1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
240 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
245 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
249 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
250 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
251 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
252 /// move on to ChannelReady.
253 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
254 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
255 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
257 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
258 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
259 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
260 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
261 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
262 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
263 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
265 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
266 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
267 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
277 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
279 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
280 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
281 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
282 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
283 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
284 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
285 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
286 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
287 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
289 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
290 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
292 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
293 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
294 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
295 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
296 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
297 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
298 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
299 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
300 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
302 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
303 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
305 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
307 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
309 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
310 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
311 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
312 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
316 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
318 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
320 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
322 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
323 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
324 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
325 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
326 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
328 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
329 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
331 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
333 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
334 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
336 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
337 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
338 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
339 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
340 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
341 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
343 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
344 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
346 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
347 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
348 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
349 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
350 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
352 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
353 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
355 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
356 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
358 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
359 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
360 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
361 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
367 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
368 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
370 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
371 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
372 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
377 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
378 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
380 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
381 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
382 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
387 macro_rules! secp_check {
388 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
391 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
396 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
397 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
398 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
399 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
400 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
401 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
402 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
403 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
405 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
407 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
409 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
413 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
415 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
416 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
417 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
419 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
420 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
422 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
423 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
424 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
425 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
426 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
428 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
429 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
433 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
439 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
442 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
443 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
444 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
445 holding_cell_msat: u64,
446 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
449 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
450 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
451 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
452 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
453 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
454 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
455 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
456 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
457 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
458 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
461 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
462 struct HTLCCandidate {
464 origin: HTLCInitiator,
468 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
476 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
478 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
480 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
481 htlc_value_msat: u64,
482 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
487 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
488 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
489 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
490 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
491 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
493 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
494 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
495 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
496 htlc_value_msat: u64,
498 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
499 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
503 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
504 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
505 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
506 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
507 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
508 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
509 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
510 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
511 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
512 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
513 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
516 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
517 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
518 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
519 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
520 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
521 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
522 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
523 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
526 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
527 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
528 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
529 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
532 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
533 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
534 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
535 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
536 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
537 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
538 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
539 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
540 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
541 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
542 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
543 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
544 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
545 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
546 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
548 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
549 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
550 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
551 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
553 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
554 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
555 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
556 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
558 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
559 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
560 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
561 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
562 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
564 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
565 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
566 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
567 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
569 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
570 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
571 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
573 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
574 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
575 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
576 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
577 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
579 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
580 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
583 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
584 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
586 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
587 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
588 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
589 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
590 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
592 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
596 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
597 (0, update, required),
598 (2, blocked, required),
601 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
602 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
603 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
605 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
606 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
607 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
608 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
610 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
614 channel_id: [u8; 32],
615 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
618 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
619 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
621 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
622 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
623 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
625 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
626 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
627 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
628 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
630 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
631 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
633 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
635 holder_signer: Signer,
636 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
637 destination_script: Script,
639 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
640 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
641 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
643 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
644 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
645 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
646 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
647 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
648 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
650 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
651 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
652 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
653 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
654 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
655 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
657 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
659 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
660 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
661 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
663 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
664 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
665 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
666 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
667 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
668 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
669 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
671 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
673 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
674 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
675 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
676 // HTLCs with similar state.
677 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
678 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
679 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
680 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
681 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
682 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
683 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
684 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
685 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
688 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
689 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
690 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
692 update_time_counter: u32,
694 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
695 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
696 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
697 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
698 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
699 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
701 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
702 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
704 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
705 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
706 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
707 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
709 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
710 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
712 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
714 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
716 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
717 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
718 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
719 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
720 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
721 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
723 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
724 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
725 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
726 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
727 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
729 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
730 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
731 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
732 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
733 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
734 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
735 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
736 channel_creation_height: u32,
738 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
741 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
743 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
746 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
748 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
753 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
755 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
756 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
759 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
761 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
763 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
764 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
766 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
768 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
769 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
770 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
772 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
774 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
775 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
777 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
778 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
779 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
781 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
783 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
785 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
786 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
787 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
788 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
790 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
791 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
792 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
794 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
795 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
796 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
798 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
799 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
800 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
801 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
802 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
803 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
804 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
805 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
807 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
808 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
809 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
810 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
811 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
813 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
814 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
816 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
817 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
818 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
819 /// unblock the state machine.
821 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
822 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
823 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
825 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
826 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
827 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
829 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
830 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
831 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
832 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
833 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
834 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
835 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
836 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
838 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
839 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
841 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
842 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
843 // the channel's funding UTXO.
845 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
846 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
847 // associated channel mapping.
849 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
850 // to store all of them.
851 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
853 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
854 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
855 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
856 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
857 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
859 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
860 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
862 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
863 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
865 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
866 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
867 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
869 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
870 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
871 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
872 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
873 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
876 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
877 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
878 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
879 self.update_time_counter
882 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
883 self.latest_monitor_update_id
886 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
887 self.config.announced_channel
890 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
891 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
894 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
895 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
896 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
897 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
900 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
901 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
902 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
905 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
906 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
907 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
908 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
909 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
912 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
913 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
914 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
915 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
916 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
921 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
925 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
927 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
928 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
929 self.temporary_channel_id
932 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
936 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
937 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
938 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
942 /// Gets the channel's type
943 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
947 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
948 /// is_usable() returns true).
949 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
950 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
951 self.short_channel_id
954 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
955 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
956 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
959 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
960 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
961 self.outbound_scid_alias
964 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
965 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
966 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
967 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
968 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
971 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
972 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
973 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
974 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
977 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
978 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
979 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
982 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
983 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
984 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
985 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
989 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
992 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
993 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
996 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
997 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1000 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1001 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1002 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1005 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1006 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1009 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1010 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1011 self.counterparty_node_id
1014 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1015 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1016 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1019 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1020 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1021 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1024 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1025 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1027 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1028 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1029 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1030 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1032 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1036 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1037 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1038 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1041 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1042 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1043 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1046 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1047 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1048 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1050 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1051 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1056 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1057 self.channel_value_satoshis
1060 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1061 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1064 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1065 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1068 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1069 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
1072 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1073 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1074 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1077 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1078 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1079 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1082 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1083 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1084 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1087 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1088 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1089 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1092 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1093 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1094 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1097 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1098 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1099 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1102 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1103 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1104 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1105 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1106 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1109 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1111 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1112 self.prev_config = None;
1116 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1117 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1121 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1122 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1123 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1124 let did_channel_update =
1125 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1126 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1127 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1128 if did_channel_update {
1129 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1130 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1131 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1132 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1134 self.config.options = *config;
1138 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1139 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1140 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1143 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1144 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1145 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1146 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1147 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1149 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1150 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1151 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1152 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1153 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1154 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1155 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1157 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1158 where L::Target: Logger
1160 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1161 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1162 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1164 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1165 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1166 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1167 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1169 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1170 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1171 if match update_state {
1172 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1173 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1174 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1175 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1176 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1178 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1182 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1183 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1184 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1185 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1187 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1188 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1189 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1191 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1192 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1193 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1194 transaction_output_index: None
1199 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1200 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1201 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1202 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1203 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1206 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1208 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1209 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1210 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1212 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1213 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1216 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1217 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1220 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1222 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1223 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1224 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1226 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1227 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1233 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1234 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1235 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1236 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1237 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1238 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1239 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1243 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1244 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1246 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1248 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1249 if generated_by_local {
1250 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1251 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1260 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1262 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1263 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1264 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1265 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1266 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1267 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1268 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1271 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1272 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1273 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1274 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1278 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1279 preimages.push(preimage);
1283 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1284 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1286 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1288 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1289 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1291 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1292 if !generated_by_local {
1293 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1301 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1302 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1303 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1304 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1305 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1306 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1307 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1308 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1310 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1312 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1313 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1314 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1315 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1317 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1319 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1320 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1321 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1322 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1325 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1326 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1327 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1328 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1330 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1333 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1334 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1335 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1336 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1338 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1341 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1342 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1347 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1348 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1353 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1355 let channel_parameters =
1356 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1357 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1358 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1365 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1368 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1369 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1370 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1371 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1373 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1374 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1375 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1383 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1384 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1390 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1391 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1392 /// our counterparty!)
1393 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1394 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1395 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1396 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1397 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1398 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1399 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1401 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1405 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1406 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1407 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1408 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1409 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1410 //may see payments to it!
1411 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1412 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1413 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1415 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1418 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1419 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1420 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1421 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1422 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1425 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1426 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1429 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1433 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1434 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1435 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1436 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1437 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1438 // which are near the dust limit.
1439 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1440 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1441 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1442 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1443 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1445 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1446 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1448 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1451 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1452 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1453 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1456 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1457 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1459 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1460 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1461 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1462 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1463 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1464 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1465 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1468 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1471 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1472 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1473 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1475 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1476 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1477 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1478 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1479 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1480 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1482 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1483 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1489 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1490 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1492 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1493 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1494 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1495 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1496 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1497 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1498 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1501 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1504 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1505 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1506 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1508 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1509 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1510 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1511 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1512 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1513 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1515 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1516 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1520 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1521 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1522 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1523 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1524 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1525 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1526 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1528 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1529 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1531 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1538 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1539 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1540 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1541 /// corner case properly.
1542 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
1543 let context = &self;
1544 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1545 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1546 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1548 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1549 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1550 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1551 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1554 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1556 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1557 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1559 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1561 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1563 if context.is_outbound() {
1564 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1565 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1567 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1568 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1570 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1571 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1572 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1573 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1576 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1577 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1578 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1579 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1581 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1582 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1583 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1584 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1585 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1586 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1587 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1588 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1589 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1590 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1592 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1595 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1596 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1597 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1598 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1599 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1602 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1603 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1605 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1606 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1607 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1609 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1610 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1611 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1612 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1616 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1618 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1619 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1620 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1621 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1622 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1623 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1625 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1626 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1628 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1629 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1630 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1632 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1633 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1634 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1635 Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1636 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1639 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1640 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1641 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1642 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1643 context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1644 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1647 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1648 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1649 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1651 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1655 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1656 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1658 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1659 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1663 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1664 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1665 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1666 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1668 outbound_capacity_msat,
1669 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1670 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1675 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1676 let context = &self;
1677 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1680 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1681 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1683 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1684 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1686 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1687 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1689 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1690 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1691 let context = &self;
1692 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1694 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1697 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1698 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1700 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1701 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1703 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1704 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1706 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1707 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1711 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1712 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1718 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1719 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1720 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1723 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1724 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1725 included_htlcs += 1;
1728 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1729 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1733 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1734 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1735 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1736 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1737 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1738 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1743 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1745 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1746 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1751 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1752 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1756 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1757 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1758 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1761 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1762 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1764 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1765 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1766 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1768 total_pending_htlcs,
1769 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1770 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1771 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1773 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1774 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1775 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1777 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1779 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1784 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1785 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1787 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1788 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1790 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1791 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1793 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1794 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1795 let context = &self;
1796 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1798 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1801 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1802 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1804 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1805 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1807 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1808 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1810 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1811 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1815 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1816 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1822 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1823 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1824 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1825 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1826 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1827 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1830 included_htlcs += 1;
1833 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1834 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1837 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1838 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1840 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1841 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1842 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1847 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1848 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1849 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1852 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1853 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1855 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1856 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1858 total_pending_htlcs,
1859 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1860 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1861 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1863 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1864 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1865 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1867 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1869 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1874 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1875 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1876 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1877 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1883 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1884 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1885 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1886 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1887 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1888 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1889 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1890 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1891 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1892 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1893 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1895 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1896 // return them to fail the payment.
1897 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1898 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1899 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1901 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1902 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1907 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1908 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1909 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1910 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1911 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1912 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1913 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1914 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1915 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1916 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1917 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1918 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1919 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1924 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1925 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1926 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1930 // Internal utility functions for channels
1932 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1933 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1934 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1936 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1938 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1939 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1940 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1942 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1945 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1947 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1950 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1951 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1952 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1954 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1956 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1957 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1958 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1959 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1960 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1963 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1964 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1965 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1966 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1967 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1968 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1969 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1972 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1973 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1975 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1976 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1979 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1980 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1981 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1982 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1983 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1984 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1987 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1988 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1989 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
1992 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
1993 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
1994 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
1995 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
1998 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1999 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2001 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2002 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2003 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2007 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2008 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2009 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2010 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2012 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2013 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2014 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2015 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2016 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2017 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2018 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2021 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2022 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2023 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2024 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2025 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2026 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2027 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2028 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2030 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2031 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2035 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2041 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2042 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2043 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2044 // outside of those situations will fail.
2045 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2049 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2054 1 + // script length (0)
2058 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2059 2 + // witness marker and flag
2060 1 + // witness element count
2061 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2062 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2063 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2064 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2065 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2066 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2068 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2069 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2070 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2076 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2077 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2078 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2079 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2081 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2082 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2083 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2085 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2086 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2087 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2088 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2089 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2090 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2093 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2094 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2097 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2098 value_to_holder = 0;
2101 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2102 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2103 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2104 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2106 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2107 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2110 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2111 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2114 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2117 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2118 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2120 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2122 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2123 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2124 where L::Target: Logger {
2125 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2126 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2127 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2128 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2129 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2130 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2131 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2132 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2136 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2137 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2138 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2139 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2141 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2142 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2144 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2146 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2148 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2149 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2150 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2152 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2153 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2154 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2155 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2156 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2158 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2159 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2160 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2162 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2163 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2165 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2168 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2169 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2173 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2177 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2178 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2179 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2180 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2181 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2182 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2185 // Now update local state:
2187 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2188 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2189 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2190 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2191 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2192 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2193 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2197 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2198 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2199 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2200 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2201 // do not not get into this branch.
2202 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2203 match pending_update {
2204 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2205 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2206 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2207 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2208 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2209 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2210 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2213 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2214 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2215 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2216 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2217 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2218 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2219 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2225 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2226 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2227 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2229 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2230 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2231 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2233 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2234 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2237 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2238 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2240 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2241 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2243 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2244 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2247 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2250 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2251 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2252 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2253 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2258 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2259 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2260 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2261 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2262 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2263 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2264 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2265 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2266 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2267 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2268 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2269 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2270 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2271 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2272 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2273 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2274 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2276 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2278 let insert_pos = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2279 .unwrap_or(self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2280 let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2281 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2282 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2283 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2284 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2286 for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2287 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2290 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2291 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2292 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2293 update, blocked: true,
2298 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2299 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2300 monitor_update: &self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2301 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2305 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2309 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2310 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2311 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2312 /// before we fail backwards.
2314 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2315 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2316 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2317 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2318 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2319 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2320 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2323 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2324 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2325 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2326 /// before we fail backwards.
2328 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2329 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2330 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2331 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2332 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2333 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2334 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2336 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2338 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2339 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2340 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2342 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2343 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2344 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2346 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2347 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2348 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2350 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2355 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2356 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2362 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2363 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2364 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2365 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2366 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2370 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2371 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2372 force_holding_cell = true;
2375 // Now update local state:
2376 if force_holding_cell {
2377 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2378 match pending_update {
2379 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2380 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2381 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2382 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2386 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2387 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2388 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2389 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2395 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2396 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2397 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2403 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2405 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2406 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2409 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2410 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2411 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2416 // Message handlers:
2418 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2419 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2420 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2421 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2422 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2424 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2427 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2428 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2430 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2431 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2433 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2434 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2435 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2436 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2439 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2441 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2442 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2443 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2444 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2446 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2447 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2449 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2450 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2452 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2453 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2454 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2455 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2456 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2457 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2461 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2462 initial_commitment_tx,
2465 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2466 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2469 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2470 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2473 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2474 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2475 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2476 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2477 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2478 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2479 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2480 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2481 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2482 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2483 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2484 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2486 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2488 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2490 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2491 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2492 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2493 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2495 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2497 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2498 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2502 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2503 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2505 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2506 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2507 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2508 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2510 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2513 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2514 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2515 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2518 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2519 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2520 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2521 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2522 // when routing outbound payments.
2523 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2527 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2529 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2530 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2531 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2532 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2533 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2534 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2535 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2536 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2537 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2539 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2540 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2541 let expected_point =
2542 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2543 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2545 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2546 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2547 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2548 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2549 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2550 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2552 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2553 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2554 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2555 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2556 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2558 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2559 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2563 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2566 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2567 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2569 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2571 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2574 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2575 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2576 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2577 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2578 if local_sent_shutdown {
2579 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2581 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2582 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2583 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2584 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2586 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2587 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2589 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2592 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2593 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2595 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2596 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2599 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2600 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2601 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2602 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2604 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2605 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2607 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2608 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2609 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2610 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2611 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2612 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2613 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2614 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2615 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2616 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2617 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2619 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2620 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2621 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2622 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2623 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2624 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2628 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2631 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2632 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2633 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2635 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2636 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2637 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2638 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2639 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2640 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2641 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2645 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2646 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2647 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2648 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2649 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2650 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2651 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2655 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2656 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2657 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2658 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2659 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2660 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2663 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2664 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2665 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2666 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2667 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2669 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2670 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2673 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2674 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2677 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2678 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2679 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2680 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2681 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2682 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2683 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2684 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2685 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2686 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2687 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2688 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2689 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2690 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2691 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2692 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2695 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2696 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2697 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2698 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2699 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2702 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2703 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2705 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2706 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2709 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2710 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2711 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2715 // Now update local state:
2716 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2717 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2718 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2719 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2720 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2721 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2722 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2727 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2729 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2730 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2731 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2732 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2733 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2734 None => fail_reason.into(),
2735 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2736 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2737 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2738 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2740 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2744 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2745 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2746 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2747 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2749 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2750 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2755 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2758 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2759 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2760 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2762 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2766 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2769 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2770 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2771 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2773 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2774 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2777 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2781 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2782 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2783 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2785 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2786 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2789 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2793 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2794 where L::Target: Logger
2796 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2797 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2799 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2800 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2802 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2803 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2806 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2808 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2810 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2811 let commitment_txid = {
2812 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2813 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2814 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2816 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2817 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2818 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2819 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2820 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2821 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2825 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2827 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2828 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2829 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2830 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2833 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2834 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2835 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2836 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2839 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2841 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2842 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2843 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2844 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2845 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2846 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2847 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2848 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2849 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2850 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2851 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2857 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2858 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2861 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2862 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2863 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2864 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2865 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2866 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2867 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2868 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2869 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2870 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2871 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2872 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2873 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2876 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2877 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2878 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2879 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2880 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2881 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2882 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2884 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2885 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2886 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2887 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2888 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2889 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2890 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2891 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2893 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2894 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2897 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2899 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2900 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2901 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2904 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2907 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2908 commitment_stats.tx,
2910 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2911 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2912 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2915 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2916 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2918 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2919 let mut need_commitment = false;
2920 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2921 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2922 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2923 need_commitment = true;
2927 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2928 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2929 Some(forward_info.clone())
2931 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2932 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2933 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2934 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2935 need_commitment = true;
2938 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2939 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2940 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2941 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2942 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2943 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2944 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2945 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2946 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2947 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2948 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2949 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2950 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2951 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
2953 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
2955 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2956 need_commitment = true;
2960 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2961 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2962 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2963 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2964 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2965 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
2967 nondust_htlc_sources,
2971 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2972 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2973 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2974 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2976 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
2977 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2978 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2979 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2980 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2981 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2982 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2983 // includes the right HTLCs.
2984 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2985 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2986 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2987 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2988 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2989 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2991 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2992 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2993 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
2996 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2997 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2998 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2999 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3000 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3001 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3002 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3003 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3004 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3008 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3009 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3010 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3011 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3014 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3015 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3016 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3017 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3018 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3019 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3020 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3021 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3024 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3025 /// for our counterparty.
3026 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3027 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3028 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3029 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3030 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3032 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3033 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3034 updates: Vec::new(),
3037 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3038 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3039 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3040 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3041 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3042 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3043 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3044 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3045 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3046 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3047 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3048 // to rebalance channels.
3049 match &htlc_update {
3050 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3051 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3052 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3055 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3056 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3057 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3058 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3059 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3060 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3061 // into the holding cell without ever being
3062 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3063 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3064 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3067 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3073 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3074 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3075 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3076 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3077 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3078 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3079 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3080 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3081 (msg, monitor_update)
3082 } else { unreachable!() };
3083 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3084 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3086 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3087 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3088 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3089 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3090 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3091 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3092 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3093 // for a full revocation before failing.
3094 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3097 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3099 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3106 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3107 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3109 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3110 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3115 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3116 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3117 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3118 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3119 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3121 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3122 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3123 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3125 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3126 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3132 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3133 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3134 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3135 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3136 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3137 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3138 where L::Target: Logger,
3140 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3141 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3143 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3144 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3146 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3150 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3152 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3153 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3158 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3159 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3160 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3161 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3162 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3163 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3164 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3165 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3166 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3169 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3171 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3172 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3175 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3176 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3178 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3180 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3181 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3182 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3183 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3184 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3185 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3186 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3187 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3191 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3192 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3193 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3194 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3195 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3196 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3197 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3198 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3199 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3201 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3202 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3205 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3206 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3207 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3208 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3209 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3210 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3211 let mut require_commitment = false;
3212 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3215 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3216 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3217 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3219 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3220 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3221 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3222 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3223 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3224 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3229 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3230 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3231 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3232 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3233 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3235 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3236 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3237 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3242 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3243 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3245 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3249 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3250 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3252 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3253 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3254 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3255 require_commitment = true;
3256 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3257 match forward_info {
3258 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3259 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3260 require_commitment = true;
3262 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3263 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3264 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3266 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3267 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3268 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3272 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3273 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3274 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3275 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3281 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3282 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3283 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3284 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3286 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3287 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3288 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3289 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3290 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3291 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3292 require_commitment = true;
3296 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3298 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3299 match update_state {
3300 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3301 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3302 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3303 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3304 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3306 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3307 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3308 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3309 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3310 require_commitment = true;
3311 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3312 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3317 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3318 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3319 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3320 if require_commitment {
3321 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3322 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3323 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3324 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3325 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3326 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3327 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3328 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3329 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3331 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3332 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3333 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3334 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3335 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3338 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3339 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3340 let mut additional_update = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3341 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3342 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3343 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3344 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3346 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3347 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3349 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3350 if require_commitment {
3351 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3353 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3354 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3355 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3356 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3358 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3359 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3360 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3361 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3363 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3364 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3365 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3371 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3372 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3373 /// commitment update.
3374 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3375 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3376 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3379 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3380 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3381 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3382 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3384 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3385 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3386 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3387 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3388 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3390 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3391 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3393 if !self.context.is_live() {
3394 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3397 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3398 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3399 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3400 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3401 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3402 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3403 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3404 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3405 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3406 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3410 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3411 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3412 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3413 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3414 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3417 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3418 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3422 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3423 force_holding_cell = true;
3426 if force_holding_cell {
3427 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3431 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3432 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3434 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3435 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3440 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3441 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3443 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3445 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3446 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3447 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3448 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3452 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3453 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3454 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3458 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3459 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3462 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3463 // will be retransmitted.
3464 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3465 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3466 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3468 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3469 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3471 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3472 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3473 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3474 // this HTLC accordingly
3475 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3478 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3479 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3480 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3481 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3484 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3485 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3486 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3487 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3488 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3489 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3494 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3496 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3497 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3498 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3499 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3503 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3504 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3505 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3506 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3507 // the update upon reconnection.
3508 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3512 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3514 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3515 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3518 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3519 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3520 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3521 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3522 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3523 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3524 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3526 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3527 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3528 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3529 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3530 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3531 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3532 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3534 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3535 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3536 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3537 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3538 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3539 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3540 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3543 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3544 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3545 /// to the remote side.
3546 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3547 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3548 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3549 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3552 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3554 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3555 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3556 let mut found_blocked = false;
3557 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3558 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3559 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3563 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3564 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3565 // first received the funding_signed.
3566 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3567 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3568 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3570 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3571 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3572 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3573 funding_broadcastable = None;
3576 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3577 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3578 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3579 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3580 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3581 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3582 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3583 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3584 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3585 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3586 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3587 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3588 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3589 next_per_commitment_point,
3590 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3594 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3596 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3597 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3598 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3599 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3600 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3601 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3603 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3604 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3605 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3606 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3607 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3608 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3612 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3613 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3615 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3616 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3617 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3620 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3621 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3622 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3623 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3624 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3625 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3626 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3627 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3628 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3632 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3633 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3635 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3636 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3638 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3639 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3641 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3642 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3644 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3645 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3646 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3647 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3648 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3649 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3650 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3651 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3652 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3653 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3654 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3655 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3656 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3658 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3659 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3660 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3666 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3667 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3668 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3669 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3670 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3671 per_commitment_secret,
3672 next_per_commitment_point,
3674 next_local_nonce: None,
3678 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3679 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3680 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3681 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3682 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3684 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3685 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3686 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3687 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3688 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3689 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3690 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3691 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3692 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3697 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3698 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3700 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3701 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3702 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3703 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3704 reason: err_packet.clone()
3707 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3708 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3709 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3710 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3711 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3712 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3715 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3716 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3717 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3718 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3719 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3726 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3727 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3728 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3729 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3733 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3734 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3735 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3736 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3737 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3738 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3742 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3743 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3745 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3746 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3747 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3748 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3749 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3750 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3751 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3752 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3755 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3757 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3758 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3759 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3760 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3761 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3764 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3765 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3766 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3769 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3770 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3771 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3772 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3773 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3774 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3776 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3777 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3778 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3779 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3780 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3783 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3784 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3785 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3786 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3787 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3788 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3789 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3790 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3794 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3795 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3796 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3797 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3799 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3803 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3804 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3805 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3806 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3808 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3809 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3810 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3811 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3812 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3816 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3818 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3819 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3820 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3821 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3822 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3825 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3826 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3827 channel_ready: None,
3828 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3829 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3830 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3834 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3835 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3836 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3837 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3838 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3839 next_per_commitment_point,
3840 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3842 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3843 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3844 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3848 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3849 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3850 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3852 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3853 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3854 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3857 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3860 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3863 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3864 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3865 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3866 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3867 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3868 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3869 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3871 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3873 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3874 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3875 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3876 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3877 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3878 next_per_commitment_point,
3879 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3883 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3884 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3885 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3887 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3890 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3891 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3892 raa: required_revoke,
3893 commitment_update: None,
3894 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3896 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3897 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3898 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3900 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3903 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3904 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3905 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3906 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3907 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3908 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3911 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3912 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3913 raa: required_revoke,
3914 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3915 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3919 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3923 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3924 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3925 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3926 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3928 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3930 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3932 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3933 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3934 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3935 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3936 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3937 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3939 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3940 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3941 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3942 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3943 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3945 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3946 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3947 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3948 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3951 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3952 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3953 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3954 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3955 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3956 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3957 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3958 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3959 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3960 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
3961 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3962 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3963 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3964 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3965 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3967 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3970 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3971 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3974 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3975 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3976 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3977 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3978 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3979 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3980 self.context.channel_state &
3981 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3982 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
3983 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
3984 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
3987 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
3988 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
3989 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
3990 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3991 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3992 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
3993 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
3995 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4001 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4002 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4003 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4004 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4006 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4007 return Ok((None, None));
4010 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4011 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4012 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4014 return Ok((None, None));
4017 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4019 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4020 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4021 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4022 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4024 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4025 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4026 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4028 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4029 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4030 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4031 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4033 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4034 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4035 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4040 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4041 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4043 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4044 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4047 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4048 /// within our expected timeframe.
4050 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4051 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4052 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4055 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4058 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4059 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4062 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4063 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4064 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4065 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4067 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4068 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4070 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4071 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4072 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4073 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4074 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4076 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4077 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4078 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4081 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4083 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4084 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4087 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4088 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4089 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4092 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4095 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4096 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4097 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4098 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4100 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4103 assert!(send_shutdown);
4104 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4105 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4106 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4108 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4109 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4111 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4116 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4118 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4119 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4121 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4122 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4123 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4124 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4125 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4126 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4129 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4130 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4131 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4134 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4135 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4136 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4137 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4141 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4142 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4143 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4144 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4145 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4146 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4148 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4149 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4156 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4157 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4159 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4162 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4163 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4165 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4167 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4168 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4169 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4170 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4171 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4172 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4173 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4174 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4175 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4177 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4178 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4181 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4185 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4186 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4187 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4188 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4190 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4191 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4193 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4194 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4196 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4199 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4203 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4207 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4208 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4209 return Ok((None, None));
4212 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4213 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4214 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4217 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4219 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4222 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4223 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4224 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4225 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4226 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4230 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4231 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4232 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4236 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4237 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4238 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4239 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4240 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4241 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4242 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4246 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4248 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4249 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4250 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4251 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4253 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4256 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4257 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4258 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4260 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4261 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4262 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4263 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4267 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4268 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4269 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4270 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4272 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4273 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4274 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4280 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4281 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4282 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4284 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4285 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4287 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4288 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4291 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4292 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4293 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4294 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4295 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4297 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4298 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4299 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4301 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4302 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4305 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4306 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4307 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4308 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4309 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4310 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4311 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4312 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4317 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4318 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4319 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4320 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4322 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4326 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4327 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4328 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4329 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4331 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4337 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4338 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4339 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4340 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4341 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4342 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4343 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4345 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4346 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4349 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4351 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4352 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4358 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4359 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4360 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4361 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4362 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4363 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4364 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4366 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4367 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4374 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4375 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4378 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4379 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4382 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4383 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4387 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4388 &self.context.holder_signer
4392 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4394 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4395 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4396 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4397 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4398 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4399 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4401 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4403 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4411 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4412 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4416 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4417 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4418 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4419 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4422 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4423 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4424 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4427 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4428 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4429 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4430 for i in 0..self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
4431 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
4432 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
4433 return Some((&self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
4434 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
4440 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
4441 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
4442 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
4443 let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
4444 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4445 update, blocked: !release_monitor
4450 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
4451 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
4453 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4454 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4455 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
4456 if release_monitor { self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
4459 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
4460 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
4463 pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4464 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
4465 if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
4466 assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
4472 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4473 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
4476 /// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
4477 pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4478 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
4479 .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
4482 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4483 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4484 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4486 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4487 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4488 if self.context.channel_state &
4489 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4490 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4491 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4492 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4493 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4496 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4497 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4498 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4499 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4500 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4501 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4503 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4504 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4505 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4507 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4508 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4509 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4510 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4511 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4512 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4518 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4519 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4520 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4523 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4524 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4525 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4528 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4529 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4530 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4533 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4534 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4535 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4536 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4537 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4538 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4543 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4544 self.context.channel_update_status
4547 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4548 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4549 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4552 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4554 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4555 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4556 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4560 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4561 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4562 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4565 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4569 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4570 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4571 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4573 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4574 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4575 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4577 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4578 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4581 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4582 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4583 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4584 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4585 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4586 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4587 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4588 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4589 self.context.channel_state);
4591 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4595 if need_commitment_update {
4596 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4597 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4598 let next_per_commitment_point =
4599 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4600 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4601 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4602 next_per_commitment_point,
4603 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4607 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4613 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4614 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4615 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4616 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4617 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4618 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4619 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4621 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4624 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4625 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4626 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4627 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4628 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4629 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4630 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4631 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4632 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4633 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4634 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4635 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4636 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4637 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4638 // channel and move on.
4639 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4640 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4642 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4643 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4644 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4646 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4647 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4648 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4649 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4650 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4651 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4652 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4656 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4657 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4658 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4659 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4660 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4664 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4665 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4666 // may have already happened for this block).
4667 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4668 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4669 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4670 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4673 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4674 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4675 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4676 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4684 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4685 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4686 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4687 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4689 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4690 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4693 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4695 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4696 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4697 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4698 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4700 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4703 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4706 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4707 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4708 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4709 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4711 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4714 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4715 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4716 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4718 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4719 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4721 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4722 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4723 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4731 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4733 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4734 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4735 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4737 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4738 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4741 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4742 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4743 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4744 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4745 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4746 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4747 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4748 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4749 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4752 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4753 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4754 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4755 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4757 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4758 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4759 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4761 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4762 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4763 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4764 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4766 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4767 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4768 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4769 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4770 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4771 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4772 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4775 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4776 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4778 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4781 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4782 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4783 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4784 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4785 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4786 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4787 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4788 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4789 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4790 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4791 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4792 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4793 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4794 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4795 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4796 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4797 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4803 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4808 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4809 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4811 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4812 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4813 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4814 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4816 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4819 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4820 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4821 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4822 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4823 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4824 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4826 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4827 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4830 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4831 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4832 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4833 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4835 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4836 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4838 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4839 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4840 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4841 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4842 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4843 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4849 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4850 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4851 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4852 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4854 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4857 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4861 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4865 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4866 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4870 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4874 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4875 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4878 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4882 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4884 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4889 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4891 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4896 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4898 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4899 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4900 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4901 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4902 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4906 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4908 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4909 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4910 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4911 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4912 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4913 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4914 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4916 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4917 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4918 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4919 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4920 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4921 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4922 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4923 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4924 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4925 contents: announcement,
4928 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4932 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4933 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4934 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4935 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4936 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4937 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4938 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4939 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4941 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4943 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4944 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4945 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4946 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4948 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4949 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4950 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4951 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4954 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4955 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4956 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4957 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4960 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4963 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4964 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4965 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4966 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
4967 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4968 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4971 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
4973 Err(_) => return None,
4975 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
4976 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4981 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4982 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4983 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4984 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4985 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4986 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4987 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4988 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4989 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4990 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4991 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4992 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4993 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4994 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4995 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4996 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4999 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5002 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5003 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5004 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5005 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5006 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5007 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5008 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5009 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5010 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5012 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5013 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5014 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5015 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5016 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5017 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5018 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5019 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5020 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5022 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5023 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5024 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5025 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5026 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5027 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5028 next_funding_txid: None,
5033 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5035 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5036 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5037 /// commitment update.
5039 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5040 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5041 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5042 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5044 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5045 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5047 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5048 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5053 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5054 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5056 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5058 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5059 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5061 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5062 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5063 /// regenerate them.
5065 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5066 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5068 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5069 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5070 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5071 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5072 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5073 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5075 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5076 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5077 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5080 if amount_msat == 0 {
5081 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5084 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
5085 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5086 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5087 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5090 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5091 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5092 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5095 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5096 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5097 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5098 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5099 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5100 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5101 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5102 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5105 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5106 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5107 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5108 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5109 else { "to peer" });
5111 if need_holding_cell {
5112 force_holding_cell = true;
5115 // Now update local state:
5116 if force_holding_cell {
5117 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5122 onion_routing_packet,
5127 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5128 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5130 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5132 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5136 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5137 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5138 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5142 onion_routing_packet,
5144 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5149 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5150 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5151 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5152 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5154 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5155 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5156 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5158 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5159 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5163 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5164 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5165 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5166 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5167 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5168 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5169 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5172 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5173 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5174 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5175 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5176 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5177 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5180 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5182 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5183 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5184 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5186 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5187 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5190 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5191 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5192 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5193 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5194 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5195 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5196 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5197 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5200 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5204 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5205 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5206 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5207 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5209 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5211 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5212 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5213 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5214 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5215 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5216 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5217 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5218 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5219 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5220 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5221 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5227 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5230 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5231 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5232 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5233 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5234 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5235 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5237 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5238 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5239 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5240 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5243 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5244 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5248 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5249 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5251 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5253 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5254 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5255 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5256 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5258 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5259 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5260 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5261 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5262 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5263 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5267 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5268 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5272 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5273 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5276 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5277 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5279 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5280 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5281 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5282 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5283 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5286 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5287 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5288 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5294 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5295 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5298 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5299 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5300 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5301 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5307 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5308 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5310 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5311 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5312 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5313 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5314 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5315 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5316 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5317 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5318 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5321 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5322 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5323 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5325 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5326 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5329 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5330 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5332 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5333 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5334 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5337 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5338 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5339 let mut chan_closed = false;
5340 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5344 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5346 None if !chan_closed => {
5347 // use override shutdown script if provided
5348 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5349 Some(script) => script,
5351 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5352 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5353 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5354 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5358 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5359 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5361 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5367 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5368 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5369 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5370 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5372 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5374 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5376 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5377 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5378 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5379 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5380 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5381 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5384 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5385 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
5386 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
5389 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5390 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5391 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5394 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5395 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5396 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5397 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5398 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5400 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5401 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5408 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5409 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5411 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5414 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5415 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5416 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5418 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5419 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5423 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5427 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5428 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5429 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5432 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5433 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5434 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5435 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5436 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5437 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5438 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5439 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5440 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5442 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5443 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5444 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5445 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5447 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5448 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5450 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5451 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5453 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5454 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5455 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5457 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5458 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5460 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5461 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5462 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5463 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5464 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5467 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5468 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5470 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5472 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5473 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5474 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5475 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5478 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5479 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5481 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5482 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5483 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5484 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5488 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5489 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5490 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5494 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5495 Ok(script) => script,
5496 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5499 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5502 context: ChannelContext {
5505 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5506 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5507 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5508 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5513 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5515 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5516 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5517 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5518 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5520 channel_value_satoshis,
5522 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5525 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5528 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5529 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5532 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5533 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5534 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5535 pending_update_fee: None,
5536 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5537 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5538 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5539 update_time_counter: 1,
5541 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5543 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5544 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5545 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5546 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5547 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5548 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5550 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5551 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5552 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5553 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5555 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5556 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5557 closing_fee_limits: None,
5558 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5560 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5562 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5563 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5564 short_channel_id: None,
5565 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5567 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5568 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5569 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5570 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5571 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5572 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5573 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5574 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5575 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5576 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5577 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5578 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5580 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5582 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5583 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5584 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5585 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5586 counterparty_parameters: None,
5587 funding_outpoint: None,
5588 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5590 funding_transaction: None,
5592 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5593 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5594 counterparty_node_id,
5596 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5598 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5600 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5601 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5603 announcement_sigs: None,
5605 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5606 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5607 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5608 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5610 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5611 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5613 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5614 outbound_scid_alias,
5616 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5617 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5619 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5620 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5625 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5630 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5631 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5632 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5633 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5634 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5635 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5638 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5639 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5640 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5641 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5642 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5643 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5644 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5645 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5646 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5647 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5648 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5650 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5651 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5653 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5654 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5655 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5656 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5659 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5660 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5662 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5665 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5666 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5667 return Err((self, e));
5671 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5673 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5675 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5676 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5677 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5679 let channel = Channel {
5680 context: self.context,
5683 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5684 temporary_channel_id,
5685 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5686 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5689 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5691 next_local_nonce: None,
5695 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5696 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5697 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5698 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5699 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5700 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5701 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5702 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5703 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5704 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5707 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5708 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5709 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5711 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
5712 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5713 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5714 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5721 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5722 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5723 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5724 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5725 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5726 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5727 // We've exhausted our options
5730 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5731 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5734 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5735 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5736 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5737 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5739 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5740 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5741 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5742 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5743 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5745 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5747 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5750 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5751 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5752 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5754 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5755 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5758 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5759 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5762 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5763 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5767 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5768 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5769 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5770 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5771 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5772 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5773 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5774 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5775 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5776 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5777 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5778 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5779 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5780 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5781 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5782 first_per_commitment_point,
5783 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5784 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5785 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5786 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5788 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5793 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5794 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5796 // Check sanity of message fields:
5797 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5798 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5800 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5801 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5803 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5804 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5806 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5807 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5809 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5810 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5812 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5813 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5814 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5816 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5817 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5818 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5820 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5821 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5822 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5824 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5825 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5827 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5828 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5831 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5832 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5833 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5835 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5836 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5838 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5839 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5841 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5842 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5844 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5845 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5847 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5848 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5850 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5851 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5854 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5855 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5856 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5858 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5859 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5861 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5862 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5863 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5865 self.context.channel_type = channel_type;
5868 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5869 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5870 &Some(ref script) => {
5871 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5872 if script.len() == 0 {
5875 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5876 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5878 Some(script.clone())
5881 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5883 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5888 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5889 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5890 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5891 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5892 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5894 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5895 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5897 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5900 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5901 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5902 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5903 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5904 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5905 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5908 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5909 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5910 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5913 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5914 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5916 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5917 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5923 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5924 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5925 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5928 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5929 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5930 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5931 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5932 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5933 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5934 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5935 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5936 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5937 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5938 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5939 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5942 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
5944 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
5945 // support this channel type.
5946 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
5947 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
5948 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
5951 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
5952 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
5953 // `static_remote_key`.
5954 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
5955 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
5957 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
5958 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
5959 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
5961 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
5962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
5964 channel_type.clone()
5966 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5967 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5968 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5973 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
5974 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5975 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5976 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5977 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5978 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5979 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5980 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5981 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5984 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5985 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
5988 // Check sanity of message fields:
5989 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
5990 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5992 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5993 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
5995 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
5996 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5998 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5999 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6002 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6005 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6006 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6008 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6010 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6011 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6012 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6014 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6015 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6017 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6018 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6021 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6022 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6023 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6025 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6026 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6028 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6029 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6031 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6032 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6034 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6035 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6037 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6038 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6040 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6044 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6046 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6047 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6048 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6052 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6053 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6054 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6055 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6056 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6058 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6059 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6061 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6062 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6063 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6065 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6066 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6069 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6070 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6071 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6072 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6073 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6074 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6077 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6078 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6079 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6080 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6081 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6084 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6085 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6086 &Some(ref script) => {
6087 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6088 if script.len() == 0 {
6091 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6092 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6094 Some(script.clone())
6097 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6099 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6104 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6105 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6106 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6107 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6111 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6112 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6113 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6117 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6118 Ok(script) => script,
6119 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6122 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6123 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6126 context: ChannelContext {
6129 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6130 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6132 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6137 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6139 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6140 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6141 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6142 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6145 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6148 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6151 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6152 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6153 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6155 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6156 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6157 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6158 pending_update_fee: None,
6159 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6160 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6161 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6162 update_time_counter: 1,
6164 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6166 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6167 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6168 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6169 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6170 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6171 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6173 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6174 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6175 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6176 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6178 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6179 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6180 closing_fee_limits: None,
6181 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6183 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6185 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6186 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6187 short_channel_id: None,
6188 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6190 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6191 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6192 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6193 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6194 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6195 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6196 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6197 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6198 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6199 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6200 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6201 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6202 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6204 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6206 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6207 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6208 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6209 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6210 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6211 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6212 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6214 funding_outpoint: None,
6215 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6217 funding_transaction: None,
6219 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6220 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6221 counterparty_node_id,
6223 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6225 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6227 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6228 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6230 announcement_sigs: None,
6232 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6233 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6234 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6235 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6237 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6238 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6240 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6241 outbound_scid_alias,
6243 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6244 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6246 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6247 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6252 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6259 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6260 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6263 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6264 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6265 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6266 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6269 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6270 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6272 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6273 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6274 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6275 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6277 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6278 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6280 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6281 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6283 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6284 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6287 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6288 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6290 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6293 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6294 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6295 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6297 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6298 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6299 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6300 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6302 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6303 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6304 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6305 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6306 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6307 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6308 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6309 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6310 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6311 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6312 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6313 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6314 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6315 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6316 first_per_commitment_point,
6317 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6318 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6319 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6321 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6323 next_local_nonce: None,
6327 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6328 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6330 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6332 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6333 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6336 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6337 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6339 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6340 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6342 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6343 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6344 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6345 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6346 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6347 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6348 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6349 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6350 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6353 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6354 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6356 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6357 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6358 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6359 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6361 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6362 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6364 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6365 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6368 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6369 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6370 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6372 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6375 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6376 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6378 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6379 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6380 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6382 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6384 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6385 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6387 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6388 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6389 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6390 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6393 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6394 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6395 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6396 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6397 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6399 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6401 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6402 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6403 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6406 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6407 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6408 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6412 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6413 initial_commitment_tx,
6416 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6417 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6420 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6421 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6424 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6426 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6427 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6428 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6429 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6430 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6431 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6432 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6433 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6434 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6435 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6436 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6438 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6440 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6442 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6443 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6444 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6445 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6447 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6449 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6450 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6451 let mut channel = Channel {
6452 context: self.context,
6454 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6455 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6456 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6458 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6462 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6463 }, channel_monitor))
6467 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6468 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6470 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6476 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6477 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6478 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6479 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6480 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6482 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6483 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6484 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6485 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6491 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6492 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6493 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6494 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6495 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6496 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6501 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6502 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6503 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6504 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6506 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6507 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6508 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6509 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6514 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6515 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6516 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6517 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6518 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6519 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6524 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6525 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6526 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6529 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6531 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6532 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6533 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6534 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6535 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6537 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6538 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6539 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6540 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6542 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6543 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6544 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6546 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6548 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6549 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6550 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6551 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6552 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6553 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6555 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6556 // deserialized from that format.
6557 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6558 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6559 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6561 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6563 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6564 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6565 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6567 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6568 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6569 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6570 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6573 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6574 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6575 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6578 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6579 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6580 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6581 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6583 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6584 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6586 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6588 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6590 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6592 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6595 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6597 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6602 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6604 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6605 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6606 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6607 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6608 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6609 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6610 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6612 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6614 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6616 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6619 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6620 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6621 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6624 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6626 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6627 preimages.push(preimage);
6629 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6630 reason.write(writer)?;
6632 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6634 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6635 preimages.push(preimage);
6637 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6638 reason.write(writer)?;
6643 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6644 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6646 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6648 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6649 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6650 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6651 source.write(writer)?;
6652 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6654 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6656 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6657 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6659 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6661 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6662 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6667 match self.context.resend_order {
6668 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6669 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6672 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6673 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6674 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6676 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6677 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6678 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6679 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6682 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6683 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6684 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6685 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6686 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6689 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6690 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6691 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6692 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6694 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6695 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6696 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6698 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6700 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6701 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6702 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6703 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6705 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6706 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6707 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6708 // consider the stale state on reload.
6711 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6712 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6713 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6715 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6716 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6717 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6719 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6720 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6722 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6723 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6724 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6726 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6727 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6729 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6732 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6733 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6734 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6736 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6739 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6740 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6742 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6743 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6744 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6746 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6748 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6750 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6752 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6753 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6754 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6755 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6756 htlc.write(writer)?;
6759 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6760 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6761 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6763 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6764 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6766 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6767 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6768 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6769 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6770 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6771 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6772 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6774 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6775 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6776 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6777 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6778 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6780 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6781 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6783 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6784 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6785 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6786 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6788 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6790 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6791 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6792 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6793 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6794 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6795 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6796 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6798 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6799 (2, chan_type, option),
6800 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6801 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6802 (5, self.context.config, required),
6803 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6804 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6805 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6806 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6807 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6808 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6809 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6810 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6811 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6812 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6813 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6814 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6815 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6816 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6817 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6818 (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6825 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6826 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6828 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6829 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6831 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6832 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6833 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6835 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6836 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6837 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6838 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6840 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6842 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6843 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6844 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6845 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6846 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6848 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6849 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6852 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6853 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6854 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6856 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6858 let mut keys_data = None;
6860 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6861 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6862 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6863 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6864 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6865 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6866 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6867 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6868 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6869 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6873 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6874 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6875 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6878 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6880 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6881 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6882 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6884 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6886 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6887 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6888 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6889 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6890 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6891 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6892 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6893 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6894 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6895 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6896 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6897 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6898 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6903 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6904 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6905 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6906 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6907 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6908 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6909 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6910 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6911 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6912 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6913 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6914 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6916 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6917 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6920 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6921 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6924 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6925 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6927 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6932 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6933 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6934 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6935 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6936 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6937 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6938 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6939 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6940 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6941 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6943 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6944 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6945 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6947 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6948 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6949 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6951 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6955 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6956 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6957 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6958 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6961 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6962 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6963 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6965 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6966 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6967 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6968 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6971 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6972 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6973 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6974 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6977 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6979 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6981 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6982 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6983 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6984 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6986 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6987 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6988 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6989 // consider the stale state on reload.
6990 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6993 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6994 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6995 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6997 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7000 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7001 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7002 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7004 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7005 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7006 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7007 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7009 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7010 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7012 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7013 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7015 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7016 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7017 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7019 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7021 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7022 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7024 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7025 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7028 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7030 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7031 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7032 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7033 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7035 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7038 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7039 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7041 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7043 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7044 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7046 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7047 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7049 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7051 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7052 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7053 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7055 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7056 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7057 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7061 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7062 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7063 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7065 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7071 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7072 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7073 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7074 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7075 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7076 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7077 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7078 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7079 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7080 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7082 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7083 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7084 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7085 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7086 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7087 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7088 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7090 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7091 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7092 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7093 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7095 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7097 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7098 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7099 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7100 (2, channel_type, option),
7101 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7102 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7103 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7104 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7105 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7106 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7107 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7108 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7109 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7110 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7111 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7112 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7113 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7114 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7115 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7116 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7117 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7118 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7119 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7122 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7123 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7124 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7125 // required channel parameters.
7126 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7127 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7128 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7130 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7132 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7133 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7134 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7135 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7138 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7139 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7140 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7142 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7143 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7145 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7146 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7151 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7152 if iter.next().is_some() {
7153 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7157 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7158 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7159 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7160 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7161 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7164 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7165 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7167 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7168 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7169 // separate u64 values.
7170 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7172 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7175 context: ChannelContext {
7178 config: config.unwrap(),
7182 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7183 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7184 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7187 temporary_channel_id,
7189 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7191 channel_value_satoshis,
7193 latest_monitor_update_id,
7196 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7199 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7200 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7203 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7204 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7205 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7206 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7210 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7211 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7212 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7213 monitor_pending_forwards,
7214 monitor_pending_failures,
7215 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7218 holding_cell_update_fee,
7219 next_holder_htlc_id,
7220 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7221 update_time_counter,
7224 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7225 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7226 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7227 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7229 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7230 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7231 closing_fee_limits: None,
7232 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7234 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7236 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7237 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7239 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7241 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7242 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7243 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7244 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7245 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7246 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7247 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7248 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7249 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7252 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7254 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7255 funding_transaction,
7257 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7258 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7259 counterparty_node_id,
7261 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7265 channel_update_status,
7266 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7270 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7271 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7272 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7273 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7275 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7276 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7278 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7279 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7280 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7282 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7283 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7285 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7286 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7288 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7291 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7300 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7301 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7302 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7303 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7304 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7306 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7307 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7309 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7310 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7311 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7312 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7313 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7314 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7315 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7316 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7317 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7318 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7319 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7320 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7321 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7322 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7323 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7324 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7325 use crate::util::test_utils;
7326 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7327 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7328 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7329 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7330 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7331 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7332 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7333 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7334 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7335 use crate::prelude::*;
7337 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7340 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7341 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7347 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7348 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7349 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7350 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7354 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7355 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7356 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7357 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7358 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7359 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7360 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7364 signer: InMemorySigner,
7367 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7368 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7371 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7372 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7374 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7375 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7378 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7382 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7384 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7385 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7386 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7387 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7388 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7391 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7392 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7393 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7394 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7398 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7399 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7400 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7404 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7405 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7406 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7407 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7409 let seed = [42; 32];
7410 let network = Network::Testnet;
7411 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7412 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7413 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7416 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7417 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7418 let config = UserConfig::default();
7419 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7420 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7421 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7423 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7424 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7428 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7429 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7431 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7432 let original_fee = 253;
7433 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7434 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7435 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7436 let seed = [42; 32];
7437 let network = Network::Testnet;
7438 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7440 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7441 let config = UserConfig::default();
7442 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7444 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7445 // same as the old fee.
7446 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7447 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7448 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7452 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7453 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7454 // dust limits are used.
7455 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7456 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7457 let seed = [42; 32];
7458 let network = Network::Testnet;
7459 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7460 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7461 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7463 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7464 // they have different dust limits.
7466 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7467 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7468 let config = UserConfig::default();
7469 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7471 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7472 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7473 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7474 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7475 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7477 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7478 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7479 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7480 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7481 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7483 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7484 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7485 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7486 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7488 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7489 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7490 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7492 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7493 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7495 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7496 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7497 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7499 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7500 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7501 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7502 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7505 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7507 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7508 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7509 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7510 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7511 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7512 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7513 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7514 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7515 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7519 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7520 // the dust limit check.
7521 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7522 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7523 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7524 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7526 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7527 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7528 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7529 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7530 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7531 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7532 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7536 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7537 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7538 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7539 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7540 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7541 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7542 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7543 let seed = [42; 32];
7544 let network = Network::Testnet;
7545 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7547 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7548 let config = UserConfig::default();
7549 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7551 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7552 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7554 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7555 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7556 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7557 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7558 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7559 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7561 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7562 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7563 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7564 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7565 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7567 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7569 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7570 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7571 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7572 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7573 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7575 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7576 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7577 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7578 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7579 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7583 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7584 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7585 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7586 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7587 let seed = [42; 32];
7588 let network = Network::Testnet;
7589 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7590 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7591 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7593 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7595 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7596 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7597 let config = UserConfig::default();
7598 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7600 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7601 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7602 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7603 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7605 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7606 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7607 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7609 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7610 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7611 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7612 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7614 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7615 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7616 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7618 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7619 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7621 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7622 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7623 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7624 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7625 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7626 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7627 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7629 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7631 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7632 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7633 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7634 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7635 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7639 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7640 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7641 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7642 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7643 let seed = [42; 32];
7644 let network = Network::Testnet;
7645 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7646 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7647 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7649 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7650 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7651 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7652 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7653 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7654 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7655 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7656 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7658 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7659 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7660 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7661 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7662 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7663 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7665 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7666 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7667 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7668 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7670 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7672 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7673 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7674 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7675 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7676 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7677 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7679 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7680 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7681 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7682 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7684 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7685 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7686 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7687 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7688 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7690 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7691 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7693 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7694 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7695 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7697 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7698 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7699 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7700 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7701 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7703 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7704 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7706 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7707 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7708 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7712 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7714 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7715 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7716 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7718 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7719 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7720 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7721 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7723 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7724 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7725 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7727 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7729 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7730 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7733 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7734 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7735 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7736 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7737 let seed = [42; 32];
7738 let network = Network::Testnet;
7739 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7740 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7741 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7744 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7745 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7746 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7748 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7749 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7751 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7752 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7753 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7755 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7756 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7758 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7760 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7761 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7763 // Channel Negotiations failed
7764 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7765 assert!(result.is_err());
7770 fn channel_update() {
7771 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7772 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7773 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7774 let seed = [42; 32];
7775 let network = Network::Testnet;
7776 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7777 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7778 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7780 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7781 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7782 let config = UserConfig::default();
7783 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7785 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7786 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7787 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7788 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7789 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7791 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7792 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7793 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7794 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7795 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7797 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7798 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7799 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7800 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7802 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7803 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7804 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7806 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7807 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7809 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7810 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7811 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7813 short_channel_id: 0,
7816 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7817 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7818 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7820 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7821 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7823 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7825 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7827 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7828 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7829 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7830 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7832 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7833 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7834 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7836 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7840 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7842 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7843 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7844 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7845 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7846 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7847 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7848 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7849 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7850 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7851 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7852 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7853 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7854 use crate::sync::Arc;
7856 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7857 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7858 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7859 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7861 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7863 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7864 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7865 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7866 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7867 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7869 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7870 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7876 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7877 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7878 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7880 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7881 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7882 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7883 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7884 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7885 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7887 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7889 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7890 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7891 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7892 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7893 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7894 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7896 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7897 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7898 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7899 selected_contest_delay: 144
7901 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7902 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7904 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7905 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7907 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7908 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7910 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7911 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7913 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7914 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7915 // build_commitment_transaction.
7916 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7917 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7918 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7919 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7920 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7922 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7923 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7924 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7925 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
7929 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7930 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7931 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
7932 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
7936 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7937 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7938 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7940 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7941 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7943 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7944 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7946 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7948 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7949 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7950 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7951 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7952 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7953 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7954 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7956 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7957 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7958 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7959 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7961 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7962 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7963 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7965 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7967 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7968 commitment_tx.clone(),
7969 counterparty_signature,
7970 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7971 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7972 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7974 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7975 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7977 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7978 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7979 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7981 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7982 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7985 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7986 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7988 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7989 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
7990 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7991 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7992 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7993 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7994 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7995 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7997 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8000 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8001 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8002 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8006 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8009 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8010 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8011 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8013 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8014 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8015 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8016 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8017 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8018 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8019 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8020 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8022 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8026 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8027 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8028 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8029 "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", {});
8031 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8032 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8034 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8035 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8036 "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", {});
8038 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8039 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8040 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8041 "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", {});
8043 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8044 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8046 amount_msat: 1000000,
8048 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8049 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8051 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8054 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8055 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8057 amount_msat: 2000000,
8059 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8060 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8062 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8065 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8066 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8068 amount_msat: 2000000,
8070 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8071 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8072 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8074 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8077 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8078 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8080 amount_msat: 3000000,
8082 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8083 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8084 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8086 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8089 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8090 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8092 amount_msat: 4000000,
8094 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8095 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8097 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8101 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8102 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8103 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8105 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8106 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8107 "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", {
8110 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8111 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8112 "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" },
8115 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8116 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8117 "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" },
8120 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8121 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8122 "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" },
8125 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8126 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8127 "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" },
8130 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8131 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8132 "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" }
8135 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8136 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8137 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8139 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8140 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8141 "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", {
8144 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8145 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8146 "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" },
8149 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8150 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8151 "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" },
8154 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8155 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8156 "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" },
8159 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8160 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8161 "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" },
8164 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8165 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8166 "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" }
8169 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8170 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8171 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8173 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8174 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8175 "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", {
8178 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8179 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8180 "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" },
8183 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8184 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8185 "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" },
8188 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8189 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8190 "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" },
8193 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8194 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8195 "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" }
8198 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8199 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8200 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8201 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8203 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8204 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8205 "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", {
8208 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8209 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8210 "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" },
8213 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8214 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8215 "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" },
8218 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8219 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8220 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320004000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c18347304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
8223 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8224 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8225 "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" }
8228 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8229 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8230 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8231 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8233 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8234 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8235 "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", {
8238 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8239 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8240 "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" },
8243 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8244 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8245 "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" },
8248 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8249 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8250 "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" },
8253 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8254 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8255 "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" }
8258 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8259 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8260 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8262 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8263 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8264 "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", {
8267 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8268 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8269 "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" },
8272 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8273 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8274 "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" },
8277 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8278 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8279 "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" }
8282 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8283 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8284 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8286 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8287 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8288 "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", {
8291 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8292 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8293 "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" },
8296 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8297 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8298 "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" },
8301 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8302 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8303 "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" }
8306 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8307 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8308 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8310 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8311 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8312 "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", {
8315 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8316 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8317 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8320 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8321 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8322 "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" }
8325 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8326 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8327 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8328 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8329 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8330 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8332 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8333 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8334 "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", {
8337 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8338 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8339 "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" },
8342 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8343 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8344 "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" }
8347 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8348 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8349 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8350 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8351 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8353 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8354 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8355 "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", {
8358 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8359 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8360 "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" },
8363 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8364 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8365 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb58170147304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8368 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8369 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8370 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8372 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8373 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8374 "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", {
8377 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8378 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8379 "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" }
8382 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8383 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8384 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8385 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8386 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8388 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8389 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8390 "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", {
8393 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8394 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8395 "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" }
8398 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8399 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8400 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8401 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8402 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8404 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8405 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8406 "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", {
8409 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8410 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8411 "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" }
8414 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8415 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8416 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8417 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8419 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8420 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8421 "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", {});
8423 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8424 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8425 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8426 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8427 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8429 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8430 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8431 "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", {});
8433 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8434 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8435 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8436 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8437 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8439 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8440 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8441 "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", {});
8443 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8444 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8445 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8447 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8448 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8449 "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", {});
8451 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8452 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8453 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8454 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8455 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8457 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8458 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8459 "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", {});
8461 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8462 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8463 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8464 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8465 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8467 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8468 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8469 "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", {});
8471 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8472 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8473 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8474 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8475 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8476 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8478 amount_msat: 2000000,
8480 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8481 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8483 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8486 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8487 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8488 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8490 amount_msat: 5000001,
8492 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8493 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8494 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8496 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8499 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8500 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8502 amount_msat: 5000000,
8504 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8505 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8506 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8508 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8512 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8513 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8514 "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", {
8517 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8518 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8519 "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" },
8521 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8522 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8523 "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" },
8525 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8526 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8527 "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" }
8530 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8531 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8532 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8533 "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", {
8536 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8537 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8538 "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" },
8540 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8541 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8542 "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" },
8544 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8545 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8546 "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" }
8551 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8552 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8554 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8555 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8556 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8557 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8559 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8560 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8561 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8563 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8564 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8566 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8567 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8569 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8570 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8571 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8575 fn test_key_derivation() {
8576 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8577 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8579 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8580 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8582 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8583 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8585 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8586 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8588 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8589 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8591 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8592 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8594 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8595 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8597 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8598 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8602 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8603 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8604 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8605 let seed = [42; 32];
8606 let network = Network::Testnet;
8607 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8608 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8610 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8611 let config = UserConfig::default();
8612 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8613 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8615 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8616 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8618 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8619 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8620 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8621 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8622 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8623 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8624 assert!(res.is_ok());
8629 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8630 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8631 // resulting `channel_type`.
8632 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8633 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8634 let network = Network::Testnet;
8635 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8636 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8638 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8639 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8641 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8642 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8644 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8645 // need to signal it.
8646 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8647 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8648 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8651 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8653 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8654 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8655 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8657 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8658 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8659 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8662 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8663 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8664 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8665 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8666 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8669 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8670 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8675 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8676 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8677 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8678 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8679 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8680 let network = Network::Testnet;
8681 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8682 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8684 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8685 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8687 let config = UserConfig::default();
8689 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8690 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8691 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8692 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8693 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8695 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8696 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8697 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8700 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8701 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8702 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8704 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8705 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8706 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8707 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8708 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8709 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8711 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8716 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8717 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8719 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8720 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8721 let network = Network::Testnet;
8722 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8723 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8725 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8726 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8728 let config = UserConfig::default();
8730 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8731 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8732 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8733 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8734 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8735 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8736 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8737 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8739 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8740 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8741 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8742 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8743 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8744 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8747 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8748 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8750 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8751 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8752 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8753 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8755 assert!(res.is_err());
8757 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8758 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8759 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8761 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8762 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8763 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8766 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8768 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8769 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8770 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8771 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8774 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8775 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8777 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8778 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8780 assert!(res.is_err());