1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
14 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
28 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
29 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys};
31 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
32 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
33 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
34 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
35 use util::transaction_utils;
36 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
37 use util::logger::Logger;
38 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
42 use std::default::Default;
43 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
45 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
48 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
49 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
50 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
51 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
52 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
53 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
54 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
55 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
56 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
59 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
60 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
61 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
62 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
65 enum InboundHTLCState {
66 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
67 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
68 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
69 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
70 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
71 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
72 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
73 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
74 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
75 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
76 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
77 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
78 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
79 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
80 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
82 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
83 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
84 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
85 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
86 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
87 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
88 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
89 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
90 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
91 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
92 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
93 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
94 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
95 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
96 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
97 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
98 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
99 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
100 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
101 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
102 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
103 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
106 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
108 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
109 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
110 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
111 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
112 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
113 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
114 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
115 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
118 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
122 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
123 state: InboundHTLCState,
126 enum OutboundHTLCState {
127 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
128 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
129 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
130 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
131 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
132 /// money back (though we won't), and,
133 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
134 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
135 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
136 /// we'll never get out of sync).
137 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
138 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
139 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
141 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
142 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
143 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
144 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
145 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
146 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
147 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
148 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
149 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
150 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
151 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
152 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
153 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
154 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
155 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
158 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
162 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
163 state: OutboundHTLCState,
167 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
168 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
169 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
173 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
175 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
178 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
183 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
187 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
188 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
189 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
190 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
191 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
192 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
193 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
195 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
196 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
197 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
198 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
199 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
200 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
201 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
203 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
204 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
205 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
207 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
208 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
209 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
210 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
211 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
212 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
214 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
215 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
217 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
218 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
219 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
220 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
221 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
222 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
223 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
224 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
225 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
227 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
228 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
229 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
230 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
231 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
232 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
233 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
234 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
235 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
236 /// us their shutdown.
237 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
238 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
239 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
240 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
242 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
243 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
245 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
247 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
248 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
249 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
250 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
253 /// Status has been gossiped.
255 /// Status has been changed.
257 /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
261 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
262 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
263 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
266 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
267 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
268 pub(super) struct Channel<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
269 config: ChannelConfig,
273 channel_id: [u8; 32],
275 channel_outbound: bool,
276 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
277 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
279 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
282 holder_keys: ChanSigner,
284 pub(super) holder_keys: ChanSigner,
285 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
286 destination_script: Script,
288 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
289 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
290 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
292 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
293 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
294 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
295 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
296 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
297 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
299 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
300 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
301 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
302 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
303 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
304 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
306 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
308 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
309 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
310 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
311 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
312 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
314 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
315 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
316 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
318 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
319 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
320 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
321 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
322 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
323 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
324 // commitment_signed.
325 pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
326 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
327 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
328 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
329 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
330 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
331 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
332 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
333 update_time_counter: u32,
336 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
337 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
338 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
339 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
340 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
341 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
343 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
345 funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
347 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
348 /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
349 /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
350 /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
351 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
352 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
353 /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
354 /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
355 pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash,
356 funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
358 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
360 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
362 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
364 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
366 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
367 //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
368 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
369 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
370 // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
371 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
372 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
373 counterparty_selected_contest_delay: u16,
374 holder_selected_contest_delay: u16,
376 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
378 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
379 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
382 counterparty_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
384 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
386 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
387 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
389 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
391 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
393 network_sync: UpdateStatus,
396 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
397 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
398 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
399 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
400 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
401 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
402 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
405 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
407 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
409 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
411 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
413 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
415 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
417 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
418 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
419 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
420 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
423 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
426 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
427 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
429 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
430 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
431 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
436 macro_rules! secp_check {
437 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
440 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
445 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> Channel<ChanSigner> {
446 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
447 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
448 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
451 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
454 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
455 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
456 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
457 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
460 fn derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
461 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate as u64 * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
465 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, APIError>
466 where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
467 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
469 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
470 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false, channel_value_satoshis);
472 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
473 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
475 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
476 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
477 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
479 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
480 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
482 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
483 if Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
484 return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
487 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
491 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
493 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
494 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
495 channel_outbound: true,
496 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
497 channel_value_satoshis,
499 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
501 holder_keys: chan_keys,
502 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
503 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
505 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
506 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
507 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
509 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
510 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
511 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
512 pending_update_fee: None,
513 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
514 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
515 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
516 update_time_counter: 1,
518 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
520 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
521 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
522 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
523 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
524 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
526 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
527 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
528 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
529 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
531 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
534 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
535 short_channel_id: None,
536 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
537 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
539 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
540 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
541 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
542 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
543 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
544 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
545 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
546 counterparty_selected_contest_delay: 0,
547 holder_selected_contest_delay,
548 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
549 minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
551 counterparty_pubkeys: None,
552 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
554 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
555 counterparty_node_id,
557 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
559 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
561 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
565 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
566 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
568 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
569 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
570 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
572 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 2;
573 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
574 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
579 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
580 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
581 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, ChannelError>
582 where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
583 F::Target: FeeEstimator
585 let mut chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
586 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
587 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
588 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
589 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
590 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
591 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
593 chan_keys.on_accept(&counterparty_pubkeys, msg.to_self_delay, config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay);
594 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
596 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
597 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
600 // Check sanity of message fields:
601 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
602 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
604 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
605 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
607 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
608 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
609 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
611 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
612 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
614 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
615 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
617 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
618 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
619 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
621 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
623 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
624 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
625 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
627 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
628 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
630 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
631 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than 483", msg.max_accepted_htlcs)));
634 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
635 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
636 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
638 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
639 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
641 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
642 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
644 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
645 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
647 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
648 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
650 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
651 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
653 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
654 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
657 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
659 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
660 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
661 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
662 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
665 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
666 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
668 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
670 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
671 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
672 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
673 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
675 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
676 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
678 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
679 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
682 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
683 // for full fee payment
684 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
685 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
686 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
687 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
690 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
691 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
692 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
693 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
696 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
697 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
698 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
699 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
700 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
702 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
703 } else if script.len() == 0 {
705 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
707 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
710 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
711 &OptionalField::Absent => {
712 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
719 config: local_config,
721 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
722 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
723 channel_outbound: false,
724 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
726 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
728 holder_keys: chan_keys,
729 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
730 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
732 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
733 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
734 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
736 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
737 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
738 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
739 pending_update_fee: None,
740 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
741 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
742 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
743 update_time_counter: 1,
745 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
747 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
748 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
749 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
750 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
751 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
753 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
754 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
755 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
756 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
758 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
761 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
762 short_channel_id: None,
763 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
764 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
766 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
767 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
768 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
769 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
770 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
771 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
772 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
773 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
774 counterparty_selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
775 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
776 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
777 minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
779 counterparty_pubkeys: Some(counterparty_pubkeys),
780 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
782 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
783 counterparty_node_id,
785 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
787 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
789 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
795 // Utilities to build transactions:
797 fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
798 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
800 let counterparty_payment_point = &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_point.serialize();
801 if self.channel_outbound {
802 sha.input(&self.holder_keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
803 sha.input(counterparty_payment_point);
805 sha.input(counterparty_payment_point);
806 sha.input(&self.holder_keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
808 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
810 ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
811 ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
812 ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
813 ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
814 ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
815 ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
818 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
819 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
820 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
821 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
822 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
824 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
825 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
826 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
827 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
828 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
829 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
830 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
831 /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
832 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
833 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
834 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
836 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
837 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
840 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
842 previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
843 script_sig: Script::new(),
844 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
850 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
851 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
853 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
854 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
855 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
856 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
858 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
860 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
861 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
862 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
864 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
865 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
866 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
867 transaction_output_index: None
872 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
873 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
874 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
875 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
876 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
877 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
879 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
880 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
881 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
883 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
884 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
887 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
888 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
889 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
890 txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
891 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
892 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
893 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
895 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
896 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
902 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
903 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
904 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
905 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
906 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
907 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
908 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
912 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
913 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
915 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
917 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
918 if generated_by_local {
919 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
920 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
929 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
930 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
931 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
932 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
933 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
934 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
935 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
939 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
940 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
942 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
944 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
945 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
947 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
948 if !generated_by_local {
949 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
957 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
958 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
959 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
960 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
961 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
962 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
963 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
964 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
966 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
968 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
969 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
970 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
971 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
973 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
975 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
976 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
977 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
978 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
981 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
982 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
983 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
985 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
988 let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
989 let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
991 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
992 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
994 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
995 if local { self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay } else { self.holder_selected_contest_delay },
996 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
997 value: value_to_a as u64
1001 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1002 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1003 let static_payment_pk = if local {
1004 self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_point
1006 self.holder_keys.pubkeys().payment_point
1008 txouts.push((TxOut {
1009 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1010 .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&static_payment_pk)[..])
1012 value: value_to_b as u64
1016 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
1017 if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
1018 if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
1019 a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
1020 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
1021 // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
1023 .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
1024 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
1025 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
1026 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1027 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1030 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
1031 let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
1032 for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
1033 outputs.push(out.0);
1034 if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
1035 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
1036 htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
1039 let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
1040 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1044 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
1047 }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
1051 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1052 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1053 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1057 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1062 1 + // script length (0)
1066 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1067 2 + // witness marker and flag
1068 1 + // witness element count
1069 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1070 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1071 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1072 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1073 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1074 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1076 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1077 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1078 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1084 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1086 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1088 previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1089 script_sig: Script::new(),
1090 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1091 witness: Vec::new(),
1096 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1097 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1098 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1100 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1101 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1102 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1104 if value_to_self < 0 {
1105 assert!(self.channel_outbound);
1106 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1107 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1108 assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
1109 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1112 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1113 txouts.push((TxOut {
1114 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1115 value: value_to_remote as u64
1119 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1120 txouts.push((TxOut {
1121 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1122 value: value_to_self as u64
1126 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1128 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1129 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1130 outputs.push(out.0);
1138 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1142 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1143 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1144 /// our counterparty!)
1145 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1146 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1147 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1148 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1149 let delayed_payment_base = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1150 let htlc_basepoint = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1151 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1153 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1157 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1158 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1159 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1160 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1161 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1162 //may see payments to it!
1163 let revocation_basepoint = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1164 let htlc_basepoint = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1165 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1167 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1170 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1171 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1172 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1173 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1174 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1177 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1178 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1179 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1180 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1181 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay } else { self.holder_selected_contest_delay }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1184 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1185 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1186 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1188 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1189 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1190 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1191 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1192 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1193 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1195 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1196 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1198 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1200 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1202 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1203 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1204 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1206 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1207 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1208 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1209 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1211 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1212 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1213 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1215 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1217 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1218 return Ok((None, None));
1221 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1222 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1229 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1230 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1233 // Now update local state:
1235 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1236 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1237 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1238 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1239 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1240 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1241 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1245 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1246 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1247 match pending_update {
1248 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1249 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1250 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1251 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1252 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1253 return Ok((None, None));
1256 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1257 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1258 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1259 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1260 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1261 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1262 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1268 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1269 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1270 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1272 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1276 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1277 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1279 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1280 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1282 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1283 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1286 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1287 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1288 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1289 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1290 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1293 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1294 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1295 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1296 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1297 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1298 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1299 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1300 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1301 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1303 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1304 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1305 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1307 (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1308 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1312 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1313 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1314 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1316 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1317 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1318 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1319 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1320 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1322 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1324 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1325 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1326 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1328 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1329 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1330 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1332 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1333 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1334 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1338 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1339 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1345 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1346 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1349 // Now update local state:
1350 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1351 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1352 match pending_update {
1353 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1354 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1355 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1356 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1359 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1360 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1361 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1362 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1368 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1369 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1376 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1377 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1380 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1381 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1382 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1387 // Message handlers:
1389 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1390 // Check sanity of message fields:
1391 if !self.channel_outbound {
1392 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1394 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1395 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1397 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1398 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1400 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1401 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1403 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1404 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1406 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1407 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1409 let remote_reserve = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1410 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1411 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1413 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1414 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1415 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1417 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1418 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1419 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1421 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1422 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1424 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
1425 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than 483", msg.max_accepted_htlcs)));
1428 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1429 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1430 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1432 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1433 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1435 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1436 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1438 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1439 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1441 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1442 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1444 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1445 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1447 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1448 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1451 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1452 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1453 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1454 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
1455 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1456 Some(script.clone())
1457 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1458 } else if script.len() == 0 {
1460 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1462 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. scriptpubkey: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1465 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1466 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1467 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1472 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1473 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1474 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1475 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1476 self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
1477 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1478 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1480 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1481 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1482 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1483 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1484 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1485 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1488 self.holder_keys.on_accept(&counterparty_pubkeys, msg.to_self_delay, self.holder_selected_contest_delay);
1489 self.counterparty_pubkeys = Some(counterparty_pubkeys);
1491 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1492 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1494 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1499 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Transaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1500 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1502 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1503 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1504 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&initial_commitment_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
1506 // They sign the "our" commitment transaction...
1507 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_tx), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1508 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1510 let tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_holder_sig(initial_commitment_tx, sig.clone(), &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey(), keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1512 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1513 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1514 let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(counterparty_keys);
1515 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &pre_remote_keys, &Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
1516 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1518 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1519 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, tx, counterparty_signature))
1522 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1523 &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("funding_pubkey() only allowed after accept_channel").funding_pubkey
1526 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1527 if self.channel_outbound {
1528 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1530 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1531 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1532 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1534 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1536 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1537 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1538 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1539 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1542 let funding_txo = OutPoint{ txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1543 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
1545 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1548 self.funding_txo = None;
1553 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1555 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1556 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1557 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1558 macro_rules! create_monitor {
1560 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_keys.clone(),
1561 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.holder_selected_contest_delay,
1562 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1563 &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1564 self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1565 self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
1566 initial_commitment_tx.clone());
1568 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1573 let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
1575 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1576 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1577 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1578 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1580 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1581 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1583 }, channel_monitor))
1586 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1587 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1588 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1589 if !self.channel_outbound {
1590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1592 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1593 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1595 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1596 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1597 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1598 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1601 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1603 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1604 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1606 let holder_keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1607 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1608 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&initial_commitment_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
1610 let counterparty_funding_pubkey = &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
1612 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1613 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, counterparty_funding_pubkey) {
1614 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1617 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1618 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1619 let funding_txo = self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap();
1620 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1621 macro_rules! create_monitor {
1623 let commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_holder_sig(initial_commitment_tx.clone(), msg.signature.clone(), &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, counterparty_funding_pubkey, holder_keys.clone(), self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1624 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_keys.clone(),
1625 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.holder_selected_contest_delay,
1626 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo.clone(), funding_txo_script.clone()),
1627 &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1628 self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1629 self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
1632 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1638 let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
1640 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1641 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1642 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1643 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1648 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1649 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1650 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1653 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1655 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1656 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1657 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1658 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1659 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1660 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1661 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1662 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1663 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1664 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1665 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1666 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1667 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1668 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1670 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1673 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1676 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1677 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1681 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1682 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1683 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1684 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1685 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1687 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1690 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1692 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1693 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1694 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1695 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1698 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1699 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1700 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1701 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1702 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1706 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1709 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1710 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1711 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1712 /// corner case properly.
1713 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1714 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1715 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1716 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1719 // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1720 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1721 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1722 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1723 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1724 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1727 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local (i.e our) next commitment transaction
1728 // based on the number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next
1729 // commitment tx. `addl_htcs` is an optional parameter allowing the caller
1730 // to add a number of additional HTLCs to the calculation. Note that dust
1731 // HTLCs are excluded.
1732 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, addl_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1733 assert!(self.channel_outbound);
1735 let mut their_acked_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len();
1736 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1737 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1741 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1742 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1743 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1748 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1750 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1755 self.commit_tx_fee_msat(their_acked_htlcs + addl_htlcs)
1758 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction
1759 // based on the number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their
1760 // next commitment tx. `addl_htcs` is an optional parameter allowing the caller
1761 // to add a number of additional HTLCs to the calculation. Note that dust HTLCs
1763 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, addl_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1764 assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
1766 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next
1767 // commitment_signed, all inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be
1768 // included) and only committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1769 let mut their_acked_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len();
1770 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1771 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis {
1774 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next
1775 // commitment_signed, i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1777 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1778 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1783 self.commit_tx_fee_msat(their_acked_htlcs + addl_htlcs)
1786 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1787 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1788 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1789 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1790 if local_sent_shutdown {
1791 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1793 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1794 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1795 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1796 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1798 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1799 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1801 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1802 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1804 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1805 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1807 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1808 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1811 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1812 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1813 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1815 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1816 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1817 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1819 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1820 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1821 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1822 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1823 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1824 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1825 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1826 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1827 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1828 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1829 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1831 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1832 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1833 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1834 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1835 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1836 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1840 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1841 self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1842 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1843 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1844 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1845 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1848 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
1849 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
1850 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else {
1851 // +1 for this HTLC.
1852 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1)
1854 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1855 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
1858 let chan_reserve_msat =
1859 Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
1860 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
1861 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
1864 if !self.channel_outbound {
1865 // `+1` for this HTLC, `2 *` and `+1` fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from the
1866 // spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's side,
1867 // only on the sender's.
1868 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output fees,
1869 // we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep the extra +1
1870 // as we should still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of
1871 // being sensitive to fee spikes.
1872 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1 + 1);
1873 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
1874 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
1875 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
1876 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
1877 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
1880 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
1882 // +1 for this HTLC.
1883 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
1884 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1885 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
1888 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
1889 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
1891 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
1892 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
1895 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
1896 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
1897 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
1901 // Now update local state:
1902 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
1903 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
1904 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1905 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
1906 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
1907 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1908 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
1913 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
1915 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1916 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1917 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
1918 match check_preimage {
1920 Some(payment_hash) =>
1921 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
1922 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
1926 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
1927 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
1928 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1929 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
1931 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
1932 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
1934 return Ok(&htlc.source);
1937 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
1940 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1941 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1944 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1945 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1948 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
1949 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
1952 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1953 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1954 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1956 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1957 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1960 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1964 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1965 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1966 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1968 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1969 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1972 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1976 pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
1977 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1980 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1981 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
1983 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1984 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
1986 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1987 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
1990 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1992 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1994 let mut update_fee = false;
1995 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
1997 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2002 let mut commitment_tx = {
2003 let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2004 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2005 (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
2007 let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.0.txid();
2008 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&commitment_tx.0).signature_hash(0, &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2009 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_tx.0), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
2010 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2011 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2014 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2016 let num_htlcs = commitment_tx.1;
2017 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2019 let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2020 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2021 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2025 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_tx.1 {
2026 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_tx.1))));
2029 // TODO: Merge these two, sadly they are currently both required to be passed separately to
2031 let mut htlcs_without_source = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_tx.2.len());
2032 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_tx.2.len());
2033 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
2034 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2035 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2036 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2037 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2038 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2039 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2040 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2042 htlcs_without_source.push((htlc.clone(), Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx])));
2043 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2045 htlcs_without_source.push((htlc.clone(), None));
2046 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2050 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2051 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_keys.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2053 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2054 let mut need_commitment = false;
2055 if !self.channel_outbound {
2056 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2057 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2058 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2059 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2060 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2061 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2062 need_commitment = true;
2063 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2068 let counterparty_funding_pubkey = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
2070 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2071 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2072 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2073 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2074 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_holder_sig(commitment_tx.0, msg.signature.clone(), &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &counterparty_funding_pubkey, keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_without_source),
2075 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2079 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2080 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2081 Some(forward_info.clone())
2083 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2084 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2085 need_commitment = true;
2088 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2089 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2090 Some(fail_reason.take())
2092 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2093 need_commitment = true;
2097 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2098 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2099 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2100 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2102 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2103 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2104 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2105 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2106 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2107 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2108 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2109 // includes the right HTLCs.
2110 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2111 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2112 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2113 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2114 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2115 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2117 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2118 // re-send the message on restoration)
2119 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2122 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2123 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2124 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2125 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2126 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2127 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2128 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2129 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2130 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2132 } else if !need_commitment {
2133 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2134 } else { (None, None) };
2136 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2137 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2138 per_commitment_secret,
2139 next_per_commitment_point,
2140 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2143 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2144 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2145 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2146 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2147 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2148 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2150 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2151 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2152 updates: Vec::new(),
2155 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2156 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2157 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2158 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2159 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2160 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2161 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2162 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2163 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2164 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2165 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2166 // to rebalance channels.
2167 match &htlc_update {
2168 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2169 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2170 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2173 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2174 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2175 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2176 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2177 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2178 // into the holding cell without ever being
2179 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2180 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2181 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2184 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2190 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2191 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2192 Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2193 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2194 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2195 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2199 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2201 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2206 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2207 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2208 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2210 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2212 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2219 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2220 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2222 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2223 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2224 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2225 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2226 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2232 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2233 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2234 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2235 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2236 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2238 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2240 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2242 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2245 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2247 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2251 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2252 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2253 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2254 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2255 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2256 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2257 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2260 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2263 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2266 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2267 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2270 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2271 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2272 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2276 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2277 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2278 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2279 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2280 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2281 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2282 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2283 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2287 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2288 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2289 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2290 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2291 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2292 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2293 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2294 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2298 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2299 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2300 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2301 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2302 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2303 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2304 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2305 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2307 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2308 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2309 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2310 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2311 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2312 let mut require_commitment = false;
2313 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2316 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2317 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2318 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2320 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2321 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2322 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2323 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2324 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2325 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2330 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2331 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2332 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2333 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2334 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2336 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2337 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2342 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2343 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2344 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2346 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2347 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2351 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2352 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2354 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2355 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2356 require_commitment = true;
2357 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2358 match forward_info {
2359 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2360 require_commitment = true;
2362 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2363 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2364 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2366 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2367 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2368 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2372 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2373 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2374 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2380 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2381 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2382 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2383 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2385 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2386 Some(fail_reason.take())
2388 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2389 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2390 require_commitment = true;
2394 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2396 if self.channel_outbound {
2397 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2398 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2401 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2402 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2403 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2404 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2405 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2406 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2407 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2408 require_commitment = true;
2409 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2414 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2415 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2416 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2417 if require_commitment {
2418 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2419 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2420 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2421 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2422 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2423 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2424 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2425 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2426 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2428 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2429 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2430 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2433 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2434 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2435 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2436 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2437 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2439 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2440 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2441 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2444 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2445 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2446 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2447 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2449 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2451 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2452 if require_commitment {
2453 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2455 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2456 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2457 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2458 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2460 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2461 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2462 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2464 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2467 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2469 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2476 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2477 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2478 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2479 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2480 if !self.channel_outbound {
2481 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2483 if !self.is_usable() {
2484 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2486 if !self.is_live() {
2487 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2490 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2491 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2495 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2496 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2498 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2499 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2504 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2505 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2506 Some(update_fee) => {
2507 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2508 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2514 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2515 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2516 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2517 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2518 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2520 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2521 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2523 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2524 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2525 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2526 return outbound_drops;
2528 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2529 // will be retransmitted.
2530 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2532 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2533 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2535 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2536 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2537 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2538 // this HTLC accordingly
2539 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2542 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2543 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2544 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2545 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2548 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2549 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2550 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2551 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2552 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2553 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2558 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2560 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2561 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2562 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2563 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2564 // the update upon reconnection.
2565 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2569 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2571 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2572 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2573 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2574 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2576 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2577 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2580 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2583 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2584 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2588 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2589 /// updates are partially paused.
2590 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2591 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2592 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2593 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2594 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2595 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2596 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2597 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2598 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2599 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2600 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2601 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2602 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2605 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2606 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2607 /// to the remote side.
2608 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2609 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2610 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2612 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound;
2614 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2615 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2616 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2617 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2618 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2619 // monitor was persisted.
2620 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2621 assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2622 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2623 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2624 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2625 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2626 next_per_commitment_point,
2630 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2631 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2632 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2633 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2635 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2636 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2637 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2638 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2641 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2642 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2644 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2645 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2648 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2649 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2650 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2651 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2652 if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2653 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2654 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2655 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2656 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2659 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2660 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2662 if self.channel_outbound {
2663 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2665 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2666 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2668 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2669 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2670 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2674 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2675 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2676 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_keys.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2677 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2678 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2679 per_commitment_secret,
2680 next_per_commitment_point,
2684 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2685 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2686 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2687 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2688 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2690 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2691 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2692 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2693 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2694 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2695 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2696 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2697 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2698 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2703 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2704 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2706 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2707 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2708 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2709 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2710 reason: err_packet.clone()
2713 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2714 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2715 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2716 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2717 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2718 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2721 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2722 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2723 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2724 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2725 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2732 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2733 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2734 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2735 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2737 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2741 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2742 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2743 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2744 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2745 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2746 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2747 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2751 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2752 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2753 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2756 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2757 match msg.data_loss_protect {
2758 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2759 let expected_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2760 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2761 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2762 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2765 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2766 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2767 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2771 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2775 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2776 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2777 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2779 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2780 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2781 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2782 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2786 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2787 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2788 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2789 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2790 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2791 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2793 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2794 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2797 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2798 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2799 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2800 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2801 next_per_commitment_point,
2802 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2805 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2806 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2807 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2809 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2810 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2811 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2814 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2817 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2820 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2821 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2822 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2823 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2824 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2826 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2827 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2828 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2829 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2830 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2831 next_per_commitment_point,
2835 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
2836 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2837 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2839 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2842 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2843 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2844 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
2845 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2846 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
2847 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
2851 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2852 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2853 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2855 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
2856 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
2857 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
2858 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
2859 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2860 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
2861 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
2862 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2864 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
2865 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2866 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
2867 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
2868 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2872 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2874 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
2875 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2876 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2878 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2881 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2882 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2883 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2886 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2888 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2892 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
2893 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2895 if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
2896 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
2897 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2901 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2902 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
2903 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
2905 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
2906 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
2908 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
2909 let sig = self.holder_keys
2910 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2912 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
2913 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
2915 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
2916 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2917 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2918 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
2919 signature: sig.unwrap(),
2923 pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2924 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2926 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2927 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2929 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2930 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
2931 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
2932 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
2933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
2935 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2936 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2937 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
2940 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2942 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
2943 // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
2944 if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
2945 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got counterparty shutdown_scriptpubkey ({}) of absurd length from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
2948 //Check counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
2949 if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2950 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
2953 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
2954 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
2955 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
2958 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
2961 // From here on out, we may not fail!
2963 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
2964 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2966 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
2967 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
2968 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
2969 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
2970 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2971 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2973 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2974 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2980 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
2981 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
2982 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
2984 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
2987 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2988 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2989 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2993 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
2994 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2996 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2999 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3000 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3001 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3002 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3004 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3006 let funding_key = self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3007 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3008 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3009 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3010 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3012 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3013 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3015 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3016 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3018 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3021 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3022 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3024 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3025 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3027 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3028 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3030 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3031 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3033 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3034 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3037 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3038 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3039 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3040 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3042 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3044 let counterparty_funding_pubkey = &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
3046 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, counterparty_funding_pubkey) {
3049 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3050 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3051 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3052 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3053 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3057 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3058 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3059 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3060 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3061 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3062 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3063 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3064 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3065 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3066 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3067 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3071 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3072 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3073 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3074 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3075 let sig = self.holder_keys
3076 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3077 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3078 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3079 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3080 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3081 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3082 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3088 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3089 if self.channel_outbound {
3090 let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3091 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3092 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3093 if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3094 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3097 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3100 min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3102 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3103 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3104 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3105 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3108 propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3111 let sig = self.holder_keys
3112 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3113 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3114 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3115 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3116 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3118 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3119 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3121 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3122 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3123 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3125 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3128 // Public utilities:
3130 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3134 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3135 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3136 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3140 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3141 /// is_usable() returns true).
3142 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3143 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3144 self.short_channel_id
3147 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3148 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3149 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3153 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3154 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3155 self.counterparty_node_id
3158 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3160 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3161 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3164 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3165 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3167 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3168 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3169 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3170 self.channel_value_satoshis * 9 / 10,
3172 Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3176 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3177 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3178 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3181 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3182 self.channel_value_satoshis
3185 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3186 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3190 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3194 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3195 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3198 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3199 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3202 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3203 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3207 pub fn get_keys(&self) -> &ChanSigner {
3212 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3214 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3215 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3216 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3217 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3218 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3219 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3221 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3223 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3231 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3232 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3236 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3237 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3238 self.update_time_counter
3241 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3242 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3245 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3246 self.config.announced_channel
3249 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3250 self.channel_outbound
3253 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3254 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3255 pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3256 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3258 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3259 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3261 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3262 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3264 if self.channel_outbound {
3265 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3266 res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3269 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3270 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3275 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3276 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3277 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3280 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3281 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3282 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3283 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3284 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3287 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3288 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3289 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3290 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3291 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3294 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3295 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3296 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3297 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3300 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3301 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3302 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3305 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3306 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3307 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3308 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3309 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3310 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3315 pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3316 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3319 pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3320 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3323 pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3324 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3327 pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3328 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3331 pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3332 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3335 /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
3336 /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
3337 /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
3338 /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
3339 /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3340 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3342 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3343 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3345 /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3347 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3349 pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3350 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3351 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3353 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3354 if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3355 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3362 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3363 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3364 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3365 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3368 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3369 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3370 if tx.txid() == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid {
3371 let txo_idx = self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as usize;
3372 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3373 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3374 if self.channel_outbound {
3375 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3376 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3377 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3378 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3379 // channel and move on.
3380 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3381 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3383 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3384 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3385 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3386 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3387 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3390 if self.channel_outbound {
3391 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3392 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3393 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3394 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3395 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3396 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3400 if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
3401 panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions");
3403 assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness
3404 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3405 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
3406 ((index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3407 ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
3412 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3413 self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3414 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
3415 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3416 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3417 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3418 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3420 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3421 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3422 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3424 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3425 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3426 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3428 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3429 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3431 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3432 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3435 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(self.last_block_connected);
3437 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3438 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3439 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3440 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3441 if need_commitment_update {
3442 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3443 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3444 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3445 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3446 next_per_commitment_point,
3447 }), timed_out_htlcs));
3449 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3450 return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
3456 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3459 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3460 /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3461 /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3462 pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3463 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3464 self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3465 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3469 self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3470 if Some(self.last_block_connected) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3471 self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3476 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3477 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3479 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3480 if !self.channel_outbound {
3481 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3483 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3484 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3487 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3488 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3491 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3492 let keys = self.holder_keys.pubkeys();
3496 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3497 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3498 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3499 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3500 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3501 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3502 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3503 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3504 to_self_delay: self.holder_selected_contest_delay,
3505 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3506 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3507 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3508 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3509 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3510 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3511 first_per_commitment_point,
3512 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3513 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3517 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3518 if self.channel_outbound {
3519 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3521 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3522 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3524 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3525 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3528 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3529 let keys = self.holder_keys.pubkeys();
3531 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3532 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3533 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3534 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3535 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3536 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3537 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3538 to_self_delay: self.holder_selected_contest_delay,
3539 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3540 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3541 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3542 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3543 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3544 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3545 first_per_commitment_point,
3546 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3550 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3551 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3552 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3553 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3554 let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(counterparty_keys);
3555 Ok(self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &pre_remote_keys, &Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3556 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3559 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3560 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3561 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3562 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3563 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3564 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3565 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3566 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3567 if !self.channel_outbound {
3568 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3570 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3571 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3573 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3574 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3575 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3576 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3579 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
3580 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3583 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3584 self.funding_txo = None;
3589 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3591 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3593 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3594 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3596 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3597 temporary_channel_id,
3598 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3599 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3604 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3605 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3606 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3607 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3608 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3610 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3611 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3612 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3613 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3614 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3616 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3617 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3619 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3620 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3623 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3625 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3626 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3628 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3629 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3630 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3631 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3632 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3633 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3636 let sig = self.holder_keys.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3637 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3642 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3643 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3644 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3645 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3646 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3647 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3648 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3649 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3650 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3651 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3652 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3653 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3654 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3655 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3656 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3657 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3658 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3659 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3660 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3663 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3664 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3665 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3666 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3669 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3670 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3671 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3672 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3673 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3674 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3675 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3676 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3678 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3679 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3680 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3681 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3682 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3683 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3684 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3685 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3686 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3688 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3694 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3696 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3697 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3698 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3699 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3700 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3701 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3702 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3703 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3704 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3705 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3707 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3708 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3709 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3712 if amount_msat == 0 {
3713 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3716 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
3717 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
3720 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3721 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3722 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3723 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3724 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3725 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3726 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3727 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
3730 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3731 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3732 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3734 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3735 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3736 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3739 if !self.channel_outbound {
3740 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3742 let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
3743 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
3744 // 1 additional HTLC corresponding to this HTLC.
3745 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
3746 if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3747 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3751 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
3752 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
3753 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
3756 // The `+1` is for the HTLC currently being added to the commitment tx and
3757 // the `2 *` and `+1` are for the fee spike buffer.
3758 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.channel_outbound {
3759 2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(1 + 1)
3761 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
3762 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
3765 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3766 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3767 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3768 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
3769 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
3772 // Now update local state:
3773 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3774 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3779 onion_routing_packet,
3784 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3785 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3787 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3789 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3793 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3794 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3795 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3799 onion_routing_packet,
3801 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
3806 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3807 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3808 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3809 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3810 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3811 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3812 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3814 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3815 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3817 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3818 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3820 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3821 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3823 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3824 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3825 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3826 have_updates = true;
3828 if have_updates { break; }
3830 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3831 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3832 have_updates = true;
3834 if have_updates { break; }
3837 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3839 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
3841 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3842 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3843 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3844 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3846 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3847 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3848 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3850 if let Some(state) = new_state {
3854 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3855 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
3856 Some(fail_reason.take())
3858 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
3861 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3863 let (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
3864 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
3865 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3866 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
3867 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
3868 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
3870 Err(e) => return Err(e),
3873 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3874 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3875 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3876 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
3877 unsigned_commitment_tx: counterparty_commitment_tx.clone(),
3878 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
3879 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
3880 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
3883 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
3884 Ok((res, monitor_update))
3887 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
3888 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
3889 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3890 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3891 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
3892 if self.channel_outbound {
3893 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3897 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3898 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
3899 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
3902 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
3903 for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
3907 let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(counterparty_keys);
3908 let res = self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(feerate_per_kw, &counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &pre_remote_keys, &htlcs, &self.secp_ctx)
3909 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
3911 htlc_signatures = res.1;
3912 let counterparty_keys = pre_remote_keys.trust_key_derivation();
3914 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} -> {}",
3915 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0),
3916 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
3917 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
3919 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
3920 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
3921 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.txid(), feerate_per_kw, self.holder_selected_contest_delay, htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
3922 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, counterparty_keys)),
3923 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
3924 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
3928 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3929 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3932 }, (counterparty_commitment_tx.0, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
3935 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
3936 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
3937 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
3939 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3940 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
3941 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
3942 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3943 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3949 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
3950 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
3951 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
3952 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3953 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3954 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
3957 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
3958 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3959 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
3961 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
3962 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
3965 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3966 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3967 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
3970 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3972 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3973 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3974 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3976 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3978 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3980 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
3981 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
3982 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3983 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3984 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3986 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3987 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3994 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
3995 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3996 scriptpubkey: closing_script,
3997 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4000 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4001 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4002 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4003 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4004 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4005 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4006 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4008 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4009 // return them to fail the payment.
4010 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4011 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4013 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4014 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4019 let funding_txo = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.funding_txo {
4020 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4021 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4022 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4023 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4024 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4025 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4026 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4027 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4028 Some(funding_txo.clone())
4032 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4033 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4034 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4035 (funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4036 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4037 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4038 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4042 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4043 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4045 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4046 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4048 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4050 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4052 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4054 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4055 err_code.write(writer)?;
4057 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4059 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4066 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4067 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4068 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4069 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4070 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4071 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4072 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4077 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> Writeable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
4078 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4079 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4080 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4082 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4083 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4085 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4086 self.config.write(writer)?;
4088 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4089 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4090 self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
4091 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4093 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4095 self.holder_keys.write(writer)?;
4096 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4097 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4099 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4100 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4101 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4103 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4104 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4105 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4106 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4109 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4110 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4111 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4114 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4115 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4116 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4117 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4119 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4120 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4122 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4124 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4126 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4128 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4131 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4133 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4138 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4139 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4140 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4141 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4142 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4143 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4144 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4146 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4148 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4150 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4153 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4155 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4157 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4159 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4161 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4163 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4168 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4169 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4171 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4173 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4174 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4175 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4176 source.write(writer)?;
4177 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4179 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4181 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4182 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4184 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4186 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4187 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4192 match self.resend_order {
4193 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4194 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4197 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4198 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4199 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4201 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4202 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4203 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4204 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4207 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4208 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4209 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4210 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4211 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4214 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4215 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4217 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4218 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4219 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4220 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4222 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4223 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4225 feerate.write(writer)?;
4229 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4232 self.funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4233 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4234 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4236 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
4237 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
4239 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4240 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4241 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4242 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4243 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4244 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4245 self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay.write(writer)?;
4246 self.holder_selected_contest_delay.write(writer)?;
4247 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4248 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4250 self.counterparty_pubkeys.write(writer)?;
4251 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4253 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4254 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4256 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4258 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4263 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
4264 fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4265 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4266 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4267 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4268 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4271 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4272 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4274 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4275 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4276 let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
4277 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4279 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4281 let holder_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
4282 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4283 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4285 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4286 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4287 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4289 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4290 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4291 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4292 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4293 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4294 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4295 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4296 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4297 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4298 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4299 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4300 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4301 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4302 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4307 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4308 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4309 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4310 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4311 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4312 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4313 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4314 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4315 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4316 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4317 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4318 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4319 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4320 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4321 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4322 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4327 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4328 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4329 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4330 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4331 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4332 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4333 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4334 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4335 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4336 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4338 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4339 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4340 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4342 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4343 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4344 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4346 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4350 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4351 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4352 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4353 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4356 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4357 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4358 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4360 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4361 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4362 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4363 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4366 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4367 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4368 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4369 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4372 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4373 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4375 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4376 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4377 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4378 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4380 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4382 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4383 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4386 let funding_txo = Readable::read(reader)?;
4387 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4388 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4390 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
4391 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4393 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4394 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4395 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4396 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4397 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4398 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4399 let counterparty_selected_contest_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
4400 let holder_selected_contest_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
4401 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4402 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4404 let counterparty_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
4405 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4407 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4408 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4410 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4411 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4420 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
4421 channel_value_satoshis,
4423 latest_monitor_update_id,
4429 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4430 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4433 pending_inbound_htlcs,
4434 pending_outbound_htlcs,
4435 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4439 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4440 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4441 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4442 monitor_pending_forwards,
4443 monitor_pending_failures,
4446 holding_cell_update_fee,
4447 next_holder_htlc_id,
4448 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4449 update_time_counter,
4452 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4453 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4454 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4455 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4457 last_sent_closing_fee,
4460 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4462 last_block_connected,
4463 funding_tx_confirmations,
4465 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4466 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4467 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4468 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4469 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4470 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4471 counterparty_selected_contest_delay,
4472 holder_selected_contest_delay,
4473 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4476 counterparty_pubkeys,
4477 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4479 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4480 counterparty_node_id,
4482 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4486 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4493 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4494 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4495 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4496 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4497 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4498 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4499 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4500 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4502 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4503 use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
4504 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4505 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4506 use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
4508 use ln::chan_utils::{HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelPublicKeys};
4509 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4510 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
4511 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4512 use util::config::UserConfig;
4513 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingChannelKeys;
4514 use util::test_utils;
4515 use util::logger::Logger;
4516 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4517 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4518 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4519 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4520 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4523 struct TestFeeEstimator {
4526 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4527 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4533 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4534 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4535 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4539 chan_keys: InMemoryChannelKeys,
4541 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4542 type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
4544 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4545 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4546 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4547 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4548 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4549 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4552 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4553 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4554 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4555 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4558 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
4559 self.chan_keys.clone()
4561 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4564 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4565 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4568 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4569 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4571 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4572 let original_fee = 253;
4573 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4574 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4575 let seed = [42; 32];
4576 let network = Network::Testnet;
4577 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4579 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4580 let config = UserConfig::default();
4581 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4583 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4584 // same as the old fee.
4585 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4586 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4587 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
4591 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
4592 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4593 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4594 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4595 let seed = [42; 32];
4596 let network = Network::Testnet;
4597 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4599 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
4601 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4602 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4603 let config = UserConfig::default();
4604 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4606 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4607 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4608 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4609 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4611 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
4612 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4613 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4615 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
4616 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4617 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4618 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
4620 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
4621 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
4622 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, &&logger).unwrap();
4624 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
4625 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, &&logger);
4627 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
4628 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
4629 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4630 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4631 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4632 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4633 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4634 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4635 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4640 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
4642 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4643 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4644 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4645 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4646 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4647 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4648 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4655 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4656 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4657 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4658 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4659 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4661 let mut chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
4663 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4664 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4665 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4666 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4667 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4669 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4670 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4675 assert_eq!(chan_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
4676 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
4677 let keys_provider = Keys { chan_keys: chan_keys.clone() };
4679 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4680 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
4681 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
4682 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
4683 chan.counterparty_selected_contest_delay = 144;
4684 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4686 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
4687 chan.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
4689 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4690 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4691 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4692 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
4693 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4694 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
4696 chan_keys.on_accept(&counterparty_pubkeys, chan.counterparty_selected_contest_delay, chan.holder_selected_contest_delay);
4698 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
4699 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4701 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
4702 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
4704 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
4705 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4707 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
4708 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
4709 // build_commitment_transaction.
4710 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
4711 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4712 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4713 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
4714 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
4716 chan.counterparty_pubkeys = Some(counterparty_pubkeys);
4718 let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
4721 macro_rules! test_commitment {
4722 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
4723 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
4726 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
4727 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
4728 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
4732 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4733 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4734 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&unsigned_tx.0).signature_hash(0, &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
4735 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
4737 let mut per_htlc = Vec::new();
4738 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
4740 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4741 per_htlc.push((unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
4743 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), per_htlc.len());
4745 holdertx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_holder_sig(unsigned_tx.0.clone(), counterparty_signature.clone(), &chan_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey(), keys.clone(), chan.feerate_per_kw, per_htlc);
4746 let holder_sig = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment(&holdertx, &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
4747 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig);
4749 assert_eq!(serialize(&holdertx.add_holder_sig(&redeemscript, holder_sig))[..],
4750 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4752 let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&holdertx, &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
4753 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holdertx.per_htlc.iter().zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
4756 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4758 let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
4759 let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4760 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
4761 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
4762 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
4764 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4767 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
4768 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
4769 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
4773 assert!(preimage.is_some());
4776 let mut htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
4777 while (htlc_sig.1).1.is_none() { htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap(); }
4778 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx));
4780 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4781 assert_eq!(Some(signature), *(htlc_sig.1).1);
4782 assert_eq!(serialize(&holdertx.get_signed_htlc_tx((htlc_sig.1).0, &(htlc_sig.1).1.unwrap(), &preimage, chan.counterparty_selected_contest_delay))[..],
4783 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4786 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next();
4787 if htlc_sig.is_none() { break; }
4788 assert!((htlc_sig.unwrap().1).1.is_none());
4793 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
4794 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
4796 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
4797 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
4798 "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", {});
4800 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4801 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4803 amount_msat: 1000000,
4805 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4806 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4808 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
4811 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4812 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4814 amount_msat: 2000000,
4816 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4817 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4819 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
4822 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4823 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4825 amount_msat: 2000000,
4827 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4828 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4829 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4831 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
4834 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4835 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4837 amount_msat: 3000000,
4839 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4840 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4841 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4843 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
4846 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4847 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4849 amount_msat: 4000000,
4851 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4852 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4854 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
4858 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4859 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4860 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
4862 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
4863 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
4864 "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", {
4867 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
4868 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
4869 "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" },
4872 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
4873 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
4874 "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" },
4877 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
4878 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
4879 "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" },
4882 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
4883 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
4884 "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" },
4887 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
4888 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
4889 "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" }
4892 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4893 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4894 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
4896 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
4897 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
4898 "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", {
4901 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
4902 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
4903 "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" },
4906 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
4907 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
4908 "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" },
4911 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
4912 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
4913 "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" },
4916 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
4917 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
4918 "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" },
4921 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
4922 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
4923 "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" }
4926 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4927 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4928 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
4930 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
4931 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
4932 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
4935 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
4936 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
4937 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
4940 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
4941 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
4942 "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" },
4945 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
4946 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
4947 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
4950 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
4951 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
4952 "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" }
4955 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4956 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4957 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
4959 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
4960 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
4961 "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", {
4964 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
4965 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
4966 "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" },
4969 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
4970 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
4971 "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" },
4974 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
4975 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
4976 "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" },
4979 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
4980 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
4981 "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" }
4984 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4985 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4986 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
4988 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
4989 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
4990 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
4993 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
4994 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
4995 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
4998 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
4999 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5000 "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" },
5003 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5004 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5005 "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" }
5008 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5009 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5010 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5012 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5013 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5014 "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", {
5017 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5018 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5019 "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" },
5022 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5023 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5024 "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" },
5027 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5028 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5029 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b014830450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5032 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5033 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5034 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5036 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5037 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5038 "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", {
5041 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5042 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5043 "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" },
5046 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5047 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5048 "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" }
5051 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5052 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5053 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5055 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5056 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5057 "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", {
5060 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5061 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5062 "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" },
5065 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5066 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5067 "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" }
5070 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5071 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5072 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5074 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5075 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5076 "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", {
5079 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5080 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5081 "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" }
5084 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5085 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5086 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5088 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5089 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5090 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484ae8f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c1901483045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c9524401475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
5093 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5094 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5095 "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" }
5098 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5099 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5100 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5102 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5103 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5104 "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", {});
5106 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5107 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5108 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5110 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5111 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5112 "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", {});
5114 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5115 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5116 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5118 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5119 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5120 "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", {});
5122 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5123 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5124 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5126 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5127 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5128 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5132 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5133 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5135 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5136 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5137 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5138 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5140 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5141 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5142 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5144 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5145 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5147 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5148 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5150 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5151 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5152 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5156 fn test_key_derivation() {
5157 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5158 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5160 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5161 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5163 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5164 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5166 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5167 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5169 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5170 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5172 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5173 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5175 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5176 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5178 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5179 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());