1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
13 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
30 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
32 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
33 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
34 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
35 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
36 use util::transaction_utils;
37 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
38 use util::logger::Logger;
39 use util::errors::APIError;
40 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
41 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
43 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
45 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
47 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
48 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
51 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
52 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
53 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
54 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
55 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
56 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
57 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
58 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
59 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
62 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
63 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
64 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
65 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
68 enum InboundHTLCState {
69 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
70 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
71 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
72 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
73 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
74 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
75 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
76 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
77 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
78 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
79 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
80 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
81 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
82 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
83 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
85 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
86 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
87 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
88 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
89 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
90 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
91 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
92 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
93 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
94 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
95 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
96 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
97 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
98 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
100 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
101 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
102 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
103 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
104 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
105 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
106 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
107 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
109 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
110 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
112 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
113 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
114 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
115 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
116 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
117 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
118 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
119 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
122 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
126 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
127 state: InboundHTLCState,
130 enum OutboundHTLCState {
131 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
132 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
133 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
134 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
135 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
136 /// money back (though we won't), and,
137 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
138 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
139 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
140 /// we'll never get out of sync).
141 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
142 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
143 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
145 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
146 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
147 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
148 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
149 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
150 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
151 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
152 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
153 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
154 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
155 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
156 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
157 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
158 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
159 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
162 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
166 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
167 state: OutboundHTLCState,
171 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
172 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
173 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
177 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
179 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
182 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
187 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
191 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
192 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
193 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
194 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
195 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
196 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
197 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
199 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
200 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
201 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
202 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
203 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
204 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
205 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
207 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
208 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
209 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
211 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
212 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
213 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
214 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
215 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
216 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
218 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
219 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
221 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
222 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
223 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
224 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
225 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
226 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
227 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
228 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
229 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
231 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
232 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
233 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
234 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
235 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
236 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
237 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
238 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
239 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
240 /// us their shutdown.
241 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
242 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
243 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
244 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
246 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
247 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
249 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
251 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
252 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
253 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
254 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
255 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
256 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
257 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
258 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
260 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
262 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
264 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
268 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
274 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
275 struct HTLCCandidate {
277 origin: HTLCInitiator,
281 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
289 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
291 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
292 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
293 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
294 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
295 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
296 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
297 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
298 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
299 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
302 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
303 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
304 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
307 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
308 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
309 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
310 config: ChannelConfig,
314 channel_id: [u8; 32],
316 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
317 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
319 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
321 holder_signer: Signer,
322 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
323 destination_script: Script,
325 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
326 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
327 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
329 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
330 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
331 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
332 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
333 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
334 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
336 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
337 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
338 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
339 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
340 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
341 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
343 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
345 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
346 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
347 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
348 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
349 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
351 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
352 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
353 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
355 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
356 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
357 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
358 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
359 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
360 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
361 // commitment_signed.
362 pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
363 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
364 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
365 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
366 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
367 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
368 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
369 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
370 update_time_counter: u32,
373 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
374 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
375 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
376 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
377 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
378 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
380 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
382 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
383 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
384 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
385 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
387 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
389 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
391 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
393 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
395 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
396 //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
397 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
398 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
399 // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
400 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
401 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
403 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
405 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
406 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
409 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
411 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
412 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
414 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
415 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
416 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
418 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
420 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
422 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
424 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
425 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
426 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
428 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
429 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
430 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
431 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
432 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
433 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
434 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
435 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
438 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
439 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
441 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
442 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
443 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
447 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
448 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
451 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
453 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
455 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
457 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
459 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
461 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
463 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
464 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
465 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
466 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
467 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
468 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
469 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
470 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
471 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
473 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
474 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
475 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
476 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
477 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
479 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
480 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
481 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
482 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
485 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
488 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
489 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
491 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
492 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
493 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
498 macro_rules! secp_check {
499 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
502 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
507 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
508 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
509 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
510 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
513 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
516 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
517 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
518 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
519 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
523 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
524 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
525 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
527 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
528 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
529 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
531 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
532 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
534 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
535 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
536 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
538 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
539 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
541 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
542 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
543 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
546 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
548 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
549 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
553 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
555 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
556 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
558 channel_value_satoshis,
560 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
563 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
564 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
566 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
567 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
568 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
570 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
571 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
572 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
573 pending_update_fee: None,
574 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
575 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
576 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
577 update_time_counter: 1,
579 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
581 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
582 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
583 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
584 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
585 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
587 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
588 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
589 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
590 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
592 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
594 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
595 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
596 short_channel_id: None,
598 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
599 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
600 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
601 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
602 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
603 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
604 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
605 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
606 minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
608 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
610 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
611 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
612 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
613 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
614 counterparty_parameters: None,
615 funding_outpoint: None
617 funding_transaction: None,
619 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
620 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
621 counterparty_node_id,
623 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
625 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
627 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
629 announcement_sigs: None,
631 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
632 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
633 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
634 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
638 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
639 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
641 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
642 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
643 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
645 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 2;
646 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
647 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
652 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
653 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
654 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
655 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
656 F::Target: FeeEstimator
658 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
659 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
660 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
661 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
662 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
663 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
664 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
665 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
667 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
669 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
670 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
673 // Check sanity of message fields:
674 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
675 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
677 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
678 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
680 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
681 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
682 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
684 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
685 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
687 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
688 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
690 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
691 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
692 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
694 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
696 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
697 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
698 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
700 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
701 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
703 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
704 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
707 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
708 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
709 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
711 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
712 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
714 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
715 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
717 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
718 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
720 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
721 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
723 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
724 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
726 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
727 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
730 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
732 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
733 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
734 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
735 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
738 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
739 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
741 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
743 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
744 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
745 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
747 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
748 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
750 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
751 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
754 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
755 // for full fee payment
756 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
757 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
758 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
759 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
762 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
763 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
764 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
765 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
768 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
769 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
770 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
771 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
772 if script.len() == 0 {
774 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
775 } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
776 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
781 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
782 &OptionalField::Absent => {
783 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
788 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
789 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
793 config: local_config,
795 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
796 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
799 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
802 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
803 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
805 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
806 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
807 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
809 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
810 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
811 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
812 pending_update_fee: None,
813 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
814 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
815 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
816 update_time_counter: 1,
818 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
820 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
821 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
822 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
823 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
824 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
826 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
827 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
828 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
829 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
831 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
833 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
834 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
835 short_channel_id: None,
837 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
838 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
839 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
840 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
841 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
842 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
843 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
844 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
845 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
846 minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
848 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
850 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
851 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
852 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
853 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
854 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
855 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
856 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
858 funding_outpoint: None
860 funding_transaction: None,
862 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
863 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
864 counterparty_node_id,
866 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
868 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
870 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
872 announcement_sigs: None,
874 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
875 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
876 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
877 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
883 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
884 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
885 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
886 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
887 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
889 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
890 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
891 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
892 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
893 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
894 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
895 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
896 /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
897 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
898 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
899 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
901 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
902 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
903 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
904 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
906 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
907 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
908 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
909 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
911 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
913 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
914 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
915 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
917 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
918 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
919 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
920 transaction_output_index: None
925 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
926 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
927 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
928 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
929 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
930 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
931 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
933 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
934 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
937 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
938 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
939 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
940 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
942 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
943 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
949 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
950 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
951 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
952 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
953 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
954 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
955 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
959 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
960 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
962 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
964 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
965 if generated_by_local {
966 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
967 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
976 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
977 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
978 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
979 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
980 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
981 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
982 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
986 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
987 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
989 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
991 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
992 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
994 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
995 if !generated_by_local {
996 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1004 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1005 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1006 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1007 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1008 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1009 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1010 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1011 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1013 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1015 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1016 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1017 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1018 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1020 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1022 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1023 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1024 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1025 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1028 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1029 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1030 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1032 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1035 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1036 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1038 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1039 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1044 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1045 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1050 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1052 let channel_parameters =
1053 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1054 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1055 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1060 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1063 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1064 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1065 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1066 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1068 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1072 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1073 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1074 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1078 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1083 1 + // script length (0)
1087 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1088 2 + // witness marker and flag
1089 1 + // witness element count
1090 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1091 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1092 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1093 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1094 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1095 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1097 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1098 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1099 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1105 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1107 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1109 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1110 script_sig: Script::new(),
1111 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1112 witness: Vec::new(),
1117 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1118 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1119 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1121 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1122 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1123 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1125 if value_to_self < 0 {
1126 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1127 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1128 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1129 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1130 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1133 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1134 txouts.push((TxOut {
1135 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1136 value: value_to_remote as u64
1140 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1141 txouts.push((TxOut {
1142 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1143 value: value_to_self as u64
1147 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1149 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1150 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1151 outputs.push(out.0);
1159 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1162 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1163 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1167 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1168 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1169 /// our counterparty!)
1170 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1171 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1172 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1173 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1174 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1175 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1176 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1178 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1182 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1183 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1184 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1185 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1186 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1187 //may see payments to it!
1188 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1189 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1190 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1192 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1195 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1196 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1197 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1198 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1199 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1202 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1203 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1204 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1205 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1206 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1209 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1210 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1211 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1213 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1214 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1215 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1216 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1217 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1218 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1220 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1221 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1223 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1225 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1227 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1228 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1229 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1231 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1232 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1233 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1234 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1236 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1237 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1238 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1240 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1242 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1243 return Ok((None, None));
1246 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1247 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1254 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1255 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1258 // Now update local state:
1260 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1261 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1262 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1263 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1264 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1265 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1266 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1270 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1271 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1272 match pending_update {
1273 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1274 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1275 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1276 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1277 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1278 return Ok((None, None));
1281 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1282 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1283 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1284 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1285 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1286 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1287 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1293 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1294 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1295 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1297 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1301 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1302 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1304 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1305 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1307 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1308 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1311 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1312 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1313 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1314 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1315 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1318 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1319 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1320 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1321 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1322 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1323 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1324 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1325 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1326 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1328 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1329 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1330 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1332 (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1333 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1337 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1338 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1339 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1341 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1342 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1343 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1344 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1345 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1347 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1349 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1350 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1351 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1353 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1354 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1355 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1357 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1358 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1359 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1363 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1364 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1370 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1371 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1374 // Now update local state:
1375 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1376 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1377 match pending_update {
1378 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1379 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1380 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1381 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1384 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1385 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1386 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1387 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1393 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1394 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1401 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1402 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1405 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1406 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1407 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1412 // Message handlers:
1414 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1415 // Check sanity of message fields:
1416 if !self.is_outbound() {
1417 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1419 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1420 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1422 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1423 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1425 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1426 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1428 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1429 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1431 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1432 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1434 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1435 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1436 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1438 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1439 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1440 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1442 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1443 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1444 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1446 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1447 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1449 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1450 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1453 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1454 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1455 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1457 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1458 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1460 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1461 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1463 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1464 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1466 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1467 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1469 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1470 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1472 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1473 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1476 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1477 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1478 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1479 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1480 if script.len() == 0 {
1482 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1483 } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
1484 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1486 Some(script.clone())
1489 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1490 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1491 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1496 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1497 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1498 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1499 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1500 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1501 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1503 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1504 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1505 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1506 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1507 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1508 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1511 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1512 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1513 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1516 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1517 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1519 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1524 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1525 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1527 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1528 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1530 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1531 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1532 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1533 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1534 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1535 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1538 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1539 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1541 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1542 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1543 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1545 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1546 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1548 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1549 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1552 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1553 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1556 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1557 if self.is_outbound() {
1558 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1560 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1561 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1562 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1564 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1566 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1567 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1568 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1569 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1572 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1573 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1574 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
1575 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1576 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1578 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1580 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1581 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1582 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1585 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1586 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1587 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1591 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1592 initial_commitment_tx,
1595 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1596 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1599 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1601 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1602 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1603 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1604 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1605 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1606 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1607 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1608 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1610 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1612 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1614 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1615 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1616 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1617 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1619 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1620 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1622 }, channel_monitor))
1625 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1626 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1627 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1628 if !self.is_outbound() {
1629 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1631 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1632 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1634 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1635 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1636 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1637 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1640 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1642 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1643 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1644 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1645 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1647 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1649 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1650 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1652 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1653 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1654 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1655 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1656 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1657 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1661 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1662 initial_commitment_tx,
1665 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1666 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1670 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1671 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1672 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1673 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1674 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1675 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1676 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1677 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1678 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1680 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1682 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1684 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1685 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1686 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1687 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1689 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1692 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1693 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1694 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1697 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1699 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1700 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1701 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1702 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1703 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1704 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1705 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1706 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1707 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1708 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1709 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1710 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1711 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1712 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1714 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1717 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1720 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1721 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1725 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1726 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1727 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1728 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1729 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1731 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1734 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1736 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1737 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1738 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1739 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1742 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1743 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1744 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1745 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1746 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1750 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1753 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1754 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1755 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1756 /// corner case properly.
1757 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1758 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1759 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1760 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1763 // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1764 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1765 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1766 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1767 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1768 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1771 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1772 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1773 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1775 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1776 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1778 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1779 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1781 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1782 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1784 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1785 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1789 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1790 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1796 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1797 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1798 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1801 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1802 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1803 included_htlcs += 1;
1806 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1807 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1811 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1812 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1813 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1814 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1815 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1816 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1821 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1823 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1824 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1829 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1830 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1834 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1835 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1836 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1839 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1840 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1842 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1843 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1844 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1846 total_pending_htlcs,
1847 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1848 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1849 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1851 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1852 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1853 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1855 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1857 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1862 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1863 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1864 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1866 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1867 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1869 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1870 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1872 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1873 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1875 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1876 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1880 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1881 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1887 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1888 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1889 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1890 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1891 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1892 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1895 included_htlcs += 1;
1898 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1899 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1902 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1903 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1905 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1906 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1907 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1912 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1913 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1914 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1917 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1918 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1920 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1921 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1923 total_pending_htlcs,
1924 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1925 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1926 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1928 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1929 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1930 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1932 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1934 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1939 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1940 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1941 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1942 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1943 if local_sent_shutdown {
1944 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1946 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1947 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1948 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1949 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1951 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1952 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1954 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1955 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1957 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1958 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1960 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1961 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1964 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1965 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1966 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1968 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1969 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1970 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1972 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1973 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1974 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1975 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1976 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1977 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1978 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1979 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1980 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1981 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1982 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1984 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1985 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1986 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1987 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1988 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1989 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1993 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1994 self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1995 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1996 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1997 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1998 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2001 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2002 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2003 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2004 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2005 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2007 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2008 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2011 let chan_reserve_msat =
2012 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2013 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2014 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2017 if !self.is_outbound() {
2018 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2019 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2020 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2021 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2022 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2023 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2024 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2025 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2026 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2027 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2028 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2029 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2030 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2031 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
2032 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2035 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2036 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2037 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2038 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2039 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2042 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2045 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2046 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2049 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2050 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2051 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2055 // Now update local state:
2056 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2057 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2058 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2059 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2060 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2061 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2062 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2067 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2069 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2070 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2071 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2072 match check_preimage {
2074 Some(payment_hash) =>
2075 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2076 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2080 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2081 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2082 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2083 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2085 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2086 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2088 return Ok(&htlc.source);
2091 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2094 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2095 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2096 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2098 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2099 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2102 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2103 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
2106 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2107 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2108 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2110 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2111 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2114 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2118 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2119 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2120 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2122 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2123 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2126 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2130 pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2131 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2134 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2135 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2137 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2138 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2140 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2141 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2144 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2146 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2148 let mut update_fee = false;
2149 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2151 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2156 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2157 let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2158 let commitment_txid = {
2159 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2160 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2161 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2163 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
2164 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2165 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2169 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2170 (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2173 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2174 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2176 let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2177 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2178 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2181 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2183 if self.is_outbound() {
2184 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2185 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2186 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2187 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2188 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2189 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2190 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2191 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2192 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2193 assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2199 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2200 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2203 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2204 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2205 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2206 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2207 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2208 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2209 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2210 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2211 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2212 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2214 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2216 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2220 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2223 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2224 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2225 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2228 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2229 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2231 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2232 let mut need_commitment = false;
2233 if !self.is_outbound() {
2234 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2235 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2236 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2237 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2238 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2239 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2240 need_commitment = true;
2241 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2246 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2247 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2248 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2249 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2250 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2251 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2255 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2256 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2257 Some(forward_info.clone())
2259 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2260 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2261 need_commitment = true;
2264 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2265 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2266 Some(fail_reason.take())
2268 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2269 need_commitment = true;
2273 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2274 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2275 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2276 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2278 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2279 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2280 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2281 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2282 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2283 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2284 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2285 // includes the right HTLCs.
2286 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2287 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2288 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2289 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2290 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2291 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2293 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2294 // re-send the message on restoration)
2295 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2298 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2299 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2300 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2301 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2302 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2303 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2304 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2305 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2306 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2308 } else if !need_commitment {
2309 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2310 } else { (None, None) };
2312 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2313 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2314 per_commitment_secret,
2315 next_per_commitment_point,
2316 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2319 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2320 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2321 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2322 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2323 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2324 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2326 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2327 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2328 updates: Vec::new(),
2331 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2332 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2333 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2334 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2335 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2336 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2337 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2338 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2339 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2340 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2341 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2342 // to rebalance channels.
2343 match &htlc_update {
2344 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2345 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2346 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2349 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2350 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2351 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2352 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2353 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2354 // into the holding cell without ever being
2355 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2356 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2357 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2360 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2366 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2367 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2368 Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2369 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2370 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2371 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2375 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2377 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2382 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2383 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2384 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2386 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2388 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2395 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2396 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2398 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2399 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2400 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2401 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2402 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2408 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2409 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2410 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2411 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2412 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2414 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2416 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2418 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2421 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2423 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2427 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2428 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2429 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2430 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2431 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2432 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2433 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2436 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2437 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2439 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2442 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2443 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2446 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2447 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2448 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2452 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2453 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2454 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2455 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2456 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2457 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2458 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2459 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2460 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2463 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2465 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2466 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2469 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2470 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2471 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2472 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2473 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2474 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2475 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2476 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2480 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2481 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2482 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2483 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2484 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2485 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2486 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2487 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2489 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2490 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2491 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2492 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2493 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2494 let mut require_commitment = false;
2495 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2498 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2499 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2500 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2502 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2503 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2504 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2505 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2506 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2507 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2512 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2513 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2514 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2515 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2516 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2518 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2519 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2524 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2525 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2526 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2528 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2529 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2533 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2534 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2536 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2537 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2538 require_commitment = true;
2539 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2540 match forward_info {
2541 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2542 require_commitment = true;
2544 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2545 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2546 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2548 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2549 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2550 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2554 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2555 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2556 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2562 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2563 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2564 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2565 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2567 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2568 Some(fail_reason.take())
2570 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2571 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2572 require_commitment = true;
2576 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2578 if self.is_outbound() {
2579 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2580 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2583 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2584 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2585 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2586 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2587 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2588 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2589 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2590 require_commitment = true;
2591 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2596 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2597 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2598 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2599 if require_commitment {
2600 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2601 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2602 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2603 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2604 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2605 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2606 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2607 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2608 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2610 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2611 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2612 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2615 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2616 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2617 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2618 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2619 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2621 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2622 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2623 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2626 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2627 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2628 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2629 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2631 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2633 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2634 if require_commitment {
2635 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2637 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2638 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2639 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2640 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2642 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2643 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2644 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2646 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2649 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2651 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2658 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2659 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2660 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2661 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2662 if !self.is_outbound() {
2663 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2665 if !self.is_usable() {
2666 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2668 if !self.is_live() {
2669 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2672 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2673 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2677 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2678 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2680 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2681 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2686 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2687 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2688 Some(update_fee) => {
2689 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2690 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2696 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2697 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2698 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2699 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2700 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2702 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2703 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2705 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2706 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2707 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2708 return outbound_drops;
2710 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2711 // will be retransmitted.
2712 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2714 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2715 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2717 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2718 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2719 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2720 // this HTLC accordingly
2721 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2724 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2725 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2726 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2727 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2730 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2731 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2732 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2733 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2734 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2735 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2740 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2742 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2743 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2744 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2745 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2746 // the update upon reconnection.
2747 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2751 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2753 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2754 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2755 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2756 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2758 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2759 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2762 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2765 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2766 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2770 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2771 /// updates are partially paused.
2772 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2773 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2774 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2775 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2776 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2777 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2778 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2779 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2780 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2781 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2782 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2783 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2784 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2787 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2788 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2789 /// to the remote side.
2790 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2791 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2792 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2794 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
2795 self.funding_transaction.take()
2798 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
2799 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
2800 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
2801 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
2802 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
2803 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2804 assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
2805 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2806 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2807 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2808 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2809 next_per_commitment_point,
2813 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2814 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2815 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2816 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2818 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2819 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2820 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2821 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
2824 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2825 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2827 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2828 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2831 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2832 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2833 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2834 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2835 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
2836 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2837 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2838 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2839 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
2842 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2843 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2845 if self.is_outbound() {
2846 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2848 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2849 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2851 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2852 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2853 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2857 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2858 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2859 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2860 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2861 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2862 per_commitment_secret,
2863 next_per_commitment_point,
2867 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2868 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2869 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2870 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2871 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2873 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2874 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2875 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2876 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2877 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2878 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2879 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2880 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2881 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2886 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2887 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2889 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2890 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2891 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2892 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2893 reason: err_packet.clone()
2896 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2897 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2898 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2899 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2900 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2901 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2904 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2905 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2906 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2907 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2908 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2915 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2916 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2917 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2918 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2920 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2924 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2925 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2926 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2927 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2928 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2929 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2930 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2931 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2934 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2935 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2939 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2940 match msg.data_loss_protect {
2941 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2942 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2943 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2944 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2945 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2946 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2948 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2949 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2950 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2954 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2958 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2959 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2960 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2962 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2963 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2964 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2965 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2969 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2970 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2971 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2972 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2973 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2974 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2976 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2977 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2980 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2981 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2982 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2983 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2984 next_per_commitment_point,
2985 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2988 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2989 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2990 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2992 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2993 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2994 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2997 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3000 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3003 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3004 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3005 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3006 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3007 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3009 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3010 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3011 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3012 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3013 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3014 next_per_commitment_point,
3018 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3019 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3020 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3022 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3025 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3026 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3027 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
3028 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3029 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
3030 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
3034 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3035 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3036 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3038 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3039 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3040 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3041 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3042 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3043 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3044 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3045 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3047 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3048 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3049 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3050 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3051 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3055 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3057 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3058 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3059 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3061 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3064 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3065 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3066 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3069 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3071 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3075 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3076 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3078 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3079 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3080 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3084 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3085 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3086 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3088 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3089 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3091 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3092 let sig = self.holder_signer
3093 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3095 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3096 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3098 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3099 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3100 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3101 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3102 signature: sig.unwrap(),
3106 pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3107 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3109 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3112 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3113 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3114 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3115 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3116 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3118 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3119 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3120 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3123 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3125 if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
3126 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3129 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3130 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3131 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3134 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3137 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3139 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3140 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3142 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3143 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3144 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3145 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3146 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3147 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3149 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3150 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3156 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3157 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3158 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3160 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3163 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3164 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3165 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3169 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3170 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3172 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3175 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3176 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3177 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3178 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3180 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3182 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3183 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3184 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3185 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3186 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3188 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3189 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3191 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3192 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3194 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3197 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3198 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3200 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3201 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3203 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3206 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3207 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3209 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3213 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3214 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3215 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3216 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3218 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3220 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3223 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3224 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3225 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3226 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3227 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3231 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3232 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3233 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3234 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3235 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3236 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3237 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3238 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3239 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3240 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3241 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3245 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3246 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3247 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3248 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3249 let sig = self.holder_signer
3250 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3251 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3252 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3253 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3254 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3255 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3256 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3262 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3263 if self.is_outbound() {
3264 let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3265 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3266 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3267 if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3271 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3274 min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3276 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3277 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3278 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3282 propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3285 let sig = self.holder_signer
3286 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3287 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3288 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3289 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3290 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3292 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3293 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3295 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3296 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3297 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3299 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3302 // Public utilities:
3304 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3308 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3309 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3310 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3314 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3315 /// is_usable() returns true).
3316 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3317 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3318 self.short_channel_id
3321 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3322 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3323 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3324 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3327 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3328 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3331 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3332 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3335 fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3336 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3339 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3340 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3343 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3344 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3345 self.counterparty_node_id
3348 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3350 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3351 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3354 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3355 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3357 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3358 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3359 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3360 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3362 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3366 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3367 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3368 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3371 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3372 self.channel_value_satoshis
3375 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3376 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3379 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3380 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3384 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3388 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3389 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3392 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3393 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3396 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3397 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3401 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3406 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3408 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3409 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3410 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3411 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3412 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3413 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3415 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3417 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3425 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3426 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3430 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3431 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3432 self.update_time_counter
3435 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3436 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3439 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3440 self.config.announced_channel
3443 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3444 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3447 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3448 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3449 pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3450 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3452 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3453 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3455 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3456 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3458 if self.is_outbound() {
3459 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3460 res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3463 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3464 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3469 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3470 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3471 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3474 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3475 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3476 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3477 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3478 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3481 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3482 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3483 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3484 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3485 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3488 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3489 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3490 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3491 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3494 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3495 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3496 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3499 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3500 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3501 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3502 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3503 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3504 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3509 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
3510 self.channel_update_status
3513 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
3514 self.channel_update_status = status;
3517 fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3518 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3522 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3523 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3524 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3527 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 {
3531 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3532 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3533 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3535 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3536 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3537 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3539 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3540 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3542 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3543 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3545 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3549 if need_commitment_update {
3550 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3551 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3552 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3553 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3554 next_per_commitment_point,
3557 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3563 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
3564 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
3565 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
3566 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
3567 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3568 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3569 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3570 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3571 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
3572 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
3573 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3574 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3575 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3576 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3577 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3578 if self.is_outbound() {
3579 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3580 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3581 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3582 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3583 // channel and move on.
3584 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3585 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3587 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3588 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3589 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3590 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
3593 if self.is_outbound() {
3594 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3595 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3596 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3597 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3598 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3599 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3603 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
3604 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
3605 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3606 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3607 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3611 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
3612 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
3613 // may have already happened for this block).
3614 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3615 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
3618 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3619 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3620 log_trace!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3621 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3622 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3623 data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
3632 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
3633 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
3634 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3635 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3637 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3638 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3641 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3643 pub fn best_block_updated(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3644 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3645 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
3646 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3648 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3649 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
3650 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3658 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
3660 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3661 return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
3664 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3665 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
3666 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
3667 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3668 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3669 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
3670 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
3671 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
3672 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
3675 // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
3676 // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
3677 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
3678 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
3679 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 / 2 {
3680 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3681 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3682 data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth, funding_tx_confirmations),
3687 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3690 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
3691 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
3692 /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
3693 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&mut self) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3694 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
3695 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
3696 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
3697 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
3698 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
3699 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
3700 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
3701 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
3702 match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time) {
3703 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
3704 assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
3705 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
3711 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
3716 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3717 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3719 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3720 if !self.is_outbound() {
3721 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3723 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3724 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3727 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3728 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3731 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3732 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3736 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3737 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3738 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3739 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3740 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3741 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3742 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3743 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3744 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3745 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3746 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3747 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3748 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3749 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3750 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3751 first_per_commitment_point,
3752 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3753 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3757 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3758 if self.is_outbound() {
3759 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3761 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3762 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3764 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3765 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3768 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3769 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3771 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3772 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3773 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3774 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3775 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3776 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3777 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3778 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3779 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3780 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3781 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3782 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3783 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3784 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3785 first_per_commitment_point,
3786 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3790 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3791 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3792 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3793 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3794 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3795 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3798 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3799 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3800 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3801 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3802 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3803 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3804 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3805 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3806 if !self.is_outbound() {
3807 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3809 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3810 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3812 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3813 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3814 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3815 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3818 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3819 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3821 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3824 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3825 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3830 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3832 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3834 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3835 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3836 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
3838 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3839 temporary_channel_id,
3840 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3841 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3846 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3847 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3848 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3849 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3850 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3852 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3853 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3855 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
3856 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3857 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3858 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3860 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3861 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3863 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3864 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3867 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3869 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3870 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3872 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3873 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3874 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3875 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3876 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3877 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3880 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3881 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3886 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
3888 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
3889 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
3890 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
3892 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
3893 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3894 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
3895 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
3896 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
3897 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3898 contents: announcement,
3901 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
3905 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
3906 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
3907 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
3908 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
3909 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
3911 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3913 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
3914 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
3915 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
3916 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
3918 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
3919 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
3920 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
3921 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
3924 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
3926 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
3929 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
3930 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
3931 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
3932 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
3934 Err(_) => return None,
3936 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3937 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
3938 Ok(res) => Some(res),
3943 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3944 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3945 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3946 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3947 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3948 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3949 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3950 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3951 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3952 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3953 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3954 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3955 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3956 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3957 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3958 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3959 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3960 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3961 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3964 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3965 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3966 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3967 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3970 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3971 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3972 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3973 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3974 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3975 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3976 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3977 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3979 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3980 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3981 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3982 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3983 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3984 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3985 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3986 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3987 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3989 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3995 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3997 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3998 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3999 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
4000 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
4001 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
4002 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
4003 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
4004 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
4005 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4006 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
4008 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
4009 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
4010 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
4013 if amount_msat == 0 {
4014 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4017 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4018 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4021 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4022 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4023 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4024 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4025 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4026 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4027 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4028 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
4031 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4032 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4033 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4035 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4036 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4037 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4040 if !self.is_outbound() {
4041 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4042 let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
4043 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
4044 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4045 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4046 if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4047 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4051 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
4052 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
4053 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
4056 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4057 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4058 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4059 2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4061 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4062 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4065 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4066 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4067 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4068 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4069 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4072 // Now update local state:
4073 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4074 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4079 onion_routing_packet,
4084 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4085 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4087 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4089 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4093 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4094 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4095 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4099 onion_routing_packet,
4101 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4106 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4107 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4108 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4109 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4110 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4111 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4112 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4114 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4115 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4117 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4118 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4120 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4121 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4123 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4124 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4125 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4126 have_updates = true;
4128 if have_updates { break; }
4130 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4131 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4132 have_updates = true;
4134 if have_updates { break; }
4137 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4139 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4141 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4142 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4143 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4144 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4146 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4147 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4148 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4150 if let Some(state) = new_state {
4154 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4155 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4156 Some(fail_reason.take())
4158 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4161 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4163 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4164 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4165 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4166 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4167 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4168 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4170 Err(e) => return Err(e),
4173 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4174 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4175 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4176 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4177 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4178 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4179 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4180 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4183 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4184 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4187 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4188 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4189 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4190 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4191 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4192 if self.is_outbound() {
4193 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4197 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4198 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4199 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4200 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4202 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4204 if !self.is_outbound() {
4205 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4206 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4207 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4208 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4209 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4210 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4211 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4212 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4213 let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4214 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4221 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4222 for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4226 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4227 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4229 htlc_signatures = res.1;
4231 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}",
4232 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4233 &counterparty_commitment_txid,
4234 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4235 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
4237 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4238 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
4239 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4240 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4241 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4242 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
4246 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4247 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4250 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4253 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4254 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4255 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4257 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4258 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4259 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4260 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4261 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4267 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4268 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4269 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4272 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4273 let usable_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
4274 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= usable_channel_value_msat {
4275 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4277 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4278 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4279 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4280 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4286 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4287 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4288 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4289 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4290 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4291 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4294 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4295 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4296 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4298 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4299 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4302 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4303 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4304 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4307 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4309 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4310 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4311 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4313 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4315 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4317 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4318 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4319 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4320 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4321 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4323 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4324 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4331 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4332 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4333 scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4334 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4337 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4338 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4339 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4340 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4341 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4342 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4343 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4344 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4345 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4346 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4347 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4349 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4350 // return them to fail the payment.
4351 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4352 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4354 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4355 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4360 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4361 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4362 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4363 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4364 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4365 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4366 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4367 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4368 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4369 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4370 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4371 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4372 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4377 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4378 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4379 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4383 fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
4384 // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
4386 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
4387 // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
4388 // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
4389 let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
4390 if is_script_too_long {
4394 if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
4398 return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
4401 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4402 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4404 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4405 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4407 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4409 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4411 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4413 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4414 err_code.write(writer)?;
4416 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4418 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4425 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4426 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4427 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4428 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4429 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4430 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4431 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4436 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4437 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4438 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4439 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4440 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4442 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4443 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4444 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4445 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4451 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4452 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4453 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4454 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4455 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4456 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4461 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4462 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4463 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4464 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4466 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4468 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4469 self.config.write(writer)?;
4471 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4472 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4473 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4475 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4477 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4478 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4479 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
4480 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
4481 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4482 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4484 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4485 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4487 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4488 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4489 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4491 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4492 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4493 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4494 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4497 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4498 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4499 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4502 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4503 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4504 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4505 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4507 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4508 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4510 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4512 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4514 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4516 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4519 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4521 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4526 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4527 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4528 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4529 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4530 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4531 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4532 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4534 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4536 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4538 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4541 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4543 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4545 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4547 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4549 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4551 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4556 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4557 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4559 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4561 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4562 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4563 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4564 source.write(writer)?;
4565 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4567 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4569 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4570 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4572 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4574 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4575 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4580 match self.resend_order {
4581 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4582 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4585 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4586 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4587 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4589 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4590 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4591 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4592 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4595 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4596 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4597 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4598 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4599 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4602 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4603 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4605 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4606 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4607 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4608 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4610 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4611 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4613 feerate.write(writer)?;
4617 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4620 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4621 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
4622 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4624 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4625 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4626 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4627 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4628 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4629 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4630 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4631 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4633 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4636 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4637 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4638 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4640 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4643 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4644 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
4646 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4647 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4648 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4650 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4652 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4654 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
4656 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {(0, self.announcement_sigs)});
4662 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4663 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4664 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4665 fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4666 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4668 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4669 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4671 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4672 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4673 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4675 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4677 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4678 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4679 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4680 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4681 let mut data = [0; 1024];
4682 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4683 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4684 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4686 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4688 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4689 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4691 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4692 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4693 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4695 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4696 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4697 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4698 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4699 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4700 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4701 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4702 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4703 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4704 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4705 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4706 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4707 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4708 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4713 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4714 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4715 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4716 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4717 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4718 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4719 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4720 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4721 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4722 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4723 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4724 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4725 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4726 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4727 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4728 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4733 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4734 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4735 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4736 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4737 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4738 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4739 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4740 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4741 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4742 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4744 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4745 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4746 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4748 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4749 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4750 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4752 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4756 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4757 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4758 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4759 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4762 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4763 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4764 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4766 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4767 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4768 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4769 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4772 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4773 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4774 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4775 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4778 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4779 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4781 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4782 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4783 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4784 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4786 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4788 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4789 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4792 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4793 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
4794 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4796 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4797 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4798 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4799 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4800 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4801 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4802 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4803 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4805 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4807 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4808 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4809 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
4810 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
4812 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4815 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4816 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
4818 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4820 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4821 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4823 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4824 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4826 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
4828 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
4829 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {(0, announcement_sigs)});
4831 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4832 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
4841 channel_value_satoshis,
4843 latest_monitor_update_id,
4849 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4850 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4853 pending_inbound_htlcs,
4854 pending_outbound_htlcs,
4855 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4859 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4860 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4861 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4862 monitor_pending_forwards,
4863 monitor_pending_failures,
4866 holding_cell_update_fee,
4867 next_holder_htlc_id,
4868 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4869 update_time_counter,
4872 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4873 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4874 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4875 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4877 last_sent_closing_fee,
4879 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4880 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
4883 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4884 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4885 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4886 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4887 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4888 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4889 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4892 counterparty_forwarding_info,
4894 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4895 funding_transaction,
4897 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4898 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4899 counterparty_node_id,
4901 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4905 channel_update_status,
4909 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4910 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4911 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4912 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4919 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4920 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4921 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4922 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4923 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4924 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4925 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4926 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4928 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4929 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, HTLCSource};
4930 use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
4931 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4932 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4933 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
4935 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
4936 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4937 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
4938 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4939 use util::config::UserConfig;
4940 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
4941 use util::test_utils;
4942 use util::logger::Logger;
4943 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4944 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
4945 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4946 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
4947 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4948 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4949 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4952 struct TestFeeEstimator {
4955 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4956 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4962 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4963 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4964 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4968 signer: InMemorySigner,
4970 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4971 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
4973 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4974 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4975 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4976 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4977 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4978 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4981 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4982 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4983 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4984 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4987 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
4990 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4991 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
4992 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
4995 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4996 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4999 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
5000 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
5002 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
5003 let original_fee = 253;
5004 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
5005 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5006 let seed = [42; 32];
5007 let network = Network::Testnet;
5008 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5010 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5011 let config = UserConfig::default();
5012 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5014 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
5015 // same as the old fee.
5016 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
5017 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5018 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
5022 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
5023 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
5024 // dust limits are used.
5025 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5026 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5027 let seed = [42; 32];
5028 let network = Network::Testnet;
5029 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5031 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
5032 // they have different dust limits.
5034 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5035 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5036 let config = UserConfig::default();
5037 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5039 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5040 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
5041 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5042 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5043 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5045 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
5046 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5047 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5048 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5049 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
5051 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
5052 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
5053 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5055 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
5056 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
5057 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
5058 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5061 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5063 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
5064 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
5065 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
5066 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5067 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5069 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5070 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5074 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5075 // the dust limit check.
5076 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5077 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5078 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5079 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5081 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5082 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5083 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5084 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5085 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5086 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5087 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5091 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5092 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5093 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5094 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5095 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5096 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5097 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5098 let seed = [42; 32];
5099 let network = Network::Testnet;
5100 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5102 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5103 let config = UserConfig::default();
5104 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5106 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5107 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5109 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5110 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5111 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5112 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5113 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5114 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5116 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5117 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5118 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5119 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5120 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5122 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5124 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5125 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5126 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5127 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5128 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5130 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5131 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5132 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5133 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5134 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5138 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5139 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5140 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5141 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5142 let seed = [42; 32];
5143 let network = Network::Testnet;
5144 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5145 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5146 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5148 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5150 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5151 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5152 let config = UserConfig::default();
5153 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5155 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5156 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5157 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5158 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5160 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5161 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5162 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5164 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5165 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5166 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5167 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5169 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5170 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5171 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5173 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5174 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5176 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5177 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5178 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5179 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5180 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5181 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5182 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5183 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5184 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5189 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5191 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5192 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5193 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5194 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5195 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5196 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5197 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5204 fn channel_update() {
5205 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5206 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5207 let seed = [42; 32];
5208 let network = Network::Testnet;
5209 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5210 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5212 // Create a channel.
5213 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5214 let config = UserConfig::default();
5215 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5216 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5217 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5218 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5220 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5221 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5222 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5224 short_channel_id: 0,
5227 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5228 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5229 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5231 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5232 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5234 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5236 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5238 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5239 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5240 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5241 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5243 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5244 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5245 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5247 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5252 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5253 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5254 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5255 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5256 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5258 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5260 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5261 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5262 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5263 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5264 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5266 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5267 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5272 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5273 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5274 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5276 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5277 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5278 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5279 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5280 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5282 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5284 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5285 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5286 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5287 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5288 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5289 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5291 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5292 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5293 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5294 selected_contest_delay: 144
5296 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5297 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5299 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5300 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5302 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5303 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5305 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5306 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5308 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5309 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5310 // build_commitment_transaction.
5311 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5312 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5313 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5314 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5315 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5317 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5318 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5319 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5321 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5322 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5324 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5325 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5329 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5330 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5331 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5332 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5333 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5334 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5336 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5337 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5338 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5339 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5341 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5342 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5343 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5345 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5347 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5348 commitment_tx.clone(),
5349 counterparty_signature,
5350 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5351 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5352 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5354 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5355 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5357 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5358 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5359 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5361 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5362 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5365 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5367 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5368 let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
5369 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5370 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5371 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5373 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5376 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5377 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5378 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5382 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5385 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5386 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5388 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5389 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5390 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5391 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5392 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5393 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5394 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5396 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5400 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5401 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5403 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5404 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5405 "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", {});
5407 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5408 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5410 amount_msat: 1000000,
5412 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5413 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5415 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5418 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5419 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5421 amount_msat: 2000000,
5423 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5424 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5426 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5429 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5430 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5432 amount_msat: 2000000,
5434 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5435 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5436 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5438 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5441 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5442 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5444 amount_msat: 3000000,
5446 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5447 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5448 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5450 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5453 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5454 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5456 amount_msat: 4000000,
5458 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5459 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5461 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5465 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5466 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5467 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5469 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5470 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5471 "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", {
5474 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5475 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5476 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b00000000000000000001e8030000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b014730440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
5479 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5480 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5481 "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" },
5484 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5485 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5486 "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" },
5489 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5490 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5491 "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" },
5494 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5495 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5496 "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" }
5499 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5500 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5501 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5503 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5504 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5505 "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", {
5508 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5509 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5510 "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" },
5513 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5514 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5515 "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" },
5518 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5519 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5520 "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" },
5523 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5524 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5525 "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" },
5528 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5529 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5530 "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" }
5533 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5534 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5535 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5537 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5538 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5539 "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", {
5542 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5543 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5544 "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" },
5547 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5548 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5549 "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" },
5552 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5553 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5554 "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" },
5557 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5558 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5559 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be01483045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5562 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5563 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5564 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5566 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5567 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5568 "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", {
5571 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5572 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5573 "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" },
5576 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5577 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5578 "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" },
5581 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5582 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5583 "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" },
5586 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5587 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5588 "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" }
5591 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5592 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5593 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5595 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5596 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5597 "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", {
5600 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5601 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5602 "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" },
5605 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5606 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5607 "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" },
5610 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5611 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5612 "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" }
5615 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5616 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5617 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5619 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5620 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5621 "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", {
5624 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5625 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5626 "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" },
5629 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5630 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5631 "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" },
5634 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5635 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5636 "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" }
5639 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5640 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5641 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5643 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5644 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5645 "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", {
5648 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5649 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5650 "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" },
5653 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5654 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5655 "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" }
5658 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5659 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5660 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5662 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5663 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5664 "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", {
5667 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5668 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5669 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5672 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5673 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5674 "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" }
5677 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5678 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5679 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5681 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5682 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5683 "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", {
5686 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5687 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5688 "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" }
5691 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5692 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5693 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5695 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5696 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5697 "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", {
5700 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5701 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5702 "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" }
5705 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5706 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5707 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5709 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5710 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5711 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5713 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5714 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5715 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5717 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5718 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5719 "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", {});
5721 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5722 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5723 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5725 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5726 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5727 "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", {});
5729 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5730 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5731 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5733 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5734 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5735 "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", {});
5737 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5738 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5739 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5740 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5741 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5742 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5744 amount_msat: 2000000,
5746 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5747 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5749 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5752 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5753 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5754 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5756 amount_msat: 5000000,
5758 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5759 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5760 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5762 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5765 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5766 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5768 amount_msat: 5000000,
5770 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5771 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5772 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5774 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5778 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5779 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5780 "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", {
5783 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5784 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5785 "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" },
5787 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5788 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5789 "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" },
5791 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5792 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5793 "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" }
5798 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5799 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5801 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5802 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5803 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5804 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5806 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5807 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5808 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5810 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5811 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5813 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5814 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5816 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5817 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5818 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5822 fn test_key_derivation() {
5823 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5824 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5826 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5827 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5829 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5830 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5832 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5833 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5835 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5836 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5838 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5839 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5841 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5842 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5844 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5845 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());