1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
240 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
245 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
249 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
250 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
251 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
252 /// move on to ChannelReady.
253 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
254 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
255 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
257 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
258 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
259 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
260 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
261 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
262 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
263 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
265 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
266 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
267 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
277 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
279 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
280 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
281 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
282 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
283 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
284 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
285 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
286 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
287 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
289 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
290 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
292 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
293 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
294 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
295 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
296 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
297 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
298 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
299 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
300 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
302 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
303 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
305 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
307 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
308 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
309 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
310 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
311 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
312 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
313 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
314 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
316 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
318 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
320 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
324 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
326 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
327 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
328 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
330 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
331 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
333 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
334 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
335 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
336 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
337 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
339 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
340 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
344 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
350 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
353 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
354 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
356 holding_cell_msat: u64,
357 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
360 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
361 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
362 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
363 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
364 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
365 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
366 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
367 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
368 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
369 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
372 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
373 struct HTLCCandidate {
375 origin: HTLCInitiator,
379 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
387 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
389 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
391 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
392 htlc_value_msat: u64,
393 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
398 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
399 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
400 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
401 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
402 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
404 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
405 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
406 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
407 htlc_value_msat: u64,
409 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
410 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
414 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
415 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
416 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
417 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
418 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
419 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
420 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
421 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
422 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
423 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
424 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
427 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
428 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
429 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
430 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
431 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
432 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
434 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
437 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
438 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
439 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
440 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
443 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
444 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
445 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
446 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
447 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
448 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
449 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
450 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
451 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
452 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
453 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
454 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
455 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
456 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
457 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
459 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
460 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
461 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
462 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
464 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
465 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
466 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
467 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
469 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
470 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
471 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
472 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
473 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
475 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
476 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
477 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
478 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
480 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
481 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
482 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
484 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
485 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
486 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
487 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
488 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
490 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
491 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
494 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
495 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
497 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
498 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
499 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
500 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
501 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
503 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
507 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
508 (0, update, required),
509 (2, blocked, required),
512 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
513 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
514 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
516 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
517 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
518 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
519 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
521 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
525 channel_id: [u8; 32],
526 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
529 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
530 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
532 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
533 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
534 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
536 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
537 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
538 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
539 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
541 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
542 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
544 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
546 holder_signer: Signer,
547 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
548 destination_script: Script,
550 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
551 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
552 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
554 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
555 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
556 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
557 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
558 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
559 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
561 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
562 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
563 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
564 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
565 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
566 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
568 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
570 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
571 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
572 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
574 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
575 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
576 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
577 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
578 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
579 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
580 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
582 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
584 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
585 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
586 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
587 // HTLCs with similar state.
588 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
589 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
590 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
591 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
592 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
593 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
594 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
595 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
596 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
599 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
600 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
601 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
603 update_time_counter: u32,
605 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
606 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
607 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
608 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
609 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
610 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
612 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
613 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
615 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
616 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
617 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
618 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
620 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
621 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
623 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
625 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
627 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
628 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
629 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
630 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
631 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
632 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
634 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
635 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
636 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
637 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
638 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
640 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
641 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
642 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
643 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
644 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
645 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
646 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
647 channel_creation_height: u32,
649 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
652 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
654 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
657 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
659 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
662 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
664 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
666 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
667 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
670 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
672 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
674 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
675 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
677 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
679 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
680 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
681 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
683 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
685 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
686 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
688 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
689 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
690 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
692 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
694 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
696 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
697 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
698 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
699 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
701 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
702 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
703 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
705 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
706 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
707 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
709 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
710 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
711 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
712 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
713 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
714 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
715 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
716 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
718 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
719 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
720 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
721 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
722 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
724 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
725 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
727 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
728 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
729 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
730 /// unblock the state machine.
732 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
733 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
734 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
736 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
737 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
738 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
740 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
741 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
742 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
743 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
744 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
745 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
746 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
747 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
749 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
750 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
752 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
753 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
754 // the channel's funding UTXO.
756 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
757 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
758 // associated channel mapping.
760 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
761 // to store all of them.
762 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
764 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
765 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
766 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
767 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
768 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
770 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
771 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
773 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
774 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
776 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
777 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
778 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
780 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
781 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
782 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
783 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
784 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
787 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
788 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
789 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
792 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
793 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
794 self.update_time_counter
797 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
798 self.latest_monitor_update_id
801 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
802 self.config.announced_channel
805 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
806 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
809 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
810 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
811 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
812 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
815 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
816 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
817 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
820 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
821 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
822 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
823 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
824 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
827 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
828 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
829 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
830 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
831 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
836 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
840 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
842 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
843 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
844 self.temporary_channel_id
847 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
851 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
852 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
853 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
857 /// Gets the channel's type
858 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
862 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
863 /// is_usable() returns true).
864 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
865 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
866 self.short_channel_id
869 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
870 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
871 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
874 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
875 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
876 self.outbound_scid_alias
879 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
880 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
881 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
882 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
883 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
886 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
887 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
888 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
889 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
892 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
893 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
894 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
897 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
898 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
899 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
900 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
904 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
907 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
908 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
911 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
912 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
915 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
916 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
917 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
920 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
921 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
924 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
925 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
926 self.counterparty_node_id
929 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
930 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
931 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
934 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
935 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
936 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
939 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
940 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
942 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
943 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
944 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
945 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
947 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
951 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
952 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
953 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
956 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
957 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
958 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
961 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
962 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
963 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
965 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
966 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
971 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
972 self.channel_value_satoshis
975 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
976 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
979 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
980 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
983 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
984 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
987 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
988 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
989 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
992 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
993 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
994 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
997 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
998 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
999 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1002 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1003 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1004 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1007 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1008 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1009 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1012 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1013 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1014 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1017 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1018 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1019 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1020 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1021 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1024 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1026 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1027 self.prev_config = None;
1031 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1032 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1036 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1037 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1038 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1039 let did_channel_update =
1040 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1041 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1042 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1043 if did_channel_update {
1044 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1045 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1046 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1047 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1049 self.config.options = *config;
1053 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1054 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1055 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1058 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1059 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1060 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1061 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1062 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1064 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1065 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1066 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1067 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1068 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1069 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1070 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1072 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1073 where L::Target: Logger
1075 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1076 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1077 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1079 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1080 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1081 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1082 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1084 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1085 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1086 if match update_state {
1087 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1088 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1089 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1090 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1091 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1093 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1097 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1098 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1099 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1100 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1102 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1103 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1104 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1106 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1107 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1108 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1109 transaction_output_index: None
1114 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1115 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1116 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1117 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1118 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1121 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1123 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1124 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1125 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1127 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1128 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1131 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1132 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1135 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1137 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1138 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1139 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1141 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1142 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1148 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1149 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1150 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1151 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1152 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1153 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1154 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1158 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1159 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1161 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1163 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1164 if generated_by_local {
1165 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1166 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1175 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1177 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1178 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1179 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1180 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1181 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1182 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1183 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1186 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1187 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1188 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1189 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1193 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1194 preimages.push(preimage);
1198 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1199 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1201 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1203 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1204 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1206 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1207 if !generated_by_local {
1208 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1216 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1217 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1218 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1219 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1220 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1221 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1222 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1223 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1225 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1227 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1228 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1229 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1230 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1232 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1234 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1235 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1236 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1237 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1240 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1241 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1242 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1243 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1245 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1248 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1249 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1250 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1251 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1253 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1256 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1257 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1262 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1263 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1268 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1270 let channel_parameters =
1271 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1272 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1273 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1276 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1281 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1284 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1285 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1286 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1287 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1289 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1290 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1291 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1299 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1300 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1306 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1307 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1308 /// our counterparty!)
1309 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1310 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1311 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1312 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1313 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1314 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1315 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1317 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1321 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1322 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1323 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1324 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1325 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1326 //may see payments to it!
1327 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1328 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1329 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1331 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1334 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1335 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1336 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1337 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1338 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1341 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1342 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1345 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1349 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1350 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1351 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1352 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1353 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1354 // which are near the dust limit.
1355 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1356 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1357 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1358 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1359 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1361 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1362 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1364 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1367 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1368 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1369 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1372 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1373 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1375 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1376 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1377 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1378 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1379 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1380 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1381 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1384 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1387 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1388 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1389 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1391 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1392 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1393 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1394 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1395 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1396 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1398 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1399 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1405 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1406 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1408 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1409 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1410 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1411 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1412 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1413 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1414 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1417 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1420 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1421 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1422 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1424 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1425 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1426 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1427 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1428 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1429 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1431 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1432 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1436 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1437 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1438 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1439 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1440 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1441 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1442 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1444 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1445 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1447 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1454 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1455 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1456 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1457 /// corner case properly.
1458 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
1459 let context = &self;
1460 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1461 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1462 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1464 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1465 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1466 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1467 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1470 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1472 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1473 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1475 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1477 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1479 if context.is_outbound() {
1480 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1481 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1483 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1484 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1486 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1487 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1488 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1489 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1492 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1493 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1494 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1495 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1497 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1498 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1499 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1500 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1501 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1502 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1503 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1504 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1505 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1506 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1508 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1511 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1512 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1513 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1514 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1515 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1518 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1519 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1521 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1522 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1523 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1525 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1526 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1527 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1528 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1532 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1534 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1535 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1536 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1537 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1538 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1539 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1541 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1542 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1544 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1545 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1546 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1548 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1549 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1550 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1551 Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1552 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1555 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1556 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1557 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1558 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1559 context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1560 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1563 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1564 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1565 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1567 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1571 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1572 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1574 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1575 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1579 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1580 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1581 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1582 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1584 outbound_capacity_msat,
1585 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1586 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1591 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1592 let context = &self;
1593 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1596 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1597 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1599 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1600 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1602 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1603 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1605 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1606 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1607 let context = &self;
1608 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1610 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1613 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1614 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1616 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1617 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1619 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1620 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1622 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1623 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1627 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1628 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1634 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1635 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1636 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1639 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1640 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1641 included_htlcs += 1;
1644 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1645 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1649 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1650 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1651 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1652 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1653 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1654 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1659 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1661 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1662 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1667 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1668 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1672 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1673 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1674 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1677 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1678 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1680 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1681 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1682 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1684 total_pending_htlcs,
1685 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1686 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1687 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1689 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1690 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1691 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1693 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1695 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1700 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1701 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1703 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1704 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1706 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1707 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1709 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1710 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1711 let context = &self;
1712 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1714 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1717 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1718 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1720 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1721 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1723 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1724 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1726 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1727 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1731 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1732 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1738 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1739 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1740 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1741 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1742 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1743 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1746 included_htlcs += 1;
1749 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1750 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1753 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1754 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1756 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1757 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1758 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1763 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1764 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1765 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1768 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1769 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1771 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1772 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1774 total_pending_htlcs,
1775 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1776 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1777 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1779 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1780 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1781 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1783 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1785 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1791 // Internal utility functions for channels
1793 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1794 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1795 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1797 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1799 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1800 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1801 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1803 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1806 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1808 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1811 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1812 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1813 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1815 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1817 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1818 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1819 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1820 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1821 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1824 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1825 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1826 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1827 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1828 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1829 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1830 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1833 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1834 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1836 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1837 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1840 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1841 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1842 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1843 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1844 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1845 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1848 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1849 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1850 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
1853 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
1854 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
1855 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
1856 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
1859 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1860 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1862 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
1863 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1864 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1868 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
1870 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1871 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
1872 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
1873 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
1877 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
1879 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
1881 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
1883 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
1884 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
1885 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
1886 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
1887 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
1889 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
1890 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
1892 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
1894 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
1895 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
1897 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
1898 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
1899 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
1900 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
1901 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
1902 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
1904 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
1905 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
1907 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
1908 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
1909 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
1910 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
1911 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
1913 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
1914 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
1916 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
1917 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
1919 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
1920 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
1921 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
1922 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
1928 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
1929 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1931 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
1932 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
1933 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
1938 macro_rules! secp_check {
1939 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
1942 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
1947 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
1948 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
1949 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
1950 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
1951 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
1952 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
1953 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1954 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
1955 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
1956 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
1957 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
1960 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
1961 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
1962 // `only_static_remotekey`.
1964 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
1965 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
1966 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1967 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
1974 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
1975 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
1976 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
1977 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
1978 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
1979 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1980 // We've exhausted our options
1983 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
1984 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
1987 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
1988 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
1989 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
1990 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
1992 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1993 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1994 assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
1995 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
1996 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
1997 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
1999 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
2001 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
2005 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
2006 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
2007 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
2008 outbound_scid_alias: u64
2009 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
2010 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
2011 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2012 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2014 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
2015 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
2016 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
2017 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
2019 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
2020 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
2022 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
2023 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
2025 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
2026 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
2027 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
2029 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
2030 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
2032 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
2033 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2034 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
2035 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
2036 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
2039 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
2040 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
2042 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2044 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
2045 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
2046 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
2047 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
2050 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2051 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2053 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
2054 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
2055 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
2056 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
2060 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2061 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
2062 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
2066 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
2067 Ok(script) => script,
2068 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
2071 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2074 context: ChannelContext {
2077 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
2078 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
2079 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
2080 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
2085 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
2087 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
2088 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
2089 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
2090 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
2092 channel_value_satoshis,
2094 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
2097 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
2100 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
2101 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
2104 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2105 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2106 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
2107 pending_update_fee: None,
2108 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
2109 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
2110 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
2111 update_time_counter: 1,
2113 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
2115 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
2116 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
2117 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
2118 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
2119 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
2120 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
2122 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2123 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2124 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2125 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2127 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
2128 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
2129 closing_fee_limits: None,
2130 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
2132 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
2134 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
2135 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
2136 short_channel_id: None,
2137 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
2139 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
2140 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
2141 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
2142 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
2143 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
2144 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2145 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
2146 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
2147 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
2148 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
2149 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
2150 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2152 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
2154 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
2155 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
2156 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
2157 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
2158 counterparty_parameters: None,
2159 funding_outpoint: None,
2160 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
2161 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
2163 funding_transaction: None,
2165 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
2166 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
2167 counterparty_node_id,
2169 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
2171 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
2173 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
2174 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
2176 announcement_sigs: None,
2178 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2179 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2180 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2181 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2183 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
2184 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
2186 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
2187 outbound_scid_alias,
2189 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
2190 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
2192 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2193 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
2198 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
2203 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2204 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2205 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2207 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2208 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2209 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2210 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2211 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2212 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2213 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2216 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2217 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2218 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2219 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2220 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2221 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2222 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2223 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2225 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2226 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2235 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
2236 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
2237 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2238 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
2239 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
2240 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
2241 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
2242 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
2243 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
2244 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2245 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2248 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
2250 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
2251 // support this channel type.
2252 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
2253 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
2254 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
2257 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
2258 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
2259 // `static_remote_key`.
2260 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
2261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
2263 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
2264 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
2265 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
2267 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
2268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
2270 channel_type.clone()
2272 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2273 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2278 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2280 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
2281 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
2282 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
2283 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2284 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2285 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2286 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2287 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2288 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2291 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
2292 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
2295 // Check sanity of message fields:
2296 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
2297 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
2299 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
2300 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
2302 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
2303 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
2305 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2306 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
2307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2309 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
2310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
2312 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2315 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
2317 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2318 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
2319 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
2321 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2322 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2324 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2325 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2328 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2329 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
2330 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
2332 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2333 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2335 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2336 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2338 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2339 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2341 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2342 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2344 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2345 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2347 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2348 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2351 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
2353 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
2354 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
2355 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
2359 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
2360 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2361 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
2362 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
2363 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2365 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
2366 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
2368 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2369 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
2370 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
2372 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
2373 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2376 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
2377 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
2378 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
2379 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
2380 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
2381 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
2384 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
2385 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
2386 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
2387 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2388 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
2391 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2392 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2393 &Some(ref script) => {
2394 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2395 if script.len() == 0 {
2398 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2399 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
2401 Some(script.clone())
2404 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2406 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2411 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
2412 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
2413 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
2414 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
2418 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2419 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
2420 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
2424 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
2425 Ok(script) => script,
2426 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
2429 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2430 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2432 let chan = Channel {
2433 context: ChannelContext {
2436 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
2437 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
2439 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
2444 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
2446 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
2447 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2448 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
2449 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
2452 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
2455 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
2458 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
2459 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
2460 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
2462 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2463 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2464 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
2465 pending_update_fee: None,
2466 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
2467 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
2468 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
2469 update_time_counter: 1,
2471 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
2473 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
2474 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
2475 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
2476 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
2477 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
2478 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
2480 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2481 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
2482 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2483 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
2485 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
2486 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
2487 closing_fee_limits: None,
2488 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
2490 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
2492 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
2493 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
2494 short_channel_id: None,
2495 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
2497 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
2498 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
2499 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
2500 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
2501 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
2502 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
2503 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
2504 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
2505 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
2506 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
2507 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
2508 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
2509 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
2511 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
2513 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
2514 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
2515 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
2516 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
2517 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2518 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2519 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2521 funding_outpoint: None,
2522 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
2523 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
2525 funding_transaction: None,
2527 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
2528 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
2529 counterparty_node_id,
2531 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
2533 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
2535 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
2536 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
2538 announcement_sigs: None,
2540 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2541 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2542 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2543 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2545 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
2546 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
2548 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
2549 outbound_scid_alias,
2551 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
2552 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
2554 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2555 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
2560 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
2568 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2569 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2570 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2571 // outside of those situations will fail.
2572 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2576 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2581 1 + // script length (0)
2585 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2586 2 + // witness marker and flag
2587 1 + // witness element count
2588 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2589 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2590 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2591 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2592 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2593 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2595 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2596 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2597 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2603 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2604 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2605 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2606 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2608 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2609 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2610 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2612 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2613 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2614 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2615 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2616 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2617 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2620 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2621 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2624 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2625 value_to_holder = 0;
2628 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2629 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2630 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2631 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2633 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2634 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2637 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2638 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2641 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2644 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2645 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2647 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2649 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2650 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2651 where L::Target: Logger {
2652 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2653 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2654 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2655 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2656 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2657 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2658 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2659 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2663 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2664 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2665 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2666 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2668 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2669 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2671 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2673 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2675 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2676 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2677 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2679 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2680 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2681 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2682 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2683 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2685 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2686 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2687 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2689 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2690 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2692 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2695 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2696 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2700 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2704 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2705 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2706 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2707 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2708 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2709 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2712 // Now update local state:
2714 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2715 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2716 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2717 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2718 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2719 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2720 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2724 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2725 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2726 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2727 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2728 // do not not get into this branch.
2729 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2730 match pending_update {
2731 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2732 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2733 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2734 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2735 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2736 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2737 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2740 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2741 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2742 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2743 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2744 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2745 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2746 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2752 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2753 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2754 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2756 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2757 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2758 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2760 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2761 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2764 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2765 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2767 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2768 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2770 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2771 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2774 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2777 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2778 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2779 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2780 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2785 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2786 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2787 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2788 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2789 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2790 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2791 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2792 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2793 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2794 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2795 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2796 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2797 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2798 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2799 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2800 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2801 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2803 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2805 let insert_pos = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2806 .unwrap_or(self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2807 let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2808 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2809 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2810 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2811 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2813 for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2814 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2817 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2818 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2819 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2820 update, blocked: true,
2825 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2826 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2827 monitor_update: &self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2828 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2832 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2836 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2837 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2838 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2839 /// before we fail backwards.
2841 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2842 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2843 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2844 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2845 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2846 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2847 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2850 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2851 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2852 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2853 /// before we fail backwards.
2855 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2856 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2857 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2858 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2859 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2860 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2861 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2863 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2865 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2866 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2867 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2869 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2870 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2871 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2873 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2874 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2875 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2877 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2882 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2883 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2889 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2890 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2891 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2892 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2893 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2897 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2898 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2899 force_holding_cell = true;
2902 // Now update local state:
2903 if force_holding_cell {
2904 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2905 match pending_update {
2906 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2907 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2908 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2909 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2913 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2914 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2915 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2916 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2922 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2923 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2924 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2930 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2932 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2933 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2936 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2937 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2938 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2943 // Message handlers:
2945 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2946 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2948 // Check sanity of message fields:
2949 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2950 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2952 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2953 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2955 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2956 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2958 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
2959 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
2961 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2962 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2964 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2965 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2966 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2968 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2969 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2970 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2972 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2973 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2974 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2976 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2977 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2979 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2980 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2983 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2984 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2985 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2987 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2988 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2990 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2991 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2993 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2994 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2996 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2997 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2999 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
3000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
3002 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
3003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
3006 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
3007 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
3008 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
3010 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
3011 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
3013 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
3014 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3015 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
3017 self.context.channel_type = channel_type;
3020 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
3021 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
3022 &Some(ref script) => {
3023 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
3024 if script.len() == 0 {
3027 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
3028 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
3030 Some(script.clone())
3033 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
3035 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
3040 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
3041 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
3042 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
3043 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
3044 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
3046 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
3047 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
3049 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
3052 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
3053 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
3054 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
3055 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
3056 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3057 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
3060 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
3061 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
3062 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
3065 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
3066 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
3068 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
3069 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
3074 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3075 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3077 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3078 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
3080 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3081 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3082 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3083 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
3084 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
3085 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
3086 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
3087 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3088 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
3091 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3092 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3094 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3095 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3096 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3097 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3099 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
3100 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
3102 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3103 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
3106 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
3107 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
3108 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
3110 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
3113 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
3116 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3117 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
3118 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
3120 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
3122 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
3123 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
3125 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3126 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3127 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3128 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3131 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
3132 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3133 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
3134 // funding_created_signature may fail.
3135 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
3137 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
3139 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
3140 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3141 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
3144 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
3145 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
3146 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
3150 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3151 initial_commitment_tx,
3154 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3155 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3158 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
3159 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3161 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3163 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3164 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
3165 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
3166 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
3167 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
3168 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
3169 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
3170 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3171 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
3172 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
3173 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
3175 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
3177 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
3179 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
3180 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3181 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3182 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3184 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3186 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
3187 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3189 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
3190 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3193 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3194 }, channel_monitor))
3197 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
3198 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
3199 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
3200 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
3201 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
3203 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
3206 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3207 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
3209 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
3210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
3212 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3213 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3214 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3215 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3218 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3220 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3221 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3222 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3223 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3225 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3226 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3228 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3229 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
3231 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3232 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3233 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3234 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
3235 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3236 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
3240 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3241 initial_commitment_tx,
3244 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3245 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3248 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
3249 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3252 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3253 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3254 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
3255 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
3256 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
3257 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
3258 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
3259 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
3260 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3261 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
3262 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
3263 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
3265 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
3267 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
3269 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
3270 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
3271 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3272 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3274 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3276 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
3277 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3281 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3282 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3284 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3285 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3286 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3287 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3289 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3292 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3293 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3294 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3297 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3298 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3299 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3300 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3301 // when routing outbound payments.
3302 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3306 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3308 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3309 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
3310 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
3311 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3312 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3313 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
3314 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
3315 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
3316 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
3318 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3319 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3320 let expected_point =
3321 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3322 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3324 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3325 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3326 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3327 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3328 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3329 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3331 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3332 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3333 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3334 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3335 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3337 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3338 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3342 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
3345 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3346 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3348 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3350 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3353 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
3354 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3355 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
3356 self.context.funding_transaction.clone()
3362 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3363 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
3364 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3365 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
3366 if local_sent_shutdown {
3367 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3369 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3370 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
3371 if remote_sent_shutdown {
3372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3374 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3375 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3377 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3378 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3380 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3381 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3383 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3384 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3387 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3388 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3389 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3390 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3392 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3393 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3395 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3396 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3397 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3398 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3399 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3400 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3401 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3402 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3403 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3404 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3405 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3407 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3408 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3409 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3410 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3411 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3412 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3416 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
3419 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3420 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
3421 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
3423 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3424 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3425 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3426 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3427 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3428 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3429 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3433 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3434 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3435 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3436 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3437 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3438 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3439 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3443 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3444 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3445 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3446 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3447 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3448 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3451 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3452 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3453 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3454 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3455 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3457 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3458 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3461 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3462 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3465 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3466 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3467 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
3468 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
3469 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
3470 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3471 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3472 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3473 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3474 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3475 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3476 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3477 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3478 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3479 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3480 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3483 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3484 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3485 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3486 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3487 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3490 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3491 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3493 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3494 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3497 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3498 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3499 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3503 // Now update local state:
3504 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3505 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3506 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3507 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3508 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3509 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3510 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3515 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3517 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3518 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3519 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3520 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3521 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3522 None => fail_reason.into(),
3523 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3524 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3525 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3526 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3528 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3532 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3533 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3534 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3535 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3537 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3538 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3543 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3546 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3547 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3548 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3550 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3551 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3554 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3557 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3558 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3559 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3561 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3562 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3565 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3569 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3570 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3573 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3574 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3577 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3581 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3582 where L::Target: Logger
3584 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3585 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3587 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3588 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3590 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3591 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3594 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3596 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3598 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3599 let commitment_txid = {
3600 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3601 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3602 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3604 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3605 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3606 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3607 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3608 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3609 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3613 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3615 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3616 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3617 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3618 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3621 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3622 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3623 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3624 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3627 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3629 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3630 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3631 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3632 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3633 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3634 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3635 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3636 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3637 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3638 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3639 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3645 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3646 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3649 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3650 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3651 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3652 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3653 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3654 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3655 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3656 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3657 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3658 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3659 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3660 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3661 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3664 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3665 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3666 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3667 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3668 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3669 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(),
3670 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3672 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3673 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3674 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3675 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3676 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3677 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3678 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3681 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3682 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3685 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3687 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3688 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3689 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3692 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3695 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3696 commitment_stats.tx,
3698 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3699 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3700 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3703 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3704 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3706 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3707 let mut need_commitment = false;
3708 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3709 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3710 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3711 need_commitment = true;
3715 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3716 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3717 Some(forward_info.clone())
3719 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3720 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3721 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3722 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3723 need_commitment = true;
3726 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3727 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3728 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3729 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3730 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3731 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3732 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3733 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3734 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3735 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3736 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3737 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3738 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3739 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3741 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3743 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3744 need_commitment = true;
3748 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3749 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3750 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3751 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3752 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3753 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3755 nondust_htlc_sources,
3759 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3760 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3761 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3762 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3764 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3765 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3766 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3767 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3768 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3769 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3770 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3771 // includes the right HTLCs.
3772 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3773 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3774 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3775 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3776 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3777 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3779 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3780 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3781 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3784 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3785 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3786 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3787 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3788 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3789 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3790 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3791 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3792 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3796 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3797 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3798 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3799 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3802 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3803 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3804 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3805 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3806 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3807 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3808 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3809 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3812 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3813 /// for our counterparty.
3814 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3815 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3816 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3817 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3818 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3820 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3821 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3822 updates: Vec::new(),
3825 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3826 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3827 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3828 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3829 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3830 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3831 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3832 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3833 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3834 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3835 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3836 // to rebalance channels.
3837 match &htlc_update {
3838 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3839 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3840 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3843 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3844 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3845 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3846 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3847 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3848 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3849 // into the holding cell without ever being
3850 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3851 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3852 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3855 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3861 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3862 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3863 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3864 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3865 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3866 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3867 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3868 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3869 (msg, monitor_update)
3870 } else { unreachable!() };
3871 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3872 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3874 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3875 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3876 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3877 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3878 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3879 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3880 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3881 // for a full revocation before failing.
3882 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3885 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3887 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3894 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3895 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3897 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3898 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3903 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3904 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3905 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3906 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3907 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3909 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3910 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3911 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3913 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3914 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3920 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3921 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3922 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3923 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3924 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3925 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3926 where L::Target: Logger,
3928 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3929 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3931 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3932 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3934 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3935 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3938 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3940 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3941 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3946 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3947 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3948 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3949 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3950 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3951 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3952 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3953 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3954 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3957 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3959 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3960 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3963 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3964 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3966 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3968 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3969 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3970 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3971 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3972 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3973 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3974 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3975 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3979 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3980 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3981 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3982 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3983 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3984 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3985 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3986 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3987 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3989 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3990 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3993 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3994 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3995 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3996 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3997 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3998 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3999 let mut require_commitment = false;
4000 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4003 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4004 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4005 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4007 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4008 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4009 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4010 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4011 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4012 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4017 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4018 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4019 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4020 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4021 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4023 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4024 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4025 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4030 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4031 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4033 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4037 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4038 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4040 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
4041 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4042 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
4043 require_commitment = true;
4044 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
4045 match forward_info {
4046 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4047 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4048 require_commitment = true;
4050 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4051 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4052 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4054 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4055 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4056 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4060 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4061 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4062 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4063 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4069 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4070 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4071 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4072 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4074 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4075 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4076 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4077 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4078 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4079 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4080 require_commitment = true;
4084 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4086 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4087 match update_state {
4088 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4089 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4090 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4091 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4092 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4094 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4095 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4096 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4097 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4098 require_commitment = true;
4099 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4100 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4105 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
4106 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4107 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4108 if require_commitment {
4109 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4110 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
4111 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
4112 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
4113 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4114 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4115 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4116 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4117 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4119 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4120 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4121 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4122 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4123 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
4126 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
4127 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4128 let mut additional_update = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
4129 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4130 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4131 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4132 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4134 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4135 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
4137 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4138 if require_commitment {
4139 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4141 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4142 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4143 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4144 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4146 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
4147 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4148 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4149 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
4151 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4152 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4153 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
4159 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4160 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4161 /// commitment update.
4162 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
4163 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
4164 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4167 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4168 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4169 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4170 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4172 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4173 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4174 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
4175 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4176 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4178 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4179 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4181 if !self.context.is_live() {
4182 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4185 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4186 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4187 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4188 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4189 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4190 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
4191 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4192 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4193 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4194 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4198 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4199 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4200 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4201 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4202 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4205 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4206 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4210 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
4211 force_holding_cell = true;
4214 if force_holding_cell {
4215 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4219 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4220 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4222 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4223 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4228 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4229 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4231 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4233 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
4234 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4235 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4236 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4240 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4241 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4242 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4246 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4247 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4250 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4251 // will be retransmitted.
4252 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4253 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4254 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4256 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4257 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4259 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4260 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4261 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4262 // this HTLC accordingly
4263 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4266 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4267 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4268 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4269 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4272 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4273 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4274 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4275 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4276 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4277 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4282 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4284 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4285 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4286 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4287 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4291 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4292 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4293 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4294 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4295 // the update upon reconnection.
4296 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4300 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4302 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
4303 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4306 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4307 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4308 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4309 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4310 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4311 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4312 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4314 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4315 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4316 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4317 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4318 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4319 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4320 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4322 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4323 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4324 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4325 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4326 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4327 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4328 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
4331 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4332 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4333 /// to the remote side.
4334 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4335 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4336 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4337 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4340 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4342 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
4343 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
4344 let mut found_blocked = false;
4345 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
4346 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
4347 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
4351 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
4352 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4353 // first received the funding_signed.
4354 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4355 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4356 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4358 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4359 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4360 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4361 funding_broadcastable = None;
4364 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4365 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4366 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4367 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4368 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4369 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4370 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4371 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4372 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4373 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4374 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4375 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4376 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4377 next_per_commitment_point,
4378 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4382 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4384 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4385 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4386 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4387 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4388 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4389 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4391 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
4392 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4393 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4394 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4395 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4396 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4400 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4401 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4403 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4404 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4405 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
4408 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4409 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4410 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4411 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4412 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4413 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4414 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4415 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4416 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4420 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4421 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4423 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4424 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4426 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4427 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4429 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4430 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
4432 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4433 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4434 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
4435 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
4436 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4437 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
4438 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4439 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4440 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4441 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4442 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4443 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4444 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4446 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4447 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4448 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4454 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4455 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4456 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4457 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4458 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4459 per_commitment_secret,
4460 next_per_commitment_point,
4462 next_local_nonce: None,
4466 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
4467 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4468 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4469 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4470 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4472 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4473 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4474 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4475 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4476 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4477 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4478 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4479 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4480 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4485 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4486 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4488 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4489 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4490 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4491 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4492 reason: err_packet.clone()
4495 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4496 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4497 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4498 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4499 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4500 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4503 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4504 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4505 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4506 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4507 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4514 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4515 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4516 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4517 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4521 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4522 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4523 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4524 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4525 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4526 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4530 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4531 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4533 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4534 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4535 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4536 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4537 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4538 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4539 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4540 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4543 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4545 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4546 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4547 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4548 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4549 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4552 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4553 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4554 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4557 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4558 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4559 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4560 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4561 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4562 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4564 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4565 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4566 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4567 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4568 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4571 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4572 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4573 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4574 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4575 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4576 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4577 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4578 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4582 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4583 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4584 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4585 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4587 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4591 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4592 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4593 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4594 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4596 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4597 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4598 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4599 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4600 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4604 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4606 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4607 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4608 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4609 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4610 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4611 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4613 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4614 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4615 channel_ready: None,
4616 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4617 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4618 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4622 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4623 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4624 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4625 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4626 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4627 next_per_commitment_point,
4628 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4630 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4631 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4632 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4636 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4637 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4638 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4640 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4641 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4642 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4645 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4648 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4651 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4652 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4653 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4654 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4655 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4656 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4657 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4659 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4661 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4662 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4663 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4664 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4665 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4666 next_per_commitment_point,
4667 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4671 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4672 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4673 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4675 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4678 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4679 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4680 raa: required_revoke,
4681 commitment_update: None,
4682 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4684 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4685 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4686 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4688 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4691 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4692 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4693 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4694 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4695 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4696 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4699 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4700 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4701 raa: required_revoke,
4702 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4703 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4707 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4711 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4712 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4713 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4714 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4716 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4718 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4720 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4721 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4722 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4723 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4724 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4725 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4727 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4728 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4729 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4730 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4731 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4733 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4734 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4735 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4736 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4739 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4740 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4741 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4742 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4743 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4744 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4745 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4746 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4747 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4748 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4749 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4750 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4751 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4752 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4753 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4755 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4758 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4759 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4762 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4763 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4764 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4765 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4766 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4767 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4768 self.context.channel_state &
4769 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4770 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4771 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4772 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4775 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4776 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4777 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4778 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4779 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4780 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4781 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4783 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4789 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4790 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4791 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4792 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4794 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4795 return Ok((None, None));
4798 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4799 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4800 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4802 return Ok((None, None));
4805 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4807 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4808 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4809 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4810 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4812 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4813 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4814 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4816 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4817 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4818 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4819 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4821 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4822 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4823 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4828 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4829 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4831 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4832 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4835 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4836 /// within our expected timeframe.
4838 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4839 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4840 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4843 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4846 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4847 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4850 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4851 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4852 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4853 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4855 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4856 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4858 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4859 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4860 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4861 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4862 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4864 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4865 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4866 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4869 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4871 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4872 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4875 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4876 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4877 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4880 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4883 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4884 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4885 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4886 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4888 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4891 assert!(send_shutdown);
4892 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4893 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4894 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4896 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4897 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4899 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4904 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4906 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4907 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4909 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4910 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4911 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4912 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4913 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4914 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4917 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4918 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4919 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4922 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4923 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4924 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4925 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4929 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4930 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4931 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4932 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4933 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4934 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4936 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4937 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4944 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4945 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4947 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4950 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4951 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4953 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4955 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4956 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4957 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4958 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4959 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4960 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4961 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4962 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4963 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4965 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4966 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4969 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4973 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4974 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4975 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4976 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4978 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4979 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4981 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4982 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4984 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4985 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4987 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4988 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4991 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4992 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4995 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4996 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4997 return Ok((None, None));
5000 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5001 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5002 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5005 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5007 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5010 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5011 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5012 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5013 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5014 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5018 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5019 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5020 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5024 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5025 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5026 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5027 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5028 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5029 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5030 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
5034 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5036 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5037 ($new_fee: expr) => {
5038 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5039 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5041 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5044 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
5045 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5046 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5048 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5049 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5050 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5051 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5055 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5056 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5057 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5058 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5060 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5061 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5062 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5068 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5069 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5070 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5072 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5073 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5075 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5076 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5079 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5080 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5081 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5082 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5083 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5085 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5086 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5087 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5089 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5090 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5093 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5094 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5095 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5096 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5097 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5098 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5099 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5100 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5102 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5105 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5106 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5107 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5108 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5110 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5114 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5115 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5116 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5117 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5119 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5125 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5126 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5127 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5128 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5129 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5130 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5131 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5133 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5134 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5137 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5139 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5140 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5146 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5147 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5148 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5149 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5150 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5151 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5152 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5154 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5155 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5162 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5163 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5166 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5167 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
5170 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5171 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5175 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
5176 &self.context.holder_signer
5180 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5182 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5183 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5184 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5185 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5186 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5187 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5189 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5191 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5199 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5200 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5204 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5205 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5206 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5207 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
5210 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5211 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5212 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5215 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5216 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5217 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5218 for i in 0..self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
5219 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
5220 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
5221 return Some((&self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
5222 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5228 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5229 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5230 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5231 let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5232 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5233 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5238 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5239 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5241 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5242 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5243 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5244 if release_monitor { self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5247 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5248 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5251 pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5252 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
5253 if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
5254 assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
5260 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5261 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5264 /// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
5265 pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5266 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
5267 .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
5270 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5271 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5272 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5274 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5275 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5276 if self.context.channel_state &
5277 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5278 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5279 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5280 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5281 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5284 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5285 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5286 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5287 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5288 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5289 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5291 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5292 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5293 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5295 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5296 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5297 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5298 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5299 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5300 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5306 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5307 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5308 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5311 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5312 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5313 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5316 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5317 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5318 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5321 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5322 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5323 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5324 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5325 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5326 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5331 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5332 self.context.channel_update_status
5335 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5336 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5337 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5340 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5342 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5343 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5344 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5348 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5349 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5350 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5353 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5357 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5358 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5359 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5361 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5362 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5363 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5365 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5366 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5369 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5370 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5371 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5372 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5373 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5374 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5375 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5376 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5377 self.context.channel_state);
5379 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5383 if need_commitment_update {
5384 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5385 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5386 let next_per_commitment_point =
5387 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5388 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5389 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5390 next_per_commitment_point,
5391 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5395 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5401 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5402 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5403 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5404 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5405 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5406 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5407 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5409 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5412 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5413 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5414 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5415 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5416 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5417 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5418 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5419 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5420 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5421 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5422 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5423 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5424 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5425 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5426 // channel and move on.
5427 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5428 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5430 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5431 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5432 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5434 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5435 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5436 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5437 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5438 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5439 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5440 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5444 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5445 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5446 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5447 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5448 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5452 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5453 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5454 // may have already happened for this block).
5455 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5456 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5457 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5458 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5461 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5462 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5463 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5464 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5472 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5473 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5474 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5475 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5477 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5478 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5481 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5483 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5484 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5485 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5486 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5488 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5491 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5494 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5495 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5496 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5497 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5499 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5502 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5503 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5504 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5506 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5507 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5509 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5510 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5511 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5519 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5521 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5522 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5523 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5525 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5526 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5529 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5530 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5531 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5532 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5533 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5534 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5535 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5536 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5537 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5540 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5541 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5542 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5543 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5545 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5546 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5547 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5549 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5550 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5551 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5552 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5554 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5555 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5556 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5557 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5558 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5559 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5560 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5563 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5564 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5566 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5569 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5570 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5571 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5572 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5573 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5574 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5575 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5576 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5577 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5578 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5579 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5580 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5581 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5582 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5583 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5584 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5585 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5591 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5596 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5597 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5599 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5600 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5601 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5603 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5604 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5607 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5608 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5611 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5612 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5616 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5617 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5618 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5619 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5620 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5621 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5622 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5623 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5624 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5625 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5626 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5627 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5628 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5629 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5630 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5631 first_per_commitment_point,
5632 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5633 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5634 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5635 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5637 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5641 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5642 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
5645 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5646 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5647 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5648 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5651 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5652 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5654 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5655 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5656 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5657 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5659 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5660 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5662 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5663 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5665 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5666 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5669 self.context.user_id = user_id;
5670 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5672 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5675 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5676 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5677 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5679 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5680 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5681 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5682 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5684 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5685 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5686 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5687 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5688 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5689 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5690 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5691 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5692 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5693 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5694 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5695 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5696 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5697 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5698 first_per_commitment_point,
5699 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5700 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5701 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5703 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5705 next_local_nonce: None,
5709 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5710 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5712 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5714 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5715 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5718 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5719 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5720 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5721 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5722 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5723 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5726 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5727 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5728 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5729 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5730 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5731 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5732 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5733 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5734 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5735 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5737 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5738 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5740 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5741 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5742 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5743 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5746 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5747 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5749 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5752 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5753 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5758 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5760 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5762 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5763 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5764 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5766 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5767 temporary_channel_id,
5768 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5769 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5772 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5774 next_local_nonce: None,
5778 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5779 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5780 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5781 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5783 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5786 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5787 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5788 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5789 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5790 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5791 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5793 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5794 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5797 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5798 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5799 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5800 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5802 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5803 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5805 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5806 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5807 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5808 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5809 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5810 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5816 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5817 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5818 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5819 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5821 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5824 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5828 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5832 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5833 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5837 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5841 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5842 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5845 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5849 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5851 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5856 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5858 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5863 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5865 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5866 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5867 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5868 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5869 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5873 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5875 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5876 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5877 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5878 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5879 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5880 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5881 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5883 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5884 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5885 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5886 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5887 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5888 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5889 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5890 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5891 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5892 contents: announcement,
5895 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5899 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5900 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5901 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5902 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5903 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5904 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5905 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5906 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5908 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5910 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5911 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5912 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5913 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5915 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5916 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5917 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5918 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5921 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5922 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5923 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5924 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5927 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5930 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5931 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5932 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5933 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5934 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5935 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5938 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5940 Err(_) => return None,
5942 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5943 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5948 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5949 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5950 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5951 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5952 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5953 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5954 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5955 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5956 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5957 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5958 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5959 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5960 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5961 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5962 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5963 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5966 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5969 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5970 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5971 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5972 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5973 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5974 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5975 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5976 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5977 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5979 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5980 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5981 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5982 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5983 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5984 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5985 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5986 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5987 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5989 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5990 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5991 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5992 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5993 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5994 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5995 next_funding_txid: None,
6000 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6002 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6003 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6004 /// commitment update.
6006 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6007 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6008 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
6009 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6011 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
6012 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6014 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6015 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6020 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6021 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6023 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6025 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6026 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6028 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6029 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6030 /// regenerate them.
6032 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6033 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6035 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6036 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6037 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
6038 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6039 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
6040 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6042 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6043 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6044 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6047 if amount_msat == 0 {
6048 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6051 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
6052 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6053 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6054 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6057 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6058 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6059 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6062 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
6063 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6064 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6065 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6066 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6067 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6068 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6069 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6072 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
6073 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
6074 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6075 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6076 else { "to peer" });
6078 if need_holding_cell {
6079 force_holding_cell = true;
6082 // Now update local state:
6083 if force_holding_cell {
6084 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6089 onion_routing_packet,
6094 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6095 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6097 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6099 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6103 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6104 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6105 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6109 onion_routing_packet,
6111 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6116 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6117 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6118 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6119 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6121 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6122 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6123 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6125 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6126 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6130 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6131 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6132 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6133 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6134 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6135 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6136 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6139 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6140 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6141 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
6142 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6143 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6144 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
6147 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6149 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6150 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6151 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6153 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6154 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6157 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6158 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6159 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6160 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6161 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6162 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6163 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6164 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
6167 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
6171 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
6172 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6173 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6174 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6176 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6178 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6179 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6180 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6181 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6182 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6183 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6184 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6185 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6186 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6187 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
6188 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6194 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6197 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6198 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6199 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6200 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6201 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6202 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6204 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6205 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6206 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6207 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6210 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6211 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6215 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6216 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6218 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6220 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6221 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6222 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6223 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6225 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6226 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6227 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6228 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6229 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6230 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6234 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6235 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6239 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6240 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6243 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6244 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6246 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6247 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6248 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6249 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6250 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6253 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6254 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6255 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6261 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6262 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6263 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6265 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6266 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6267 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6268 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6274 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6275 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6277 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6278 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6279 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6280 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6281 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6282 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6283 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6284 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6285 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6288 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6289 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6290 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6292 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6293 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6296 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6297 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6299 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6300 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6301 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6304 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6305 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6306 let mut chan_closed = false;
6307 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6311 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6313 None if !chan_closed => {
6314 // use override shutdown script if provided
6315 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6316 Some(script) => script,
6318 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6319 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6320 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6321 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6325 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6326 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6328 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6334 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6335 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6336 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6337 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6339 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6341 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6343 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6344 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6345 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6346 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6347 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6348 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6351 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6352 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6353 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6356 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6357 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6358 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6361 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6362 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6363 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6364 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6365 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6367 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6368 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6375 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6376 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6378 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6381 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6382 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6383 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6384 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6385 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6386 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
6387 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6388 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6389 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6390 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6391 assert!(self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6393 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6394 // return them to fail the payment.
6395 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6396 let counterparty_node_id = self.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6397 for htlc_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6399 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6400 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id));
6405 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6406 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6407 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6408 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6409 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6410 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6411 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6412 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6413 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6414 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6415 Some((self.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6416 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6417 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6422 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6423 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6424 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6427 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6428 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6429 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6431 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6432 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6436 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6440 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6441 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6443 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6449 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6450 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6451 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6452 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6453 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6455 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6456 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6457 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6458 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6464 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6465 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6466 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6467 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6468 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6469 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6474 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6475 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6476 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6477 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6479 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6480 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6481 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6482 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6487 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6488 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6489 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6490 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6491 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6492 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6497 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6498 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6499 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6502 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6504 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6505 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6506 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6507 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6508 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6510 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6511 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6512 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6513 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6515 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6516 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6517 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6519 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6521 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6522 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6523 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6524 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6525 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6526 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6528 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6529 // deserialized from that format.
6530 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6531 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6532 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6534 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6536 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6537 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6538 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6540 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6541 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6542 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6543 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6546 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6547 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6548 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6551 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6552 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6553 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6554 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6556 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6557 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6559 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6561 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6563 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6565 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6568 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6570 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6575 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6577 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6578 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6579 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6580 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6581 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6582 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6583 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6585 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6587 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6589 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6592 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6593 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6594 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6597 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6599 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6600 preimages.push(preimage);
6602 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6603 reason.write(writer)?;
6605 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6607 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6608 preimages.push(preimage);
6610 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6611 reason.write(writer)?;
6616 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6617 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6619 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6621 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6622 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6623 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6624 source.write(writer)?;
6625 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6627 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6629 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6630 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6632 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6634 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6635 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6640 match self.context.resend_order {
6641 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6642 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6645 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6646 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6647 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6649 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6650 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6651 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6652 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6655 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6656 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6657 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6658 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6659 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6662 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6663 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6664 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6665 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6667 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6668 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6669 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6671 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6673 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6674 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6675 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6676 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6678 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6679 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6680 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6681 // consider the stale state on reload.
6684 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6685 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6686 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6688 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6689 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6690 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6692 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6693 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6695 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6696 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6697 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6699 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6700 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6702 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6705 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6706 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6707 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6709 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6712 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6713 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6715 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6716 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6717 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6719 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6721 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6723 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6725 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6726 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6727 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6728 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6729 htlc.write(writer)?;
6732 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6733 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6734 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6736 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6737 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6739 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6740 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6741 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6742 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6743 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6744 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6745 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6747 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6748 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6749 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6750 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6751 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6753 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6754 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6756 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6757 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6758 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6759 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6761 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6763 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6764 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6765 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6766 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6767 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6768 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6769 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6771 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6772 (2, chan_type, option),
6773 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6774 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6775 (5, self.context.config, required),
6776 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6777 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6778 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6779 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6780 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6781 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6782 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6783 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6784 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6785 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6786 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6787 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6788 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6789 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6790 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6791 (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6798 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6799 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6801 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6802 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6804 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6805 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6806 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6808 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6809 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6810 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6811 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6813 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6815 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6816 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6817 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6818 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6819 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6821 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6822 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6825 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6826 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6827 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6829 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6831 let mut keys_data = None;
6833 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6834 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6835 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6836 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6837 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6838 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6839 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6840 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6841 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6842 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6846 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6847 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6848 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6851 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6853 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6854 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6855 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6857 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6859 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6860 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6861 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6862 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6863 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6864 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6865 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6866 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6867 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6868 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6869 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6870 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6871 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6876 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6877 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6878 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6879 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6880 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6881 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6882 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6883 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6884 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6885 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6886 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6887 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6889 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6890 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6893 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6894 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6897 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6898 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6900 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6905 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6906 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6907 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6908 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6909 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6910 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6911 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6912 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6913 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6914 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6916 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6917 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6918 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6920 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6921 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6922 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6924 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6928 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6929 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6930 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6931 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6934 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6935 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6936 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6938 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6939 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6940 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6941 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6944 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6945 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6946 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6947 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6950 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6952 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6954 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6955 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6956 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6957 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6959 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6960 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6961 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6962 // consider the stale state on reload.
6963 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6966 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6967 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6968 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6970 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6973 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6974 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6975 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6977 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6978 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6979 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6980 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6982 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6983 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6985 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6986 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6988 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6989 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6990 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6992 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6994 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6995 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6997 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6998 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7001 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7003 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7004 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7005 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7006 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7008 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7011 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7012 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7014 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7016 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7017 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7019 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7020 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7022 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7024 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7025 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7026 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7028 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7029 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7030 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7034 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7035 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7036 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7038 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7044 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7045 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7046 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7047 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7048 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7049 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7050 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7051 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7052 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7053 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7055 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7056 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7057 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7058 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7059 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7060 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7061 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7063 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7064 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7065 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7066 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7068 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7070 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7071 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7072 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7073 (2, channel_type, option),
7074 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7075 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7076 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7077 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7078 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7079 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7080 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7081 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7082 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7083 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7084 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7085 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7086 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7087 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7088 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7089 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7090 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7091 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7092 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7095 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7096 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7097 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7098 // required channel parameters.
7099 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7100 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7101 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7103 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7105 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7106 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7107 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7108 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7111 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7112 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7113 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7115 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7116 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7118 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7119 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7124 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7125 if iter.next().is_some() {
7126 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7130 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7131 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7132 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7133 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7134 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7137 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7138 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7140 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7141 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7142 // separate u64 values.
7143 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7145 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7148 context: ChannelContext {
7151 config: config.unwrap(),
7155 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7156 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7157 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7160 temporary_channel_id,
7162 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7164 channel_value_satoshis,
7166 latest_monitor_update_id,
7169 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7172 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7173 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7176 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7177 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7178 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7179 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7183 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7184 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7185 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7186 monitor_pending_forwards,
7187 monitor_pending_failures,
7188 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7191 holding_cell_update_fee,
7192 next_holder_htlc_id,
7193 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7194 update_time_counter,
7197 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7198 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7199 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7200 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7202 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7203 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7204 closing_fee_limits: None,
7205 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7207 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7209 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7210 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7212 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7214 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7215 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7216 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7217 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7218 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7219 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7220 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7221 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7222 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7225 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7227 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7228 funding_transaction,
7230 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7231 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7232 counterparty_node_id,
7234 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7238 channel_update_status,
7239 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7243 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7244 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7245 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7246 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7248 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7249 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7251 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7252 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7253 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7255 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7256 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7258 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7259 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7261 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7264 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7273 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7274 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7275 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7276 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7277 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7279 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7280 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7282 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7283 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7284 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7285 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7286 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7287 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7288 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7289 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7290 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7291 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7292 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7293 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7294 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7295 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7296 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7297 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7298 use crate::util::test_utils;
7299 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7300 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7301 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7302 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7303 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7304 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7305 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7306 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7307 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7308 use crate::prelude::*;
7310 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7313 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7314 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7320 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7321 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7322 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7323 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7327 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7328 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7329 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7330 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7331 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7332 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7333 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7337 signer: InMemorySigner,
7340 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7341 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7344 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7345 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7347 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7348 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7351 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7355 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7357 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7358 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7359 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7360 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7361 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7364 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7365 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7366 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7367 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7371 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7372 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7373 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7377 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7378 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7379 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7380 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7382 let seed = [42; 32];
7383 let network = Network::Testnet;
7384 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7385 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7386 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7389 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7390 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7391 let config = UserConfig::default();
7392 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7393 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7394 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7396 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7397 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7401 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7402 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7404 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7405 let original_fee = 253;
7406 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7407 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7408 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7409 let seed = [42; 32];
7410 let network = Network::Testnet;
7411 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7413 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7414 let config = UserConfig::default();
7415 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7417 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7418 // same as the old fee.
7419 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7420 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7421 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7425 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7426 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7427 // dust limits are used.
7428 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7429 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7430 let seed = [42; 32];
7431 let network = Network::Testnet;
7432 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7433 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7435 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7436 // they have different dust limits.
7438 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7439 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7440 let config = UserConfig::default();
7441 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7443 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7444 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7445 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7446 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7447 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7449 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7450 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7451 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7452 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7453 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7455 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7456 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7457 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7459 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7460 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7461 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7462 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7465 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7467 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7468 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7469 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7470 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7471 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7472 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7473 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7474 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7475 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7479 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7480 // the dust limit check.
7481 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7482 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7483 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7484 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7486 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7487 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7488 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7489 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7490 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7491 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7492 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7496 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7497 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7498 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7499 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7500 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7501 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7502 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7503 let seed = [42; 32];
7504 let network = Network::Testnet;
7505 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7507 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7508 let config = UserConfig::default();
7509 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7511 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7512 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7514 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7515 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7516 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7517 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7518 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7519 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7521 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7522 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7523 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7524 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7525 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7527 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7529 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7530 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7531 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7532 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7533 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7535 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7536 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7537 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7538 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7539 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7543 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7544 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7545 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7546 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7547 let seed = [42; 32];
7548 let network = Network::Testnet;
7549 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7550 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7551 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7553 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7555 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7556 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7557 let config = UserConfig::default();
7558 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7560 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7561 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7562 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7563 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7565 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7566 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7567 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7569 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7570 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7571 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7572 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7574 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7575 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7576 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7578 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7579 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7581 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7582 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7583 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7584 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7585 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7586 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7587 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7589 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7591 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7592 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7593 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7594 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7595 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7599 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7600 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7601 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7602 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7603 let seed = [42; 32];
7604 let network = Network::Testnet;
7605 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7606 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7607 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7609 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7610 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7611 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7612 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7613 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7614 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7615 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7616 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7618 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7619 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7620 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7621 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7622 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7623 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7625 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7626 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7627 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7628 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7630 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7632 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7633 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7634 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7635 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7636 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7637 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7639 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7640 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7641 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7642 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7644 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7645 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7646 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7647 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7648 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7650 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7651 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7653 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7654 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7655 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7657 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7658 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7659 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7660 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7661 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7663 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7664 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7666 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7667 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7668 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7672 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7674 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7675 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7676 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7678 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7679 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7680 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7681 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7683 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7684 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7685 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7687 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7689 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7690 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7693 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7694 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7695 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7696 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7697 let seed = [42; 32];
7698 let network = Network::Testnet;
7699 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7700 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7701 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7704 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7705 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7706 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7708 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7709 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7711 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7712 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7713 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7715 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7716 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7718 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7720 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7721 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7723 // Channel Negotiations failed
7724 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7725 assert!(result.is_err());
7730 fn channel_update() {
7731 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7732 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7733 let seed = [42; 32];
7734 let network = Network::Testnet;
7735 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7736 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7738 // Create a channel.
7739 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7740 let config = UserConfig::default();
7741 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7742 assert!(node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7743 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7744 assert!(node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7746 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7747 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7748 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7750 short_channel_id: 0,
7753 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7754 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7755 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7757 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7758 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7760 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7762 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7764 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7765 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7766 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7767 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7769 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7770 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7771 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7773 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7777 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7779 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7780 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7781 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7782 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7783 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7784 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7785 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7786 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7787 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7788 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7789 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7790 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7791 use crate::sync::Arc;
7793 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7794 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7795 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7796 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7798 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7800 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7801 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7802 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7803 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7804 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7806 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7807 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7813 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7814 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7815 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7817 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7818 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7819 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7820 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7821 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7822 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7824 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7826 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7827 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7828 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7829 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7830 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7831 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7833 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7834 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7835 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7836 selected_contest_delay: 144
7838 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7839 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7841 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7842 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7844 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7845 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7847 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7848 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7850 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7851 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7852 // build_commitment_transaction.
7853 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7854 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7855 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7856 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7857 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7859 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7860 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7861 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7862 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7866 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7867 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7868 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7869 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7873 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7874 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7875 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7877 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7878 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7880 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7881 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7883 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7885 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7886 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7887 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7888 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7889 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7890 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7891 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7893 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7894 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7895 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7896 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7898 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7899 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7900 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7902 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7904 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7905 commitment_tx.clone(),
7906 counterparty_signature,
7907 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7908 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7909 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7911 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7912 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7914 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7915 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7916 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7918 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7919 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7922 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7923 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7925 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7926 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
7927 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7928 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7929 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7930 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7931 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7932 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7934 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7937 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7938 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7939 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7943 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7946 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7947 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7948 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7950 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7951 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7952 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7953 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7954 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7955 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7956 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7957 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7959 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7963 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7964 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7965 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7966 "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", {});
7968 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7969 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7971 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7972 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7973 "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", {});
7975 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7976 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7977 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7978 "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", {});
7980 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7981 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7983 amount_msat: 1000000,
7985 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7986 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7988 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7991 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7992 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7994 amount_msat: 2000000,
7996 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7997 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7999 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8002 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8003 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8005 amount_msat: 2000000,
8007 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8008 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8009 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8011 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8014 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8015 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8017 amount_msat: 3000000,
8019 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8020 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8021 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8023 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8026 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8027 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8029 amount_msat: 4000000,
8031 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8032 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8034 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8038 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8039 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8040 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8042 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8043 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8044 "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", {
8047 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8048 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8049 "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" },
8052 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8053 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8054 "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" },
8057 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8058 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8059 "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" },
8062 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8063 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8064 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8067 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8068 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8069 "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" }
8072 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8073 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8074 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8076 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8077 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8078 "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", {
8081 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8082 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8083 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
8086 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8087 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8088 "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" },
8091 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8092 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8093 "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" },
8096 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8097 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8098 "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" },
8101 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8102 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8103 "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" }
8106 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8107 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8108 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8110 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8111 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8112 "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", {
8115 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8116 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8117 "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" },
8120 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8121 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8122 "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" },
8125 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8126 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8127 "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" },
8130 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8131 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8132 "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" }
8135 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8136 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8137 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8138 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8140 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8141 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8142 "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", {
8145 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8146 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8147 "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" },
8150 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8151 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8152 "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" },
8155 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8156 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8157 "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" },
8160 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8161 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8162 "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" }
8165 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8166 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8167 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8168 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8170 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8171 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8172 "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", {
8175 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8176 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8177 "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" },
8180 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8181 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8182 "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" },
8185 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8186 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8187 "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" },
8190 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8191 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8192 "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" }
8195 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8196 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8197 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8199 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8200 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8201 "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", {
8204 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8205 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8206 "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" },
8209 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8210 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8211 "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" },
8214 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8215 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8216 "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" }
8219 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8220 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8221 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8223 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8224 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8225 "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", {
8228 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8229 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8230 "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" },
8233 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8234 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8235 "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" },
8238 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8239 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8240 "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" }
8243 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8244 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8245 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8247 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8248 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8249 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8252 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8253 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8254 "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" },
8257 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8258 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8259 "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" }
8262 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8263 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8264 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8265 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8267 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8268 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8269 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80064a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994b80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ac5916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd501473044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8272 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8273 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8274 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc02000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb834730440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
8277 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8278 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8279 "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" }
8282 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8283 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8284 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8285 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8287 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8288 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8289 "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", {
8292 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8293 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8294 "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" },
8297 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8298 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8299 "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" }
8302 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8303 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8304 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8306 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8307 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8308 "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", {
8311 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8312 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8313 "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" }
8316 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8317 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8318 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8319 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8321 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8322 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8323 "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", {
8326 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8327 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8328 "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" }
8331 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8332 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8333 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8334 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8336 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8337 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8338 "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", {
8341 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8342 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8343 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8346 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8347 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8348 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8349 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8351 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8352 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8353 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8355 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8356 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8357 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8358 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8360 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8361 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8362 "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", {});
8364 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8365 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8366 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8367 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8369 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8370 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8371 "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", {});
8373 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8374 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8375 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8377 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8378 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8379 "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", {});
8381 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8382 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8383 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8384 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8386 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8387 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8388 "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", {});
8390 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8391 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8392 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8393 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8395 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8396 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8397 "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", {});
8399 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8400 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8401 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8402 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8403 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8404 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8406 amount_msat: 2000000,
8408 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8409 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8411 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8414 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8415 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8416 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8418 amount_msat: 5000001,
8420 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8421 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8422 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8424 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8427 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8428 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8430 amount_msat: 5000000,
8432 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8433 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8434 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8436 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8440 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8441 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8442 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a69f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c0147304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8445 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8446 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8447 "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" },
8449 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8450 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8451 "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" },
8453 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8454 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8455 "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" }
8458 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8459 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8460 "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", {
8463 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8464 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8465 "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" },
8467 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8468 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8469 "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" },
8471 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8472 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8473 "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" }
8478 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8479 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8481 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8482 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8483 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8484 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8486 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8487 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8488 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8490 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8491 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8493 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8494 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8496 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8497 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8498 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8502 fn test_key_derivation() {
8503 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8504 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8506 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8507 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8509 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8510 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8512 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8513 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8515 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8516 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8518 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8519 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8521 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8522 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8524 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8525 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8529 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8530 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8531 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8532 let seed = [42; 32];
8533 let network = Network::Testnet;
8534 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8535 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8537 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8538 let config = UserConfig::default();
8539 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8540 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8542 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8543 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8545 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8546 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8547 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8548 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8549 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8550 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8551 assert!(res.is_ok());
8556 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8557 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8558 // resulting `channel_type`.
8559 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8560 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8561 let network = Network::Testnet;
8562 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8563 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8565 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8566 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8568 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8569 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8571 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8572 // need to signal it.
8573 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8574 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8575 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8578 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8580 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8581 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8582 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8584 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8585 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8586 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8589 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8590 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8591 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8592 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8593 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8596 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8597 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8602 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8603 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8604 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8605 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8606 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8607 let network = Network::Testnet;
8608 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8609 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8611 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8612 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8614 let config = UserConfig::default();
8616 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8617 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8618 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8619 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8620 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8622 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8623 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8624 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8627 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8628 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8629 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8631 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8632 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8633 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8634 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8635 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8636 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8638 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8643 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8644 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8646 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8647 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8648 let network = Network::Testnet;
8649 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8650 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8652 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8653 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8655 let config = UserConfig::default();
8657 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8658 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8659 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8660 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8661 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8662 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8663 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8664 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8666 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8667 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8668 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8669 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8670 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8671 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8674 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8675 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8677 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8678 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8679 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8680 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8682 assert!(res.is_err());
8684 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8685 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8686 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8688 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8689 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8690 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8693 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8695 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8696 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8697 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8698 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8701 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8702 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8704 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8705 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8707 assert!(res.is_err());