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS),
378 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
379 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
380 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT),
381 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
382 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT)
387 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
388 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
389 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
390 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
391 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
392 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
397 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
398 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
399 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
400 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
401 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY),
402 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
403 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
404 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY),
405 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
406 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
407 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)
412 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
413 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
414 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
415 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
416 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
417 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
418 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE)
422 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
424 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
425 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
426 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
427 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
428 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
430 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
431 /// funding transaction to confirm.
432 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
433 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
435 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
436 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
437 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
441 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
442 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
444 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
447 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.is_set($state_flag.into()),
456 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags |= $state_flag,
458 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
462 fn $clear(&mut self) {
465 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags &= !($state_flag),
467 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
471 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, FUNDED_STATES) => {
472 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
474 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, $state: ident) => {
475 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [$state]);
480 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
482 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
483 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
485 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
486 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
487 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
488 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
489 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
490 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
491 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
492 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
500 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
502 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
503 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
504 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
505 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
506 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
510 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
511 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
514 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
515 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
518 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
520 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
521 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
522 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
526 fn should_force_holding_cell(&self) -> bool {
528 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
529 flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) ||
530 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) ||
531 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
533 debug_assert!(false, "The holding cell is only valid within ChannelReady");
539 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected,
540 FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED, FUNDED_STATES);
541 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress,
542 FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, FUNDED_STATES);
543 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent,
544 FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
545 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent,
546 FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
547 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready,
548 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
549 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready,
550 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
551 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch,
552 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH, AwaitingChannelReady);
553 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke,
554 ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, ChannelReady);
557 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
559 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
561 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
562 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
563 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
564 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
568 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
570 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
572 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
574 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
575 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
576 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
577 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
578 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
580 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
581 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
583 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
585 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
586 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
588 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
589 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
590 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
591 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
592 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
593 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
595 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
596 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
598 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
599 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
600 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
601 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
602 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
604 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
605 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
607 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
608 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
610 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
611 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
612 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
613 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
619 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
620 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
622 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
623 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
624 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
629 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
630 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
632 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
633 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
634 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
639 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
641 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
642 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
645 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
646 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
647 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
648 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
649 self.logger.log(record)
653 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
654 where L::Target: Logger {
655 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
656 where S::Target: SignerProvider
660 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
661 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
666 macro_rules! secp_check {
667 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
670 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
675 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
676 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
677 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
678 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
679 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
680 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
681 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
682 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
684 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
686 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
688 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
692 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
694 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
695 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
696 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
698 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
699 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
701 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
702 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
703 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
704 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
705 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
707 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
708 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
712 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
718 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
721 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
722 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
723 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
724 holding_cell_msat: u64,
725 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
728 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
729 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
730 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
731 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
732 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
733 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
734 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
735 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
736 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
737 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
738 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
741 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
742 struct HTLCCandidate {
744 origin: HTLCInitiator,
748 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
756 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
758 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
760 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
761 htlc_value_msat: u64,
762 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
767 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
768 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
769 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
770 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
771 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
773 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
774 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
775 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
776 htlc_value_msat: u64,
778 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
779 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
783 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
784 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
785 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
786 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
787 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
788 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
789 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
790 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
791 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
792 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
793 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
796 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
798 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
799 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
800 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
801 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
804 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
805 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
806 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
807 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
808 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
809 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
810 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
811 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
814 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
816 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
817 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
818 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
819 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
820 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
821 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
822 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
823 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
824 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
825 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
828 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
829 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
830 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
831 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
832 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
833 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
834 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
835 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
836 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
837 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
838 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
839 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
840 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
841 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
842 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
844 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
845 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
846 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
847 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
849 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
850 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
851 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
852 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
854 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
855 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
856 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
857 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
858 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
860 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
861 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
862 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
863 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
865 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
866 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
867 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
869 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
870 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
871 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
872 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
873 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
875 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
876 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
879 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
880 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
882 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
883 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
884 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
885 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
887 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
888 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
890 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
891 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
894 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
895 (0, update, required),
898 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
899 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
900 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
901 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
902 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
906 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
907 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
908 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
910 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
912 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
913 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
914 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
918 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
920 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
921 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
927 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
928 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
929 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
930 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
931 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
933 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
934 /// in a timely manner.
935 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
938 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
939 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
940 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
942 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
943 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
944 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
945 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
949 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
950 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
951 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
953 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
954 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
955 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
956 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
958 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
962 /// The current channel ID.
963 channel_id: ChannelId,
964 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
965 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
966 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
967 channel_state: ChannelState,
969 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
970 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
972 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
973 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
974 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
976 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
977 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
978 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
979 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
981 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
982 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
984 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
986 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
987 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
988 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
990 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
991 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
992 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
994 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
995 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
996 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
997 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
998 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
999 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1001 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1002 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1003 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1004 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1005 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1006 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1008 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1010 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1011 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1012 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1014 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1015 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1016 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1017 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1018 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1019 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1020 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1022 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1023 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1024 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1026 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1027 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1028 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1029 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1030 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1031 /// outbound or inbound.
1032 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1034 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1036 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1037 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1038 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1039 // HTLCs with similar state.
1040 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1041 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1042 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1043 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1044 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1045 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1046 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1047 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1048 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1049 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1051 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1052 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1053 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1055 update_time_counter: u32,
1057 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1058 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1059 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1060 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1061 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1062 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1064 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1065 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1067 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1068 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1069 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1070 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1072 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1073 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1075 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1077 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1079 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1080 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1081 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1082 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1083 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1085 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1086 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1088 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1089 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1090 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1092 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1093 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1094 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1095 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1096 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1097 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1098 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1099 channel_creation_height: u32,
1101 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1104 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1106 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1109 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1111 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1114 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1116 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1118 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1119 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1122 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1124 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1126 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1127 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1129 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1131 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1132 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1133 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1135 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1137 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1138 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1139 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1141 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1142 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1143 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1145 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1147 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1149 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1150 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1151 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1152 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1154 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1155 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1156 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1158 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1159 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1160 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1162 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1163 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1164 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1165 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1166 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1167 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1168 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1169 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1171 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1172 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1173 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1174 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1175 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1177 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1178 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1180 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1181 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1182 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1183 /// unblock the state machine.
1185 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1186 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1187 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1189 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1190 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1191 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1193 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1194 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1195 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1196 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1197 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1198 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1199 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1200 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1202 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1203 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1205 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1206 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1207 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1209 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1210 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1211 // associated channel mapping.
1213 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1214 // to store all of them.
1215 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1217 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1218 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1219 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1220 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1221 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1223 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1224 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1226 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1227 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1229 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1230 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1231 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1233 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1234 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1235 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1238 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1239 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1240 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1241 self.update_time_counter
1244 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1245 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1248 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1249 self.config.announced_channel
1252 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1253 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1256 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1257 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1258 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1259 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1262 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1263 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1264 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1267 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1268 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1269 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1270 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1271 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1272 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1273 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1276 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1277 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1278 match self.channel_state {
1279 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1280 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1281 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1282 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1283 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1284 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1285 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1287 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1289 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1290 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1294 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1295 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1296 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1297 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1298 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1299 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1302 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1303 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1304 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1308 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1309 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1310 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1311 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1312 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1315 // Public utilities:
1317 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1321 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1323 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1324 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1325 self.temporary_channel_id
1328 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1332 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1333 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1334 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1338 /// Gets the channel's type
1339 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1343 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1345 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1346 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1347 self.short_channel_id
1350 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1351 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1352 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1355 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1356 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1357 self.outbound_scid_alias
1360 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1362 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1363 return &self.holder_signer
1366 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1367 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1368 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1369 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1370 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1371 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1374 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1375 /// get_funding_created.
1376 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1377 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1380 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1381 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1382 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1383 if conf_height > 0 {
1390 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1391 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1392 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1395 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1396 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1397 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1398 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1402 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1405 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1406 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1409 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1410 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1413 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1414 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1415 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1418 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1419 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1422 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1423 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1424 self.counterparty_node_id
1427 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1428 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1429 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1432 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1433 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1434 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1437 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1438 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1440 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1441 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1442 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1443 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1445 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1449 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1450 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1451 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1454 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1455 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1456 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1459 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1460 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1461 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1463 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1464 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1469 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1470 self.channel_value_satoshis
1473 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1474 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1477 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1478 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1481 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1482 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1483 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1485 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1486 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1487 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1488 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1489 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1491 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1495 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1496 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1497 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1500 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1501 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1502 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1505 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1506 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1507 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1510 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1511 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1512 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1515 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1516 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1517 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1520 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1521 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1522 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1525 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1526 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1527 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1528 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1529 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1532 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1534 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1535 self.prev_config = None;
1539 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1540 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1544 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1545 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1546 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1547 let did_channel_update =
1548 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1549 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1550 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1551 if did_channel_update {
1552 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1553 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1554 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1555 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1557 self.config.options = *config;
1561 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1562 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1563 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1564 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1565 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1568 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1569 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1570 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1571 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1572 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1574 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1575 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1576 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1577 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1578 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1579 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1580 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1582 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1583 where L::Target: Logger
1585 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1586 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1587 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1589 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1590 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1591 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1592 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1594 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1595 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1596 if match update_state {
1597 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1598 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1599 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1600 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1601 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1603 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1607 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1608 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1609 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1611 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1613 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1614 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1615 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1617 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1618 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1619 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1620 transaction_output_index: None
1625 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1626 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1627 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1628 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1629 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1632 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1634 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1635 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1636 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1638 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1639 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1642 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1643 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1646 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1648 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1649 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1650 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1652 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1653 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1659 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1661 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1662 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1663 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1664 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1665 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1666 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1667 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1671 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1672 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1674 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1676 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1677 if generated_by_local {
1678 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1679 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1680 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1690 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1692 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1693 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1694 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1695 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1696 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1697 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1698 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1701 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1702 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1703 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1704 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1708 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1709 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1713 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1714 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1716 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1718 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1719 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1721 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1722 if !generated_by_local {
1723 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1731 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1732 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1733 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1734 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1735 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1736 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1737 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1738 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1740 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1742 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1743 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1744 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1745 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1747 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1749 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1750 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1751 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1752 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1755 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1756 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1757 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1758 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1760 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1763 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1764 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1765 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1766 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1768 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1771 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1772 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1777 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1778 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1783 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1785 let channel_parameters =
1786 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1787 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1788 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1795 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1798 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1799 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1800 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1801 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1803 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1804 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1805 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1813 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1814 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1815 inbound_htlc_preimages,
1816 outbound_htlc_preimages,
1821 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1822 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1823 /// our counterparty!)
1824 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1825 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1826 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1827 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1828 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1829 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1830 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1832 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1836 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1837 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1838 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1839 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1840 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1841 //may see payments to it!
1842 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1843 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1844 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1846 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1849 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1850 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1851 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1852 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1853 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1856 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1857 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1860 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1864 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1865 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1866 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1867 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1868 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1869 // which are near the dust limit.
1870 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1871 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1872 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1873 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1874 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1876 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1877 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1879 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1882 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1883 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1884 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1887 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1888 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1890 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1891 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1892 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1893 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1894 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1895 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1896 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1899 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1902 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1903 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1904 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1906 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1907 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1908 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1909 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1910 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1911 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1913 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1914 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1920 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1921 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1923 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1924 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1925 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1926 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1927 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1928 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1929 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1932 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1935 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1936 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1937 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1939 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1940 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1941 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1942 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1943 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1944 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1946 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1947 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1951 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1952 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1953 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1954 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1955 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1956 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1957 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1959 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1960 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1962 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1969 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1970 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1971 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1972 /// corner case properly.
1973 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1974 -> AvailableBalances
1975 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1977 let context = &self;
1978 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1979 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1980 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1982 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1983 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1984 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1985 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1988 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1990 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1991 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1993 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1995 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1997 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1998 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2002 if context.is_outbound() {
2003 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2004 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2006 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2007 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2009 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2010 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2011 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2012 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2015 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2016 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2017 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2018 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2019 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2020 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2021 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2024 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2025 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2026 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2027 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2028 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2029 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2030 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2031 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2032 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2033 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2034 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2036 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2039 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2040 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2041 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2042 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2043 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2046 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2047 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2049 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2050 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2051 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2053 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2054 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2055 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2056 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2060 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2062 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2063 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2064 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2065 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2066 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2067 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2068 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2070 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2071 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2073 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2074 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2075 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2077 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2078 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2079 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2080 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2081 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2084 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2085 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2086 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2087 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2088 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2089 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2092 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2093 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2094 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2096 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2100 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2101 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2103 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2104 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2108 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2109 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2110 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2111 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2113 outbound_capacity_msat,
2114 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2115 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2120 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2121 let context = &self;
2122 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2125 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2126 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2128 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2129 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2131 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2132 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2134 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2135 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2136 let context = &self;
2137 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2139 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2142 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2143 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2145 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2146 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2148 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2149 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2151 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2152 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2156 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2157 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2163 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2164 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2165 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2168 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2169 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2170 included_htlcs += 1;
2173 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2174 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2178 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2179 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2180 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2181 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2182 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2183 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2188 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2190 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2191 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2196 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2197 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2201 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2202 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2203 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2206 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2207 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2209 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2210 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2211 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2213 total_pending_htlcs,
2214 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2215 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2216 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2218 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2219 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2220 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2222 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2224 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2229 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2230 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2232 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2233 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2235 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2236 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2238 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2239 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2240 let context = &self;
2241 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2243 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2246 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2247 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2249 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2250 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2252 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2253 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2255 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2256 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2260 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2261 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2267 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2268 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2269 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2270 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2271 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2272 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2275 included_htlcs += 1;
2278 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2279 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2282 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2283 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2285 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2286 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2287 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2292 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2293 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2294 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2297 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2298 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2300 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2301 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2303 total_pending_htlcs,
2304 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2305 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2306 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2308 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2309 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2310 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2312 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2314 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2319 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2320 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2321 match self.channel_state {
2322 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2323 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) {
2332 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2334 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2335 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2338 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2340 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2341 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2342 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2346 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2347 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2348 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2351 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2353 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2354 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2357 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2358 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2359 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2360 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2361 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2362 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2363 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2364 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2365 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2366 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2367 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2369 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2370 // return them to fail the payment.
2371 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2372 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2373 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2375 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2376 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2381 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2382 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2383 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2384 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2385 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2386 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2387 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2388 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2389 let generate_monitor_update = match self.channel_state {
2390 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => true,
2393 if generate_monitor_update {
2394 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2395 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2396 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2397 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2401 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2403 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2404 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2407 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2408 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2409 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2410 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2414 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2415 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2416 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2417 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2419 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2420 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2421 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2422 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2424 match &self.holder_signer {
2425 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2426 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2427 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2428 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2429 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2432 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2436 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2437 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2438 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2439 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2440 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2441 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2444 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2445 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2447 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2454 // Internal utility functions for channels
2456 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2457 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2458 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2460 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2462 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2463 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2464 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2466 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2469 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2471 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2474 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2475 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2476 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2478 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2480 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2481 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2482 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2483 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2484 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2487 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2488 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2489 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2490 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2491 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2492 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2493 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2496 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2497 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2499 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2500 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2503 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2504 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2505 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2506 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2507 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2508 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2511 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2512 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2513 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2514 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2517 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2518 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2520 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2521 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2522 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2526 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
2527 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
2528 trait FailHTLCContents {
2529 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
2530 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
2531 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
2532 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
2534 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
2535 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
2536 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2537 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
2539 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2540 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
2542 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2543 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
2546 impl FailHTLCContents for (u16, [u8; 32]) {
2547 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC; // (failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
2548 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2549 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2552 failure_code: self.0,
2553 sha256_of_onion: self.1
2556 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2557 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(
2558 InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((self.1, self.0))
2561 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2562 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
2564 failure_code: self.0,
2565 sha256_of_onion: self.1
2570 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
2571 fn name() -> &'static str;
2573 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2574 fn name() -> &'static str {
2578 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2579 fn name() -> &'static str {
2580 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
2584 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2585 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2586 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2588 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2589 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2590 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2591 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2593 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2594 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2596 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2598 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2599 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2600 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2601 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2603 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2604 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2608 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2614 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2615 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2616 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2617 // outside of those situations will fail.
2618 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2622 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2627 1 + // script length (0)
2631 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2632 2 + // witness marker and flag
2633 1 + // witness element count
2634 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2635 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2636 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2637 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2638 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2639 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2641 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2642 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2643 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2649 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2650 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2651 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2652 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2654 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2655 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2656 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2658 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2659 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2660 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2661 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2662 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2663 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2666 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2667 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2670 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2671 value_to_holder = 0;
2674 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2675 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2676 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2677 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2679 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2680 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2683 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2684 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2687 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2690 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2691 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2693 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2695 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2696 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2697 where L::Target: Logger {
2698 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2699 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2700 assert!(self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell());
2701 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2702 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2703 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2704 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2705 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2709 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2710 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2711 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2712 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2714 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2715 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2718 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2719 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2720 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2722 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2723 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2724 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2725 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2726 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2727 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2728 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2730 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2731 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2732 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2734 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2735 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2737 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2740 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2741 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2745 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2749 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2750 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2751 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2752 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2753 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2754 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2757 // Now update local state:
2759 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2760 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2761 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2762 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2763 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2764 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2765 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2769 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2770 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2771 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2772 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2773 // do not not get into this branch.
2774 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2775 match pending_update {
2776 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2777 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2778 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2779 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2780 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2781 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2782 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2785 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2786 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2788 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2789 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2790 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2791 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2792 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2793 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2799 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
2800 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2801 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2803 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2804 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2805 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2807 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2808 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2811 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2812 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2814 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2815 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2817 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2818 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2821 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2824 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2825 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2826 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2827 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2832 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2833 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2834 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2835 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2836 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2837 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2838 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2839 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2840 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2841 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2842 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2843 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2844 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2845 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2846 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2848 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2849 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2850 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2851 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2852 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2855 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2856 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2857 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2863 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2864 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2866 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2870 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2871 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2872 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2873 /// before we fail backwards.
2875 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2876 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2877 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2878 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2879 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2880 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2881 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2884 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
2885 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
2887 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
2888 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
2889 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
2890 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2891 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (failure_code, sha256_of_onion), true, logger)
2892 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2895 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2896 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2897 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2898 /// before we fail backwards.
2900 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2901 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2902 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2903 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
2904 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
2906 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2907 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2908 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2911 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2912 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2913 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2915 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2916 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2917 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2919 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2920 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2921 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2923 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2928 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2929 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2935 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2936 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2937 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2938 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2939 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2943 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2944 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2945 force_holding_cell = true;
2948 // Now update local state:
2949 if force_holding_cell {
2950 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2951 match pending_update {
2952 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2953 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2954 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2955 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2959 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2960 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2962 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2963 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2964 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2970 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2971 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_packet.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
2975 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
2976 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
2978 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2979 htlc.state = err_packet.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
2982 Ok(Some(err_packet.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
2985 // Message handlers:
2986 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2987 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2988 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2989 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2990 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2991 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2992 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
2995 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2996 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2998 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2999 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3000 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3001 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3003 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3006 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3007 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3008 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3011 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3012 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3013 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3014 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3015 // when routing outbound payments.
3016 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3020 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3021 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3022 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3023 match &self.context.channel_state {
3024 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3025 let flags = *flags & !FundedStateFlags::ALL;
3026 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3027 if flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3028 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3029 check_reconnection = true;
3030 } else if (flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3031 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3032 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3033 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3034 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3036 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3037 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3040 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3041 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3042 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3044 if check_reconnection {
3045 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3046 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3047 let expected_point =
3048 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3049 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3051 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3052 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3053 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3054 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3055 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3056 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3058 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3059 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3060 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3061 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3062 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3064 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3065 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3070 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3071 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3073 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3075 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3078 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3079 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3080 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3081 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3082 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3083 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3085 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3086 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3088 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3089 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3090 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3092 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3093 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3094 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3096 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3097 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3099 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3102 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3103 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3105 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3109 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3110 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3111 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3112 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3114 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3115 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3118 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3119 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3120 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3121 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3122 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3123 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3124 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3125 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3126 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3127 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3128 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3130 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3131 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3132 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3133 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3134 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3135 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3139 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3140 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3143 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3144 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3145 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3147 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3148 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3149 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3150 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3151 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3152 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3153 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3157 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3158 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3159 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3160 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3161 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3162 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3163 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3167 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3168 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3169 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3170 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3171 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3172 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3175 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3176 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3178 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3179 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3180 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3182 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3183 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3187 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3190 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3191 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3195 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3196 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3200 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3201 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3202 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3203 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3204 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3205 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3206 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3207 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3208 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3210 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3211 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3212 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3213 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3214 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3217 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3218 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3219 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3220 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3224 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3227 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3228 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3231 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3232 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3233 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3237 // Now update local state:
3238 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3239 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3240 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3241 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3242 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3243 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3244 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3249 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3251 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3252 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3253 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3254 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3255 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3256 None => fail_reason.into(),
3257 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3258 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3259 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3262 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3266 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3267 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3268 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3269 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3271 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3272 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3277 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3280 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3281 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3282 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3284 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3285 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3288 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3291 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3292 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3293 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3295 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3299 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3303 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3304 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3305 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3307 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3311 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3315 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3316 where L::Target: Logger
3318 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3319 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3321 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3322 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3324 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3325 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3328 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3330 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3332 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3333 let commitment_txid = {
3334 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3335 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3336 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3338 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3339 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3340 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3341 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3342 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3343 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3347 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3349 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3350 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3351 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3352 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3355 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3356 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3357 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3358 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3361 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3363 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3364 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3365 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3366 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3367 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3368 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3369 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3370 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3371 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3372 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3373 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3379 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3380 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3383 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3384 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3385 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3386 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3387 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3388 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3389 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3390 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3391 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3392 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3393 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3394 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3395 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3398 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3399 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3400 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3401 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3402 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3403 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3404 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3406 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3407 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3408 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3409 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3410 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3411 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3412 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3413 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3415 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3416 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3419 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3421 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3422 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3423 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3426 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3429 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3430 commitment_stats.tx,
3432 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3433 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3434 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3437 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3438 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3440 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3441 let mut need_commitment = false;
3442 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3443 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3444 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3445 need_commitment = true;
3449 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3450 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3451 Some(forward_info.clone())
3453 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3454 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3455 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3456 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3457 need_commitment = true;
3460 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3461 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3462 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3463 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3464 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3465 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3466 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3467 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3468 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3469 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3470 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3471 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3472 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3473 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3475 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3477 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3478 need_commitment = true;
3482 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3483 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3484 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3485 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3486 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3487 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3489 nondust_htlc_sources,
3493 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3494 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3495 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3496 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3497 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3499 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3500 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3501 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3502 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3503 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3504 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3505 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3506 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3507 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3508 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3509 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3510 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3511 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3512 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3514 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3515 &self.context.channel_id);
3516 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3519 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3520 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3521 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3522 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3523 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3524 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3525 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3526 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3527 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3531 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3532 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3533 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3534 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3537 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3538 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3539 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3540 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3541 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3542 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3543 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3545 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && !self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
3546 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3547 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3550 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3551 /// for our counterparty.
3552 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3553 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3554 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3555 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3557 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3558 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3559 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3560 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3562 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3563 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3564 updates: Vec::new(),
3567 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3568 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3569 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3570 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3571 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3572 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3573 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3574 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3575 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3576 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3577 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3578 // to rebalance channels.
3579 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
3580 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3581 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3582 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3584 match self.send_htlc(
3585 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3586 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3588 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3591 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3592 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3593 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3594 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3595 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3596 // into the holding cell without ever being
3597 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3598 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3599 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3602 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3609 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3610 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3611 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3612 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3613 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3614 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3615 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3616 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3617 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3618 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3619 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3620 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3623 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3624 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
3625 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
3627 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
3628 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (failure_code, sha256_of_onion), false, logger)
3629 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
3632 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
3634 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
3635 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3636 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3637 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3638 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3639 // for a full revocation before failing.
3640 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
3641 update_fail_count += 1;
3643 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
3645 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3650 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3651 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3653 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3654 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3659 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3660 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3661 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3662 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3663 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3665 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3666 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3667 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3669 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3670 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3676 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3677 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3678 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3679 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3680 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3681 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3682 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3683 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3684 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3686 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3687 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3689 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3690 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3692 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3693 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3696 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3698 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3699 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3700 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3704 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3705 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3706 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3707 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3708 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3709 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3710 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3711 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3712 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3715 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3717 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3718 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3721 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3722 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3723 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3724 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3726 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3728 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3733 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3734 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3735 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3736 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3737 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3738 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3739 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3740 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3744 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3745 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3746 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3747 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3748 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
3749 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3750 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3751 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3752 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3754 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3755 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3758 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3759 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3760 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3761 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3762 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3763 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3764 let mut require_commitment = false;
3765 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3768 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3769 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3770 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3771 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3773 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3774 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3775 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3776 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3777 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3778 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3780 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3784 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3785 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3786 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3787 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3788 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3790 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3791 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3792 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3797 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3798 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3800 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3804 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3805 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3807 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3808 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3809 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3810 require_commitment = true;
3811 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3812 match forward_info {
3813 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3814 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3815 require_commitment = true;
3817 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3818 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3819 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3821 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3822 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3823 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3827 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3828 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3829 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3830 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3836 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3837 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3838 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3839 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3840 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3842 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3843 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3844 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3845 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3846 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3847 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3848 require_commitment = true;
3852 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3854 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3855 match update_state {
3856 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3857 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3858 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3859 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3860 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3861 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3863 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3864 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3865 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3866 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3867 require_commitment = true;
3868 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3869 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3874 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3875 let release_state_str =
3876 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3877 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3878 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3879 if !release_monitor {
3880 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3881 update: monitor_update,
3883 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3885 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3890 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3891 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3892 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3893 if require_commitment {
3894 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3895 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3896 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3897 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3899 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3900 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3901 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3902 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3903 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3905 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3906 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3907 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3908 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3909 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3912 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3913 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3914 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3915 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3916 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3917 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3919 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3920 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3922 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3923 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3925 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3926 if require_commitment {
3927 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3929 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3930 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3931 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3932 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3934 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3935 &self.context.channel_id(),
3936 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3939 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3940 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3942 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3943 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3945 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3946 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3952 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3953 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3954 /// commitment update.
3955 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3956 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3957 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3959 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3960 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3963 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3964 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3965 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3966 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3968 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3969 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3970 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3971 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3972 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3973 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3974 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3976 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3977 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3979 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3980 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3982 if !self.context.is_live() {
3983 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3986 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3987 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3988 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3989 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3990 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3991 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3992 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3993 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3994 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3995 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3999 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4000 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4001 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4002 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4003 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4004 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4007 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4008 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4012 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4013 force_holding_cell = true;
4016 if force_holding_cell {
4017 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4021 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4022 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4024 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4025 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4030 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4031 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4033 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4035 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4036 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4037 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4038 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4042 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4043 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4044 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4048 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4049 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4052 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4053 // will be retransmitted.
4054 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4055 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4056 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4058 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4059 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4061 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4062 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4063 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4064 // this HTLC accordingly
4065 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4068 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4069 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4070 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4071 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4074 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4075 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4076 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4077 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4078 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4079 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4084 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4086 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4087 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4088 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4089 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4093 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4094 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4095 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4096 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4097 // the update upon reconnection.
4098 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4102 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4104 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4105 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4109 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4110 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4111 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4112 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4113 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4114 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4115 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4117 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4118 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4119 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4120 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4121 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4122 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4123 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4125 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4126 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4127 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4128 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4129 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4130 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4131 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4134 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4135 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4136 /// to the remote side.
4137 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4138 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4139 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4140 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4143 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4145 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4146 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4148 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4149 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4150 // first received the funding_signed.
4151 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4152 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4153 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4154 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
4156 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4158 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4159 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4160 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4161 funding_broadcastable = None;
4164 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4165 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4166 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4167 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4168 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4169 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4170 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4171 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4172 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4173 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4174 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4175 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4176 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4177 next_per_commitment_point,
4178 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4182 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4184 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4185 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4186 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4187 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4188 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4189 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4191 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4192 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4193 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4194 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4195 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4196 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4200 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4201 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4203 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4204 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4206 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4207 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4210 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4211 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4212 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4213 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4214 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4215 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4216 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4217 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4218 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4222 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4223 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4225 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4226 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4228 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4229 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4231 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4233 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4234 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4235 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4236 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4237 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4238 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4239 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4240 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4241 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4242 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4243 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4244 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4246 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4247 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4248 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4254 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4257 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4258 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4259 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4261 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4262 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4264 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4265 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4268 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4269 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4270 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4271 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4273 SignerResumeUpdates {
4280 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4281 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4282 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4283 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4284 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4285 per_commitment_secret,
4286 next_per_commitment_point,
4288 next_local_nonce: None,
4292 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4293 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4294 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4295 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4296 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4297 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4299 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4300 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4301 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4302 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4303 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4304 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4305 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4306 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4307 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4308 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4309 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4314 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4315 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4317 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4318 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4319 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4320 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4321 reason: err_packet.clone()
4324 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4325 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4326 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4327 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4328 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4329 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4332 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4333 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4334 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4335 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4336 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4343 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4344 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4345 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4346 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4350 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4351 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4352 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4353 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4354 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4355 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4356 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4360 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4361 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4362 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4366 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4367 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4372 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4373 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4374 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4375 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4376 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4377 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4378 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4383 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4384 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4386 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4387 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4388 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4389 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4390 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4391 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4392 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4393 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4396 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4398 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4399 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4400 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4401 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4405 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4406 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4407 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4410 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4411 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4412 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4413 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4414 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4415 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4416 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4418 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4419 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4420 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4421 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4422 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4425 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4426 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4427 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4428 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4429 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4430 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4431 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4432 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4436 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4437 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4438 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4439 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4440 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4441 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4442 our_commitment_transaction
4446 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4447 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4448 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4449 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4451 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4453 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4455 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4456 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4457 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4458 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4459 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4460 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4462 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4463 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4464 channel_ready: None,
4465 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4466 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4467 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4471 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4472 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4473 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4474 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4475 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4476 next_per_commitment_point,
4477 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4479 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4480 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4481 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4485 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4486 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4487 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4489 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4490 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4491 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4494 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4497 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4498 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4499 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4500 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4501 our_commitment_transaction
4505 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4506 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4507 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4508 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4509 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4510 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4511 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4513 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4515 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4516 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4517 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4518 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4519 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4520 next_per_commitment_point,
4521 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4525 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4526 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4527 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4529 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4532 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4533 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4534 raa: required_revoke,
4535 commitment_update: None,
4536 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4538 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4539 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4540 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4542 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4545 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4546 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4547 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4548 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4549 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4550 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4553 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4554 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4555 raa: required_revoke,
4556 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4557 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4560 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4561 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4562 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4563 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4564 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4567 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4568 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4569 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4570 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4575 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4576 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4577 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4578 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4580 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4582 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4584 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4585 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4586 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4587 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4588 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4589 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4590 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4591 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4593 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4594 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4595 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4596 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4597 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4599 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4600 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4601 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4602 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4605 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4606 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4607 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4608 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4609 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4610 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4611 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4612 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4613 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4614 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4615 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4616 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4617 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4618 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4619 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4621 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4624 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4625 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4628 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4629 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4630 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4631 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4632 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4633 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4636 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4637 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4638 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4639 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4640 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4641 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4642 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4644 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4650 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4651 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4652 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4653 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4655 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4656 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4657 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4658 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4659 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4660 return Ok((None, None, None));
4663 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4664 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4665 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4667 return Ok((None, None, None));
4670 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4671 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4672 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4673 return Ok((None, None, None));
4676 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4678 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4679 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4680 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4681 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4683 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4684 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4686 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4687 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4689 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4690 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4691 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4692 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4694 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4695 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4696 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4700 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4706 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4707 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4709 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4710 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4713 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4714 /// within our expected timeframe.
4716 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4717 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4718 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4721 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4724 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4725 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4729 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4730 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4732 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4733 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4735 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4736 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4737 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4738 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4739 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4741 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4742 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4743 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4746 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4748 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4749 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4752 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4753 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4754 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4757 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4760 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4761 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4762 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4763 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
4765 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4768 assert!(send_shutdown);
4769 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4770 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4771 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4773 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4774 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4776 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4781 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4783 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
4784 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4786 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4787 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4788 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4789 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4790 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4791 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4794 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4795 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4797 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4798 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4799 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4800 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4804 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4805 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4806 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4807 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4808 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4809 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4811 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4812 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4819 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
4820 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4822 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4825 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4826 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4828 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4830 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4831 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4832 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4833 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4834 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4835 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4836 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4837 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4838 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4840 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4841 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4844 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4848 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4849 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4850 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4851 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4853 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
4854 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4856 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4857 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4859 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4860 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4862 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4863 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4866 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4867 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4870 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4871 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4872 return Ok((None, None, None));
4875 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4876 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4877 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4878 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4880 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4882 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4885 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4886 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4887 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4888 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4889 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4893 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4894 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4895 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4899 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4900 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4901 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4902 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4903 monitor_update: None,
4904 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4905 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4906 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4907 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4909 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4910 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4911 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4912 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4916 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4918 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4919 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4920 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4921 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4923 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4926 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4927 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4929 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4930 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4931 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4932 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4933 monitor_update: None,
4934 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4935 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4936 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4937 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4939 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4940 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4941 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4942 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4947 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4948 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4949 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4950 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4952 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4953 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4954 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4956 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4958 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4965 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4966 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4967 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4969 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4970 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4972 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4973 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4976 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4977 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4978 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4979 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4980 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4982 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4983 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4984 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4986 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4987 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4990 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4991 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4992 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4993 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4994 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4995 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4996 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4997 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4999 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5002 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5003 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5004 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5005 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5007 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5011 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5012 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5013 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5014 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5016 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5022 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5023 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5024 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5025 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5026 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5027 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5028 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5030 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5031 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5034 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5036 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5037 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5043 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5044 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5045 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5046 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5047 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5048 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5049 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5051 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5052 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5059 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5060 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5063 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5064 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5067 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5068 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5072 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5073 &self.context.holder_signer
5077 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5079 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5080 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5081 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5082 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5083 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5084 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5086 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5088 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5096 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5097 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5101 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5102 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5103 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5104 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5107 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5108 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5109 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5110 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5113 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5114 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5115 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5116 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5117 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5118 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5121 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5122 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5123 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5124 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5125 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5126 if !release_monitor {
5127 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5136 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5137 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5140 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5141 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5142 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5144 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5145 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5147 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5148 if (flags & !(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)).is_empty()
5150 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5151 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5152 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5155 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5156 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5157 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5158 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5159 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5160 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5162 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5163 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5164 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5166 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5167 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5168 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5169 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5170 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5171 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5177 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5178 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5179 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5180 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5183 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5184 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5185 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5188 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5189 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5190 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5193 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5194 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5195 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5196 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5197 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5200 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5201 self.context.channel_update_status
5204 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5205 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5206 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5209 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5211 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5212 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5213 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5217 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5218 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5219 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5222 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5226 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5227 // channel_ready yet.
5228 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5232 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5233 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5234 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if (f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL).is_empty()) {
5235 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5237 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5238 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5239 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5241 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5242 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5245 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5246 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5248 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5249 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5250 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5251 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5252 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5253 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5254 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5255 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5257 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5261 if need_commitment_update {
5262 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5263 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5264 let next_per_commitment_point =
5265 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5266 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5267 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5268 next_per_commitment_point,
5269 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5273 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5279 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5280 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5281 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5282 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5283 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5284 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5285 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5287 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5290 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5291 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5292 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5293 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5294 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5295 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5296 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5297 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5298 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5299 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5300 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5301 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5302 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5303 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5304 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5305 // channel and move on.
5306 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5307 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5309 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5310 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5311 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5313 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5314 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5315 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5316 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5317 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5318 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5319 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5320 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5325 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5326 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5327 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5328 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5329 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5332 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5333 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5334 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5335 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5336 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5337 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5340 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5341 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5342 // may have already happened for this block).
5343 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5344 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5345 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5346 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5349 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5350 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5351 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5352 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5360 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5361 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5362 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5363 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5365 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5366 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5369 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5371 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5372 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5373 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5374 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5376 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5379 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5382 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5383 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5384 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5385 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5387 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5390 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5391 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5392 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5394 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5395 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5397 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5398 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5399 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5407 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5409 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5410 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5411 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5413 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5414 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5417 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5418 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5419 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5420 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5421 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5422 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5423 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5424 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5427 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5428 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5429 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5430 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5432 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5433 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5434 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5436 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5437 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5438 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5439 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5441 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5442 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5443 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5444 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5445 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5446 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5447 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5450 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5451 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5453 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5456 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5457 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5458 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5459 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5460 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5461 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5462 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5463 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5464 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5465 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5466 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5467 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5468 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5469 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5470 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5471 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5472 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5478 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5483 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5484 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5486 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5487 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5488 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5489 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5491 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5494 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5496 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5497 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5498 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5499 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5500 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5501 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5503 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5504 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5507 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5508 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5509 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5510 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5511 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5512 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5514 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5515 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5518 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5519 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5520 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5521 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5522 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5528 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5529 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5530 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5531 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5533 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5536 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5540 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5544 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5545 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5549 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5553 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5554 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5557 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5561 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5563 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5568 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5569 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5570 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5572 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5577 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5579 None => return None,
5582 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5584 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5585 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5587 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5588 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5591 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5597 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5599 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5600 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5601 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5602 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5603 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5604 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5605 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5607 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5608 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5609 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5610 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5611 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5612 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5613 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5614 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5615 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5616 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5617 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5618 contents: announcement,
5621 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5626 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5630 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5631 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5632 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5633 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5634 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5635 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5636 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5637 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5639 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5641 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5642 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5643 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5644 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5646 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5647 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5648 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5649 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5652 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5653 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5654 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5655 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5658 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5661 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5662 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5663 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5664 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5665 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5666 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5669 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5671 Err(_) => return None,
5673 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5674 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5679 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5680 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5681 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5682 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
5683 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5684 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5685 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5686 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5687 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5688 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5689 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5690 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5691 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5692 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5693 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5694 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5697 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5700 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5701 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5702 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5703 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5704 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5705 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5706 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5707 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5708 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5710 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5711 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5712 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5713 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5714 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5715 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5716 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5717 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5718 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
5720 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5721 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5722 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5723 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5724 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5725 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5726 next_funding_txid: None,
5731 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5733 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5734 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5735 /// commitment update.
5737 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5738 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5739 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5740 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5741 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5742 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5743 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5746 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5747 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5748 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5750 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5751 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5756 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5757 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5759 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5761 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5762 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5764 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5765 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5766 /// regenerate them.
5768 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5769 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5771 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5772 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5773 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5774 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5775 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5776 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5777 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5778 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5780 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5781 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
5782 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5784 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5786 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5787 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5788 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5791 if amount_msat == 0 {
5792 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5795 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5796 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5797 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5798 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5801 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5802 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5803 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5806 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5807 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5808 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5809 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5810 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5811 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5812 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5813 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5816 let need_holding_cell = self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell();
5817 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5818 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5819 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5820 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5821 else { "to peer" });
5823 if need_holding_cell {
5824 force_holding_cell = true;
5827 // Now update local state:
5828 if force_holding_cell {
5829 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5834 onion_routing_packet,
5841 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5842 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5844 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5846 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5852 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5853 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5854 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5858 onion_routing_packet,
5862 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5867 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5868 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5869 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5870 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5872 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5873 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5874 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5876 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5877 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5881 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5882 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5883 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5884 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5885 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5886 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5887 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5890 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5891 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5892 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5893 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5894 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5895 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5898 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5900 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5901 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5902 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5903 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5904 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5906 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5907 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5910 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5911 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5912 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5913 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5914 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5915 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5916 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5917 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5918 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5919 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5920 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5923 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5927 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5928 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5929 where L::Target: Logger
5931 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5932 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5933 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5935 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5937 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5938 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5939 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5940 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5941 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5942 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5943 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5944 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5945 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5946 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5947 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5953 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5956 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5957 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5958 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5959 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5960 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5961 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5963 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5964 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5965 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5967 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5968 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5969 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5972 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5973 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5977 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
5978 &commitment_stats.tx,
5979 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
5980 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
5981 &self.context.secp_ctx,
5982 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5984 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5986 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5987 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5988 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5989 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5991 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5992 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5993 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5994 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5995 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
5996 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6000 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6001 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6005 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6006 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6008 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6014 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6015 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6017 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6018 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6019 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6020 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6021 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6022 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6023 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6024 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6026 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6027 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6028 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6031 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6032 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6033 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6039 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6041 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6042 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6043 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6044 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6045 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6047 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6049 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6055 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6056 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6057 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6058 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6059 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6061 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6062 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6063 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6066 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6067 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6069 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6070 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6072 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6073 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6075 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6076 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6077 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6080 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6083 // use override shutdown script if provided
6084 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6085 Some(script) => script,
6087 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6088 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6089 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6090 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6094 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6095 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6097 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6102 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6103 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6104 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6105 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6107 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6108 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6109 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6110 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6111 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6112 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6115 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6116 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6118 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6119 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6120 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6123 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6124 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6125 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6126 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6127 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6129 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6130 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6137 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6138 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6140 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6143 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6144 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6145 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6147 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6148 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6152 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6156 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6157 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6158 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6159 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6162 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6163 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6164 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6165 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6166 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6167 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6168 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6169 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6171 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6172 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6173 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6174 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6176 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6177 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6179 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6180 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6182 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6183 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6184 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6186 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6187 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6189 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6190 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6191 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6192 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6193 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6196 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6197 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6199 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6200 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6202 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6204 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6206 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6207 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6208 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6209 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6212 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6213 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6215 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6216 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6217 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6218 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6222 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6223 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6224 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6228 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6229 Ok(script) => script,
6230 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6233 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6236 context: ChannelContext {
6239 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6240 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6241 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6242 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6247 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6249 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6250 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6251 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6252 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6254 channel_value_satoshis,
6256 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6258 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6259 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6262 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6263 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6266 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6267 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6268 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6269 pending_update_fee: None,
6270 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6271 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6272 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6273 update_time_counter: 1,
6275 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6277 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6278 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6279 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6280 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6281 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6282 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6284 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6285 signer_pending_funding: false,
6287 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6288 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6289 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6290 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6292 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6293 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6294 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6295 closing_fee_limits: None,
6296 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6298 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6299 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6300 short_channel_id: None,
6301 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6303 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6304 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6305 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6306 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6307 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6308 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6309 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6310 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6311 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6312 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6313 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6314 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6316 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6318 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6319 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6320 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6321 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6322 counterparty_parameters: None,
6323 funding_outpoint: None,
6324 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6326 funding_transaction: None,
6327 is_batch_funding: None,
6329 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6330 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6331 counterparty_node_id,
6333 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6335 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6337 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6338 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6340 announcement_sigs: None,
6342 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6343 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6344 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6345 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6347 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6348 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6350 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6351 outbound_scid_alias,
6353 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6354 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6356 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6357 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6362 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6364 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6368 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6369 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6370 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6371 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6372 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6373 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6374 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6375 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6376 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6378 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6383 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6384 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6385 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6388 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6389 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6390 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6391 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6394 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6396 next_local_nonce: None,
6400 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6401 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6402 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6403 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6404 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6405 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6406 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6407 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6408 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6409 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6410 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6413 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6414 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6416 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6418 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6419 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6420 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6421 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6424 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6425 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6427 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6429 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6430 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6432 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6433 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6434 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6435 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6436 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6437 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6440 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6441 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6443 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6444 if funding_created.is_none() {
6445 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6446 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6447 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6454 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6455 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6456 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6457 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6458 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6459 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6460 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6461 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6462 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6463 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6466 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6467 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6468 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6469 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6470 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6471 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6477 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6478 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6479 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6480 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6481 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6482 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6484 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6486 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6488 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6489 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6494 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6495 // We've exhausted our options
6498 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6499 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6502 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6503 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6504 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6505 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6507 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6508 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6509 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6510 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6511 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6512 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6514 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6516 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6517 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6520 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6521 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6522 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6524 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6525 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6528 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6529 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6532 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6533 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6537 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6538 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6539 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6540 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6541 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6542 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6543 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6544 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6545 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6546 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6547 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6548 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6549 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6550 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6551 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6552 first_per_commitment_point,
6553 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6554 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6555 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6556 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6558 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6563 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6564 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6566 // Check sanity of message fields:
6567 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6568 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6570 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6573 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6574 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6576 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6577 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6579 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6580 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6582 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6583 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6584 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6586 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6587 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6588 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6590 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6591 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6592 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6594 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6597 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6598 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6601 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6602 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6603 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6605 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6606 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6608 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6609 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6611 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6612 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6614 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6615 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6617 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6618 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6620 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6621 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6624 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6625 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6626 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6628 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6629 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6631 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6632 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6633 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6635 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6636 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6639 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6640 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6641 &Some(ref script) => {
6642 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6643 if script.len() == 0 {
6646 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6647 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6649 Some(script.clone())
6652 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6654 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6659 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6660 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6661 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6662 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6663 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6665 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6666 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6668 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6671 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6672 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6673 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6674 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6675 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6676 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6679 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6680 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6681 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6684 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6685 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6687 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6688 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6690 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6695 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
6696 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
6697 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
6698 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6699 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
6703 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6704 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
6706 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
6707 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
6709 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6710 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6711 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6712 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6715 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6717 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6718 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6719 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6720 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6722 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6723 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6725 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6726 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
6728 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6729 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6730 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6731 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
6732 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6733 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
6737 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6738 initial_commitment_tx,
6741 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6742 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6746 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
6747 if validated.is_err() {
6748 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6751 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6752 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
6753 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6754 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6755 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6756 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6757 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6758 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6759 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6760 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
6761 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6762 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6764 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6765 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6766 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
6767 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6768 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6769 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
6770 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6771 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6773 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
6774 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
6775 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
6777 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
6779 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6780 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6782 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6784 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
6786 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6787 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6788 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
6791 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
6794 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6795 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
6796 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
6797 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
6802 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6803 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6804 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6805 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6808 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6809 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6810 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6811 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6812 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6813 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6814 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6815 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6816 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6817 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6818 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6821 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
6822 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6824 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6825 // support this channel type.
6826 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6827 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6828 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6831 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6832 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6833 // `static_remote_key`.
6834 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6835 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6837 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6838 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6839 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6841 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6842 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6844 channel_type.clone()
6846 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6847 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6853 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6854 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6855 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6856 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6857 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6858 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6859 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6860 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6861 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6864 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6865 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6868 // Check sanity of message fields:
6869 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6870 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6872 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6873 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6875 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6876 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6878 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6879 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6880 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6882 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6883 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6885 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6886 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6888 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
6890 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6891 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6892 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6894 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6895 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6897 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6898 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6901 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6902 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6903 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6905 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6906 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6908 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6909 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6911 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6912 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6914 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6915 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6917 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6918 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6920 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6921 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6924 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6926 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6927 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6928 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6932 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6933 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6934 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6935 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6936 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6938 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6939 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6941 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6942 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6943 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6945 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6946 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6949 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6950 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6951 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6952 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6956 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6957 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6958 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6959 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6962 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6963 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6964 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6965 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6966 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6969 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6970 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6971 &Some(ref script) => {
6972 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6973 if script.len() == 0 {
6976 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6977 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6979 Some(script.clone())
6982 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6989 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6990 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6991 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6992 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6996 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6997 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6998 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
7002 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
7003 Ok(script) => script,
7004 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
7007 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7008 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7010 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
7013 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
7017 context: ChannelContext {
7020 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
7021 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
7023 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
7028 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7030 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
7031 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
7032 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7033 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7035 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7038 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
7040 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7041 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7044 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7045 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7046 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
7048 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7049 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7050 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7051 pending_update_fee: None,
7052 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7053 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7054 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7055 update_time_counter: 1,
7057 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7059 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7060 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7061 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7062 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7063 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7064 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7066 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7067 signer_pending_funding: false,
7069 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7070 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7071 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7072 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7074 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7075 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7076 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7077 closing_fee_limits: None,
7078 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7080 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7081 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7082 short_channel_id: None,
7083 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7085 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7086 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7087 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7088 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7089 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7090 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7091 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7092 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7093 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7094 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7095 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7096 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7099 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7101 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7102 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7103 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7104 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7105 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7106 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7107 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7109 funding_outpoint: None,
7110 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7112 funding_transaction: None,
7113 is_batch_funding: None,
7115 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7116 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7117 counterparty_node_id,
7119 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7121 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7123 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7124 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7126 announcement_sigs: None,
7128 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7129 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7130 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7131 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7133 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7134 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7136 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7137 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7139 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7140 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7142 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7143 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
7148 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7150 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7156 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7157 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7159 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7160 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7161 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7162 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7165 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7166 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7168 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7170 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7171 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7174 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7177 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7178 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7179 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7181 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7182 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7183 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7184 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7186 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7187 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7188 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7189 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7190 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7191 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7192 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7193 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7194 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7195 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7196 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7197 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7198 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7199 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7200 first_per_commitment_point,
7201 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7202 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7203 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7205 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7207 next_local_nonce: None,
7211 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7212 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7214 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7216 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7217 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7220 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7221 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7223 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7224 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7225 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7226 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7227 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7228 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7229 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7230 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7231 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7232 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7233 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7235 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7238 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7239 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7240 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7244 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7245 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7248 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7249 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7251 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7252 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7254 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7256 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7257 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7258 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7259 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7262 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7263 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7264 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7265 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7266 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7268 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7270 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7271 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7272 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7275 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7276 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7277 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7281 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7282 initial_commitment_tx,
7285 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7286 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7289 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7290 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7293 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7295 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7296 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
7297 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7298 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7300 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7302 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7303 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7304 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7305 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7306 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7307 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7308 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7309 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7310 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7311 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7312 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7314 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
7315 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7316 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7317 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7318 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7319 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7320 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7322 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7323 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7325 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7326 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7327 let mut channel = Channel {
7328 context: self.context,
7330 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7331 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7333 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7337 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7338 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7340 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7346 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7347 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7348 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7349 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7350 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7352 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7353 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7354 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7355 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7361 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7362 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7363 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7364 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7365 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7366 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7371 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7372 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7373 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7374 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7376 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7377 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7378 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7379 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7384 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7385 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7386 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7387 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7388 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7389 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7394 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7395 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7396 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7399 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7401 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7402 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7403 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7404 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7405 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7407 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7408 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7409 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7410 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7412 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7414 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7415 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7416 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7418 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7420 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7422 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7424 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7425 // deserialized from that format.
7426 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7427 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7428 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7430 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7432 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7433 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7434 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7436 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7437 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7438 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7439 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7442 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7443 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7444 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7447 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7448 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7449 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7450 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7452 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7453 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7455 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7457 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7459 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7461 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7464 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7466 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7471 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7472 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7473 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7475 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7476 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7477 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7478 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7479 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7480 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7481 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7483 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7485 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7487 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7490 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7491 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7492 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7495 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7497 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7498 preimages.push(preimage);
7500 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7501 reason.write(writer)?;
7503 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7505 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7506 preimages.push(preimage);
7508 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7509 reason.write(writer)?;
7512 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7513 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7516 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7517 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7518 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
7519 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
7520 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7521 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7523 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7524 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7525 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7528 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7529 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7530 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7531 source.write(writer)?;
7532 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7534 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7535 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7537 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7539 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7540 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7542 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7544 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7545 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7547 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
7548 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
7550 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
7551 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
7552 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
7554 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
7556 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7557 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
7562 match self.context.resend_order {
7563 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7564 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7567 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7568 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7569 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7571 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7572 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7573 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7574 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7577 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7578 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7579 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7580 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7581 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7584 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7585 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7586 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7587 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7589 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7590 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7591 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7593 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7595 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7596 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7597 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7598 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7600 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7601 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7602 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7603 // consider the stale state on reload.
7606 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7607 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7608 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7610 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7611 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7612 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7614 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7615 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7617 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7618 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7619 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7621 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7622 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7624 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7627 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7628 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7629 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7631 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7634 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7635 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7637 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7638 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7639 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7641 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7643 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7645 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7647 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7648 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7649 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7650 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7651 htlc.write(writer)?;
7654 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7655 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7656 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7658 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7659 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7661 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7662 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7663 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7664 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7665 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7666 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7667 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7669 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7670 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7671 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7672 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7673 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7675 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7676 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7678 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7679 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7680 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7681 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7683 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7685 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7686 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7687 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7688 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7689 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7690 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7691 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7693 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7694 (2, chan_type, option),
7695 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7696 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7697 (5, self.context.config, required),
7698 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7699 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7700 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7701 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7702 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7703 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7704 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7705 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7706 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7707 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7708 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7709 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7710 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7711 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7712 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7713 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7714 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7715 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7716 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7717 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7718 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7719 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
7726 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7727 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7729 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7730 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7732 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7733 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7734 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7736 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7737 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7738 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7739 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7741 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7743 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7744 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7745 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7746 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7747 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7749 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7750 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7753 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7754 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7755 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7757 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7759 let mut keys_data = None;
7761 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7762 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7763 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7764 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7765 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7766 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7767 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7768 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7769 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7770 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7774 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7775 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7776 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7779 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7781 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7782 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7783 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7785 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7787 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7788 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7789 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7790 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7791 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7792 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7793 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7794 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7795 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7796 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7797 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7798 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7799 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7804 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7805 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7806 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7807 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7808 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7809 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7810 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7811 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7812 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7813 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7814 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7815 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7817 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7818 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7821 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7822 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7825 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7826 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7828 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7830 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7831 blinding_point: None,
7835 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7836 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7837 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7838 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7839 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7840 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7841 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7842 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7843 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7844 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7845 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7846 blinding_point: None,
7848 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7849 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7850 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7852 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7853 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7854 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7856 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7860 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7861 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7862 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7863 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7866 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7867 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7868 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7870 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7871 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7872 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7873 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7876 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7877 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7878 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7879 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7882 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7884 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7886 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7887 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7888 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7889 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7891 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7892 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7893 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7894 // consider the stale state on reload.
7895 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7898 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7899 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7900 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7902 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7905 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7906 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7907 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7909 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7910 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7911 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7912 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7914 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7915 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7917 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7918 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7920 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7921 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7922 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7924 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7926 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7927 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7929 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7930 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7933 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7935 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7936 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7937 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7938 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7940 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7943 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7944 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7946 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7948 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7949 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7951 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7952 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7954 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7956 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7957 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7958 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7960 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7961 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7962 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7966 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7967 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7968 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7970 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7976 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7977 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7978 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7979 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7980 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7981 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7982 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7983 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7984 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7985 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7987 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7988 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7989 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7990 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7991 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7992 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7993 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7995 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7996 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7997 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7998 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8000 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8002 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8003 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8005 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8007 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8008 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8010 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8012 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8013 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8014 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8015 (2, channel_type, option),
8016 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8017 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8018 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8019 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8020 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8021 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8022 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8023 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8024 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8025 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8026 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8027 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8028 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8029 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8030 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8031 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8032 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8033 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8034 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8035 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8036 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8037 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8038 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8039 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8040 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8043 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8044 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8045 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8046 // required channel parameters.
8047 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8048 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8050 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8052 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8053 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8054 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8055 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8058 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8059 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8060 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8062 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8063 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8065 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8066 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8071 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8072 if iter.next().is_some() {
8073 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8077 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8078 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8079 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8080 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8081 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8084 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8085 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8086 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8088 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8089 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8091 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8092 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8093 // separate u64 values.
8094 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8096 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8098 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8099 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8100 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8101 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8103 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8104 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8106 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8107 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8108 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8109 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8110 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8113 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8114 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8116 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8117 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8118 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8119 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8121 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8122 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8124 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8125 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8126 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8127 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8128 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8131 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8132 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8135 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8136 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8137 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8138 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8139 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8140 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8143 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8144 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8145 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8147 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8152 context: ChannelContext {
8155 config: config.unwrap(),
8159 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8160 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8161 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8164 temporary_channel_id,
8166 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8168 channel_value_satoshis,
8170 latest_monitor_update_id,
8172 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8173 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8176 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8177 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8180 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8181 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8182 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8183 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8187 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8188 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8189 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8190 monitor_pending_forwards,
8191 monitor_pending_failures,
8192 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8194 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8195 signer_pending_funding: false,
8198 holding_cell_update_fee,
8199 next_holder_htlc_id,
8200 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8201 update_time_counter,
8204 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8205 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8206 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8207 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8209 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8210 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8211 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8212 closing_fee_limits: None,
8213 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8215 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8216 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8218 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8220 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8221 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8222 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8223 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8224 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8225 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8226 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8227 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8228 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8231 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8233 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8234 funding_transaction,
8237 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8238 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8239 counterparty_node_id,
8241 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8245 channel_update_status,
8246 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8250 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8251 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8252 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8253 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8255 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8256 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8258 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8259 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8260 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8262 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8263 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8265 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8266 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8268 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8271 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8280 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8281 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8282 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8283 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8284 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8285 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
8286 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8287 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8288 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8289 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8290 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8291 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8292 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8293 use crate::ln::msgs;
8294 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8295 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8296 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8297 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8298 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8299 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8300 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8301 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8302 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8303 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8304 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8305 use crate::util::test_utils;
8306 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8307 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8308 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8309 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8310 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8311 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8312 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8313 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8314 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8315 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8316 use crate::prelude::*;
8318 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8321 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8322 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8328 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8329 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8330 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8331 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8335 signer: InMemorySigner,
8338 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8339 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8342 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8343 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8345 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8347 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8348 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8351 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8355 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8357 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8358 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8359 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8360 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8361 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8364 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8365 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8366 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8367 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8371 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8372 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8373 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8377 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8378 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8379 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8380 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8383 let seed = [42; 32];
8384 let network = Network::Testnet;
8385 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8386 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8387 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8390 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8391 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8392 let config = UserConfig::default();
8393 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8394 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8395 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8397 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8398 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8402 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8403 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8405 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8406 let original_fee = 253;
8407 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8408 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8409 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8410 let seed = [42; 32];
8411 let network = Network::Testnet;
8412 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8414 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8415 let config = UserConfig::default();
8416 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8418 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8419 // same as the old fee.
8420 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8421 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8422 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8426 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8427 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8428 // dust limits are used.
8429 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8430 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8431 let seed = [42; 32];
8432 let network = Network::Testnet;
8433 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8434 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8435 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8437 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8438 // they have different dust limits.
8440 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8441 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8442 let config = UserConfig::default();
8443 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8445 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8446 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8447 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8448 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8449 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8451 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8452 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8453 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8454 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8455 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8457 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8458 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8459 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8460 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8462 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8463 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8464 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8466 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8467 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8468 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8470 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8471 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8472 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8474 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8475 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8476 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8477 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8480 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8482 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8483 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8484 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8485 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8486 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8487 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8488 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8489 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8490 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8492 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8493 blinding_point: None,
8496 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8497 // the dust limit check.
8498 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8499 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8500 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8501 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8503 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8504 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8505 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8506 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8507 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8508 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8509 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8513 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8514 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8515 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8516 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8517 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8518 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8519 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8520 let seed = [42; 32];
8521 let network = Network::Testnet;
8522 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8524 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8525 let config = UserConfig::default();
8526 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8528 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8529 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8531 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8532 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8533 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8534 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8535 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8536 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8538 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8539 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8540 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8541 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8542 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8544 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8546 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8547 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8548 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8549 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8550 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8552 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8553 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8554 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8555 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8556 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8560 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8561 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8562 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8563 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8564 let seed = [42; 32];
8565 let network = Network::Testnet;
8566 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8567 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8568 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8570 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8572 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8573 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8574 let config = UserConfig::default();
8575 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8577 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8578 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8579 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8580 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8582 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8583 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8584 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8586 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8587 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8588 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8589 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8591 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8592 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8593 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8595 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8596 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8597 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8599 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8600 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8601 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8602 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8603 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8604 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8605 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8607 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8609 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8610 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8611 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8612 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8613 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8617 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8618 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8619 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8620 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8621 let seed = [42; 32];
8622 let network = Network::Testnet;
8623 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8624 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8625 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8627 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8628 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8629 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8630 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8631 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8632 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8633 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8634 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8636 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8637 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8638 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8639 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8640 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8641 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8643 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8644 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8645 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8646 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8648 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8650 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8651 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8652 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8653 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8654 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8655 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8657 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8658 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8659 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8660 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8662 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8663 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8664 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8665 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8666 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8668 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8669 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8671 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8672 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8673 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8675 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8676 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8677 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8678 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8679 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8681 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8682 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8684 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8685 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8686 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8690 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8692 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8693 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8694 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8696 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8697 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8698 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8699 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8701 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8702 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8703 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8705 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8707 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8708 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8711 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8712 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8713 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8714 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8715 let seed = [42; 32];
8716 let network = Network::Testnet;
8717 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8718 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8719 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8722 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8723 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8724 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8726 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8727 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8729 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8730 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8731 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8733 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8734 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8736 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8738 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8739 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8741 // Channel Negotiations failed
8742 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8743 assert!(result.is_err());
8748 fn channel_update() {
8749 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8750 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8751 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8752 let seed = [42; 32];
8753 let network = Network::Testnet;
8754 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8755 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8756 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8758 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8759 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8760 let config = UserConfig::default();
8761 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8763 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8764 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8765 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8766 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8767 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8769 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8770 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8771 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8772 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8773 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8775 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8776 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8777 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8778 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8780 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8781 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8782 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8784 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8785 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8786 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8788 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8789 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8790 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8792 short_channel_id: 0,
8795 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8796 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8797 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8799 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8800 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8802 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8804 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8806 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8807 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8808 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8809 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8811 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8812 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8813 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8815 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8818 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8822 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
8823 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
8825 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8826 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8827 let seed = [42; 32];
8828 let network = Network::Testnet;
8829 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8831 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8832 let config = UserConfig::default();
8833 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
8834 let outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8835 let mut chan = Channel { context: outbound_chan.context };
8837 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8839 hops: vec![RouteHop {
8840 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
8841 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
8842 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
8846 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
8847 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
8848 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8850 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
8853 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8855 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8856 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8857 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8858 blinding_point: None,
8860 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
8861 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
8863 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
8866 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
8869 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
8871 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8874 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8875 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8876 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
8878 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
8879 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
8882 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8883 blinding_point: None,
8885 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8886 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
8889 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8890 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
8892 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8893 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
8895 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
8898 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
8899 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
8900 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
8901 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
8902 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
8903 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8904 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
8905 } = &mut dummy_add {
8906 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
8907 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
8909 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
8910 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
8911 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
8913 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
8916 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
8918 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
8919 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
8920 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
8921 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
8922 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
8923 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
8924 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
8925 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
8928 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8930 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8931 use bitcoin::sighash;
8932 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8933 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
8934 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8935 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8936 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8937 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
8938 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8939 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8940 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
8941 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8942 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8943 use crate::sync::Arc;
8944 use core::str::FromStr;
8945 use hex::DisplayHex;
8947 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8948 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8949 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8950 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8952 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8954 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8955 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8956 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8957 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8958 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8960 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8961 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8967 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8968 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8969 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8971 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8972 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8973 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8974 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8975 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8976 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8978 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8980 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8981 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8982 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
8983 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8984 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
8985 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
8987 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8988 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8989 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8990 selected_contest_delay: 144
8992 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8993 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8995 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8996 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8998 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8999 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9001 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9002 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9004 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9005 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9006 // build_commitment_transaction.
9007 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9008 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9009 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9010 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9011 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9013 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9014 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9015 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9016 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9020 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9021 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9022 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9023 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9027 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9028 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9029 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9031 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9032 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9034 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9035 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9037 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9039 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9040 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9041 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9042 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9043 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9044 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9045 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9047 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9048 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9049 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9050 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9052 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9053 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9054 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9056 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9058 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9059 commitment_tx.clone(),
9060 counterparty_signature,
9061 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9062 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9063 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9065 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9066 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9068 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9069 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9070 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9072 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9073 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9076 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9077 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9079 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9080 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9081 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9082 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9083 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9084 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9085 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9086 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9088 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9091 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9092 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9093 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9097 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9100 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9101 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9102 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9103 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9104 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9105 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9107 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9108 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9109 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9110 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9112 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9113 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9114 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9115 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9116 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9118 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9119 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9120 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9121 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9122 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9123 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9125 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9129 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9130 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9131 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9132 "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", {});
9134 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9135 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9137 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9138 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9139 "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", {});
9141 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9142 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9143 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9144 "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", {});
9146 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9147 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9149 amount_msat: 1000000,
9151 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9152 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9154 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9157 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9158 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9160 amount_msat: 2000000,
9162 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9163 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9165 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9168 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9169 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9171 amount_msat: 2000000,
9173 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9174 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9175 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9176 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9177 blinding_point: None,
9179 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9182 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9183 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9185 amount_msat: 3000000,
9187 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9188 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9189 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9190 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9191 blinding_point: None,
9193 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9196 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9197 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9199 amount_msat: 4000000,
9201 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9202 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9204 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9208 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9209 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9210 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9212 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9213 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9214 "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", {
9217 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9218 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9219 "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" },
9222 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9223 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9224 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
9227 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9228 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9229 "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" },
9232 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9233 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9234 "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" },
9237 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9238 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9239 "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" }
9242 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9243 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9244 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9246 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9247 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9248 "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", {
9251 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9252 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9253 "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" },
9256 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9257 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9258 "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" },
9261 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9262 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9263 "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" },
9266 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9267 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9268 "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" },
9271 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9272 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9273 "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" }
9276 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9277 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9278 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9280 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9281 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9282 "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", {
9285 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9286 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9287 "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" },
9290 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9291 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9292 "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" },
9295 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9296 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9297 "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" },
9300 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9301 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9302 "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" }
9305 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9306 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9307 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9308 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9310 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9311 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9312 "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", {
9315 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9316 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9317 "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" },
9320 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9321 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9322 "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" },
9325 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9326 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9327 "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" },
9330 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9331 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9332 "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" }
9335 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9336 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9337 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9338 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9340 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9341 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9342 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9345 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9346 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9347 "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" },
9350 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9351 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9352 "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" },
9355 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9356 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9357 "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" },
9360 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9361 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9362 "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" }
9365 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9366 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9367 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9369 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9370 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9371 "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", {
9374 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9375 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9376 "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" },
9379 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9380 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9381 "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" },
9384 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9385 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9386 "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" }
9389 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9390 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9391 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9393 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9394 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9395 "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", {
9398 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9399 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9400 "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" },
9403 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9404 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9405 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a001483045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b7701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
9408 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9409 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9410 "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" }
9413 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9414 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9415 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9417 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9418 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9419 "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", {
9422 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9423 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9424 "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" },
9427 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9428 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9429 "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" }
9432 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9433 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9434 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9435 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9436 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9437 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9439 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9440 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9441 "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", {
9444 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9445 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9446 "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" },
9449 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9450 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9451 "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" }
9454 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9455 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9456 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9457 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9458 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9460 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9461 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9462 "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", {
9465 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9466 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9467 "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" },
9470 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9471 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9472 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb58170147304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
9475 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9476 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9477 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9479 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9480 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9481 "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", {
9484 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9485 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9486 "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" }
9489 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9490 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9491 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9492 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9493 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9495 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9496 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9497 "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", {
9500 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9501 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9502 "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" }
9505 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9506 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9507 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9508 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9509 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9511 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9512 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9513 "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", {
9516 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9517 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9518 "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" }
9521 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9522 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9523 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9524 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9526 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9527 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9528 "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", {});
9530 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9531 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9532 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9533 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9534 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9536 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9537 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9538 "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", {});
9540 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9541 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9542 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9543 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9544 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9546 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9547 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9548 "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", {});
9550 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9551 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9552 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9554 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9555 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9556 "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", {});
9558 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9559 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9560 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9561 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9562 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9564 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9565 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9566 "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", {});
9568 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9569 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9570 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9571 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9572 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9574 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9575 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9576 "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", {});
9578 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9579 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9580 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9581 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9582 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9583 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9585 amount_msat: 2000000,
9587 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9588 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9590 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9593 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9594 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9595 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9597 amount_msat: 5000001,
9599 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9600 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9601 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9602 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9603 blinding_point: None,
9605 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9608 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9609 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9611 amount_msat: 5000000,
9613 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9614 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9615 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9616 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9617 blinding_point: None,
9619 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9623 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9624 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9625 "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", {
9628 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9629 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9630 "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" },
9632 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9633 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9634 "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" },
9636 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9637 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9638 "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" }
9641 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9642 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9643 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9644 "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", {
9647 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9648 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9649 "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" },
9651 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9652 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9653 "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" },
9655 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9656 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9657 "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" }
9662 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9663 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9665 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9666 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9667 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9668 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9670 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9671 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9672 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9674 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9675 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9677 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9678 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9680 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9681 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9682 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9686 fn test_key_derivation() {
9687 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9688 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9690 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9691 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9693 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9694 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9696 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9697 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9699 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9700 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9702 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9703 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9705 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9706 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9710 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9711 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9712 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9713 let seed = [42; 32];
9714 let network = Network::Testnet;
9715 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9716 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9718 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9719 let config = UserConfig::default();
9720 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9721 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9723 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9724 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9726 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9727 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9728 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9729 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9730 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9731 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9732 assert!(res.is_ok());
9736 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9737 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9738 // resulting `channel_type`.
9739 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9740 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9741 let network = Network::Testnet;
9742 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9743 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9745 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9746 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9748 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9749 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9751 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9752 // need to signal it.
9753 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9754 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9755 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9756 &config, 0, 42, None
9758 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9760 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9761 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9762 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9764 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9765 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9766 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9770 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9771 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9772 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9773 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9774 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9777 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9778 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9782 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9783 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9784 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9785 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9786 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9787 let network = Network::Testnet;
9788 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9789 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9791 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9792 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9794 let config = UserConfig::default();
9796 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9797 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9798 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9799 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9800 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9802 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9803 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9804 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9808 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9809 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9810 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9812 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9813 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9814 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9815 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9816 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9817 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9819 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9823 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9824 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9826 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9827 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9828 let network = Network::Testnet;
9829 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9830 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9832 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9833 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9835 let config = UserConfig::default();
9837 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9838 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9839 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9840 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9841 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9842 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9843 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9844 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9846 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9847 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9848 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9849 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9850 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9851 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9855 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9856 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9858 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9859 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9860 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9861 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9863 assert!(res.is_err());
9865 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9866 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9867 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9869 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9870 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9871 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9874 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9876 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9877 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9878 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9879 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9882 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9883 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9885 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9886 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9888 assert!(res.is_err());
9892 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9893 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9894 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9895 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9896 let seed = [42; 32];
9897 let network = Network::Testnet;
9898 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9899 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9900 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9902 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9903 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9904 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9905 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9907 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9908 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9909 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9914 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9924 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9925 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9926 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9931 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9932 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9938 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9941 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9942 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9943 &accept_channel_msg,
9944 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9945 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9948 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9949 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9950 let tx = Transaction {
9952 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9956 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9959 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9962 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9963 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9964 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
9965 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9966 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9967 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9971 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9972 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9980 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9981 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9982 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9983 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
9985 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9986 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9993 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9994 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9995 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9996 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9997 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
9999 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10000 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10001 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10009 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10010 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10013 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10014 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10015 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10016 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());