1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
57 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
58 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
65 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
68 pub struct AvailableBalances {
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
75 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
76 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
79 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
81 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
83 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
84 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
85 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
86 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
87 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
88 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
90 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
94 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
95 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
96 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
97 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
100 enum InboundHTLCState {
101 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
102 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
103 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
104 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
105 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
106 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
107 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
108 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
109 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
110 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
111 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
112 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
113 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
114 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
115 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
117 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
118 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
121 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
122 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
123 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
124 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
125 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
126 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
127 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
128 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
129 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
130 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
132 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
133 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
134 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
135 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
136 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
137 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
138 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
142 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
144 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
145 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
146 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
147 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
148 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
149 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
150 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
151 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
154 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
158 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
159 state: InboundHTLCState,
162 enum OutboundHTLCState {
163 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
164 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
165 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
166 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
167 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
168 /// money back (though we won't), and,
169 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
170 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
171 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
172 /// we'll never get out of sync).
173 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
174 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
175 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
177 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
178 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
179 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
180 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
181 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
182 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
183 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
184 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
185 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
186 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
187 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
188 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
189 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
190 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
191 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
195 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
196 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
197 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
198 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
201 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
202 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
204 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
205 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
210 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
219 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
223 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
224 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
239 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
242 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
247 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
251 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
252 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
253 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
254 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
255 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
256 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
257 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
259 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
260 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
261 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
262 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
263 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
264 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
265 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
267 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
268 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
269 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
271 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
272 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
273 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
278 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
279 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
281 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
282 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
283 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
284 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
285 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
286 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
287 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
288 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
289 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
291 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
292 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
293 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
294 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
295 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
296 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
297 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
298 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
299 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
300 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
301 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
302 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
304 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
305 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
307 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
309 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
311 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
312 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
314 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
318 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
320 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
322 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
324 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
325 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
326 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
327 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
328 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
330 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
331 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
333 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
335 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
336 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
338 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
339 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
340 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
341 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
342 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
343 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
345 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
346 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
348 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
349 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
350 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
351 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
352 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
354 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
355 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
357 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
358 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
360 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
361 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
362 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
363 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
369 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
370 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
372 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
373 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
379 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
380 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
382 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
383 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
389 macro_rules! secp_check {
390 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
393 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
398 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
399 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
400 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
401 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
402 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
403 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
404 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
405 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
407 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
409 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
411 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
415 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
417 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
418 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
419 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
421 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
422 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
424 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
425 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
426 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
427 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
428 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
430 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
431 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
435 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
441 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
444 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
445 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
446 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 holding_cell_msat: u64,
448 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
451 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
452 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
453 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
454 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
455 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
456 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
457 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
458 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
459 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
463 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
464 struct HTLCCandidate {
466 origin: HTLCInitiator,
470 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
478 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
480 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
482 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
483 htlc_value_msat: u64,
484 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
489 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
490 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
491 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
492 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
493 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
495 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
496 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
497 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
498 htlc_value_msat: u64,
500 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
501 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
505 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
506 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
507 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
508 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
509 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
510 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
511 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
512 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
513 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
514 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
515 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
518 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
519 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
520 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
521 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
522 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
523 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
524 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
525 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
528 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
531 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
532 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
533 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
534 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
535 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>
538 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
539 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
540 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
541 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
542 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
543 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
544 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
545 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
546 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
547 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
548 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
549 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
550 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
552 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
554 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
555 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
556 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
557 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
559 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
560 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
561 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
562 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
564 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
565 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
566 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
567 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
568 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
570 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
571 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
572 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
573 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
575 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
576 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
577 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
579 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
580 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
581 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
582 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
583 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
585 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
586 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
589 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
590 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
592 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
593 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
594 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
595 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
597 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
598 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
600 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
601 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
604 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
605 (0, update, required),
608 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
609 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
610 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
611 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
612 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
614 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
615 /// in a timely manner.
616 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
619 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
620 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
621 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
623 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
624 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
625 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
626 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
630 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
631 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
632 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
634 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
635 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
636 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
637 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
639 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
643 /// The current channel ID.
644 channel_id: ChannelId,
645 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
646 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
647 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
650 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
651 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
653 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
654 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
655 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
657 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
658 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
659 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
660 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
662 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
663 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
665 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
667 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
668 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
669 destination_script: Script,
671 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
672 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
673 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
675 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
676 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
677 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
678 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
679 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
680 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
682 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
683 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
684 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
685 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
686 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
687 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
689 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
691 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
692 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
693 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
695 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
696 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
697 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
698 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
699 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
700 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
701 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
703 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
704 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
705 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
707 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
708 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
709 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
711 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
713 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
714 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
715 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
716 // HTLCs with similar state.
717 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
718 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
719 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
720 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
721 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
722 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
723 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
724 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
725 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
728 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
729 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
730 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
732 update_time_counter: u32,
734 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
735 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
736 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
737 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
738 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
739 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
741 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
742 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
744 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
745 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
746 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
747 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
749 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
750 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
752 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
754 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
756 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
757 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
758 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
759 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
760 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
761 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
762 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
763 channel_creation_height: u32,
765 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
768 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
770 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
773 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
775 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
778 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
780 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
782 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
783 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
786 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
788 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
790 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
791 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
793 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
795 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
796 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
797 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
799 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
801 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
802 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
804 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
805 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
806 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
808 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
810 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
812 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
813 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
814 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
815 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
817 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
818 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
819 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
821 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
822 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
823 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
825 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
826 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
827 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
828 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
829 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
830 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
831 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
832 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
834 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
835 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
836 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
837 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
838 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
840 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
841 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
843 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
844 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
845 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
846 /// unblock the state machine.
848 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
849 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
850 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
852 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
853 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
854 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
856 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
857 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
858 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
859 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
860 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
861 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
862 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
863 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
865 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
866 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
868 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
869 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
870 // the channel's funding UTXO.
872 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
873 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
874 // associated channel mapping.
876 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
877 // to store all of them.
878 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
880 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
881 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
882 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
883 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
884 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
886 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
887 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
889 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
890 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
892 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
893 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
894 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
896 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
897 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
898 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
901 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
902 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
903 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
904 self.update_time_counter
907 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
908 self.latest_monitor_update_id
911 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
912 self.config.announced_channel
915 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
916 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
919 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
920 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
921 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
922 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
925 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
926 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
927 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
930 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
931 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
932 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
933 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
934 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
937 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
938 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
939 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
940 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
942 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
943 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
945 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
946 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
948 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
949 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
951 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
954 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
955 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
956 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
957 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
959 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
960 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
961 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
962 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
965 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
966 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
967 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
968 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
969 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
974 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
978 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
980 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
981 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
982 self.temporary_channel_id
985 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
989 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
990 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
991 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
995 /// Gets the channel's type
996 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1000 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1002 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1003 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1004 self.short_channel_id
1007 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1008 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1009 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1012 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1013 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1014 self.outbound_scid_alias
1017 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1018 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1019 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1020 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1021 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1022 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1025 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1026 /// get_funding_created.
1027 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1028 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1031 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1032 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1033 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1036 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1037 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1038 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1039 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1043 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1046 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1047 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1050 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1051 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1054 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1055 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1056 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1059 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1060 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1063 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1064 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1065 self.counterparty_node_id
1068 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1069 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1070 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1073 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1074 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1075 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1078 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1079 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1081 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1082 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1083 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1084 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1086 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1090 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1091 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1092 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1095 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1096 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1097 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1100 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1101 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1102 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1104 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1105 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1110 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1111 self.channel_value_satoshis
1114 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1115 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1118 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1119 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1122 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1123 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1124 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1126 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1127 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1128 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1129 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1130 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1132 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1136 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1137 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1138 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1141 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1142 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1143 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1146 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1147 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1148 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1151 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1152 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1153 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1156 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1157 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1158 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1161 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1162 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1163 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1166 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1167 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1168 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1169 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1170 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1173 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1175 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1176 self.prev_config = None;
1180 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1181 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1185 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1186 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1187 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1188 let did_channel_update =
1189 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1190 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1191 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1192 if did_channel_update {
1193 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1194 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1195 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1196 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1198 self.config.options = *config;
1202 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1203 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1204 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1207 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1208 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1209 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1210 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1211 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1213 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1214 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1215 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1216 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1217 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1218 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1219 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1221 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1222 where L::Target: Logger
1224 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1225 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1226 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1228 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1229 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1230 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1231 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1233 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1234 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1235 if match update_state {
1236 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1237 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1238 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1239 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1240 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1242 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1246 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1247 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1248 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1250 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1252 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1253 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1254 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1256 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1257 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1258 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1259 transaction_output_index: None
1264 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1265 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1266 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1267 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1268 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1271 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1273 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1274 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1275 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1277 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1278 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1281 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1282 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1285 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1287 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1288 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1289 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1291 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1292 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1298 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1299 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1300 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1301 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1302 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1303 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1304 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1308 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1309 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1311 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1313 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1314 if generated_by_local {
1315 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1316 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1325 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1327 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1328 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1329 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1330 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1331 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1332 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1333 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1336 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1337 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1338 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1339 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1343 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1344 preimages.push(preimage);
1348 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1349 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1351 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1353 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1354 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1356 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1357 if !generated_by_local {
1358 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1366 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1367 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1368 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1369 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1370 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1371 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1372 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1373 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1375 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1377 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1378 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1379 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1380 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1382 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1384 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1385 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1386 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1387 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1390 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1391 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1392 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1393 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1395 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1398 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1399 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1400 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1401 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1403 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1406 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1407 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1412 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1413 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1418 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1420 let channel_parameters =
1421 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1422 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1423 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1430 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1433 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1434 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1435 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1436 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1438 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1439 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1440 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1448 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1449 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1455 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1456 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1457 /// our counterparty!)
1458 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1459 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1460 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1461 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1462 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1463 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1464 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1466 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1470 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1471 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1472 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1473 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1474 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1475 //may see payments to it!
1476 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1477 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1478 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1480 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1483 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1484 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1485 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1486 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1487 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1490 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1491 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1494 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1498 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1499 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1500 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1501 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1502 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1503 // which are near the dust limit.
1504 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1505 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1506 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1507 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1508 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1510 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1511 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1513 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1516 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1517 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1518 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1521 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1522 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1524 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1525 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1526 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1527 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1528 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1529 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1530 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1533 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1536 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1537 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1538 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1540 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1541 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1542 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1543 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1544 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1545 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1547 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1548 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1554 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1555 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1557 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1558 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1559 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1560 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1561 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1562 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1563 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1566 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1569 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1570 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1571 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1573 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1574 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1575 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1576 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1577 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1578 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1580 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1581 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1585 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1586 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1587 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1588 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1589 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1590 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1591 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1593 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1594 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1596 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1603 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1604 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1605 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1606 /// corner case properly.
1607 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1608 -> AvailableBalances
1609 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1611 let context = &self;
1612 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1613 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1614 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1616 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1617 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1619 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1621 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1623 if context.is_outbound() {
1624 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1625 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1627 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1628 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1630 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1631 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1632 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1633 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1636 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1637 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1638 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1639 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1641 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1642 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1643 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1644 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1645 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1646 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1647 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1648 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1649 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1650 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1652 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1655 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1656 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1657 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1658 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1659 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1662 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1663 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1665 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1666 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1667 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1669 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1670 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1671 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1672 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1676 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1678 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1679 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1680 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1681 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1682 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1683 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1684 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1686 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1687 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1689 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1690 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1691 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1693 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1694 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1695 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1696 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1697 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1700 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1701 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1702 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1703 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1704 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1705 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1708 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1709 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1710 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1712 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1716 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1717 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1719 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1720 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1724 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1725 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1726 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1727 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1729 outbound_capacity_msat,
1730 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1731 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1735 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1736 let context = &self;
1737 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1740 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1741 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1743 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1744 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1746 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1747 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1749 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1750 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1751 let context = &self;
1752 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1754 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1757 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1758 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1760 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1761 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1763 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1764 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1766 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1767 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1771 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1772 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1778 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1779 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1780 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1783 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1784 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1785 included_htlcs += 1;
1788 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1789 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1793 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1794 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1795 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1796 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1797 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1798 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1803 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1805 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1806 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1811 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1812 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1816 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1817 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1818 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1821 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1822 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1824 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1825 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1826 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1828 total_pending_htlcs,
1829 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1830 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1831 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1833 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1834 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1835 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1837 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1839 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1844 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1845 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1847 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1848 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1850 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1851 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1853 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1854 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1855 let context = &self;
1856 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1858 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1861 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1862 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1864 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1865 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1867 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1868 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1870 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1871 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1875 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1876 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1882 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1883 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1884 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1885 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1886 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1887 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1890 included_htlcs += 1;
1893 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1894 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1897 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1898 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1900 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1901 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1902 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1907 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1908 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1909 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1912 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1913 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1915 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1916 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1918 total_pending_htlcs,
1919 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1920 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1921 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1923 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1924 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1925 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1927 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1929 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1934 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1935 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1936 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1937 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1943 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1944 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1945 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1946 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1947 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1948 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1949 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1950 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1951 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1952 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1953 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1955 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1956 // return them to fail the payment.
1957 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1958 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1959 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1961 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1962 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1967 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1968 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1969 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1970 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1971 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1972 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1973 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1974 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1975 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1976 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1977 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1978 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1979 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1984 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1985 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1986 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1990 // Internal utility functions for channels
1992 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1993 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1994 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1996 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1998 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1999 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2000 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2002 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2005 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2007 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2010 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2011 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2012 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2014 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2016 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2017 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2018 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2019 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2020 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2023 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2024 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2025 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2026 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2027 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2028 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2029 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2032 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2033 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2035 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2036 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2039 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2040 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2041 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2042 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2043 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2044 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2047 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2048 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2049 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_funding_signed on an
2052 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2053 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2054 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2055 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2058 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2059 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2061 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2062 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2063 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2067 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2068 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2069 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2071 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2072 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2073 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2074 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2076 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2077 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2078 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2079 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2080 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2081 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2082 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2083 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2084 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2085 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2086 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2090 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2091 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2092 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2093 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2094 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2095 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2097 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2099 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2100 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2101 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2102 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2103 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2104 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2105 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2106 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2108 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2109 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2113 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2119 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2120 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2121 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2122 // outside of those situations will fail.
2123 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2127 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2132 1 + // script length (0)
2136 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2137 2 + // witness marker and flag
2138 1 + // witness element count
2139 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2140 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2141 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2142 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2143 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2144 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2146 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2147 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2148 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2154 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2155 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2156 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2157 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2159 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2160 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2161 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2163 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2164 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2165 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2166 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2167 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2168 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2171 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2172 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2175 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2176 value_to_holder = 0;
2179 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2180 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2181 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2182 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2184 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2185 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2188 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2189 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2192 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2195 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2196 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2198 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2200 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2201 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2202 where L::Target: Logger {
2203 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2204 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2205 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2206 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2207 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2208 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2209 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2210 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2214 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2215 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2216 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2217 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2219 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2220 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2222 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2224 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2225 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2226 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2228 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2229 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2230 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2231 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2232 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2233 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2234 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2236 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2237 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2238 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2240 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2241 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2243 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2246 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2247 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2251 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2255 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2256 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2257 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2258 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2259 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2260 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2263 // Now update local state:
2265 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2266 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2267 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2268 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2269 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2270 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2271 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2275 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2276 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2277 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2278 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2279 // do not not get into this branch.
2280 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2281 match pending_update {
2282 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2283 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2284 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2285 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2286 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2287 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2288 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2291 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2292 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2293 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2294 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2295 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2296 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2297 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2303 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2304 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2305 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2307 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2308 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2309 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2311 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2312 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2315 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2316 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2318 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2319 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2321 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2322 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2325 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2328 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2329 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2330 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2331 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2336 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2337 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2338 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2339 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2340 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2341 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2342 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2343 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2344 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2345 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2346 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2347 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2348 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2349 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2350 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2352 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2353 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2354 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2355 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2356 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2359 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2360 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2361 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2367 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2368 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2370 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2374 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2375 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2376 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2377 /// before we fail backwards.
2379 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2380 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2381 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2382 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2383 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2384 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2385 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2388 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2389 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2390 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2391 /// before we fail backwards.
2393 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2394 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2395 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2396 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2397 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2398 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2399 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2401 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2403 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2404 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2405 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2407 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2408 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2409 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2411 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2412 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2413 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2415 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2420 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2421 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2427 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2428 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2429 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2430 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2431 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2435 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2436 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2437 force_holding_cell = true;
2440 // Now update local state:
2441 if force_holding_cell {
2442 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2443 match pending_update {
2444 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2445 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2446 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2447 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2451 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2452 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2453 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2454 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2460 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2461 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2462 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2468 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2470 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2471 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2474 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2475 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2476 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2481 // Message handlers:
2483 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2484 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2485 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2486 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2487 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2491 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2492 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2494 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2495 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2497 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2498 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2499 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2500 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2503 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2505 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2506 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2507 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2508 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2510 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2511 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2513 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2514 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2516 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2517 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2518 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2519 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2520 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2521 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2525 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2526 initial_commitment_tx,
2529 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2530 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2533 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2534 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2537 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2538 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2539 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2540 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2541 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2542 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2543 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2544 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2545 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2546 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2547 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2548 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2550 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2552 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2553 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2554 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2555 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2556 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2557 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2558 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2560 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2561 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2562 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2563 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2565 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2567 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2568 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2572 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2573 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2575 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2576 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2577 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2578 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2580 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2583 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2584 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2585 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2588 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2589 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2590 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2591 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2592 // when routing outbound payments.
2593 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2597 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2599 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2600 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2601 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2602 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2603 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2604 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2605 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2606 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2607 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2609 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2610 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2611 let expected_point =
2612 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2613 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2615 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2616 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2617 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2618 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2619 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2620 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2622 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2623 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2624 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2625 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2626 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2628 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2629 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2633 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2636 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2637 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2639 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2641 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2644 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2645 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2646 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2647 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2648 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2649 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2651 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2652 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2653 if local_sent_shutdown {
2654 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2656 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2657 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2658 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2659 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2661 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2662 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2664 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2665 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2667 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2668 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2670 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2671 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2674 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2675 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2676 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2677 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2679 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2680 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2682 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2683 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2684 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2685 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2686 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2687 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2688 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2689 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2690 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2691 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2692 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2694 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2695 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2696 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2697 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2698 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2699 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2703 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2704 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2707 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2708 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2709 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2711 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2712 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2713 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2714 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2715 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2716 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2717 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2721 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2722 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2723 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2724 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2725 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2726 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2727 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2731 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2732 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2733 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2734 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2735 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2736 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2739 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2740 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2741 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2742 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2743 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2745 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2746 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2749 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2750 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2753 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2754 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2755 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2756 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2757 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2758 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2759 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2760 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2761 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2762 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2763 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2764 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2765 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2766 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2767 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2768 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2771 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2772 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2773 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2774 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2775 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2778 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2779 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2781 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2782 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2785 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2786 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2787 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2791 // Now update local state:
2792 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2793 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2794 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2795 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2796 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2797 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2798 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2803 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2805 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2806 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2807 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2808 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2809 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2810 None => fail_reason.into(),
2811 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2812 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2813 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2814 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2816 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2820 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2821 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2822 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2823 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2825 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2826 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2831 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2834 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2835 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2836 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2838 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2839 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2842 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2845 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2846 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2847 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2849 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2850 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2853 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2857 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2858 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2859 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2861 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2862 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2865 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2869 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2870 where L::Target: Logger
2872 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2875 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2878 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2879 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2882 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2884 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2886 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2887 let commitment_txid = {
2888 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2889 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2890 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2892 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2893 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2894 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2895 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
2896 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2897 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2901 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2903 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2904 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2905 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2906 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2909 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2910 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2911 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2912 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2915 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2917 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2918 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2919 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2920 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2921 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2922 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2923 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2924 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2925 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2926 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2927 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2933 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2934 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2937 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2938 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2939 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2940 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2941 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2942 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2943 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2944 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2945 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2946 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2947 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2948 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2949 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2952 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2953 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2954 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2955 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2956 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2957 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2958 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2960 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2961 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2962 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2963 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2964 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2965 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
2966 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2967 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2969 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2970 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2973 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2975 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2976 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2977 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2980 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2983 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2984 commitment_stats.tx,
2986 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2987 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2988 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2991 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2992 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2994 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2995 let mut need_commitment = false;
2996 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2997 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2998 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2999 need_commitment = true;
3003 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3004 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3005 Some(forward_info.clone())
3007 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3008 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3009 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3010 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3011 need_commitment = true;
3014 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3015 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3016 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3017 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3018 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3019 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3020 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3021 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3022 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3023 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3024 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3025 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3026 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3027 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3029 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3031 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3032 need_commitment = true;
3036 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3037 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3038 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3039 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3040 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3041 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3043 nondust_htlc_sources,
3047 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3048 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3049 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3050 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3052 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3053 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3054 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3055 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3056 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3057 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3058 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3059 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3060 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3061 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3062 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3063 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3064 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3065 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3067 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3068 &self.context.channel_id);
3069 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3072 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3073 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3074 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3075 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3076 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3077 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3078 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3079 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3080 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3084 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3085 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3086 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3087 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3090 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3091 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3092 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3093 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3094 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3095 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3096 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3098 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3099 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3100 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3101 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3104 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3105 /// for our counterparty.
3106 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3107 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3108 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3109 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3111 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3112 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3113 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3114 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3116 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3117 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3118 updates: Vec::new(),
3121 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3122 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3123 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3124 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3125 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3126 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3127 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3128 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3129 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3130 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3131 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3132 // to rebalance channels.
3133 match &htlc_update {
3134 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3135 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3136 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3138 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3139 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3141 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3144 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3145 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3146 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3147 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3148 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3149 // into the holding cell without ever being
3150 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3151 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3152 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3155 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3161 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3162 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3163 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3164 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3165 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3166 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3167 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3168 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3169 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3170 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3171 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3172 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3174 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3175 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3176 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3177 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3178 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3179 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3180 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3181 // for a full revocation before failing.
3182 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3183 update_fail_count += 1;
3186 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3188 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3195 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3196 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3198 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3199 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3204 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3205 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3206 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3207 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3208 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3210 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3211 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3212 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3214 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3215 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3221 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3222 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3223 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3224 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3225 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3226 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3227 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3228 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3229 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3231 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3232 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3234 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3235 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3237 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3238 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3241 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3243 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3244 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3245 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3249 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3250 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3251 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3252 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3253 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3254 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3255 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3256 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3257 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3260 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3262 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3263 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3266 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3267 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3268 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3269 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3271 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3275 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3276 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3277 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3278 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3279 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3280 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3281 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3282 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3286 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3287 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3288 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3289 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3290 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3291 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3292 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3293 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3294 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3296 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3297 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3300 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3301 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3302 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3303 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3304 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3305 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3306 let mut require_commitment = false;
3307 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3310 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3311 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3312 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3314 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3315 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3316 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3317 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3318 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3319 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3324 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3325 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3326 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3327 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3328 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3330 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3331 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3332 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3337 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3338 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3340 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3344 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3345 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3347 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3348 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3349 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3350 require_commitment = true;
3351 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3352 match forward_info {
3353 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3354 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3355 require_commitment = true;
3357 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3358 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3359 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3361 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3362 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3363 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3367 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3368 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3369 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3370 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3376 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3377 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3378 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3379 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3381 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3382 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3383 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3384 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3385 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3386 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3387 require_commitment = true;
3391 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3393 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3394 match update_state {
3395 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3396 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3397 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3398 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3399 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3401 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3402 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3403 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3404 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3405 require_commitment = true;
3406 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3407 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3412 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3413 let release_state_str =
3414 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3415 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3416 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3417 if !release_monitor {
3418 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3419 update: monitor_update,
3421 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3423 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3428 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3429 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3430 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3431 if require_commitment {
3432 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3433 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3434 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3435 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3437 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3438 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3439 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3440 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3441 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3443 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3444 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3445 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3446 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3447 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3450 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3451 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3452 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3453 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3454 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3455 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3457 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3458 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3460 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3461 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3463 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3464 if require_commitment {
3465 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3467 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3468 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3469 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3470 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3472 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3473 &self.context.channel_id(),
3474 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3477 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3478 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3480 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3481 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3483 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3484 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3490 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3491 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3492 /// commitment update.
3493 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3494 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3495 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3497 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3498 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3501 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3502 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3503 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3504 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3506 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3507 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3508 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3509 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3510 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3511 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3512 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3514 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3515 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3517 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3518 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3520 if !self.context.is_live() {
3521 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3524 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3525 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3526 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3527 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3528 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3529 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3530 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3531 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3532 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3533 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3537 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3538 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3539 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3540 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3541 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3542 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3545 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3546 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3550 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3551 force_holding_cell = true;
3554 if force_holding_cell {
3555 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3559 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3560 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3562 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3563 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3568 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3569 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3571 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3573 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3574 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3575 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3576 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3580 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3581 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3582 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3586 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3587 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3590 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3591 // will be retransmitted.
3592 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3593 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3594 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3596 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3597 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3599 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3600 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3601 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3602 // this HTLC accordingly
3603 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3606 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3607 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3608 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3609 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3612 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3613 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3614 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3615 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3616 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3617 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3622 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3624 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3625 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3626 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3627 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3631 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3632 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3633 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3634 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3635 // the update upon reconnection.
3636 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3640 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3642 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3643 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3646 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3647 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3648 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3649 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3650 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3651 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3652 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3654 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3655 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3656 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3657 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3658 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3659 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3660 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3662 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3663 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3664 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3665 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3666 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3667 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3668 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3671 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3672 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3673 /// to the remote side.
3674 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3675 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3676 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3677 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3680 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3682 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3683 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3685 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3686 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3687 // first received the funding_signed.
3688 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3689 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3690 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3692 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3693 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3694 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3695 funding_broadcastable = None;
3698 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3699 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3700 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3701 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3702 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3703 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3704 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3705 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3706 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3707 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3708 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3709 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3710 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3711 next_per_commitment_point,
3712 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3716 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3718 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3719 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3720 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3721 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3722 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3723 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3725 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3726 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3727 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3728 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3729 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3730 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3734 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3735 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3737 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3738 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3740 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3741 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3744 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3745 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3746 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3747 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3748 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3749 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3750 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3751 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3752 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3756 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3757 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3759 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3760 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3762 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3765 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3766 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3768 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3769 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3770 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3771 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3772 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3773 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3774 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3775 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3776 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3777 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3778 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3779 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3780 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3781 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3783 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3784 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3785 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3791 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3792 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3793 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3794 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3795 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3796 per_commitment_secret,
3797 next_per_commitment_point,
3799 next_local_nonce: None,
3803 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
3804 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3805 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3806 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3807 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3808 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3810 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3811 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3812 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3813 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3814 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3815 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3816 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3817 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3818 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3819 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3824 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3825 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3827 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3828 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3829 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3830 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3831 reason: err_packet.clone()
3834 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3835 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3836 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3837 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3838 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3839 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3842 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3843 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3844 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3845 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3846 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3853 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3854 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3855 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3856 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3860 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3861 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3862 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3863 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
3864 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
3867 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
3870 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3871 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3876 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3877 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3878 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3879 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3880 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3881 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3882 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3887 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3888 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3890 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3891 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3892 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3893 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3894 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3895 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3896 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3897 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3900 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3902 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3903 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3904 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3905 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3906 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3909 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3910 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3911 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3914 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3915 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3916 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3917 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3918 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3919 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3921 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3922 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3923 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3924 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3925 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3928 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3929 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3930 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3931 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3932 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3933 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3934 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3935 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3939 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3940 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3941 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3942 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3944 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3948 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3949 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3950 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3951 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3953 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
3955 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3957 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3958 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3959 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3960 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3961 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3964 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3965 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3966 channel_ready: None,
3967 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3968 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3969 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3973 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3974 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3975 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3976 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3977 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3978 next_per_commitment_point,
3979 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3981 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3982 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3983 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3987 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3988 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3989 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3991 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3992 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3993 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3996 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3999 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4002 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4003 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4004 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4005 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4006 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4007 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4008 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4010 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4012 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4013 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4014 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4015 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4016 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4017 next_per_commitment_point,
4018 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4022 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4023 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4024 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4026 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4029 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4030 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4031 raa: required_revoke,
4032 commitment_update: None,
4033 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4035 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4036 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4037 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4039 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4042 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4043 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4044 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4045 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4046 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4047 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4050 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4051 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4052 raa: required_revoke,
4053 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4054 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4058 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4062 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4063 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4064 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4065 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4067 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4069 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4071 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4072 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4073 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4074 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4075 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4076 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4078 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4079 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4080 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4081 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4082 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4084 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4085 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4086 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4087 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4090 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4091 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4092 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4093 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4094 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4095 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4096 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4097 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4098 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4099 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4100 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4101 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4102 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4103 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4104 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4106 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4109 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4110 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4113 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4114 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4115 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4116 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4117 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4118 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4121 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4122 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4123 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4124 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4125 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4126 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4129 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4135 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4136 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4137 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4138 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4140 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4141 return Ok((None, None));
4144 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4145 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4146 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4148 return Ok((None, None));
4151 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4153 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4154 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4155 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4156 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4158 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4159 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4161 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4162 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4164 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4165 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4166 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4167 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4169 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4170 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4171 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4178 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4179 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4181 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4182 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4185 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4186 /// within our expected timeframe.
4188 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4189 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4190 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4193 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4196 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4197 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4201 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4202 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4204 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4207 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4208 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4209 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4210 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4211 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4213 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4214 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4218 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4220 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4221 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4224 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4225 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4226 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4229 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4232 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4233 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4234 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4235 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4237 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4240 assert!(send_shutdown);
4241 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4242 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4243 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4245 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4246 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4248 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4253 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4255 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4256 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4258 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4259 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4260 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4261 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4262 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4263 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4266 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4267 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4269 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4270 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4271 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4272 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4276 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4277 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4278 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4279 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4280 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4281 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4283 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4284 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4291 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4292 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4294 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4297 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4298 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4300 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4302 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4303 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4304 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4305 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4306 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4307 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4308 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4309 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4310 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4312 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4313 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4316 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4320 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4321 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4322 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4323 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4325 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4326 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4328 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4329 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4331 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4332 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4334 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4335 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4338 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4339 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4342 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4343 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4344 return Ok((None, None));
4347 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4348 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4349 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4350 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4352 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4354 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4357 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4358 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4359 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4360 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4361 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4365 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4366 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4367 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4371 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4372 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4373 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4374 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4375 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4376 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4377 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4381 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4383 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4384 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4385 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4386 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4388 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4391 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4392 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4394 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4395 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4397 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4398 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4399 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4400 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4404 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4405 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4406 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4407 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4409 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4410 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4411 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4419 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4420 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4421 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4423 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4424 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4426 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4427 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4430 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4431 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4432 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4433 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4434 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4436 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4437 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4438 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4440 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4441 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4444 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4445 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4446 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4447 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4448 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4449 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4450 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4451 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4453 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4456 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4457 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4458 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4459 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4461 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4465 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4466 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4467 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4468 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4470 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4476 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4477 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4478 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4479 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4480 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4481 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4482 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4484 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4485 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4488 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4490 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4491 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4497 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4498 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4499 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4500 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4501 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4502 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4503 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4505 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4506 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4513 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4514 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4517 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4518 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4521 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4522 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4526 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4527 &self.context.holder_signer
4531 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4533 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4534 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4535 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4536 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4537 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4538 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4540 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4542 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4550 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4551 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4555 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4556 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4557 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4558 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4561 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4562 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4563 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4564 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4567 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4568 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4569 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4570 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4571 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4572 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4575 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4576 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4577 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4578 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4579 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4580 if !release_monitor {
4581 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4590 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4591 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4594 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4595 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4596 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4598 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4599 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4600 if self.context.channel_state &
4601 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4602 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4603 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4604 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4605 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4608 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4609 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4610 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4611 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4612 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4613 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4615 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4616 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4617 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4619 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4620 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4621 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4622 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4623 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4624 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4630 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4631 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4632 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4635 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4636 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4637 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4640 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4641 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4642 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4645 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4646 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4647 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4648 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4649 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4650 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4655 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4656 self.context.channel_update_status
4659 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4660 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4661 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4664 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4666 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4667 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4668 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4672 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4673 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4674 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4677 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4681 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4682 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4683 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4685 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4686 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4687 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4689 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4690 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4693 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4694 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4695 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4696 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4697 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4698 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4699 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4700 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4701 self.context.channel_state);
4703 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4707 if need_commitment_update {
4708 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4709 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4710 let next_per_commitment_point =
4711 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4712 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4713 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4714 next_per_commitment_point,
4715 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4719 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4725 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4726 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4727 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4728 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4729 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4730 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4731 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4733 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4736 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4737 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4738 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4739 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4740 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4741 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4742 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4743 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4744 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4745 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4746 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4747 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4748 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4749 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4750 // channel and move on.
4751 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4752 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4754 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4755 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4756 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4758 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4759 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4760 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4761 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4762 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4763 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4764 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4765 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4770 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4771 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4772 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4773 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4774 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4777 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4778 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4779 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4780 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4781 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4782 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
4785 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4786 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4787 // may have already happened for this block).
4788 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4789 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4790 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4791 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4794 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4795 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4796 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4797 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4805 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4806 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4807 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4808 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4810 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4811 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4814 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4816 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4817 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4818 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4819 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4821 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4824 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4827 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4828 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4829 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4830 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4832 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4835 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4836 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4837 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4839 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4840 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4842 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4843 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4844 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4852 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4854 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4855 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4856 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4858 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4859 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4862 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4863 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4864 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4865 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4866 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4867 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4868 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4869 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4870 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4873 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4874 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4875 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4876 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4878 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4879 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4880 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4882 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4883 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4884 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4885 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4887 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4888 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4889 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
4890 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4891 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4892 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4893 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4896 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4897 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4899 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4902 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4903 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4904 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4905 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4906 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4907 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4908 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4909 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4910 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4911 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4912 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4913 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4914 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4915 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4916 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4917 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4918 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4924 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4929 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4930 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4932 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4933 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
4934 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4935 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4937 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4940 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4942 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
4943 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4944 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4945 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4946 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4947 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4949 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4950 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4953 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4954 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4955 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4956 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4957 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4958 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4960 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4961 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4964 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4965 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4966 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4967 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4968 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4974 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4975 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4976 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4977 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4979 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4982 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4986 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4990 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4991 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4995 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4999 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5000 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5003 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5007 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5009 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5014 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5015 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5016 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5018 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5023 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5025 None => return None,
5028 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5030 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5031 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5033 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5034 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5040 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5042 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5043 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5044 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5045 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5046 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5047 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5048 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5050 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5051 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5052 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5053 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5054 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5055 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5056 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5057 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5058 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5059 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5060 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5061 contents: announcement,
5066 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5070 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5071 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5072 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5073 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5074 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5075 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5076 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5077 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5079 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5081 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5082 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5083 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5084 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5086 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5087 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5088 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5089 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5092 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5093 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5094 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5095 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5098 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5101 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5102 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5103 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5104 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5105 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5106 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5109 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5111 Err(_) => return None,
5113 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5114 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5119 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5120 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5121 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5122 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5123 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5124 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5125 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5126 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5127 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5128 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5129 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5130 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5131 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5132 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5133 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5134 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5137 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5140 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5141 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5142 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5143 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5144 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5145 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5146 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5147 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5148 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5150 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5151 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5152 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5153 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5154 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5155 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5156 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5157 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5158 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5160 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5161 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5162 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5163 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5164 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5165 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5166 next_funding_txid: None,
5171 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5173 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5174 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5175 /// commitment update.
5177 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5178 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5179 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5180 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5181 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5182 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5183 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5186 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5187 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5188 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5190 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5191 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5196 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5197 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5199 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5201 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5202 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5204 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5205 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5206 /// regenerate them.
5208 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5209 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5211 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5212 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5213 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5214 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5215 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5216 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5217 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5219 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5220 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5222 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5223 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5224 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5227 if amount_msat == 0 {
5228 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5231 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5232 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5233 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5234 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5237 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5238 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5239 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5242 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5243 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5244 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5245 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5246 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5247 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5248 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5249 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5252 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5253 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5254 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5255 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5256 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5257 else { "to peer" });
5259 if need_holding_cell {
5260 force_holding_cell = true;
5263 // Now update local state:
5264 if force_holding_cell {
5265 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5270 onion_routing_packet,
5276 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5277 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5279 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5281 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5286 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5287 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5288 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5292 onion_routing_packet,
5295 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5300 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5301 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5302 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5303 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5305 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5306 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5307 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5309 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5310 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5314 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5315 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5316 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5317 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5318 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5319 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5320 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5323 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5324 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5325 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5326 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5327 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5328 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5331 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5333 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5334 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5335 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5336 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5337 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5339 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5340 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5343 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5344 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5345 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5346 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5347 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5348 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5349 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5350 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5351 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5352 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5353 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5356 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5360 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5361 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5362 where L::Target: Logger
5364 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5365 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5366 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5368 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5370 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5371 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5372 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5373 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5374 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5375 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5376 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5377 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5378 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5379 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5380 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5386 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5389 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5390 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5391 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5392 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5393 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5394 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5396 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5397 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5398 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5400 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5401 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5402 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5405 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5406 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5410 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5411 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5413 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5415 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5416 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5417 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5418 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5420 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5421 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5422 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5423 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5424 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5425 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5429 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5430 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5434 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5435 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5440 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5441 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5443 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5444 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5445 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5446 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5447 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5448 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5449 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5450 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5452 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5453 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5454 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5457 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5458 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5459 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5465 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5466 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5467 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5469 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5470 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5471 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5472 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5478 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5479 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5481 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5482 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5483 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5484 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5485 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5487 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5488 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5489 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5492 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5493 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5494 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5496 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5497 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5500 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5501 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5503 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5504 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5505 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5508 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5509 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5510 let mut chan_closed = false;
5511 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5515 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5517 None if !chan_closed => {
5518 // use override shutdown script if provided
5519 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5520 Some(script) => script,
5522 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5523 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5524 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5525 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5529 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5530 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5532 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5538 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5539 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5540 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5541 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5543 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5545 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5547 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5548 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5549 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5550 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5551 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5552 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5555 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5556 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5558 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5559 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5560 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5563 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5564 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5565 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5566 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5567 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5569 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5570 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5577 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5578 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5580 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5583 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5584 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5585 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5587 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5588 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5592 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5596 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5597 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5598 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5599 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5602 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5603 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5604 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5605 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5606 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5607 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5608 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5609 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5611 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5612 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5613 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5614 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5616 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5617 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5619 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5620 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5622 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5623 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5624 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5626 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5627 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5629 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5630 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5631 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5632 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5633 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5636 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5637 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5639 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5640 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5642 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5644 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5646 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5647 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5648 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5649 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5652 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5653 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5655 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5656 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5657 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5658 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5662 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5663 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5664 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5668 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5669 Ok(script) => script,
5670 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5673 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5676 context: ChannelContext {
5679 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5680 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5681 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5682 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5687 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5689 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5690 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5691 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5692 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5694 channel_value_satoshis,
5696 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5698 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5699 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5702 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5703 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5706 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5707 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5708 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5709 pending_update_fee: None,
5710 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5711 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5712 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5713 update_time_counter: 1,
5715 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5717 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5718 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5719 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5720 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5721 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5722 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5724 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
5726 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5727 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5728 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5729 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5731 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5732 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5733 closing_fee_limits: None,
5734 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5736 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5737 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5738 short_channel_id: None,
5739 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5741 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5742 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5743 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5744 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5745 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5746 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5747 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5748 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5749 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5750 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5751 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5752 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5754 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5756 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5757 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5758 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5759 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5760 counterparty_parameters: None,
5761 funding_outpoint: None,
5762 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5764 funding_transaction: None,
5766 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5767 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5768 counterparty_node_id,
5770 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5772 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5774 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5775 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5777 announcement_sigs: None,
5779 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5780 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5781 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5782 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5784 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5785 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5787 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5788 outbound_scid_alias,
5790 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5791 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5793 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5794 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5799 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5801 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5805 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5806 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5807 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5808 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5809 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5810 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5811 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5812 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5813 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5818 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5819 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5820 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5821 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5822 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5823 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5824 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5825 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5826 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5827 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5828 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5830 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5831 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5833 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5834 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5835 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5836 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5839 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5840 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5842 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5845 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5846 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5847 return Err((self, e));
5851 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5853 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5855 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5856 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5858 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
5859 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
5860 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
5861 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5862 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5863 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5866 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5868 let channel = Channel {
5869 context: self.context,
5872 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5873 temporary_channel_id,
5874 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5875 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5878 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5880 next_local_nonce: None,
5884 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5885 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5886 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5887 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5888 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5889 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5890 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5891 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5892 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5893 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5896 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5897 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5898 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5899 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5900 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5901 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5907 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5908 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5909 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5910 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5911 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5912 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5914 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5916 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5917 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5918 // We've exhausted our options
5921 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5922 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5925 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5926 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5927 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5928 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5930 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5931 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5932 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5933 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5934 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5935 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5937 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5939 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5940 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5943 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5944 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5945 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5947 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5948 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5951 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5952 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5955 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5956 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5960 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5961 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5962 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5963 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5964 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5965 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5966 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5967 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5968 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5969 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5970 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5971 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5972 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5973 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5974 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5975 first_per_commitment_point,
5976 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5977 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5978 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5979 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5981 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5986 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5987 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5989 // Check sanity of message fields:
5990 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5991 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5993 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5994 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5996 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5997 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5999 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6002 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6005 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6006 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6007 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6009 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6010 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6011 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6013 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6014 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6017 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6018 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6020 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6021 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6024 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6025 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6026 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6028 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6029 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6031 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6032 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6034 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6035 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6037 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6038 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6040 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6043 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6044 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6047 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6048 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6049 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6051 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6052 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6054 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6055 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6056 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6058 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6059 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6062 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6063 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6064 &Some(ref script) => {
6065 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6066 if script.len() == 0 {
6069 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6070 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6072 Some(script.clone())
6075 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6077 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6082 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6083 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6084 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6085 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6086 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6088 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6089 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6091 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6094 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6095 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6096 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6097 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6098 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6099 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6102 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6103 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6104 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6107 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6108 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6110 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6111 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6117 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6118 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6119 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6120 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6123 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6124 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6125 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6126 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6127 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6128 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6129 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6130 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6131 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6132 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6133 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6136 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6138 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6139 // support this channel type.
6140 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6141 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6145 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6146 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6147 // `static_remote_key`.
6148 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6149 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6151 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6152 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6155 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6156 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6158 channel_type.clone()
6160 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6161 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6162 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6167 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6168 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6169 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6170 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6171 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6172 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6173 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6174 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6175 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6178 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6179 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6182 // Check sanity of message fields:
6183 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6184 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6186 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6189 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6190 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6192 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6193 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6194 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6196 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6199 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6200 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6202 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6204 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6205 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6208 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6211 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6215 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6216 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6219 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6222 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6225 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6226 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6228 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6229 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6231 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6232 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6234 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6235 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6238 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6240 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6241 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6242 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6246 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6247 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6248 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6249 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6252 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6253 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6255 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6256 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6257 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6259 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6263 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6264 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6265 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6266 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6267 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6271 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6272 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6273 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6274 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6275 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6278 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6279 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6280 &Some(ref script) => {
6281 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6282 if script.len() == 0 {
6285 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6288 Some(script.clone())
6291 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6293 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6298 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6299 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6300 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6301 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6305 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6306 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6311 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6312 Ok(script) => script,
6313 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6316 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6317 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6319 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6322 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6326 context: ChannelContext {
6329 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6330 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6332 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6337 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6339 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6340 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6341 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6342 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6345 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6347 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6348 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6351 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6352 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6353 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6355 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6356 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6357 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6358 pending_update_fee: None,
6359 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6360 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6361 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6362 update_time_counter: 1,
6364 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6366 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6367 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6368 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6369 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6370 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6371 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6373 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6375 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6376 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6377 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6378 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6380 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6381 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6382 closing_fee_limits: None,
6383 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6385 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6386 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6387 short_channel_id: None,
6388 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6390 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6391 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6392 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6393 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6394 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6395 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6396 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6397 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6398 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6399 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6400 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6401 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6404 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6406 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6407 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6408 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6409 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6410 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6411 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6412 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6414 funding_outpoint: None,
6415 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6417 funding_transaction: None,
6419 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6420 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6421 counterparty_node_id,
6423 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6425 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6427 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6428 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6430 announcement_sigs: None,
6432 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6433 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6434 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6435 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6437 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6438 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6440 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6441 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6443 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6444 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6446 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6447 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6452 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6454 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6460 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6461 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6463 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6464 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6465 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6466 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6468 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6469 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6471 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6472 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6475 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6478 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6479 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6480 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6482 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6483 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6484 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6485 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6487 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6488 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6489 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6490 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6491 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6492 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6493 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6494 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6495 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6496 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6497 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6498 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6499 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6500 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6501 first_per_commitment_point,
6502 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6503 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6504 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6506 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6508 next_local_nonce: None,
6512 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6513 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6515 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6517 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6518 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6521 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6522 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6524 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6525 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6527 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6528 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6529 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6530 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6531 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6532 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6533 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6534 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6535 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6538 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6539 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6541 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6542 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6543 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6544 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6546 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6547 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6548 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6549 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6550 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6552 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6553 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6558 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6559 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6560 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6564 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6565 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6567 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6568 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6569 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6571 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6573 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6574 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6575 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6576 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6579 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6580 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6581 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6582 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6583 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6585 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6587 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6588 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6589 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6592 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6593 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6594 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6598 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6599 initial_commitment_tx,
6602 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6603 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6606 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6607 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6610 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6612 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6613 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6614 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6615 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6616 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6617 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6618 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6619 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6620 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6621 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6622 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6624 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6626 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6627 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6628 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6629 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6630 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6631 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6633 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6634 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6635 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6636 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6638 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6640 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6641 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6642 let mut channel = Channel {
6643 context: self.context,
6645 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6646 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6647 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6649 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6653 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6654 }, channel_monitor))
6658 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6659 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6661 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6667 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6668 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6669 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6670 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6671 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6673 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6674 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6675 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6676 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6682 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6683 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6684 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6685 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6686 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6687 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6692 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6693 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6694 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6695 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6697 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6698 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6699 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6700 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6705 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6706 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6707 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6708 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6709 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6710 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6715 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6716 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6717 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6720 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6722 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6723 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6724 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6725 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6726 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6728 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6729 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6730 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6731 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6733 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6734 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6735 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6737 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6739 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6740 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6741 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6742 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6743 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6744 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6745 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6747 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6748 // deserialized from that format.
6749 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6750 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6751 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6753 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6755 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6756 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6757 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6759 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6760 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6761 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6762 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6765 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6766 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6767 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6770 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6771 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6772 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6773 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6775 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6776 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6778 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6780 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6782 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6784 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6787 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6789 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6794 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6795 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6797 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6798 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6799 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6800 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6801 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6802 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6803 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6805 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6807 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6809 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6812 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6813 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6814 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6817 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6819 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6820 preimages.push(preimage);
6822 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6823 reason.write(writer)?;
6825 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6827 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6828 preimages.push(preimage);
6830 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6831 reason.write(writer)?;
6834 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6835 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6836 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6838 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6839 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6840 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6844 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6845 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6846 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6848 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6849 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6853 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6854 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6855 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6856 source.write(writer)?;
6857 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6859 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6860 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6861 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6863 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6864 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6866 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6868 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6869 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6871 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6873 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6874 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6879 match self.context.resend_order {
6880 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6881 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6884 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6885 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6886 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6888 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6889 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6890 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6891 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6894 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6895 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6896 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6897 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6898 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6901 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6902 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6903 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6904 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6906 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6907 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6908 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6910 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6912 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6913 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6914 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6915 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6917 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6918 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6919 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6920 // consider the stale state on reload.
6923 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6924 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6925 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6927 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6928 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6929 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6931 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6932 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6934 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6935 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6936 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6938 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6939 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6941 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6944 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6945 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6946 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6948 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6951 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6952 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6954 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6955 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6956 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6958 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6960 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6962 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6964 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6965 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6966 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6967 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6968 htlc.write(writer)?;
6971 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6972 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6973 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6975 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6976 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6978 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6979 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6980 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6981 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6982 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6983 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6984 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6986 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6987 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6988 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6989 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6990 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6992 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6993 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6995 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6996 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6997 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6998 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7000 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7002 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7003 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7004 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7005 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7006 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7007 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7008 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7010 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7011 (2, chan_type, option),
7012 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7013 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7014 (5, self.context.config, required),
7015 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7016 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7017 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7018 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7019 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7020 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7021 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7022 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7023 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7024 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7025 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7026 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7027 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7028 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7029 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7030 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7031 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7032 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7039 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7040 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7042 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7043 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7045 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7046 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7047 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7049 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7050 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7051 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7052 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7054 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7056 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7057 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7058 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7059 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7060 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7062 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7063 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7066 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7067 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7068 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7070 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7072 let mut keys_data = None;
7074 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7075 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7076 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7077 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7078 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7079 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7080 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7081 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7082 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7083 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7087 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7088 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7089 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7092 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7094 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7095 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7096 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7098 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7100 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7101 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7102 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7103 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7104 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7105 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7106 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7107 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7108 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7109 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7110 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7111 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7112 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7117 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7118 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7119 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7120 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7121 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7122 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7123 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7124 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7125 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7126 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7127 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7128 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7130 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7131 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7134 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7135 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7138 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7139 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7141 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7143 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7147 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7148 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7149 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7150 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7151 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7152 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7153 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7154 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7155 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7156 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7157 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7159 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7160 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7161 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7163 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7164 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7165 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7167 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7171 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7172 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7173 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7174 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7177 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7178 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7179 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7181 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7182 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7183 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7184 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7187 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7188 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7189 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7190 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7193 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7195 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7197 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7198 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7199 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7200 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7202 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7203 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7204 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7205 // consider the stale state on reload.
7206 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7209 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7210 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7211 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7213 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7216 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7217 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7218 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7220 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7221 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7222 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7223 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7225 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7226 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7228 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7229 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7231 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7232 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7233 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7235 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7237 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7238 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7240 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7241 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7244 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7246 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7247 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7248 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7249 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7251 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7254 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7255 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7257 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7259 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7260 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7262 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7263 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7265 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7267 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7268 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7269 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7271 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7272 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7273 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7277 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7278 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7279 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7281 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7287 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7288 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7289 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7290 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7291 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7292 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7293 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7294 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7295 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7296 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7298 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7299 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7300 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7301 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7302 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7303 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7304 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7306 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7307 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7308 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7309 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7311 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7313 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7314 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7316 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7317 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7318 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7319 (2, channel_type, option),
7320 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7321 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7322 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7323 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7324 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7325 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7326 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7327 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7328 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7329 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7330 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7331 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7332 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7333 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7334 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7335 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7336 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7337 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7338 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7339 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7340 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7343 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7344 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7345 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7346 // required channel parameters.
7347 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7348 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7349 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7351 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7353 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7354 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7355 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7356 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7359 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7360 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7361 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7363 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7364 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7366 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7367 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7372 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7373 if iter.next().is_some() {
7374 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7378 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7379 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7380 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7381 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7382 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7385 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7386 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7387 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7389 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7390 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7392 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7393 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7394 // separate u64 values.
7395 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7397 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7399 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7400 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7401 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7402 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7404 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7405 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7407 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7408 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7409 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7410 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7411 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7414 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7415 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7419 context: ChannelContext {
7422 config: config.unwrap(),
7426 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7427 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7428 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7431 temporary_channel_id,
7433 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7435 channel_value_satoshis,
7437 latest_monitor_update_id,
7439 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7440 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7443 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7444 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7447 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7448 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7449 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7450 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7454 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7455 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7456 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7457 monitor_pending_forwards,
7458 monitor_pending_failures,
7459 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7461 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7464 holding_cell_update_fee,
7465 next_holder_htlc_id,
7466 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7467 update_time_counter,
7470 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7471 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7472 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7473 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7475 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7476 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7477 closing_fee_limits: None,
7478 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7480 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7481 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7483 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7485 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7486 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7487 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7488 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7489 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7490 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7491 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7492 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7493 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7496 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7498 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7499 funding_transaction,
7501 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7502 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7503 counterparty_node_id,
7505 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7509 channel_update_status,
7510 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7514 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7515 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7516 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7517 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7519 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7520 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7522 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7523 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7524 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7526 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7527 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7529 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7530 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7532 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7535 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7544 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7545 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7546 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7547 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7548 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7550 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7551 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7552 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7553 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7554 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7555 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7556 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7557 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7558 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7559 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7560 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7561 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7562 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7563 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7564 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7565 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7566 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7567 use crate::util::test_utils;
7568 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7569 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7570 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7571 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7572 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7573 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7574 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7575 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7576 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7577 use crate::prelude::*;
7579 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7582 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7583 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7589 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7590 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7591 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7592 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7596 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7597 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7598 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7599 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7600 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7601 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7602 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7603 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7607 signer: InMemorySigner,
7610 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7611 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7614 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7615 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7617 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7618 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7621 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7625 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7627 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7628 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7629 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7630 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7631 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7634 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7635 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7636 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7637 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7641 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7642 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7643 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7647 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7648 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7649 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7650 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7652 let seed = [42; 32];
7653 let network = Network::Testnet;
7654 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7655 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7656 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7659 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7660 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7661 let config = UserConfig::default();
7662 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7663 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7664 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7666 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7667 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7671 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7672 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7674 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7675 let original_fee = 253;
7676 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7677 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7678 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7679 let seed = [42; 32];
7680 let network = Network::Testnet;
7681 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7683 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7684 let config = UserConfig::default();
7685 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7687 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7688 // same as the old fee.
7689 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7690 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7691 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7695 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7696 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7697 // dust limits are used.
7698 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7699 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7700 let seed = [42; 32];
7701 let network = Network::Testnet;
7702 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7703 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7704 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7706 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7707 // they have different dust limits.
7709 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7710 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7711 let config = UserConfig::default();
7712 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7714 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7715 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7716 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7717 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7718 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7720 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7721 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7722 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7723 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7724 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7726 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7727 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7728 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7729 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7731 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7732 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7733 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7735 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7736 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7738 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7739 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7740 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7742 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7743 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7744 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7745 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7748 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7750 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7751 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7752 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7753 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7754 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7755 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7756 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7757 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7758 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7760 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7763 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7764 // the dust limit check.
7765 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7766 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7767 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7768 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7770 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7771 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7772 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7773 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7774 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7775 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7776 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7780 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7781 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7782 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7783 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7784 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7785 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7786 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7787 let seed = [42; 32];
7788 let network = Network::Testnet;
7789 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7791 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7792 let config = UserConfig::default();
7793 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7795 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7796 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7798 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7799 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7800 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7801 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7802 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7803 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7805 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7806 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7807 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7808 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7809 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7811 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7813 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7814 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7815 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7816 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7817 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7819 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7820 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7821 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7822 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7823 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7827 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7828 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7829 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7830 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7831 let seed = [42; 32];
7832 let network = Network::Testnet;
7833 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7834 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7835 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7837 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7839 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7840 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7841 let config = UserConfig::default();
7842 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7844 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7845 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7846 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7847 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7849 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7850 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7851 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7853 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7854 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7855 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7856 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7858 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7859 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7860 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7862 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7863 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7865 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7866 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7867 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7868 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7869 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7870 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7871 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7873 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7875 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7876 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7877 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7878 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7879 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7883 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7884 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7885 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7886 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7887 let seed = [42; 32];
7888 let network = Network::Testnet;
7889 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7890 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7891 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7893 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7894 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7895 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7896 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7897 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7898 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7899 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7900 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7902 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7903 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7904 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7905 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7906 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7907 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7909 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7910 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7911 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7912 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7914 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7916 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7917 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7918 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7919 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7920 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7921 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7923 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7924 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7925 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7926 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7928 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7929 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7930 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7931 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7932 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7934 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7935 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7937 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7938 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7939 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7941 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7942 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7943 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7944 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7945 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7947 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7948 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7950 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7951 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7952 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7956 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7958 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7959 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7960 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7962 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7963 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7964 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7965 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7967 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7968 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7969 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7971 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7973 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7974 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7977 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7978 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7979 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7980 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7981 let seed = [42; 32];
7982 let network = Network::Testnet;
7983 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7984 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7985 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7988 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7989 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7990 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7992 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7993 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7995 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7996 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7997 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7999 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8000 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8002 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8004 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8005 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8007 // Channel Negotiations failed
8008 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8009 assert!(result.is_err());
8014 fn channel_update() {
8015 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8016 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8017 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8018 let seed = [42; 32];
8019 let network = Network::Testnet;
8020 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8021 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8022 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8024 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8025 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8026 let config = UserConfig::default();
8027 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8029 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8030 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8031 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8032 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8033 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8035 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8036 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8037 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8038 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8039 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8041 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8042 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8043 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8044 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8046 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8047 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8048 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8050 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8051 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8053 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8054 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8055 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8057 short_channel_id: 0,
8060 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8061 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8062 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8064 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8065 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8067 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8069 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
8071 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8072 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8073 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8074 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8076 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8077 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8078 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8080 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8084 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8086 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8087 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8088 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8089 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8090 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8091 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8092 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8093 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8094 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8095 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8096 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8097 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8098 use crate::sync::Arc;
8100 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8101 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8102 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8103 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8105 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8107 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8108 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8109 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8110 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8111 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8113 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8114 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8120 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8121 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8122 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8124 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8125 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8126 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8127 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8128 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8129 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8131 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8133 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8134 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8135 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8136 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8137 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8138 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8140 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8141 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8142 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8143 selected_contest_delay: 144
8145 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8146 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8148 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8149 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8151 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8152 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8154 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8155 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8157 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8158 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8159 // build_commitment_transaction.
8160 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8161 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8162 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8163 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8164 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8166 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8167 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8168 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8169 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8173 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8174 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8175 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8176 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8180 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8181 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8182 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8184 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8185 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8187 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8188 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8190 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8192 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8193 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8194 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8195 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8196 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8197 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8198 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8200 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8201 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8202 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8203 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8205 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8206 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8207 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8209 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8211 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8212 commitment_tx.clone(),
8213 counterparty_signature,
8214 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8215 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8216 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8218 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8219 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8221 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8222 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8223 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8225 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8226 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8229 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8230 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8232 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8233 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8234 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8235 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8236 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8237 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8238 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8239 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8241 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8244 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8245 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8246 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8250 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8253 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8254 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8255 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8257 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8258 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8259 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8260 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8261 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8262 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8263 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8264 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8266 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8270 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8271 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8272 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8273 "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", {});
8275 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8276 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8278 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8279 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8280 "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", {});
8282 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8283 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8284 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8285 "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", {});
8287 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8288 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8290 amount_msat: 1000000,
8292 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8293 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8295 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8298 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8299 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8301 amount_msat: 2000000,
8303 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8304 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8306 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8309 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8310 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8312 amount_msat: 2000000,
8314 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8315 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8316 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8317 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8319 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8322 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8323 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8325 amount_msat: 3000000,
8327 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8328 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8329 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8330 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8332 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8335 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8336 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8338 amount_msat: 4000000,
8340 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8341 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8343 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8347 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8348 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8349 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8351 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8352 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8353 "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", {
8356 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8357 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8358 "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" },
8361 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8362 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8363 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8366 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8367 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8368 "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" },
8371 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8372 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8373 "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" },
8376 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8377 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8378 "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" }
8381 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8382 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8383 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8385 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8386 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8387 "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", {
8390 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8391 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8392 "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" },
8395 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8396 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8397 "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" },
8400 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8401 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8402 "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" },
8405 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8406 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8407 "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" },
8410 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8411 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8412 "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" }
8415 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8416 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8417 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8419 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8420 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8421 "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", {
8424 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8425 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8426 "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" },
8429 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8430 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8431 "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" },
8434 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8435 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8436 "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" },
8439 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8440 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8441 "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" }
8444 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8445 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8446 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8447 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8449 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8450 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8451 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80084a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994abc996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d005101473044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc31201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8454 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8455 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8456 "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" },
8459 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8460 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8461 "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" },
8464 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8465 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8466 "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" },
8469 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8470 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8471 "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" }
8474 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8475 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8476 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8477 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8479 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8480 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8481 "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", {
8484 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8485 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8486 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8489 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8490 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8491 "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" },
8494 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8495 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8496 "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" },
8499 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8500 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8501 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8504 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8505 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8506 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8508 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8509 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8510 "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", {
8513 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8514 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8515 "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" },
8518 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8519 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8520 "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" },
8523 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8524 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8525 "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" }
8528 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8529 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8530 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8532 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8533 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8534 "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", {
8537 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8538 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8539 "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" },
8542 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8543 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8544 "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" },
8547 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8548 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8549 "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" }
8552 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8553 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8554 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8556 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8557 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8558 "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", {
8561 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8562 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8563 "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" },
8566 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8567 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8568 "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" }
8571 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8572 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8573 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8574 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8575 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8576 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8578 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8579 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8580 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80064a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994b80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ac5916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd501473044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8583 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8584 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8585 "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" },
8588 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8589 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8590 "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" }
8593 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8594 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8595 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8596 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8597 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8599 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8600 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8601 "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", {
8604 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8605 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8606 "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" },
8609 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8610 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8611 "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" }
8614 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8615 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8616 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8618 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8619 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8620 "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", {
8623 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8624 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8625 "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" }
8628 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8629 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8630 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8631 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8632 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8634 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8635 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8636 "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", {
8639 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8640 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8641 "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" }
8644 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8645 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8646 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8647 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8648 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8650 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8651 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8652 "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", {
8655 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8656 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8657 "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" }
8660 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8661 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8662 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8663 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8665 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8666 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8667 "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", {});
8669 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8670 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8671 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8672 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8673 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8675 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8676 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8677 "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", {});
8679 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8680 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8681 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8682 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8683 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8685 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8686 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8687 "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", {});
8689 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8690 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8691 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8693 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8694 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8695 "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", {});
8697 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8698 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8699 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8700 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8701 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8703 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8704 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8705 "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", {});
8707 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8708 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8709 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8710 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8711 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8713 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8714 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8715 "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", {});
8717 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8718 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8719 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8720 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8721 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8722 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8724 amount_msat: 2000000,
8726 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8727 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8729 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8732 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8733 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8734 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8736 amount_msat: 5000001,
8738 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8739 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8740 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8741 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8743 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8746 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8747 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8749 amount_msat: 5000000,
8751 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8752 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8753 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8754 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8756 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8760 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8761 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8762 "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", {
8765 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8766 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8767 "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" },
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8773 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8774 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8775 "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" }
8778 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8779 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
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8781 "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", {
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8785 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8786 "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" },
8788 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8789 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8790 "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" },
8792 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8793 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8794 "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" }
8799 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8800 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8802 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8803 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8804 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8805 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8807 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8808 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8809 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8811 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8812 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8814 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8815 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8817 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8818 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8819 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8823 fn test_key_derivation() {
8824 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8825 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8827 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8828 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8830 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8831 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8833 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8834 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8836 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8837 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8839 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8840 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8842 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8843 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8845 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8846 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8850 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8851 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8852 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8853 let seed = [42; 32];
8854 let network = Network::Testnet;
8855 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8856 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8858 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8859 let config = UserConfig::default();
8860 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8861 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8863 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8864 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8866 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8867 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8868 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8869 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8870 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8871 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8872 assert!(res.is_ok());
8876 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8877 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8878 // resulting `channel_type`.
8879 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8880 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8881 let network = Network::Testnet;
8882 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8883 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8885 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8886 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8888 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8889 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8891 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8892 // need to signal it.
8893 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8894 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8895 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8898 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8900 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8901 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8902 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8904 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8905 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8906 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8909 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8910 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8911 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8912 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8913 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8916 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8917 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8921 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8922 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8923 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8924 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8925 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8926 let network = Network::Testnet;
8927 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8928 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8930 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8931 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8933 let config = UserConfig::default();
8935 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8936 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8937 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8938 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8939 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8941 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8942 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8943 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8946 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8947 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8948 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8950 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8951 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8952 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8953 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8954 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8955 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8957 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8961 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8962 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8964 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8965 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8966 let network = Network::Testnet;
8967 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8968 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8970 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8971 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8973 let config = UserConfig::default();
8975 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8976 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8977 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8978 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8979 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8980 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8981 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8982 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8984 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8985 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8986 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8987 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8988 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8989 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8992 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8993 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8995 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8996 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8997 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8998 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9000 assert!(res.is_err());
9002 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9003 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9004 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9006 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9007 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9008 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9011 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9013 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9014 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9015 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9016 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9019 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9020 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9022 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9023 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9025 assert!(res.is_err());