1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
170 enum OutboundHTLCState {
171 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
172 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
173 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
174 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
175 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
176 /// money back (though we won't), and,
177 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
178 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
179 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
180 /// we'll never get out of sync).
181 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
182 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
183 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
185 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
186 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
187 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
192 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
193 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
195 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
196 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
197 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
198 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
199 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
203 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
204 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
206 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
207 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
210 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
213 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
214 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
219 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
220 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
228 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
229 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 state: OutboundHTLCState,
236 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
237 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
242 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
243 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
247 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
250 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
251 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
252 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
255 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
260 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
265 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
269 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
270 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
271 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
272 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
273 struct $flag_type(u32);
278 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
281 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
283 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
286 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
289 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
290 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
293 Ok($flag_type(flags))
298 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
301 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
304 impl core::ops::Not for $flag_type {
306 fn not(self) -> Self::Output { Self(!self.0) }
308 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
310 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
312 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
313 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
315 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
317 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
319 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
320 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
323 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
324 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
326 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
327 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
328 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
330 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
332 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
333 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
335 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
337 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
339 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
340 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
342 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
343 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
345 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
346 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
351 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
354 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
355 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
356 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
357 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
358 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
359 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
360 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
361 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
362 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
363 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
364 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
365 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
366 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
367 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
371 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
373 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
374 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED),
375 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
376 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
377 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS),
378 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
379 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
380 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT),
381 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
382 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT)
387 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
388 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
389 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
390 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
391 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
392 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
397 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
398 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
399 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
400 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
401 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY),
402 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
403 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
404 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY),
405 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
406 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
407 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)
412 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
413 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
414 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
415 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
416 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
417 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
418 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE)
422 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
424 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
425 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
426 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
427 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
428 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
430 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
431 /// funding transaction to confirm.
432 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
433 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
435 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
436 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
437 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
441 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
442 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
444 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
447 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.is_set($state_flag.into()),
456 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags |= $state_flag,
458 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
462 fn $clear(&mut self) {
465 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags &= !($state_flag),
467 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
471 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, FUNDED_STATES) => {
472 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
474 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, $state: ident) => {
475 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [$state]);
480 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
482 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
483 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
485 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
486 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
487 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
488 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
489 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
490 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
491 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
492 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
500 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
502 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
503 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
504 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
505 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
506 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
510 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
511 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
514 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
515 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
518 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
520 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
521 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
522 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
526 fn should_force_holding_cell(&self) -> bool {
528 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
529 flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) ||
530 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) ||
531 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
533 debug_assert!(false, "The holding cell is only valid within ChannelReady");
539 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected,
540 FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED, FUNDED_STATES);
541 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress,
542 FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, FUNDED_STATES);
543 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent,
544 FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
545 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent,
546 FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
547 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready,
548 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
549 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready,
550 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
551 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch,
552 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH, AwaitingChannelReady);
553 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke,
554 ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, ChannelReady);
557 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
559 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
561 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
562 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
563 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
564 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
568 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
570 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
572 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
574 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
575 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
576 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
577 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
578 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
580 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
581 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
583 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
585 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
586 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
588 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
589 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
590 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
591 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
592 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
593 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
595 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
596 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
598 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
599 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
600 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
601 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
602 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
604 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
605 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
607 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
608 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
610 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
611 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
612 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
613 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
619 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
620 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
622 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
623 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
624 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
629 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
630 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
632 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
633 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
634 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
639 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
641 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
642 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
645 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
646 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
647 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
648 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
649 self.logger.log(record)
653 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
654 where L::Target: Logger {
655 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
656 where S::Target: SignerProvider
660 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
661 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
666 macro_rules! secp_check {
667 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
670 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
675 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
676 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
677 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
678 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
679 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
680 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
681 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
682 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
684 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
686 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
688 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
692 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
694 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
695 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
696 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
698 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
699 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
701 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
702 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
703 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
704 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
705 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
707 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
708 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
712 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
718 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
721 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
722 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
723 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
724 holding_cell_msat: u64,
725 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
728 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
729 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
730 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
731 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
732 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
733 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
734 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
735 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
736 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
737 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
738 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
741 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
742 struct HTLCCandidate {
744 origin: HTLCInitiator,
748 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
756 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
758 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
760 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
761 htlc_value_msat: u64,
762 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
767 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
768 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
769 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
770 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
771 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
773 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
774 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
775 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
776 htlc_value_msat: u64,
778 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
779 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
783 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
784 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
785 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
786 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
787 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
788 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
789 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
790 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
791 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
792 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
793 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
796 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
798 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
799 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
800 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
801 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
804 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
805 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
806 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
807 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
808 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
809 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
810 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
811 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
814 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
816 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
817 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
818 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
819 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
820 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
821 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
822 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
823 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
824 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
825 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
828 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
829 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
830 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
831 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
832 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
833 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
834 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
835 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
836 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
837 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
838 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
839 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
840 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
841 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
842 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
844 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
845 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
846 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
847 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
849 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
850 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
851 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
852 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
854 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
855 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
856 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
857 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
858 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
860 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
861 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
862 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
863 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
865 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
866 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
867 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
869 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
870 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
871 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
872 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
873 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
875 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
876 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
879 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
880 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
882 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
883 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
884 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
885 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
887 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
888 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
890 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
891 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
894 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
895 (0, update, required),
898 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
899 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
900 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
901 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
902 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
906 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
907 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
908 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
910 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
912 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
913 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
914 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
918 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
920 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
921 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
927 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
928 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
929 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
930 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
931 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
933 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
934 /// in a timely manner.
935 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
938 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
939 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
940 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
942 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
943 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
944 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
945 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
949 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
950 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
951 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
953 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
954 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
955 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
956 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
958 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
962 /// The current channel ID.
963 channel_id: ChannelId,
964 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
965 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
966 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
967 channel_state: ChannelState,
969 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
970 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
972 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
973 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
974 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
976 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
977 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
978 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
979 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
981 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
982 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
984 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
986 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
987 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
988 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
990 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
991 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
992 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
994 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
995 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
996 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
997 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
998 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
999 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1001 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1002 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1003 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1004 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1005 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1006 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1008 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1010 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1011 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1012 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1014 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1015 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1016 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1017 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1018 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1019 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1020 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1022 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1023 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1024 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1026 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1027 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1028 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1029 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1030 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1031 /// outbound or inbound.
1032 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1034 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1036 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1037 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1038 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1039 // HTLCs with similar state.
1040 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1041 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1042 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1043 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1044 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1045 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1046 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1047 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1048 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1049 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1051 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1052 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1053 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1055 update_time_counter: u32,
1057 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1058 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1059 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1060 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1061 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1062 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1064 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1065 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1067 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1068 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1069 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1070 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1072 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1073 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1075 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1077 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1079 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1080 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1081 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1082 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1083 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1085 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1086 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1088 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1089 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1090 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1092 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1093 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1094 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1095 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1096 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1097 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1098 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1099 channel_creation_height: u32,
1101 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1104 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1106 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1109 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1111 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1114 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1116 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1118 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1119 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1122 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1124 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1126 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1127 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1129 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1131 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1132 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1133 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1135 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1137 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1138 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1139 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1141 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1142 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1143 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1145 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1147 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1149 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1150 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1151 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1152 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1154 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1155 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1156 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1158 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1159 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1160 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1162 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1163 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1164 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1165 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1166 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1167 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1168 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1169 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1171 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1172 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1173 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1174 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1175 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1177 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1178 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1180 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1181 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1182 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1183 /// unblock the state machine.
1185 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1186 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1187 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1189 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1190 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1191 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1193 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1194 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1195 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1196 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1197 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1198 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1199 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1200 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1202 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1203 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1205 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1206 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1207 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1209 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1210 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1211 // associated channel mapping.
1213 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1214 // to store all of them.
1215 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1217 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1218 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1219 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1220 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1221 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1223 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1224 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1226 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1227 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1229 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1230 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1231 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1233 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1234 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1235 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1238 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1239 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1240 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1241 self.update_time_counter
1244 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1245 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1248 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1249 self.config.announced_channel
1252 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1253 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1256 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1257 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1258 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1259 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1262 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1263 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1264 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1267 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1268 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1269 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1270 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1271 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1272 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1273 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1276 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1277 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1278 match self.channel_state {
1279 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1280 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1281 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1282 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1283 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1284 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1285 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1287 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1289 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1290 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1294 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1295 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1296 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1297 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1298 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1299 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1302 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1303 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1304 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1308 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1309 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1310 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1311 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1312 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1315 // Public utilities:
1317 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1321 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1323 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1324 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1325 self.temporary_channel_id
1328 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1332 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1333 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1334 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1338 /// Gets the channel's type
1339 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1343 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1345 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1346 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1347 self.short_channel_id
1350 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1351 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1352 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1355 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1356 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1357 self.outbound_scid_alias
1360 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1362 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1363 return &self.holder_signer
1366 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1367 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1368 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1369 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1370 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1371 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1374 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1375 /// get_funding_created.
1376 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1377 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1380 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1381 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1382 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1383 if conf_height > 0 {
1390 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1391 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1392 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1395 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1396 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1397 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1398 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1402 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1405 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1406 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1409 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1410 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1413 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1414 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1415 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1418 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1419 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1422 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1423 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1424 self.counterparty_node_id
1427 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1428 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1429 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1432 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1433 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1434 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1437 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1438 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1440 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1441 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1442 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1443 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1445 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1449 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1450 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1451 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1454 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1455 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1456 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1459 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1460 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1461 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1463 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1464 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1469 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1470 self.channel_value_satoshis
1473 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1474 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1477 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1478 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1481 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1482 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1483 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1485 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1486 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1487 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1488 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1489 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1491 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1495 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1496 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1497 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1500 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1501 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1502 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1505 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1506 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1507 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1510 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1511 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1512 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1515 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1516 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1517 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1520 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1521 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1522 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1525 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1526 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1527 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1528 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1529 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1532 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1534 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1535 self.prev_config = None;
1539 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1540 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1544 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1545 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1546 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1547 let did_channel_update =
1548 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1549 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1550 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1551 if did_channel_update {
1552 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1553 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1554 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1555 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1557 self.config.options = *config;
1561 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1562 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1563 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1564 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1565 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1568 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1569 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1570 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1571 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1572 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1574 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1575 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1576 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1577 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1578 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1579 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1580 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1582 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1583 where L::Target: Logger
1585 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1586 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1587 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1589 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1590 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1591 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1592 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1594 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1595 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1596 if match update_state {
1597 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1598 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1599 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1600 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1601 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1603 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1607 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1608 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1609 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1611 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1613 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1614 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1615 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1617 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1618 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1619 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1620 transaction_output_index: None
1625 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1626 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1627 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1628 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1629 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1632 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1634 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1635 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1636 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1638 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1639 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1642 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1643 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1646 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1648 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1649 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1650 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1652 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1653 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1659 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1661 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1662 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1663 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1664 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1665 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1666 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1667 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1671 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1672 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1674 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1676 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1677 if generated_by_local {
1678 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1679 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1680 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1690 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1692 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1693 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1694 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1695 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1696 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1697 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1698 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1701 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1702 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1703 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1704 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1708 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1709 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1713 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1714 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1716 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1718 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1719 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1721 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1722 if !generated_by_local {
1723 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1731 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1732 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1733 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1734 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1735 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1736 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1737 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1738 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1740 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1742 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1743 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1744 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1745 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1747 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1749 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1750 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1751 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1752 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1755 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1756 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1757 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1758 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1760 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1763 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1764 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1765 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1766 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1768 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1771 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1772 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1777 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1778 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1783 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1785 let channel_parameters =
1786 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1787 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1788 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1795 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1798 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1799 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1800 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1801 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1803 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1804 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1805 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1813 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1814 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1815 inbound_htlc_preimages,
1816 outbound_htlc_preimages,
1821 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1822 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1823 /// our counterparty!)
1824 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1825 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1826 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1827 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1828 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1829 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1830 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1832 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1836 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1837 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1838 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1839 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1840 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1841 //may see payments to it!
1842 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1843 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1844 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1846 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1849 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1850 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1851 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1852 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1853 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1856 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1857 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1860 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1864 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1865 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1866 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1867 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1868 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1869 // which are near the dust limit.
1870 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1871 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1872 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1873 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1874 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1876 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1877 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1879 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1882 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1883 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1884 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1887 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1888 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1890 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1891 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1892 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1893 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1894 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1895 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1896 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1899 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1902 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1903 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1904 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1906 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1907 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1908 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1909 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1910 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1911 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1913 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1914 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1920 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1921 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1923 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1924 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1925 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1926 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1927 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1928 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1929 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1932 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1935 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1936 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1937 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1939 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1940 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1941 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1942 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1943 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1944 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1946 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1947 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1951 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1952 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1953 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1954 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1955 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1956 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1957 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1959 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1960 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1962 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1969 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1970 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1971 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1972 /// corner case properly.
1973 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1974 -> AvailableBalances
1975 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1977 let context = &self;
1978 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1979 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1980 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1982 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1983 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1984 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1985 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1988 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1990 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1991 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1993 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1995 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1997 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1998 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2002 if context.is_outbound() {
2003 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2004 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2006 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2007 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2009 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2010 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2011 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2012 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2015 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2016 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2017 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2018 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2019 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2020 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2021 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2024 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2025 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2026 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2027 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2028 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2029 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2030 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2031 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2032 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2033 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2034 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2036 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2039 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2040 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2041 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2042 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2043 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2046 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2047 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2049 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2050 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2051 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2053 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2054 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2055 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2056 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2060 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2062 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2063 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2064 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2065 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2066 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2067 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2068 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2070 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2071 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2073 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2074 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2075 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2077 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2078 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2079 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2080 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2081 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2084 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2085 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2086 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2087 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2088 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2089 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2092 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2093 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2094 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2096 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2100 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2101 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2103 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2104 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2108 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2109 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2110 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2111 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2113 outbound_capacity_msat,
2114 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2115 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2120 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2121 let context = &self;
2122 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2125 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2126 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2128 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2129 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2131 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2132 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2134 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2135 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2136 let context = &self;
2137 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2139 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2142 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2143 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2145 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2146 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2148 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2149 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2151 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2152 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2156 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2157 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2163 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2164 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2165 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2168 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2169 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2170 included_htlcs += 1;
2173 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2174 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2178 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2179 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2180 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2181 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2182 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2183 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2188 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2190 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2191 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2196 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2197 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2201 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2202 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2203 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2206 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2207 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2209 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2210 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2211 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2213 total_pending_htlcs,
2214 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2215 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2216 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2218 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2219 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2220 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2222 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2224 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2229 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2230 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2232 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2233 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2235 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2236 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2238 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2239 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2240 let context = &self;
2241 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2243 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2246 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2247 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2249 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2250 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2252 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2253 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2255 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2256 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2260 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2261 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2267 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2268 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2269 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2270 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2271 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2272 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2275 included_htlcs += 1;
2278 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2279 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2282 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2283 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2285 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2286 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2287 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2292 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2293 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2294 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2297 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2298 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2300 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2301 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2303 total_pending_htlcs,
2304 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2305 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2306 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2308 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2309 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2310 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2312 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2314 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2319 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2320 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2321 match self.channel_state {
2322 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2323 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) {
2332 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2334 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2335 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2338 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2340 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2341 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2342 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2346 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2347 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2348 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2351 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2353 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2354 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2357 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2358 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2359 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2360 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2361 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2362 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2363 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2364 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2365 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2366 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2367 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2369 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2370 // return them to fail the payment.
2371 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2372 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2373 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2375 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2376 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2381 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2382 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2383 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2384 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2385 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2386 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2387 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2388 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2389 let generate_monitor_update = match self.channel_state {
2390 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => true,
2393 if generate_monitor_update {
2394 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2395 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2396 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2397 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2401 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2403 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2404 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2407 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2408 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2409 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2410 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2414 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2415 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2416 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2417 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2419 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2420 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2421 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2422 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2424 match &self.holder_signer {
2425 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2426 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2427 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2428 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2429 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2432 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2436 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2437 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2438 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2439 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2440 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2441 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2444 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2445 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2447 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2454 // Internal utility functions for channels
2456 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2457 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2458 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2460 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2462 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2463 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2464 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2466 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2469 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2471 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2474 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2475 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2476 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2478 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2480 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2481 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2482 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2483 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2484 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2487 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2488 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2489 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2490 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2491 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2492 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2493 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2496 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2497 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2499 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2500 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2503 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2504 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2505 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2506 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2507 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2508 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2511 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2512 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2513 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2514 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2517 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2518 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2520 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2521 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2522 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2526 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
2527 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
2528 trait FailHTLCContents {
2529 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
2530 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
2531 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
2532 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
2534 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
2535 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
2536 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2537 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
2539 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2540 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
2542 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2543 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
2546 impl FailHTLCContents for (u16, [u8; 32]) {
2547 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC; // (failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
2548 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2549 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2552 failure_code: self.0,
2553 sha256_of_onion: self.1
2556 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2557 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(
2558 InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((self.1, self.0))
2561 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2562 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
2564 failure_code: self.0,
2565 sha256_of_onion: self.1
2570 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
2571 fn name() -> &'static str;
2573 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2574 fn name() -> &'static str {
2578 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2579 fn name() -> &'static str {
2580 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
2584 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2585 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2586 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2588 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2589 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2590 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2591 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2593 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2594 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2596 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2598 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2599 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2600 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2601 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2603 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2604 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2608 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2614 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2615 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2616 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2617 // outside of those situations will fail.
2618 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2622 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2627 1 + // script length (0)
2631 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2632 2 + // witness marker and flag
2633 1 + // witness element count
2634 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2635 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2636 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2637 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2638 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2639 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2641 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2642 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2643 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2649 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2650 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2651 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2652 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2654 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2655 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2656 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2658 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2659 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2660 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2661 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2662 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2663 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2666 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2667 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2670 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2671 value_to_holder = 0;
2674 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2675 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2676 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2677 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2679 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2680 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2683 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2684 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2687 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2690 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2691 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2693 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2695 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2696 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2697 where L::Target: Logger {
2698 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2699 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2700 assert!(self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell());
2701 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2702 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2703 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2704 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2705 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2709 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2710 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2711 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2712 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2714 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2715 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2718 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2719 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2720 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2722 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2723 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2724 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2725 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2726 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2727 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2728 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2730 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2731 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2732 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2734 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2735 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2737 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2740 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2741 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2745 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2749 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2750 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2751 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2752 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2753 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2754 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2757 // Now update local state:
2759 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2760 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2761 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2762 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2763 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2764 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2765 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2769 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2770 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2771 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2772 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2773 // do not not get into this branch.
2774 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2775 match pending_update {
2776 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2777 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2778 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2779 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2780 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2781 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2782 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2785 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2786 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2788 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2789 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2790 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2791 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2792 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2793 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2799 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
2800 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2801 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2803 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2804 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2805 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2807 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2808 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2811 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2812 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2814 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2815 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2817 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2818 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2821 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2824 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2825 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2826 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2827 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2832 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2833 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2834 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2835 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2836 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2837 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2838 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2839 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2840 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2841 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2842 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2843 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2844 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2845 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2846 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2848 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2849 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2850 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2851 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2852 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2855 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2856 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2857 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2863 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2864 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2866 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2870 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2871 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2872 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2873 /// before we fail backwards.
2875 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2876 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2877 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2878 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2879 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2880 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2881 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2884 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2885 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2886 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2887 /// before we fail backwards.
2889 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2890 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2891 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2892 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
2893 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
2895 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2896 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2897 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2900 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2901 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2902 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2904 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2905 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2906 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2908 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2909 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2910 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2912 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2917 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2918 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2924 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2925 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2926 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2927 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2928 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2932 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2933 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2934 force_holding_cell = true;
2937 // Now update local state:
2938 if force_holding_cell {
2939 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2940 match pending_update {
2941 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2942 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2943 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2944 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2948 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2949 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2951 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2952 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2953 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2959 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2960 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_packet.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
2964 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
2965 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
2967 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2968 htlc.state = err_packet.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
2971 Ok(Some(err_packet.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
2974 // Message handlers:
2975 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2976 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2977 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2978 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2979 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2980 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2981 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
2984 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2985 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2987 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2988 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2989 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2990 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2992 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2995 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
2996 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2997 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3000 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3001 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3002 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3003 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3004 // when routing outbound payments.
3005 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3009 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3010 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3011 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3012 match &self.context.channel_state {
3013 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3014 let flags = *flags & !FundedStateFlags::ALL;
3015 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3016 if flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3017 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3018 check_reconnection = true;
3019 } else if (flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3020 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3021 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3022 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3023 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3025 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3026 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3029 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3030 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3031 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3033 if check_reconnection {
3034 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3035 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3036 let expected_point =
3037 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3038 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3040 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3041 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3042 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3043 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3044 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3045 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3047 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3048 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3049 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3050 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3051 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3053 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3054 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3059 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3060 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3062 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3064 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3067 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3068 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3069 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3070 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3071 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3072 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3074 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3075 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3077 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3078 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3079 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3081 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3082 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3085 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3086 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3088 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3089 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3091 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3094 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3098 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3099 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3100 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3101 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3103 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3104 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3107 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3108 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3109 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3110 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3111 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3112 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3113 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3114 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3115 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3116 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3117 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3119 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3120 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3121 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3122 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3123 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3124 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3128 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3129 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3132 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3133 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3134 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3136 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3137 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3138 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3139 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3140 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3141 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3142 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3146 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3147 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3148 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3149 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3150 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3151 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3152 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3156 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3157 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3158 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3159 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3160 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3161 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3164 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3165 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3167 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3168 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3169 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3171 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3172 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3176 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3177 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3179 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3184 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3185 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3189 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3190 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3191 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3192 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3193 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3194 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3195 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3196 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3197 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3199 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3200 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3201 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3202 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3203 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3206 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3207 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3208 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3209 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3213 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3216 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3220 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3221 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3222 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3226 // Now update local state:
3227 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3228 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3229 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3230 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3231 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3232 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3233 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3238 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3240 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3241 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3242 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3243 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3244 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3245 None => fail_reason.into(),
3246 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3247 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3248 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3251 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3255 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3257 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3258 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3260 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3261 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3266 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3269 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3270 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3273 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3277 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3280 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3281 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3282 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3284 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3285 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3288 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3292 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3293 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3294 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3296 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3300 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3304 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3305 where L::Target: Logger
3307 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3310 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3311 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3313 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3314 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3317 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3319 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3321 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3322 let commitment_txid = {
3323 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3324 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3325 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3327 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3328 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3329 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3330 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3331 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3332 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3336 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3338 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3339 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3340 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3341 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3344 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3345 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3346 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3347 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3350 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3352 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3353 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3354 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3355 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3356 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3357 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3358 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3359 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3360 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3361 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3362 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3368 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3369 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3372 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3373 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3374 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3375 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3376 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3377 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3378 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3379 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3380 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3381 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3382 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3383 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3384 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3387 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3388 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3389 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3390 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3391 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3392 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3393 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3395 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3396 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3397 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3398 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3399 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3400 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3401 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3404 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3405 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3408 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3410 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3411 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3412 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3415 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3418 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3419 commitment_stats.tx,
3421 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3422 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3423 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3426 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3427 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3429 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3430 let mut need_commitment = false;
3431 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3432 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3433 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3434 need_commitment = true;
3438 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3439 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3440 Some(forward_info.clone())
3442 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3443 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3444 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3445 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3446 need_commitment = true;
3449 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3450 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3451 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3452 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3453 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3454 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3455 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3456 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3457 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3458 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3459 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3460 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3461 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3462 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3464 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3466 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3467 need_commitment = true;
3471 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3472 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3473 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3474 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3475 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3476 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3478 nondust_htlc_sources,
3482 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3483 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3484 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3485 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3486 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3488 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3489 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3490 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3491 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3492 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3493 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3494 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3495 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3496 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3497 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3498 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3499 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3500 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3501 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3503 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3504 &self.context.channel_id);
3505 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3508 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3509 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3510 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3511 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3512 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3513 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3514 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3515 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3516 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3520 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3521 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3522 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3523 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3526 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3527 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3528 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3529 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3530 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3531 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3532 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3534 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && !self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
3535 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3536 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3539 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3540 /// for our counterparty.
3541 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3542 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3543 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3544 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3546 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3547 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3548 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3549 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3551 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3552 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3553 updates: Vec::new(),
3556 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3557 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3558 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3559 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3560 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3561 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3562 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3563 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3564 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3565 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3566 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3567 // to rebalance channels.
3568 match &htlc_update {
3569 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3570 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3571 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3573 match self.send_htlc(
3574 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3575 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3577 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3580 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3581 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3582 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3583 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3584 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3585 // into the holding cell without ever being
3586 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3587 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3588 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3591 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3597 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3598 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3599 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3600 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3601 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3602 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3603 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3604 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3605 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3606 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3607 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3608 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3610 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3611 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3612 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3613 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3614 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3615 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3616 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3617 // for a full revocation before failing.
3618 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3619 update_fail_count += 1;
3622 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3624 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3629 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
3630 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (failure_code, sha256_of_onion), false, logger) {
3631 Ok(update_fail_malformed_opt) => {
3632 debug_assert!(update_fail_malformed_opt.is_some()); // See above comment
3633 update_fail_count += 1;
3636 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3638 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3645 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3646 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3648 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3649 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3654 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3655 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3656 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3657 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3658 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3660 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3661 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3662 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3664 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3665 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3671 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3672 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3673 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3674 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3675 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3676 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3677 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3678 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3679 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3681 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3682 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3684 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3685 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3687 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3688 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3691 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3693 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3694 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3695 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3699 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3700 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3701 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3702 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3703 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3704 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3705 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3706 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3707 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3712 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3713 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3716 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3717 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3718 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3719 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3721 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3723 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3728 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3729 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3730 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3731 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3732 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3733 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3734 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3735 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3739 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3740 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3741 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3742 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3743 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
3744 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3745 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3746 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3747 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3749 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3750 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3753 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3754 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3755 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3756 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3757 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3758 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3759 let mut require_commitment = false;
3760 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3763 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3764 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3765 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3766 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3768 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3769 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3770 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3771 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3772 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3773 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3775 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3779 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3780 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3781 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3782 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3783 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3785 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3786 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3787 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3792 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3793 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3795 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3799 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3800 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3802 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3803 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3804 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3805 require_commitment = true;
3806 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3807 match forward_info {
3808 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3809 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3810 require_commitment = true;
3812 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3813 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3814 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3816 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3817 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3818 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3822 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3823 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3824 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3825 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3831 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3832 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3833 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3834 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3835 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3837 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3838 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3839 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3840 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3841 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3842 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3843 require_commitment = true;
3847 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3849 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3850 match update_state {
3851 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3852 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3853 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3854 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3855 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3856 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3858 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3859 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3860 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3861 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3862 require_commitment = true;
3863 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3864 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3869 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3870 let release_state_str =
3871 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3872 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3873 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3874 if !release_monitor {
3875 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3876 update: monitor_update,
3878 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3880 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3885 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3886 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3887 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3888 if require_commitment {
3889 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3890 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3891 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3892 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3894 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3895 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3896 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3897 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3898 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3900 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3901 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3902 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3903 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3904 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3907 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3908 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3909 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3910 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3911 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3912 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3914 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3915 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3917 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3918 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3920 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3921 if require_commitment {
3922 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3924 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3925 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3926 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3927 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3929 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3930 &self.context.channel_id(),
3931 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3934 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3935 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3937 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3938 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3940 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3941 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3947 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3948 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3949 /// commitment update.
3950 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3951 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3952 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3954 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3955 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3958 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3959 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3960 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3961 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3963 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3964 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3965 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3966 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3967 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3968 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3969 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3971 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3972 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3974 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3975 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3977 if !self.context.is_live() {
3978 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3981 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3982 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3983 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3984 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3985 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3986 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3987 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3988 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3989 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3990 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3994 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3995 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3996 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3997 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3998 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3999 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4002 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4003 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4007 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4008 force_holding_cell = true;
4011 if force_holding_cell {
4012 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4016 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4017 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4019 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4020 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4025 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4026 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4028 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4030 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4031 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4032 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4033 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4037 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4038 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4039 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4043 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4044 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4047 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4048 // will be retransmitted.
4049 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4050 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4051 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4053 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4054 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4056 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4057 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4058 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4059 // this HTLC accordingly
4060 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4063 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4064 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4065 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4066 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4069 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4070 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4071 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4072 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4073 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4074 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4079 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4081 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4082 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4083 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4084 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4088 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4089 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4090 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4091 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4092 // the update upon reconnection.
4093 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4097 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4099 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4100 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4104 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4105 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4106 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4107 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4108 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4109 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4110 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4112 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4113 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4114 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4115 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4116 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4117 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4118 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4120 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4121 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4122 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4123 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4124 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4125 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4126 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4129 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4130 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4131 /// to the remote side.
4132 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4133 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4134 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4135 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4138 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4140 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4141 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4143 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4144 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4145 // first received the funding_signed.
4146 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4147 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4148 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4149 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
4151 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4153 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4154 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4155 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4156 funding_broadcastable = None;
4159 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4160 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4161 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4162 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4163 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4164 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4165 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4166 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4167 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4168 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4169 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4170 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4171 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4172 next_per_commitment_point,
4173 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4177 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4179 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4180 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4181 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4182 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4183 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4184 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4186 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4187 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4188 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4189 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4190 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4191 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4195 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4196 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4198 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4199 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4201 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4202 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4205 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4206 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4207 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4208 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4209 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4210 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4211 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4212 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4213 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4217 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4218 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4220 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4223 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4224 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4226 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4228 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4229 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4230 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4231 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4232 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4233 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4234 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4235 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4236 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4237 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4238 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4239 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4241 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4242 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4243 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4249 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4252 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4253 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4254 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4256 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4257 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4259 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4260 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4263 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4264 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4265 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4266 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4268 SignerResumeUpdates {
4275 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4276 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4277 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4278 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4279 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4280 per_commitment_secret,
4281 next_per_commitment_point,
4283 next_local_nonce: None,
4287 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4288 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4289 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4290 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4291 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4292 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4294 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4295 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4296 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4297 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4298 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4299 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4300 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4301 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4302 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4303 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4304 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4309 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4310 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4312 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4313 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4314 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4315 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4316 reason: err_packet.clone()
4319 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4320 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4321 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4322 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4323 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4324 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4327 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4328 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4329 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4330 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4331 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4338 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4339 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4340 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4341 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4345 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4346 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4347 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4348 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4349 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4350 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4351 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4355 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4356 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4357 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4361 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4362 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4367 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4368 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4369 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4370 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4371 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4372 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4373 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4378 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4379 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4381 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4382 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4383 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4384 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4385 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4386 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4387 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4388 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4391 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4393 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4394 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4395 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4396 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4397 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4400 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4401 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4405 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4406 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4407 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4408 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4409 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4410 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4413 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4414 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4415 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4416 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4417 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4420 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4421 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4422 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4423 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4424 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4425 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4426 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4427 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4431 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4432 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4433 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4434 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4435 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4436 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4437 our_commitment_transaction
4441 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4442 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4443 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4444 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4446 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4448 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4450 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4451 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4452 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4453 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4454 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4455 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4457 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4458 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4459 channel_ready: None,
4460 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4461 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4462 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4466 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4467 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4468 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4469 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4470 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4471 next_per_commitment_point,
4472 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4474 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4475 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4476 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4480 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4481 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4482 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4484 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4485 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4486 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4489 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4492 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4493 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4494 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4495 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4496 our_commitment_transaction
4500 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4501 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4502 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4503 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4504 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4505 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4506 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4508 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4510 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4511 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4512 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4513 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4514 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4515 next_per_commitment_point,
4516 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4520 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4521 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4522 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4524 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4527 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4528 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4529 raa: required_revoke,
4530 commitment_update: None,
4531 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4533 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4534 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4535 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4537 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4540 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4541 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4542 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4543 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4544 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4545 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4548 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4549 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4550 raa: required_revoke,
4551 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4552 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4555 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4556 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4557 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4558 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4559 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4562 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4563 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4564 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4565 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4570 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4571 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4572 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4573 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4575 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4577 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4579 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4580 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4581 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4582 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4583 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4584 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4585 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4586 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4588 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4589 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4590 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4591 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4592 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4594 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4595 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4596 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4597 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4600 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4601 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4602 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4603 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4604 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4605 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4606 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4607 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4608 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4609 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4610 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4611 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4612 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4613 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4614 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4616 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4619 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4620 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4623 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4624 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4625 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4626 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4627 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4628 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4631 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4632 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4633 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4634 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4635 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4636 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4637 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4639 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4645 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4646 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4647 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4648 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4650 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4651 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4652 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4653 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4654 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4655 return Ok((None, None, None));
4658 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4659 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4660 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4662 return Ok((None, None, None));
4665 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4666 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4667 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4668 return Ok((None, None, None));
4671 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4673 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4674 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4675 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4676 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4678 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4679 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4681 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4682 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4684 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4685 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4686 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4687 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4689 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4690 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4691 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4695 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4701 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4702 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4704 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4705 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4708 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4709 /// within our expected timeframe.
4711 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4712 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4713 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4716 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4719 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4720 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4724 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4725 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4727 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4728 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4730 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4731 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4732 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4733 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4734 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4736 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4737 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4738 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4741 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4743 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4744 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4747 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4748 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4749 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4752 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4755 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4756 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4757 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4758 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
4760 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4763 assert!(send_shutdown);
4764 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4765 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4766 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4768 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4769 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4771 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4776 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4778 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
4779 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4781 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4782 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4783 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4784 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4785 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4786 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4789 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4790 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4792 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4793 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4794 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4795 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4799 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4800 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4801 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4802 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4803 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4804 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4806 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4807 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4814 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
4815 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4817 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4820 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4821 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4823 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4825 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4826 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4827 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4828 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4829 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4830 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4831 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4832 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4833 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4835 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4836 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4839 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4843 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4844 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4845 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4846 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4848 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
4849 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4851 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4854 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4855 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4857 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4858 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4861 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4862 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4865 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4866 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4867 return Ok((None, None, None));
4870 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4871 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4872 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4873 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4875 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4877 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4880 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4881 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4882 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4883 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4884 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4888 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4889 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4890 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4894 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4895 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4896 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4897 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4898 monitor_update: None,
4899 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4900 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4901 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4902 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4904 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4905 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4906 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4907 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4911 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4913 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4914 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4915 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4916 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4918 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4921 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4922 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4924 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4925 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4926 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4927 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4928 monitor_update: None,
4929 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4930 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4931 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4932 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4934 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4935 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4936 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4937 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4942 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4943 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4944 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4945 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4947 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4948 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4949 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4951 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4953 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4960 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4961 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4962 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4964 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4965 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4967 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4968 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4971 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4972 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4973 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4974 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4975 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4977 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4978 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4979 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4981 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4982 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4985 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4986 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4987 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4988 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4989 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4990 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4991 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4992 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4994 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4997 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4998 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4999 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5000 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5002 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5006 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5007 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5008 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5009 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5011 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5017 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5018 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5019 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5020 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5021 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5022 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5023 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5025 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5026 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5029 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5031 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5032 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5038 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5039 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5040 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5041 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5042 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5043 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5044 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5046 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5047 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5054 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5055 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5058 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5059 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5062 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5063 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5067 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5068 &self.context.holder_signer
5072 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5074 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5075 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5076 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5077 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5078 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5079 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5081 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5083 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5091 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5092 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5096 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5097 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5098 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5099 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5102 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5103 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5104 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5105 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5108 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5109 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5110 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5111 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5112 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5113 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5116 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5117 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5118 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5119 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5120 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5121 if !release_monitor {
5122 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5131 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5132 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5135 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5136 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5137 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5139 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5140 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5142 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5143 if (flags & !(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)).is_empty()
5145 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5146 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5147 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5150 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5151 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5152 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5153 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5154 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5155 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5157 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5158 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5159 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5161 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5162 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5163 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5164 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5165 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5166 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5172 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5173 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5174 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5175 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5178 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5179 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5180 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5183 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5184 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5185 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5188 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5189 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5190 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5191 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5192 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5195 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5196 self.context.channel_update_status
5199 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5200 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5201 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5204 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5206 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5207 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5208 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5212 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5213 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5214 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5217 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5221 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5222 // channel_ready yet.
5223 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5227 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5228 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5229 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if (f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL).is_empty()) {
5230 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5232 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5233 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5234 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5236 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5237 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5240 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5241 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5243 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5244 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5245 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5246 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5247 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5248 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5249 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5250 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5252 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5256 if need_commitment_update {
5257 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5258 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5259 let next_per_commitment_point =
5260 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5261 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5262 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5263 next_per_commitment_point,
5264 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5268 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5274 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5275 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5276 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5277 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5278 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5279 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5280 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5282 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5285 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5286 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5287 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5288 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5289 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5290 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5291 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5292 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5293 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5294 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5295 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5296 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5297 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5298 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5299 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5300 // channel and move on.
5301 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5302 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5304 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5305 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5306 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5308 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5309 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5310 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5311 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5312 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5313 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5314 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5315 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5320 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5321 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5322 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5323 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5324 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5327 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5328 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5329 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5330 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5331 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5332 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5335 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5336 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5337 // may have already happened for this block).
5338 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5339 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5340 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5341 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5344 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5345 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5346 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5347 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5355 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5356 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5357 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5358 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5360 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5361 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5364 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5366 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5367 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5368 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5369 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5371 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5374 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5377 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5378 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5379 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5380 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5382 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5385 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5386 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5387 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5389 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5390 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5392 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5393 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5394 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5402 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5404 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5405 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5406 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5408 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5409 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5412 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5413 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5414 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5415 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5416 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5417 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5418 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5419 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5422 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5423 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5424 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5425 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5427 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5428 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5429 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5431 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5432 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5433 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5434 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5436 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5437 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5438 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5439 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5440 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5441 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5442 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5445 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5446 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5448 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5451 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5452 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5453 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5454 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5455 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5456 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5457 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5458 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5459 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5460 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5461 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5462 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5463 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5464 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5465 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5466 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5467 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5473 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5478 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5479 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5481 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5482 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5483 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5484 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5486 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5489 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5491 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5492 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5493 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5494 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5495 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5496 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5498 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5499 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5502 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5503 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5504 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5505 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5506 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5507 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5509 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5510 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5513 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5514 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5515 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5516 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5517 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5523 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5524 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5525 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5526 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5528 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5531 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5535 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5539 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5540 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5544 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5548 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5549 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5552 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5556 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5558 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5563 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5564 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5565 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5567 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5572 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5574 None => return None,
5577 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5579 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5580 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5582 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5583 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5586 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5592 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5594 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5595 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5596 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5597 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5598 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5599 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5600 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5602 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5603 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5604 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5605 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5606 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5607 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5608 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5609 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5610 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5611 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5612 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5613 contents: announcement,
5616 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5621 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5625 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5626 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5627 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5628 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5629 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5630 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5631 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5632 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5634 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5636 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5637 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5638 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5639 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5641 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5642 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5643 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5644 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5647 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5648 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5649 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5650 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5653 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5656 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5657 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5658 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5659 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5660 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5661 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5664 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5666 Err(_) => return None,
5668 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5669 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5674 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5675 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5676 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5677 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
5678 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5679 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5680 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5681 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5682 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5683 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5684 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5685 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5686 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5687 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5688 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5689 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5692 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5695 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5696 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5697 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5698 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5699 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5700 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5701 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5702 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5703 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5705 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5706 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5707 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5708 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5709 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5710 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5711 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5712 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5713 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
5715 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5716 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5717 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5718 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5719 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5720 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5721 next_funding_txid: None,
5726 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5728 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5729 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5730 /// commitment update.
5732 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5733 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5734 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5735 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5736 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5737 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5738 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5741 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5742 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5743 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5745 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5746 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5751 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5752 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5754 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5756 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5757 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5759 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5760 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5761 /// regenerate them.
5763 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5764 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5766 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5767 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5768 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5769 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5770 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5771 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5772 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5773 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5775 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5776 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
5777 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5779 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5781 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5782 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5783 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5786 if amount_msat == 0 {
5787 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5790 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5791 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5792 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5793 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5796 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5797 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5798 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5801 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5802 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5803 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5804 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5805 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5806 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5807 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5808 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5811 let need_holding_cell = self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell();
5812 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5813 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5814 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5815 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5816 else { "to peer" });
5818 if need_holding_cell {
5819 force_holding_cell = true;
5822 // Now update local state:
5823 if force_holding_cell {
5824 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5829 onion_routing_packet,
5836 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5837 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5839 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5841 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5847 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5848 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5849 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5853 onion_routing_packet,
5857 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5862 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5863 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5864 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5865 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5867 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5868 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5869 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5871 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5872 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5876 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5877 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5878 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5879 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5880 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5881 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5882 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5885 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5886 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5887 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5888 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5889 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5890 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5893 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5895 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5896 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5897 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5898 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5899 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5901 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5902 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5905 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5906 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5907 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5908 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5909 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5910 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5911 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5912 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5913 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5914 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5915 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5918 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5922 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5923 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5924 where L::Target: Logger
5926 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5927 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5928 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5930 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5932 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5933 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5934 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5935 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5936 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5937 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5938 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5939 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5940 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5941 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5942 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5948 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5951 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5952 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5953 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5954 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5955 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5956 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5958 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5959 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5960 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5962 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5963 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5964 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5967 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5968 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5972 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
5973 &commitment_stats.tx,
5974 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
5975 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
5976 &self.context.secp_ctx,
5977 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5979 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5981 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5982 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5983 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5984 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5986 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5987 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5988 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5989 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5990 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
5991 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5995 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5996 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6000 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6001 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6003 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6009 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6010 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6012 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6013 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6014 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6015 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6016 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6017 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6018 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6019 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6021 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6022 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6023 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6026 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6027 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6028 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6034 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6036 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6037 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6038 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6039 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6040 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6042 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6044 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6050 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6051 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6052 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6053 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6054 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6056 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6057 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6058 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6061 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6062 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6064 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6065 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6067 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6068 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6070 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6071 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6072 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6075 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6078 // use override shutdown script if provided
6079 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6080 Some(script) => script,
6082 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6083 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6084 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6085 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6089 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6090 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6092 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6097 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6098 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6099 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6100 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6102 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6103 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6104 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6105 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6106 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6107 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6110 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6111 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6113 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6114 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6115 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6118 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6119 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6120 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6121 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6122 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6124 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6125 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6132 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6133 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6135 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6138 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6139 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6140 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6142 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6143 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6147 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6151 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6152 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6153 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6154 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6157 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6158 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6159 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6160 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6161 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6162 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6163 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6164 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6166 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6167 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6168 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6169 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6171 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6172 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6174 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6175 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6177 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6178 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6179 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6181 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6182 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6184 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6185 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6186 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6187 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6188 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6191 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6192 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6194 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6195 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6197 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6199 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6201 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6202 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6203 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6204 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6207 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6208 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6210 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6211 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6212 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6213 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6217 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6218 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6219 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6223 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6224 Ok(script) => script,
6225 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6228 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6231 context: ChannelContext {
6234 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6235 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6236 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6237 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6242 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6244 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6245 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6246 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6247 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6249 channel_value_satoshis,
6251 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6253 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6254 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6257 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6258 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6261 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6262 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6263 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6264 pending_update_fee: None,
6265 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6266 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6267 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6268 update_time_counter: 1,
6270 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6272 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6273 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6274 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6275 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6276 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6277 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6279 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6280 signer_pending_funding: false,
6282 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6283 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6284 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6285 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6287 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6288 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6289 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6290 closing_fee_limits: None,
6291 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6293 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6294 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6295 short_channel_id: None,
6296 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6298 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6299 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6300 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6301 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6302 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6303 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6304 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6305 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6306 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6307 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6308 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6309 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6311 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6313 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6314 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6315 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6316 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6317 counterparty_parameters: None,
6318 funding_outpoint: None,
6319 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6321 funding_transaction: None,
6322 is_batch_funding: None,
6324 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6325 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6326 counterparty_node_id,
6328 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6330 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6332 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6333 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6335 announcement_sigs: None,
6337 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6338 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6339 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6340 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6342 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6343 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6345 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6346 outbound_scid_alias,
6348 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6349 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6351 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6352 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6357 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6359 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6363 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6364 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6365 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6366 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6367 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6368 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6369 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6370 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6371 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6373 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6378 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6379 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6380 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6383 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6384 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6385 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6386 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6389 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6391 next_local_nonce: None,
6395 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6396 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6397 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6398 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6399 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6400 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6401 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6402 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6403 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6404 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6405 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6408 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6409 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6411 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6413 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6414 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6415 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6416 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6419 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6420 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6422 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6424 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6425 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6427 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6428 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6429 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6430 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6431 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6432 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6435 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6436 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6438 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6439 if funding_created.is_none() {
6440 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6441 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6442 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6449 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6450 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6451 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6452 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6453 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6454 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6455 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6456 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6457 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6458 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6461 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6462 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6463 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6464 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6465 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6466 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6472 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6473 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6474 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6475 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6476 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6477 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6479 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6481 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6483 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6484 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6489 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6490 // We've exhausted our options
6493 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6494 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6497 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6498 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6499 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6500 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6502 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6503 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6504 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6505 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6506 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6507 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6509 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6511 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6512 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6515 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6516 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6517 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6519 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6520 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6523 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6524 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6527 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6528 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6532 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6533 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6534 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6535 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6536 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6537 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6538 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6539 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6540 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6541 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6542 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6543 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6544 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6545 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6546 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6547 first_per_commitment_point,
6548 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6549 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6550 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6551 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6553 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6558 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6559 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6561 // Check sanity of message fields:
6562 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6563 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6565 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6566 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6568 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6569 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6571 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6572 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6574 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6575 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6577 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6578 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6579 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6581 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6582 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6583 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6585 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6586 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6587 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6589 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6592 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6593 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6596 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6597 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6598 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6600 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6601 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6603 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6604 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6606 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6607 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6609 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6610 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6612 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6613 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6615 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6616 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6619 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6620 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6621 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6623 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6624 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6626 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6627 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6628 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6630 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6631 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6634 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6635 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6636 &Some(ref script) => {
6637 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6638 if script.len() == 0 {
6641 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6642 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6644 Some(script.clone())
6647 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6649 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6654 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6655 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6656 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6657 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6658 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6660 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6661 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6663 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6666 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6667 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6668 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6669 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6670 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6671 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6674 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6675 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6676 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6679 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6680 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6682 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6683 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6685 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6690 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
6691 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
6692 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
6693 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6694 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
6698 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6699 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
6701 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
6702 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
6704 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6705 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6706 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6707 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6710 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6712 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6713 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6714 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6715 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6717 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6718 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6720 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6721 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
6723 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6724 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6725 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6726 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
6727 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6728 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
6732 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6733 initial_commitment_tx,
6736 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6737 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6741 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
6742 if validated.is_err() {
6743 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6746 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6747 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
6748 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6749 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6750 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6751 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6752 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6753 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6754 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6755 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
6756 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6757 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6759 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6760 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6761 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
6762 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6763 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6764 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
6765 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6766 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6768 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
6769 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
6770 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
6772 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
6774 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6775 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6777 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6779 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
6781 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6782 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6783 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
6786 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
6789 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6790 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
6791 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
6792 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
6797 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6798 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6799 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6800 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6803 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6804 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6805 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6806 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6807 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6808 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6809 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6810 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6811 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6812 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6813 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6816 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
6817 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6819 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6820 // support this channel type.
6821 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6822 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6826 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6827 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6828 // `static_remote_key`.
6829 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6830 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6832 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6833 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6834 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6836 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6839 channel_type.clone()
6841 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6842 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6843 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6848 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6849 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6850 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6851 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6852 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6853 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6854 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6855 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6856 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6859 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6860 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6863 // Check sanity of message fields:
6864 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6865 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6867 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6868 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6870 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6871 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6873 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6874 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6875 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6877 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6878 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6880 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6881 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6883 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
6885 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6886 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6887 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6889 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6890 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6892 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6893 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6896 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6897 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6898 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6900 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6901 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6903 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6904 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6906 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6907 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6909 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6910 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6912 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6913 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6915 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6916 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6919 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6921 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6922 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6923 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6927 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6928 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6929 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6930 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6931 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6933 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6934 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6936 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6937 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6938 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6940 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6941 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6944 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6945 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6946 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6947 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6951 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6952 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6953 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6954 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6957 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6958 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6959 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6960 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6961 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6964 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6965 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6966 &Some(ref script) => {
6967 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6968 if script.len() == 0 {
6971 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6972 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6974 Some(script.clone())
6977 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6979 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6984 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6985 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6986 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6987 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6991 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6992 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6993 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6997 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6998 Ok(script) => script,
6999 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
7002 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7003 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7005 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
7008 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
7012 context: ChannelContext {
7015 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
7016 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
7018 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
7023 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7025 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
7026 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
7027 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7028 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7030 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7033 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
7035 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7036 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7039 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7040 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7041 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
7043 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7044 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7045 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7046 pending_update_fee: None,
7047 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7048 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7049 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7050 update_time_counter: 1,
7052 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7054 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7055 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7056 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7057 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7058 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7059 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7061 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7062 signer_pending_funding: false,
7064 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7065 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7066 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7067 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7069 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7070 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7071 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7072 closing_fee_limits: None,
7073 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7075 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7076 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7077 short_channel_id: None,
7078 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7080 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7081 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7082 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7083 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7084 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7085 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7086 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7087 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7088 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7089 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7090 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7091 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7094 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7096 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7097 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7098 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7099 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7100 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7101 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7102 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7104 funding_outpoint: None,
7105 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7107 funding_transaction: None,
7108 is_batch_funding: None,
7110 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7111 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7112 counterparty_node_id,
7114 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7116 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7118 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7119 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7121 announcement_sigs: None,
7123 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7124 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7125 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7126 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7128 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7129 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7131 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7132 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7134 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7135 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7137 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7138 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
7143 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7145 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7151 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7152 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7154 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7155 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7156 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7157 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7160 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7161 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7163 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7165 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7166 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7169 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7172 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7173 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7174 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7176 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7177 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7178 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7179 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7181 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7182 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7183 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7184 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7185 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7186 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7187 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7188 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7189 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7190 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7191 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7192 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7193 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7194 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7195 first_per_commitment_point,
7196 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7197 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7198 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7200 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7202 next_local_nonce: None,
7206 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7207 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7209 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7211 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7212 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7215 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7216 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7218 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7219 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7220 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7221 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7222 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7223 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7224 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7225 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7226 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7227 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7228 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7230 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7233 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7234 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7235 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7239 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7240 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7243 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7244 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7246 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7247 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7249 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7251 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7252 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7253 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7254 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7257 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7258 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7259 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7260 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7261 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7263 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7265 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7266 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7267 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7270 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7271 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7272 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7276 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7277 initial_commitment_tx,
7280 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7281 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7284 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7285 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7288 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7290 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7291 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
7292 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7293 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7295 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7297 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7298 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7299 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7300 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7301 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7302 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7303 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7304 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7305 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7306 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7307 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7309 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
7310 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7311 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7312 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7313 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7314 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7315 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7317 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7318 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7320 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7321 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7322 let mut channel = Channel {
7323 context: self.context,
7325 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7326 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7328 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7332 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7333 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7335 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7341 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7342 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7343 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7344 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7345 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7347 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7348 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7349 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7350 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7356 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7357 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7358 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7359 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7360 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7361 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7366 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7367 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7368 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7369 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7371 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7372 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7373 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7374 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7379 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7380 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7381 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7382 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7383 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7384 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7389 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7390 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7391 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7394 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7396 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7397 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7398 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7399 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7400 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7402 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7403 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7404 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7405 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7407 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7409 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7410 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7411 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7413 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7415 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7417 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7419 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7420 // deserialized from that format.
7421 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7422 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7423 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7425 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7427 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7428 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7429 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7431 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7432 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7433 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7434 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7437 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7438 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7439 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7442 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7443 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7444 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7445 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7447 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7448 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7450 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7452 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7454 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7456 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7459 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7461 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7466 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7467 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7468 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7470 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7471 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7472 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7473 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7474 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7475 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7476 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7478 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7480 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7482 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7485 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7486 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7487 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7490 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7492 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7493 preimages.push(preimage);
7495 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7496 reason.write(writer)?;
7498 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7500 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7501 preimages.push(preimage);
7503 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7504 reason.write(writer)?;
7507 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7508 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7511 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7512 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7513 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
7514 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
7515 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7516 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7518 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7519 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7520 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7523 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7524 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7525 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7526 source.write(writer)?;
7527 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7529 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7530 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7532 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7534 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7535 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7537 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7539 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7540 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7542 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
7543 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
7545 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
7546 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
7547 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
7549 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
7551 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7552 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
7557 match self.context.resend_order {
7558 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7559 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7562 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7563 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7564 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7566 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7567 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7568 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7569 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7572 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7573 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7574 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7575 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7576 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7579 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7580 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7581 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7582 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7584 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7585 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7586 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7588 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7590 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7591 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7592 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7593 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7595 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7596 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7597 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7598 // consider the stale state on reload.
7601 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7602 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7603 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7605 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7606 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7607 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7609 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7610 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7612 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7613 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7614 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7616 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7617 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7619 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7622 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7623 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7624 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7626 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7629 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7630 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7632 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7633 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7634 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7636 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7638 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7640 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7642 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7643 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7644 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7645 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7646 htlc.write(writer)?;
7649 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7650 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7651 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7653 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7654 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7656 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7657 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7658 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7659 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7660 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7661 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7662 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7664 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7665 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7666 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7667 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7668 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7670 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7671 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7673 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7674 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7675 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7676 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7678 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7680 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7681 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7682 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7683 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7684 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7685 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7686 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7688 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7689 (2, chan_type, option),
7690 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7691 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7692 (5, self.context.config, required),
7693 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7694 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7695 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7696 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7697 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7698 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7699 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7700 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7701 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7702 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7703 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7704 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7705 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7706 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7707 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7708 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7709 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7710 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7711 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7712 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7713 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7714 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
7721 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7722 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7724 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7725 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7727 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7728 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7729 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7731 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7732 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7733 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7734 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7736 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7738 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7739 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7740 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7741 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7742 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7744 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7745 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7748 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7749 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7750 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7752 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7754 let mut keys_data = None;
7756 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7757 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7758 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7759 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7760 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7761 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7762 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7763 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7764 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7765 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7769 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7770 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7771 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7774 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7776 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7777 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7778 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7780 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7782 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7783 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7784 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7785 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7786 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7787 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7788 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7789 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7790 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7791 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7792 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7793 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7794 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7799 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7800 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7801 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7802 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7803 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7804 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7805 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7806 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7807 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7808 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7809 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7810 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7812 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7813 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7816 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7817 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7820 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7821 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7823 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7825 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7826 blinding_point: None,
7830 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7831 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7832 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7833 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7834 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7835 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7836 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7837 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7838 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7839 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7840 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7841 blinding_point: None,
7843 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7844 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7845 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7847 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7848 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7849 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7851 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7855 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7856 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7857 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7858 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7861 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7862 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7863 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7865 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7866 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7867 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7868 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7871 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7872 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7873 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7874 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7877 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7879 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7881 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7882 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7883 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7884 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7886 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7887 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7888 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7889 // consider the stale state on reload.
7890 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7893 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7894 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7895 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7897 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7900 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7901 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7902 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7904 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7905 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7906 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7907 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7909 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7910 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7912 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7913 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7915 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7916 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7917 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7919 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7921 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7922 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7924 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7925 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7928 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7930 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7931 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7932 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7933 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7935 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7938 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7939 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7941 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7943 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7944 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7946 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7947 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7949 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7951 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7952 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7953 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7955 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7956 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7957 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7961 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7962 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7963 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7965 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7971 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7972 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7973 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7974 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7975 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7976 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7977 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7978 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7979 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7980 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7982 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7983 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7984 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7985 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7986 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7987 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7988 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7990 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7991 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7992 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7993 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7995 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7997 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7998 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8000 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8002 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8003 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8005 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8007 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8008 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8009 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8010 (2, channel_type, option),
8011 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8012 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8013 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8014 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8015 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8016 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8017 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8018 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8019 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8020 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8021 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8022 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8023 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8024 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8025 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8026 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8027 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8028 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8029 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8030 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8031 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8032 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8033 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8034 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8035 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8038 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8039 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8040 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8041 // required channel parameters.
8042 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8043 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8045 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8047 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8048 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8049 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8050 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8053 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8054 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8055 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8057 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8058 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8060 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8061 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8066 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8067 if iter.next().is_some() {
8068 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8072 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8073 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8074 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8075 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8076 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8079 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8080 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8081 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8083 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8084 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8086 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8087 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8088 // separate u64 values.
8089 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8091 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8093 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8094 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8095 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8096 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8098 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8099 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8101 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8102 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8103 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8104 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8105 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8108 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8109 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8111 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8112 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8113 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8114 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8116 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8117 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8119 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8120 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8121 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8122 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8123 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8126 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8127 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8130 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8131 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8132 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8133 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8134 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8135 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8138 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8139 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8140 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8142 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8147 context: ChannelContext {
8150 config: config.unwrap(),
8154 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8155 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8156 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8159 temporary_channel_id,
8161 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8163 channel_value_satoshis,
8165 latest_monitor_update_id,
8167 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8168 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8171 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8172 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8175 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8176 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8177 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8178 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8182 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8183 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8184 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8185 monitor_pending_forwards,
8186 monitor_pending_failures,
8187 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8189 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8190 signer_pending_funding: false,
8193 holding_cell_update_fee,
8194 next_holder_htlc_id,
8195 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8196 update_time_counter,
8199 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8200 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8201 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8202 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8204 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8205 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8206 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8207 closing_fee_limits: None,
8208 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8210 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8211 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8213 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8215 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8216 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8217 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8218 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8219 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8220 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8221 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8222 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8223 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8226 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8228 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8229 funding_transaction,
8232 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8233 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8234 counterparty_node_id,
8236 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8240 channel_update_status,
8241 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8245 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8246 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8247 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8248 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8250 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8251 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8253 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8254 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8255 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8257 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8258 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8260 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8261 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8263 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8266 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8275 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8276 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8277 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8278 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8279 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8280 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8281 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8282 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8283 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8284 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8285 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8286 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8287 use crate::ln::msgs;
8288 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8289 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8290 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8291 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8292 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8293 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8294 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8295 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8296 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8297 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8298 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8299 use crate::util::test_utils;
8300 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8301 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8302 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8303 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8304 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8305 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8306 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8307 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8308 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8309 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8310 use crate::prelude::*;
8312 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8315 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8316 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8322 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8323 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8324 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8325 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8329 signer: InMemorySigner,
8332 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8333 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8336 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8337 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8339 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8341 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8342 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8345 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8349 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8351 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8352 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8353 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8354 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8355 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8358 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8359 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8360 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8361 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8365 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8366 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8367 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8371 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8372 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8373 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8374 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8377 let seed = [42; 32];
8378 let network = Network::Testnet;
8379 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8380 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8381 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8384 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8385 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8386 let config = UserConfig::default();
8387 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8388 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8389 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8391 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8392 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8396 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8397 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8399 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8400 let original_fee = 253;
8401 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8402 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8403 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8404 let seed = [42; 32];
8405 let network = Network::Testnet;
8406 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8408 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8409 let config = UserConfig::default();
8410 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8412 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8413 // same as the old fee.
8414 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8415 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8416 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8420 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8421 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8422 // dust limits are used.
8423 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8424 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8425 let seed = [42; 32];
8426 let network = Network::Testnet;
8427 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8428 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8429 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8431 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8432 // they have different dust limits.
8434 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8435 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8436 let config = UserConfig::default();
8437 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8439 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8440 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8441 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8442 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8443 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8445 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8446 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8447 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8448 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8449 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8451 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8452 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8453 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8454 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8456 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8457 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8458 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8460 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8461 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8462 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8464 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8465 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8466 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8468 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8469 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8470 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8471 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8474 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8476 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8477 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8478 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8479 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8480 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8481 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8482 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8483 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8484 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8486 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8487 blinding_point: None,
8490 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8491 // the dust limit check.
8492 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8493 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8494 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8495 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8497 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8498 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8499 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8500 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8501 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8502 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8503 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8507 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8508 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8509 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8510 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8511 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8512 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8513 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8514 let seed = [42; 32];
8515 let network = Network::Testnet;
8516 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8518 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8519 let config = UserConfig::default();
8520 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8522 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8523 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8525 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8526 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8527 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8528 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8529 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8530 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8532 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8533 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8534 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8535 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8536 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8538 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8540 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8541 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8542 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8543 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8544 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8546 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8547 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8548 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8549 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8550 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8554 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8555 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8556 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8557 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8558 let seed = [42; 32];
8559 let network = Network::Testnet;
8560 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8561 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8562 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8564 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8566 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8567 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8568 let config = UserConfig::default();
8569 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8571 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8572 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8573 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8574 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8576 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8577 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8578 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8580 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8581 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8582 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8583 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8585 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8586 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8587 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8589 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8590 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8591 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8593 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8594 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8595 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8596 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8597 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8598 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8599 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8601 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8603 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8604 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8605 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8606 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8607 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8611 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8612 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8613 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8614 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8615 let seed = [42; 32];
8616 let network = Network::Testnet;
8617 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8618 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8619 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8621 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8622 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8623 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8624 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8625 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8626 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8627 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8628 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8630 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8631 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8632 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8633 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8634 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8635 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8637 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8638 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8639 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8640 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8642 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8644 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8645 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8646 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8647 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8648 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8649 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8651 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8652 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8653 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8654 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8656 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8657 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8658 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8659 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8660 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8662 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8663 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8665 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8666 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8667 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8669 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8670 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8671 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8672 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8673 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8675 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8676 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8678 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8679 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8680 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8684 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8686 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8687 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8688 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8690 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8691 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8692 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8693 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8695 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8696 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8697 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8699 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8701 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8702 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8705 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8706 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8707 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8708 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8709 let seed = [42; 32];
8710 let network = Network::Testnet;
8711 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8712 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8713 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8716 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8717 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8718 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8720 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8721 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8723 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8724 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8725 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8727 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8728 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8730 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8732 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8733 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8735 // Channel Negotiations failed
8736 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8737 assert!(result.is_err());
8742 fn channel_update() {
8743 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8744 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8745 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8746 let seed = [42; 32];
8747 let network = Network::Testnet;
8748 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8749 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8750 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8752 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8753 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8754 let config = UserConfig::default();
8755 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8757 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8758 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8759 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8760 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8761 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8763 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8764 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8765 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8766 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8767 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8769 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8770 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8771 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8772 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8774 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8775 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8776 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8778 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8779 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8780 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8782 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8783 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8784 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8786 short_channel_id: 0,
8789 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8790 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8791 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8793 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8794 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8796 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8798 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8800 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8801 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8802 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8803 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8805 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8806 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8807 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8809 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8812 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8816 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_ser() {
8817 // Ensure that channel blinding points and skimmed fees are (de)serialized properly.
8818 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8819 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8820 let seed = [42; 32];
8821 let network = Network::Testnet;
8822 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8824 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8825 let config = UserConfig::default();
8826 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
8827 let outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8828 let mut chan = Channel { context: outbound_chan.context };
8830 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8832 hops: vec![RouteHop {
8833 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
8834 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
8835 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
8839 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
8840 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
8841 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8843 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
8846 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8848 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8849 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8850 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8851 blinding_point: None,
8853 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
8854 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
8856 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
8859 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
8862 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
8864 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8867 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8868 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8869 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
8871 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
8872 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
8875 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8876 blinding_point: None,
8878 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8879 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
8882 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(10);
8885 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
8886 } else if i % 3 == 1 {
8887 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
8889 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
8890 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8891 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
8892 } = &mut dummy_add {
8893 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
8894 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
8896 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
8899 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
8901 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
8902 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
8903 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
8904 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
8905 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
8906 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
8907 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
8908 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
8911 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8913 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8914 use bitcoin::sighash;
8915 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8916 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
8917 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8918 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8919 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8920 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
8921 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8922 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8923 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
8924 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8925 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8926 use crate::sync::Arc;
8927 use core::str::FromStr;
8928 use hex::DisplayHex;
8930 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8931 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8932 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8933 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8935 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8937 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8938 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8939 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8940 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8941 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8943 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8944 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8950 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8951 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8952 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8954 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8955 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8956 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8957 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8958 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8959 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8961 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8963 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8964 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8965 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
8966 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8967 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
8968 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
8970 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8971 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8972 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8973 selected_contest_delay: 144
8975 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8976 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8978 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8979 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8981 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8982 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8984 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
8985 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8987 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8988 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8989 // build_commitment_transaction.
8990 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8991 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8992 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8993 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8994 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8996 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8997 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8998 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8999 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9003 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9004 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9005 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9006 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9010 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9011 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9012 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9014 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9015 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9017 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9018 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9020 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9022 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9023 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9024 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9025 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9026 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9027 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9028 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9030 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9031 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9032 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9033 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9035 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9036 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9037 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9039 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9041 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9042 commitment_tx.clone(),
9043 counterparty_signature,
9044 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9045 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9046 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9048 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9049 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9051 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9052 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9053 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9055 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9056 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9059 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9060 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9062 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9063 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9064 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9065 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9066 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9067 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9068 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9069 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9071 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9074 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9075 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9076 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9080 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9083 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9084 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9085 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9086 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9087 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9088 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9090 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9091 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9092 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9093 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9095 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9096 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9097 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9098 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9099 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9101 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9102 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9103 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9104 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9105 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9106 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9108 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9112 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9113 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9114 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9115 "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", {});
9117 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9118 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9120 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9121 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9122 "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", {});
9124 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9125 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9126 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9127 "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", {});
9129 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9130 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9132 amount_msat: 1000000,
9134 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9135 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9137 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9140 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9141 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9143 amount_msat: 2000000,
9145 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9146 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9148 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9151 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9152 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9154 amount_msat: 2000000,
9156 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9157 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9158 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9159 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9160 blinding_point: None,
9162 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9165 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9166 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9168 amount_msat: 3000000,
9170 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9171 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9172 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9173 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9174 blinding_point: None,
9176 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9179 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9180 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9182 amount_msat: 4000000,
9184 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9185 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9187 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9191 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9192 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9193 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9195 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9196 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9197 "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", {
9200 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9201 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9202 "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" },
9205 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9206 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9207 "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" },
9210 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9211 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9212 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b02000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d4335201483045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
9215 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9216 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9217 "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" },
9220 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9221 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9222 "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" }
9225 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9226 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9227 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9229 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9230 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9231 "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", {
9234 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9235 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9236 "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" },
9239 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9240 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9241 "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" },
9244 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9245 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9246 "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" },
9249 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9250 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9251 "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" },
9254 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9255 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9256 "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" }
9259 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9260 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9261 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9263 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9264 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9265 "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", {
9268 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9269 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9270 "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" },
9273 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9274 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9275 "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" },
9278 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9279 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9280 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
9283 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9284 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9285 "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" }
9288 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9289 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9290 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9291 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9293 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9294 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9295 "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", {
9298 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9299 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9300 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
9303 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9304 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9305 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
9308 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9309 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9310 "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" },
9313 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9314 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9315 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
9318 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9319 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9320 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9321 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9323 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9324 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9325 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9328 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9329 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9330 "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" },
9333 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9334 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9335 "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" },
9338 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9339 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9340 "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" },
9343 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9344 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9345 "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" }
9348 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9349 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9350 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9352 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9353 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9354 "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", {
9357 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9358 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9359 "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" },
9362 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9363 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9364 "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" },
9367 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9368 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9369 "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" }
9372 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9373 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9374 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9376 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9377 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9378 "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", {
9381 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9382 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9383 "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" },
9386 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9387 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9388 "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" },
9391 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9392 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9393 "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" }
9396 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9397 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9398 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9400 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9401 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9402 "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", {
9405 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9406 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9407 "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" },
9410 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9411 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9412 "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" }
9415 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9416 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9417 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9418 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9419 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9420 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9422 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9423 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9424 "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", {
9427 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9428 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9429 "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" },
9432 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9433 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9434 "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" }
9437 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9438 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9439 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9440 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9441 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9443 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9444 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9445 "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", {
9448 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9449 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9450 "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" },
9453 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9454 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9455 "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" }
9458 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9459 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9460 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9462 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9463 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9464 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484eb936a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e101483045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9467 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9468 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9469 "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
9472 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9473 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9474 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9475 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9476 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9478 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9479 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9480 "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", {
9483 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9484 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9485 "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" }
9488 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9489 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9490 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9491 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9492 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9494 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9495 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9496 "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", {
9499 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9500 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9501 "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" }
9504 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9505 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9506 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9507 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9509 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9510 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9511 "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", {});
9513 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9514 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9515 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9516 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9517 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9519 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9520 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9521 "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", {});
9523 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9524 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9525 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9526 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9527 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9529 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9530 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9531 "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", {});
9533 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9534 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9535 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9537 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9538 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9539 "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", {});
9541 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9542 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9543 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9544 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9545 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9547 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9548 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9549 "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", {});
9551 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9552 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9553 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9554 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9555 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9557 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9558 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9559 "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", {});
9561 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9562 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9563 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9564 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9565 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9566 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9568 amount_msat: 2000000,
9570 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9571 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9573 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9576 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9577 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9578 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9580 amount_msat: 5000001,
9582 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9583 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9584 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9585 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9586 blinding_point: None,
9588 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9591 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9592 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9594 amount_msat: 5000000,
9596 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9597 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9598 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9599 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9600 blinding_point: None,
9602 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9606 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9607 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9608 "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", {
9611 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9612 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9613 "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" },
9615 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9616 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9617 "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" },
9619 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9620 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9621 "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" }
9624 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9625 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9626 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9627 "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", {
9630 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9631 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9632 "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" },
9634 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9635 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9636 "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" },
9638 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9639 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9640 "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" }
9645 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9646 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9648 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9649 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9650 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9651 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9653 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9654 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9655 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9657 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9658 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9660 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9661 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9663 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9664 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9665 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9669 fn test_key_derivation() {
9670 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9671 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9673 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9674 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9676 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9677 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9679 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9680 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9682 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9683 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9685 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9686 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9688 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9689 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9693 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9694 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9695 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9696 let seed = [42; 32];
9697 let network = Network::Testnet;
9698 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9699 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9701 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9702 let config = UserConfig::default();
9703 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9704 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9706 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9707 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9709 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9710 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9711 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9712 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9713 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9714 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9715 assert!(res.is_ok());
9719 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9720 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9721 // resulting `channel_type`.
9722 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9723 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9724 let network = Network::Testnet;
9725 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9726 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9728 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9729 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9731 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9732 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9734 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9735 // need to signal it.
9736 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9737 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9738 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9739 &config, 0, 42, None
9741 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9743 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9744 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9745 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9747 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9748 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9749 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9753 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9754 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9755 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9756 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9757 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9760 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9761 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9765 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9766 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9767 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9768 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9769 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9770 let network = Network::Testnet;
9771 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9772 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9774 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9775 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9777 let config = UserConfig::default();
9779 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9780 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9781 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9782 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9783 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9785 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9786 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9787 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9791 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9792 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9793 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9795 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9796 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9797 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9798 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9799 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9800 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9802 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9806 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9807 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9809 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9810 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9811 let network = Network::Testnet;
9812 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9813 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9815 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9816 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9818 let config = UserConfig::default();
9820 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9821 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9822 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9823 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9824 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9825 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9826 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9827 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9829 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9830 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9831 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9832 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9833 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9834 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9838 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9839 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9841 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9842 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9843 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9844 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9846 assert!(res.is_err());
9848 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9849 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9850 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9852 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9853 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9854 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9857 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9859 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9860 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9861 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9862 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9865 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9866 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9868 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9869 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9871 assert!(res.is_err());
9875 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9876 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9877 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9878 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9879 let seed = [42; 32];
9880 let network = Network::Testnet;
9881 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9882 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9883 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9885 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9886 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9887 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9888 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9890 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9891 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9892 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9897 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9907 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9908 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9909 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9914 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9915 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9921 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9924 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9925 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9926 &accept_channel_msg,
9927 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9928 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9931 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9932 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9933 let tx = Transaction {
9935 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9939 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9942 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9945 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9946 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9947 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
9948 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9949 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9950 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9954 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9955 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9963 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9964 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9965 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9966 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
9968 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9969 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9976 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9977 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9978 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9979 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9980 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
9982 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9983 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9984 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9992 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9993 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
9996 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9997 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9998 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
9999 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());