1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
54 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
55 use crate::sync::Mutex;
56 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
61 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
62 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
63 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
65 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
69 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
72 pub struct AvailableBalances {
73 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
74 pub balance_msat: u64,
75 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
76 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
78 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
80 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
81 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
85 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
87 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
89 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
90 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
91 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
92 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
93 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
94 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
96 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
100 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
101 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
102 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
103 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
106 /// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
108 enum InboundHTLCResolution {
109 /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
110 /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
112 // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
113 // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
115 pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
117 /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
118 /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
119 /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
121 update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
125 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
127 (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
130 (0, update_add_htlc, required),
134 enum InboundHTLCState {
135 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
136 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
137 RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
138 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
139 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
140 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
141 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
142 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
143 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
144 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
145 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
146 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
147 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
148 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
149 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
151 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
152 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
153 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
154 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
155 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
156 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
157 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
158 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
159 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
160 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
161 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
162 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
163 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
164 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
166 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
167 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
168 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
169 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
170 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
171 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
172 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
173 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
175 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
176 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
178 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
179 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
180 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
181 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
182 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
183 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
184 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
185 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
188 /// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs.
190 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
191 /// through the following states in the state machine:
192 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
193 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
194 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
195 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
196 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
197 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
198 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
200 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
201 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
202 pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails {
203 /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
204 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
205 /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction.
206 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
207 /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides
208 /// and is included in both commitment transactions.
210 /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will
211 /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this
212 /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart
213 /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts.
215 /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with
216 /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting
217 /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote
218 /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc.
219 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
220 /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
221 /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate
222 /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment
224 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
227 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
228 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
230 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
231 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
232 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
233 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
234 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
235 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
236 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
237 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
238 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
239 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
240 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
241 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
242 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
247 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails,
248 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
249 (2, Committed) => {},
250 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {},
251 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {};
254 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
258 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
259 state: InboundHTLCState,
262 /// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs.
263 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
264 pub struct InboundHTLCDetails {
266 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
267 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
268 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
270 /// The amount in msat.
271 pub amount_msat: u64,
272 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
273 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
274 /// The payment hash.
275 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
276 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
278 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
279 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
281 /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
283 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
284 /// states may result in `None` here.
285 pub state: Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails>,
286 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
287 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
288 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
289 /// transactions as well.
291 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
292 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
295 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
296 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
300 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, {
301 (0, htlc_id, required),
302 (2, amount_msat, required),
303 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
304 (6, payment_hash, required),
305 (7, state, upgradable_option),
306 (8, is_dust, required),
309 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
310 enum OutboundHTLCState {
311 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
312 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
313 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
314 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
315 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
316 /// money back (though we won't), and,
317 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
318 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
319 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
320 /// we'll never get out of sync).
321 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
322 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
323 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
325 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
326 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
327 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
328 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
329 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
330 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
331 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
332 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
333 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
334 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
335 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
336 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
337 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
338 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
339 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
342 /// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs.
344 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
345 /// through the following states in the state machine:
346 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
347 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
348 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
349 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
350 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
351 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
352 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
354 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
355 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
356 pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
357 /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added
358 /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc.
359 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
360 /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed
361 /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return.
363 /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we
364 /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node.
366 /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc,
367 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
368 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
369 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
370 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
371 /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc,
372 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
373 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
374 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
375 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
378 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
379 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
381 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
382 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
383 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
384 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
385 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
387 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
388 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
389 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
390 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
391 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
392 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
393 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
394 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
395 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
396 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
401 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails,
402 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
403 (2, Committed) => {},
404 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {},
405 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {};
409 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
410 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
411 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
412 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
413 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
416 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
417 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
419 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
420 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
425 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
426 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
428 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
429 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
434 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
435 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
439 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
440 state: OutboundHTLCState,
442 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
443 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
446 /// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs.
447 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
448 pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails {
450 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
451 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
452 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
454 /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet.
455 pub htlc_id: Option<u64>,
456 /// The amount in msat.
457 pub amount_msat: u64,
458 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
459 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
460 /// The payment hash.
461 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
462 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
464 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
465 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
467 /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
469 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
470 /// states may result in `None` here.
471 pub state: Option<OutboundHTLCStateDetails>,
472 /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
473 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
474 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
475 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
476 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
477 /// transactions as well.
479 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
480 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
483 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
484 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
488 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, {
489 (0, htlc_id, required),
490 (2, amount_msat, required),
491 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
492 (6, payment_hash, required),
493 (7, state, upgradable_option),
494 (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required),
495 (10, is_dust, required),
498 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
499 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
500 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
501 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
505 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
507 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
508 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
509 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
510 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
513 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
518 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
523 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
527 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
528 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
529 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
530 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
531 struct $flag_type(u32);
536 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
539 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
541 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
544 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
547 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
548 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
551 Ok($flag_type(flags))
556 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
558 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
560 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
562 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
566 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
569 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
571 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
573 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
574 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
576 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
578 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
580 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
581 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
584 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
585 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
587 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
590 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
592 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
594 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
597 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
598 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
600 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
601 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
602 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
603 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
604 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
605 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
606 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
607 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
609 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
611 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
613 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
614 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
616 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
618 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
620 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
621 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
623 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
624 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
626 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
627 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
632 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
635 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
636 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
637 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
638 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
639 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
640 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
641 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
642 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
643 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
644 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
645 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
646 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
647 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
648 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
652 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
654 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
655 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
656 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
657 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
658 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
659 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
660 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
661 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
662 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
663 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
664 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
665 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
666 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
667 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
672 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
673 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
674 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
675 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
676 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
677 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
682 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
683 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
684 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
685 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
686 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
687 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
688 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
689 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
690 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
691 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
692 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
693 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
694 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
695 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
700 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
701 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
702 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
703 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
704 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
705 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
706 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
707 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
711 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
712 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
713 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
715 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
716 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
717 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
718 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
719 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
721 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
722 /// funding transaction to confirm.
723 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
724 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
726 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
727 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
728 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
732 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
733 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
735 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
738 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
747 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
749 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
753 fn $clear(&mut self) {
756 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
758 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
762 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
763 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
765 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
766 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
771 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
773 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
774 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
776 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
777 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
778 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
779 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
780 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
781 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
782 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
783 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
791 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
793 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
794 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
795 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
796 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
797 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
801 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
802 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
805 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
806 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
809 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
811 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
812 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
813 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
817 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
819 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
820 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
821 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
822 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
824 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
830 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
831 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
832 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
833 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
834 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
835 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
836 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
837 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
840 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
842 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
844 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
845 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
846 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
847 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
851 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
853 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
855 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
857 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
858 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
859 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
860 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
861 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
863 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
864 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
866 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
868 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
869 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
871 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
872 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
873 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
874 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
875 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
876 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
878 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
879 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
881 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
882 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
883 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
884 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
885 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
887 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
888 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
890 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
891 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
893 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
894 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
895 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
896 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
902 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
903 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
905 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
906 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
907 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
912 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
913 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
915 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
916 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
917 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
922 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
924 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
925 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
926 pub payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
929 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
930 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
931 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
932 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
933 record.payment_hash = self.payment_hash;
934 self.logger.log(record)
938 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
939 where L::Target: Logger {
940 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>, payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>) -> Self
941 where S::Target: SignerProvider
945 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
946 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
952 macro_rules! secp_check {
953 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
956 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
961 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
962 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
963 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
964 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
965 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
966 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
967 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
968 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
970 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
972 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
974 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
978 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
980 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
981 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
982 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
984 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
985 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
987 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
988 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
989 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
990 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
991 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
993 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
994 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
998 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
1004 /// Current counts of various HTLCs, useful for calculating current balances available exactly.
1006 pending_inbound_htlcs: usize,
1007 pending_outbound_htlcs: usize,
1008 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
1009 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
1010 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
1011 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
1012 outbound_holding_cell_msat: u64,
1013 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
1016 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
1017 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
1018 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
1019 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
1020 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
1021 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
1022 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
1023 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
1024 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
1025 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
1026 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
1029 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
1030 struct HTLCCandidate {
1032 origin: HTLCInitiator,
1035 impl HTLCCandidate {
1036 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
1044 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
1046 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
1048 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1049 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1050 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1055 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
1056 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
1057 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
1058 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
1059 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
1061 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
1062 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1063 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
1064 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1066 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
1067 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
1071 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
1072 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
1073 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1074 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1075 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1076 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1077 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1078 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1079 pub pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1080 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
1081 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1082 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1085 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
1087 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
1088 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1089 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
1090 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1093 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
1094 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
1095 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1096 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1097 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1098 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1099 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1100 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
1103 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
1105 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
1106 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
1107 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
1108 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
1109 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
1110 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
1111 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
1112 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
1113 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
1114 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
1115 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
1116 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
1117 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1118 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
1119 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1122 /// Tracks the transaction number, along with current and next commitment points.
1123 /// This consolidates the logic to advance our commitment number and request new
1124 /// commitment points from our signer.
1125 #[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone)]
1126 enum HolderCommitmentPoint {
1127 // TODO: add a variant for before our first commitment point is retrieved
1128 /// We've advanced our commitment number and are waiting on the next commitment point.
1129 /// Until the `get_per_commitment_point` signer method becomes async, this variant
1130 /// will not be used.
1131 PendingNext { transaction_number: u64, current: PublicKey },
1132 /// Our current commitment point is ready, we've cached our next point,
1133 /// and we are not pending a new one.
1134 Available { transaction_number: u64, current: PublicKey, next: PublicKey },
1137 impl HolderCommitmentPoint {
1138 pub fn new<SP: Deref>(signer: &ChannelSignerType<SP>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Self
1139 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
1141 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
1142 transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1143 current: signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, secp_ctx),
1144 next: signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, secp_ctx),
1148 pub fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
1149 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { .. } = self { true } else { false }
1152 pub fn transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
1154 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { transaction_number, .. } => *transaction_number,
1155 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number, .. } => *transaction_number,
1159 pub fn current_point(&self) -> PublicKey {
1161 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { current, .. } => *current,
1162 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { current, .. } => *current,
1166 pub fn next_point(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1168 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { .. } => None,
1169 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { next, .. } => Some(*next),
1173 pub fn advance<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, signer: &ChannelSignerType<SP>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, logger: &L)
1174 where SP::Target: SignerProvider, L::Target: Logger
1176 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number, next, .. } = self {
1177 *self = HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext {
1178 transaction_number: *transaction_number - 1,
1183 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { transaction_number, current } = self {
1184 let next = signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(*transaction_number - 1, secp_ctx);
1185 log_trace!(logger, "Retrieved next per-commitment point {}", *transaction_number - 1);
1186 *self = HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number: *transaction_number, current: *current, next };
1191 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1192 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1193 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1194 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1195 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1196 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1197 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1198 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1199 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1200 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1201 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1202 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1203 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1204 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1205 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1207 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1208 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1209 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1210 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1212 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1213 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1214 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1215 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1217 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1218 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1219 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1220 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1221 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1223 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1224 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1225 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1226 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1228 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1229 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1230 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1232 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1233 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1234 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1235 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1236 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1238 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1239 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1242 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1243 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1245 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1246 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1247 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1248 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1250 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1251 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1253 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1254 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1257 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1258 (0, update, required),
1261 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1262 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1263 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1264 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1265 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1266 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1267 UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel<SP>),
1268 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1269 UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel<SP>),
1270 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1273 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1274 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1275 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1277 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1279 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1280 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1281 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1282 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1283 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1284 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1285 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1289 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1291 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1292 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1293 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1294 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1295 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1296 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1297 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1302 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1303 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1304 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1305 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1306 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1308 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1309 /// in a timely manner.
1310 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1313 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1314 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1315 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1317 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1318 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1319 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1320 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1324 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1325 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1326 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1328 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1329 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1330 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1331 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1333 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1337 /// The current channel ID.
1338 channel_id: ChannelId,
1339 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1340 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1341 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1342 channel_state: ChannelState,
1344 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1345 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1347 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1348 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1349 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1351 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1352 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1353 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1354 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1356 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1357 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1359 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1361 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1362 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1363 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1365 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1366 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1367 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1369 holder_commitment_point: HolderCommitmentPoint,
1370 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1371 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1372 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1373 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1374 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1376 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1377 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1378 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1379 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1380 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1381 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1383 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1385 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1386 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1387 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1389 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1390 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1391 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1392 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1393 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1394 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1395 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1396 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1398 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1399 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1400 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1402 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1403 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1404 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1405 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1406 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1407 /// outbound or inbound.
1408 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1410 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1412 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1413 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1414 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1415 // HTLCs with similar state.
1416 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1417 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1418 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1419 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1420 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1421 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1422 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1423 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1424 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1425 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1427 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1428 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1429 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1431 update_time_counter: u32,
1433 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1434 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1435 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1436 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1437 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1438 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1440 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1441 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1443 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1444 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1445 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1446 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1448 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1449 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1451 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1453 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1455 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1456 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1457 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1458 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1459 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1461 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1462 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1464 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1465 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1466 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1468 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1469 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1470 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1471 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1472 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1473 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1474 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1475 pub(super) channel_creation_height: u32,
1477 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1480 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1482 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1485 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1487 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1490 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1492 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1494 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1495 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1498 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1500 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1502 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1503 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1505 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1507 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1508 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1509 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1511 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1513 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1514 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1515 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1517 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1518 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1519 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1521 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1523 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1525 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1526 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1527 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1528 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1530 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1531 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1532 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1534 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1535 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1536 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1538 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1539 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1540 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1541 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1542 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1543 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1544 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1545 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1547 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1548 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1549 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1550 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1551 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1553 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1554 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1556 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1557 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1558 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1559 /// unblock the state machine.
1561 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1562 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1563 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1565 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1566 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1567 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1569 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1570 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1571 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1572 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1573 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1574 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1575 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1576 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1578 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1579 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1581 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1582 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1583 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1585 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1586 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1587 // associated channel mapping.
1589 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1590 // to store all of them.
1591 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1593 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1594 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1595 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1596 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1597 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1599 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1600 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1602 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1603 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1605 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1606 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1608 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1609 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1611 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1613 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1615 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1616 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1617 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1620 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1621 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1622 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1623 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1624 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1625 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1626 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1628 config: &'a UserConfig,
1629 current_chain_height: u32,
1632 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1633 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1634 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1635 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1636 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1638 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1639 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1641 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1642 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1644 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1646 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
1647 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1649 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1651 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1652 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1653 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1655 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1656 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1659 // Check sanity of message fields:
1660 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1661 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1662 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1663 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1664 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1666 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1667 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1669 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1670 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1672 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1673 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1674 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1676 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1677 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1679 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1680 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1682 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1684 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1685 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1686 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1688 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1689 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1691 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1692 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1695 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1696 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1697 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1699 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1700 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1702 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1703 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1705 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1706 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1708 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1709 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1711 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1712 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1714 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1715 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1718 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1720 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1721 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1726 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1727 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1728 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1729 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1731 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1732 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1734 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1735 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1736 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1738 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1739 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1742 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1743 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1744 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1745 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1749 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1750 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1751 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1752 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1755 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1756 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1757 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1758 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1759 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1762 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1763 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1764 &Some(ref script) => {
1765 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1766 if script.len() == 0 {
1769 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1770 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1772 Some(script.clone())
1775 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1777 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1782 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1783 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1784 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1785 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1789 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1790 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1791 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1795 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1796 Ok(script) => script,
1797 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1800 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1801 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1803 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1806 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1809 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1811 let holder_signer = ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer);
1812 let holder_commitment_point = HolderCommitmentPoint::new(&holder_signer, &secp_ctx);
1814 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1816 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1819 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1820 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1822 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1827 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1829 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1830 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1831 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1832 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1834 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1837 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1840 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1843 holder_commitment_point,
1844 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1847 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1848 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1849 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1850 pending_update_fee: None,
1851 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1852 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1853 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1854 update_time_counter: 1,
1856 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1858 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1859 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1860 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1861 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1862 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1863 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1864 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1866 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1867 signer_pending_funding: false,
1870 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1871 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1872 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1873 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1875 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1876 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1877 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1878 closing_fee_limits: None,
1879 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1881 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1882 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1883 short_channel_id: None,
1884 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1886 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1887 channel_value_satoshis,
1888 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1889 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1890 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1891 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1892 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1893 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1894 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1895 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1896 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1897 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1900 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1902 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1903 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1904 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1905 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1906 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1907 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1908 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1910 funding_outpoint: None,
1911 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1913 funding_transaction: None,
1914 is_batch_funding: None,
1916 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1917 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1918 counterparty_node_id,
1920 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1922 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1924 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1925 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1927 announcement_sigs: None,
1929 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1930 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1931 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1932 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1934 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1935 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1937 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1938 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1940 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1941 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1943 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1944 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1949 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1951 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1957 fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1958 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1959 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1960 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1961 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1962 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1963 funding_satoshis: u64,
1966 config: &'a UserConfig,
1967 current_chain_height: u32,
1968 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1969 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1970 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1971 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1972 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1973 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1974 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1976 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1977 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1978 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1980 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1981 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1983 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1985 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1988 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1989 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1991 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1992 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1993 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1995 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1996 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1999 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
2000 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
2002 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2003 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
2005 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
2007 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
2009 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
2010 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
2011 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
2012 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
2015 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2016 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2018 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
2019 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
2020 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
2021 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
2025 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2026 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
2027 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
2031 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
2032 Ok(script) => script,
2033 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
2036 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
2038 let holder_signer = ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer);
2039 let holder_commitment_point = HolderCommitmentPoint::new(&holder_signer, &secp_ctx);
2044 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
2045 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
2046 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
2047 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
2052 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
2054 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
2055 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
2056 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
2057 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
2059 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
2060 channel_value_satoshis,
2062 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
2065 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
2068 holder_commitment_point,
2069 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
2072 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2073 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2074 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
2075 pending_update_fee: None,
2076 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
2077 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
2078 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
2079 update_time_counter: 1,
2081 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
2083 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
2084 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
2085 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
2086 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
2087 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
2088 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
2089 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
2091 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
2092 signer_pending_funding: false,
2094 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
2095 // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
2096 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2097 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2098 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2099 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2101 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
2102 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
2103 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
2104 closing_fee_limits: None,
2105 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
2107 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
2108 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
2109 short_channel_id: None,
2110 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
2112 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
2113 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
2114 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
2115 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
2116 // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
2117 // receive `accept_channel2`.
2118 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
2119 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2120 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
2121 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
2122 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
2123 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
2124 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
2125 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2127 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
2129 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
2130 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
2131 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
2132 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
2133 counterparty_parameters: None,
2134 funding_outpoint: None,
2135 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
2137 funding_transaction: None,
2138 is_batch_funding: None,
2140 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
2141 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
2142 counterparty_node_id,
2144 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
2146 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
2148 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
2149 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
2151 announcement_sigs: None,
2153 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2154 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2155 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2156 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2158 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
2159 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
2161 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
2162 outbound_scid_alias,
2164 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
2165 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
2167 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2168 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
2173 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
2174 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
2178 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2179 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
2180 self.update_time_counter
2183 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2184 self.latest_monitor_update_id
2187 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2188 self.config.announced_channel
2191 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2192 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
2195 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2196 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2197 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
2198 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
2201 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2202 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2203 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
2206 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2207 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2208 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2209 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
2210 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
2211 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
2212 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
2215 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
2216 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
2217 match self.channel_state {
2218 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
2219 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
2220 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
2221 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2222 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
2223 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2224 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
2226 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
2228 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
2229 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
2233 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
2234 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
2235 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2236 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2237 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
2238 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2241 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2242 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2243 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
2247 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2248 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2249 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2250 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2251 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
2254 // Public utilities:
2256 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2260 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2262 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2263 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2264 self.temporary_channel_id
2267 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2271 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2272 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2273 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2277 /// Gets the channel's type
2278 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2282 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2284 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2285 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2286 self.short_channel_id
2289 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2290 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2291 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2294 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2295 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2296 self.outbound_scid_alias
2299 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2301 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2302 return &self.holder_signer
2305 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2306 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2307 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2308 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2309 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2310 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2313 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2314 /// get_funding_created.
2315 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2316 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2319 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2320 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2321 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2322 if conf_height > 0 {
2329 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2330 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2331 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2334 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2335 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2336 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2337 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2341 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2344 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2345 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2348 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2349 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2352 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2353 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2354 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2357 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2358 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2361 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2362 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2363 self.counterparty_node_id
2366 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2367 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2368 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2371 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2372 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2373 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2376 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2377 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2379 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2380 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2381 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2382 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2384 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2388 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2389 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2390 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2393 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2394 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2395 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2398 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2399 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2400 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2402 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2403 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2408 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2409 self.channel_value_satoshis
2412 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2413 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2416 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2417 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2420 fn get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate<F: Deref>(&self,
2421 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2422 ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
2423 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep)
2426 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self, limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw: u32) -> u64 {
2427 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2428 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2429 (limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw as u64).saturating_mul(multiplier)
2431 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2435 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2436 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2437 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2440 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2441 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2442 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2445 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2446 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2447 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2450 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2451 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2452 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2455 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2456 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2457 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2460 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2461 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2462 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2465 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2466 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2467 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2468 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2469 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2472 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2474 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2475 self.prev_config = None;
2479 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2480 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2484 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2485 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2486 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2487 let did_channel_update =
2488 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2489 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2490 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2491 if did_channel_update {
2492 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2493 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2494 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2495 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2497 self.config.options = *config;
2501 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2502 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2503 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2504 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2505 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2508 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2509 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2510 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2511 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2512 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2514 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2515 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2516 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2517 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2518 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2519 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2520 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2522 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2523 where L::Target: Logger
2525 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2526 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2527 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2529 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2530 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2531 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2532 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2534 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2535 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2536 if match update_state {
2537 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2538 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2539 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2540 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2541 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2543 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2547 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2548 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2549 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2551 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2553 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2554 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2555 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2557 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2558 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2559 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2560 transaction_output_index: None
2565 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2566 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2567 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2568 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2569 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2572 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2574 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2575 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2576 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2578 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2579 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2582 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2583 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2586 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2588 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2589 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2590 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2592 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2593 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2599 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2601 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2602 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2603 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2604 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2605 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2606 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2607 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2611 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2612 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2614 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2616 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2617 if generated_by_local {
2618 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2619 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2620 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2630 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2632 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2633 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2634 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2635 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2636 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2637 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2638 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2641 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2642 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2643 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2644 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2648 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2649 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2653 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2654 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2656 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2658 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2659 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2661 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2662 if !generated_by_local {
2663 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2671 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2672 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2673 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2674 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2675 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2676 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2677 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2678 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2680 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2682 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2683 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2684 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2685 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2687 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2689 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2690 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2691 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2692 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2695 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2696 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2697 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2698 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2700 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2703 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2704 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2705 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2706 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2708 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2711 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2712 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2717 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2718 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2723 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2725 let channel_parameters =
2726 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2727 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2728 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2735 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2738 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2739 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2740 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2741 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2749 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2750 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2751 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2752 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2757 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2758 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2759 /// our counterparty!)
2760 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2761 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2762 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2763 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
2764 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2765 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2766 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2768 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2772 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2773 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2774 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2775 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2776 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2777 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2778 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2780 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2783 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2784 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2785 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2786 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2787 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2790 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2791 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2794 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2798 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2799 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2800 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2801 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2802 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2803 // which are near the dust limit.
2804 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2805 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2806 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2807 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2808 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2810 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2811 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2813 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2814 cmp::max(feerate_per_kw + 2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2817 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2818 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2819 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2822 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending htlcs
2823 fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate: u32) -> HTLCStats {
2825 let uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors = self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2827 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update);
2828 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors {
2831 (dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2832 dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2835 let mut on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2836 let mut on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2838 let mut on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2839 let mut on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2841 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2844 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2845 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2846 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2847 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2848 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2849 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2851 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2853 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2854 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2859 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2860 let mut outbound_holding_cell_msat = 0;
2861 let mut on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count = 0;
2862 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2864 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2865 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2866 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2867 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2868 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2869 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2871 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2873 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2874 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2878 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2879 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2880 pending_outbound_htlcs += 1;
2881 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2882 outbound_holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2883 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2884 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2886 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2888 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2889 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2891 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2897 // Include any mining "excess" fees in the dust calculation
2898 let excess_feerate_opt = outbound_feerate_update
2899 .or(self.pending_update_fee.map(|(fee, _)| fee))
2900 .unwrap_or(self.feerate_per_kw)
2901 .checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2902 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2903 let on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs =
2904 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs + on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs;
2905 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2906 commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs, &self.channel_type);
2907 if !self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2908 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2909 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2910 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2911 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2912 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2913 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2918 pending_inbound_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len(),
2919 pending_outbound_htlcs,
2920 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2921 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2922 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2923 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2924 outbound_holding_cell_msat,
2925 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count,
2929 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2930 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2931 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2932 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2933 match holding_cell_update {
2934 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2935 holding_cell_states.insert(
2937 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2940 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2941 holding_cell_states.insert(
2943 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2946 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2947 holding_cell_states.insert(
2949 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2953 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2956 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2957 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2960 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2961 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2963 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2964 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2965 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2966 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2967 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2968 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2969 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2970 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2971 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2972 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2979 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2980 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2981 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2982 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2985 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2986 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2988 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2989 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2990 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2991 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2992 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2993 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2994 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2995 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2996 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2997 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
3000 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3001 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3007 } = *holding_cell_update {
3008 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
3010 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3011 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3012 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3013 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
3014 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
3015 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
3022 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
3023 /// Doesn't bother handling the
3024 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
3025 /// corner case properly.
3026 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3027 -> AvailableBalances
3028 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3030 let context = &self;
3031 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the case mentioned in the docs in general
3034 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
3035 let htlc_stats = context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
3037 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
3038 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3039 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
3040 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3043 balance_msat -= htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat;
3045 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
3046 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat)
3048 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
3050 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
3052 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3053 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3057 if context.is_outbound() {
3058 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
3059 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
3061 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
3062 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
3064 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
3065 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3066 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3067 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
3070 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3071 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
3072 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3073 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
3074 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3075 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3076 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3079 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
3080 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
3081 // match the value to right-below-dust.
3082 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
3083 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
3084 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
3085 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
3086 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
3087 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
3088 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
3089 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
3091 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
3094 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
3095 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
3096 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3097 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3098 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
3101 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3102 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
3104 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3105 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
3106 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat);
3108 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3109 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
3110 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
3111 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
3115 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
3117 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
3118 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
3119 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
3120 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
3121 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
3122 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
3123 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
3125 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3126 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
3128 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3129 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3130 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3133 let excess_feerate_opt = self.feerate_per_kw.checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
3134 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
3135 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
3136 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, &context.channel_type);
3137 let nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
3138 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
3139 if nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3140 // If adding an extra HTLC would put us over the dust limit in total fees, we cannot
3141 // send any non-dust HTLCs.
3142 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
3146 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000) > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_add(1) {
3147 // Note that we don't use the `counterparty_tx_dust_exposure` (with
3148 // `htlc_dust_exposure_msat`) here as it only applies to non-dust HTLCs.
3149 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
3150 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat));
3151 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
3154 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
3155 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
3156 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
3157 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
3158 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
3161 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
3162 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
3163 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
3165 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
3169 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
3170 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat);
3172 if htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
3173 available_capacity_msat = 0;
3177 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
3178 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
3179 - htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat as i64
3180 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
3182 outbound_capacity_msat,
3183 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
3184 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
3189 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
3190 let context = &self;
3191 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
3194 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
3195 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
3197 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3198 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3200 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3201 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3203 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3204 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3205 let context = &self;
3206 assert!(context.is_outbound());
3208 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3211 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3212 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3214 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3215 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3217 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3218 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3220 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3221 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3225 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3226 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3232 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3233 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3234 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3237 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
3238 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
3239 included_htlcs += 1;
3242 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3243 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3247 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3248 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3249 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3250 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
3251 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
3252 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3257 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3259 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3260 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3265 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3266 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3270 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3271 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3272 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3275 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3276 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3278 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3279 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3280 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3282 total_pending_htlcs,
3283 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3284 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3285 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3287 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3288 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3289 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3291 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3293 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3298 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3299 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3301 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3302 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3304 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3305 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3307 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3308 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3309 let context = &self;
3310 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3312 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3315 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3316 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3318 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3319 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3321 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3322 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3324 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3325 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3329 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3330 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3336 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3337 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3338 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3339 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3340 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3341 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3344 included_htlcs += 1;
3347 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3348 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3351 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3352 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3354 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3355 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3356 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3361 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3362 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3363 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3366 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3367 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3369 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3370 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3372 total_pending_htlcs,
3373 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3374 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3375 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3377 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3378 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3379 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3381 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3383 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3388 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3389 match self.channel_state {
3390 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3391 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3392 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3393 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3403 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3405 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3406 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3409 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3411 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3412 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3413 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3417 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3418 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3419 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3422 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3424 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3425 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3428 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3429 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3430 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3431 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3432 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3433 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3434 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3435 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3436 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3437 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3438 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3440 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3441 // return them to fail the payment.
3442 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3443 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3444 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3446 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3447 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3452 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3453 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3454 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3455 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3456 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3457 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3458 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3459 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3460 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3461 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3462 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3463 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3464 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3465 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3466 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3470 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3471 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3473 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3474 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3478 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3479 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3480 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3481 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3482 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3483 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3484 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3485 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3489 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3490 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3491 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3492 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3494 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3495 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3496 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3497 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3499 match &self.holder_signer {
3500 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3501 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3502 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3503 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3504 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3507 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3511 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3512 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3513 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3515 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3516 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3517 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3519 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3520 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3521 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3524 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3525 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3527 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3533 /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3534 /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3535 /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3536 pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3537 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3540 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3542 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3544 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3545 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3550 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3551 // We've exhausted our options
3554 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3555 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3558 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3559 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3560 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3561 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3563 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3564 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3565 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3566 assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3567 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3568 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3570 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3572 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3577 // Internal utility functions for channels
3579 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3580 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3581 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3583 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3585 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3586 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3587 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3589 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3592 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3594 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3597 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3598 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3599 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3601 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3603 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3604 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3605 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3606 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3607 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3610 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3611 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3612 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3613 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3614 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3615 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3616 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3619 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3620 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3622 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3624 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3625 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3626 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3627 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3628 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3629 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3630 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3633 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3634 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3636 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3637 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3640 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3641 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3642 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3643 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3644 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3645 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3648 pub(crate) fn per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3649 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3650 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3651 let commitment_tx_fee = COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000;
3652 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3653 commitment_tx_fee + htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000
3659 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3660 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3661 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3662 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3663 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3664 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3665 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3666 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3667 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3668 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3669 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3670 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3673 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3674 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3675 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3676 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3677 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3678 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3681 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3682 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3684 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3685 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3686 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3690 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3691 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3692 trait FailHTLCContents {
3693 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3694 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3695 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3696 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3698 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3699 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3700 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3701 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3703 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3704 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3706 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3707 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3710 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3711 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3712 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3713 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3716 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3717 failure_code: self.1
3720 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3721 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3723 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3724 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3726 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3727 failure_code: self.1
3732 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3733 fn name() -> &'static str;
3735 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3736 fn name() -> &'static str {
3740 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3741 fn name() -> &'static str {
3742 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3746 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3747 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3748 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: EcdsaChannelSigner
3750 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3751 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3752 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3753 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3755 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3756 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3758 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3760 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3761 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3762 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3763 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3765 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3766 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3770 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
3776 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3777 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3778 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3779 // outside of those situations will fail.
3780 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3784 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3789 1 + // script length (0)
3793 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3794 2 + // witness marker and flag
3795 1 + // witness element count
3796 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3797 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3798 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3799 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3800 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3801 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3803 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3804 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3805 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3811 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3812 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3813 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3814 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3816 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3817 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3818 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3820 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3821 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3822 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3823 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3824 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3825 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3828 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3829 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3832 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3833 value_to_holder = 0;
3836 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3837 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3838 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3839 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3841 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3842 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3845 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3846 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3849 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3852 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3853 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3855 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3857 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3858 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3859 where L::Target: Logger {
3860 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3861 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3862 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3863 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3864 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3865 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3866 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3867 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3871 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3872 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3873 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3874 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3876 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3877 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3880 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3881 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3882 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3884 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3885 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3886 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3887 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3888 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3889 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3890 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3892 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3893 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3894 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3896 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3897 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3899 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3902 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3903 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3907 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3911 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3912 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3913 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3914 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3915 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3916 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3919 // Now update local state:
3921 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3922 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3923 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3924 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3925 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3926 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3927 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3928 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3930 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3933 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3934 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3935 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3936 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3937 // do not not get into this branch.
3938 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3939 match pending_update {
3940 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3941 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3942 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3943 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3944 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3945 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3946 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3949 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3950 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3952 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3953 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3954 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3955 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3956 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3957 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3963 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3964 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3965 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3967 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3968 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3969 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3971 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3972 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3975 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3976 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3978 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3979 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3981 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3982 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3985 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3988 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3989 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3990 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3991 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3996 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3997 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3998 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3999 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
4000 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
4001 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
4002 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
4003 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
4004 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
4005 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
4006 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4007 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
4008 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4009 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4010 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4012 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
4013 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
4014 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
4015 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
4016 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
4019 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
4020 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4021 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4027 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4028 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
4030 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
4034 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
4035 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
4036 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
4037 /// before we fail backwards.
4039 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
4040 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
4041 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
4042 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
4043 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4044 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
4045 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
4048 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
4049 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
4051 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
4052 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
4053 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
4054 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4055 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
4056 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
4059 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
4060 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
4061 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
4062 /// before we fail backwards.
4064 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
4065 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
4066 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
4067 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
4068 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4070 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4071 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4072 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
4075 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
4076 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
4077 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
4079 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
4080 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
4081 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
4083 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
4084 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
4085 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4087 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
4092 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
4093 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
4099 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
4100 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4101 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
4102 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
4103 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
4107 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4108 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
4109 force_holding_cell = true;
4112 // Now update local state:
4113 if force_holding_cell {
4114 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4115 match pending_update {
4116 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
4117 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
4118 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4119 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
4123 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
4124 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
4126 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
4127 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
4128 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
4134 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
4135 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
4139 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
4140 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
4142 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
4143 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
4146 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
4149 // Message handlers:
4150 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
4151 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
4152 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
4153 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
4154 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
4155 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
4156 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
4159 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
4161 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
4163 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
4164 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
4165 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
4166 debug_assert!(matches!(
4167 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
4169 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4170 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
4173 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
4174 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
4176 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4177 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4178 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
4179 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
4181 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4184 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4185 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
4186 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
4189 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
4190 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
4191 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
4192 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
4193 // when routing outbound payments.
4194 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
4198 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
4199 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
4200 let mut check_reconnection = false;
4201 match &self.context.channel_state {
4202 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
4203 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
4204 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4205 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
4206 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4207 check_reconnection = true;
4208 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
4209 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
4210 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
4211 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
4212 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4214 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
4215 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4218 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4219 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
4220 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
4222 if check_reconnection {
4223 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
4224 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
4225 let expected_point =
4226 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4227 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
4229 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
4230 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
4231 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
4232 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
4233 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
4234 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
4236 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
4237 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
4238 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
4239 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
4240 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
4242 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
4243 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
4248 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4249 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4251 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4253 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
4256 pub fn update_add_htlc<F: Deref>(
4257 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
4258 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
4259 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
4260 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4263 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4264 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4265 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4267 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4270 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4273 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4276 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4280 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4281 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4282 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
4283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4285 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4289 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4290 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4291 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4292 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4293 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4294 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4295 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4296 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4297 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4298 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4299 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4301 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4302 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4303 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4304 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4305 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4306 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4310 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4311 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4312 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4313 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4314 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4315 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4318 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4319 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4321 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4322 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4323 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4325 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4326 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4330 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4331 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4333 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4334 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4338 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4339 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4343 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4344 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4345 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4346 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4347 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4351 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4352 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4354 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4355 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4358 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4359 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4360 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4364 // Now update local state:
4365 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4366 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4367 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4368 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4369 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4370 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4371 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
4372 pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
4378 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4380 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4381 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4382 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4383 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4384 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4385 None => fail_reason.into(),
4386 Some(payment_preimage) => {
4387 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4388 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4389 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4391 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4395 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4396 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4397 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4398 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4400 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4401 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4406 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4409 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4410 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4413 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4414 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4417 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4420 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4421 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4422 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4424 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4425 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4428 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4432 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4433 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4434 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4436 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4437 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4440 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4444 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4445 where L::Target: Logger
4447 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4448 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4450 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4451 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4453 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4454 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4457 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4459 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
4461 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, false, logger);
4462 let commitment_txid = {
4463 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4464 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4465 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4467 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4468 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4469 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4470 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4471 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4472 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4476 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4478 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4479 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4480 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4481 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4484 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4485 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4486 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4487 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4490 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4492 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4493 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4494 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4495 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4496 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4497 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4498 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4499 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4500 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4501 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4502 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4508 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4509 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4512 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4513 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4514 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4515 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4516 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4517 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4518 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4519 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4520 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4521 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4522 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4523 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4524 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4527 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4528 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4529 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4530 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4531 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4532 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4533 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4535 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4536 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4537 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4538 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4539 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4540 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4541 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4542 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4544 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4545 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4548 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4550 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4551 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4552 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4555 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4558 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4559 commitment_stats.tx,
4561 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4562 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4563 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4566 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4567 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4569 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4570 let mut need_commitment = false;
4571 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4572 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4573 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4574 need_commitment = true;
4578 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4579 let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
4580 Some(resolution.clone())
4582 if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
4583 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4584 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4585 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
4586 need_commitment = true;
4589 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4590 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4591 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4592 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4593 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4594 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4595 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4596 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4597 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4598 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4599 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4600 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4601 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4602 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4604 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4606 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4607 need_commitment = true;
4611 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4612 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4613 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4614 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4615 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4616 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4617 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4619 nondust_htlc_sources,
4621 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4624 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
4625 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4626 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4627 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4628 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4630 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4631 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4632 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4633 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4634 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4635 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4636 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4637 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4638 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4639 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4640 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4641 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4642 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4643 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4645 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4646 &self.context.channel_id);
4647 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4650 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4651 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4652 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4653 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4654 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4655 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4656 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4657 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4658 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4662 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4663 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4664 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4665 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4668 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4669 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4670 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4671 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4672 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4673 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4674 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4676 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4677 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4678 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4681 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4682 /// for our counterparty.
4683 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4684 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4685 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4686 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4688 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4689 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4690 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4691 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4693 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4694 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4695 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4696 updates: Vec::new(),
4697 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4700 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4701 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4702 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4703 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4704 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4705 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4706 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4707 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4708 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4709 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4710 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4711 // to rebalance channels.
4712 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4713 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4714 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4715 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4717 match self.send_htlc(
4718 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4719 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4721 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4724 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4725 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4726 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4727 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4728 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4729 // into the holding cell without ever being
4730 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4731 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4732 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4735 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4742 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4743 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4744 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4745 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4746 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4747 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4748 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4749 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4750 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4751 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4752 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4753 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4756 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4757 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4758 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4760 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4761 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4762 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4765 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4767 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4768 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4769 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4770 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4771 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4772 // for a full revocation before failing.
4773 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4774 update_fail_count += 1;
4776 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4778 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4783 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4784 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4786 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4787 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4792 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4793 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4794 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4795 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4796 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4798 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4799 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4800 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4802 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4803 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4809 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4810 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4811 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4812 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4813 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4814 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4815 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4816 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4817 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4819 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4820 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4822 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4825 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4829 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4831 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4832 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4837 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4838 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4839 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4840 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4841 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4842 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4843 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4844 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4845 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4848 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4850 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4851 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4854 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4855 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4856 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4857 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4859 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4861 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4866 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4867 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4868 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4869 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4870 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4871 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4872 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4873 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4874 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4876 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4879 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4880 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4881 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4882 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4883 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4884 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4885 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4886 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4887 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4889 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4890 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4893 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4894 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4895 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
4896 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4897 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4898 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4899 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4900 let mut require_commitment = false;
4901 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4904 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4905 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4906 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4907 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4909 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4910 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4911 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4912 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4913 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4914 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4916 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4920 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4921 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4922 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4923 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4924 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4926 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4927 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4928 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4933 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4934 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4936 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4940 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4941 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4943 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
4944 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4945 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
4946 require_commitment = true;
4947 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
4949 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
4950 match pending_htlc_status {
4951 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4952 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4953 require_commitment = true;
4955 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4956 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4957 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4959 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4960 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4961 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4965 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4966 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
4967 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4968 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4971 InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
4972 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4973 pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
4974 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4980 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4981 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4982 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4983 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4984 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4986 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4987 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4988 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4989 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4990 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4991 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4992 require_commitment = true;
4996 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4998 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4999 match update_state {
5000 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
5001 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
5002 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5003 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5004 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5005 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
5007 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
5008 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
5009 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5010 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5011 require_commitment = true;
5012 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5013 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5018 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
5019 let release_state_str =
5020 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
5021 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
5022 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
5023 if !release_monitor {
5024 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5025 update: monitor_update,
5027 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
5029 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
5034 self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
5036 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5037 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
5038 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
5039 if require_commitment {
5040 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5041 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
5042 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
5043 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
5045 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5046 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
5047 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
5048 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5049 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
5051 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
5052 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
5053 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5054 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
5055 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
5058 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
5059 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
5060 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
5061 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
5062 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5063 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
5065 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
5066 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
5068 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5069 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5071 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
5072 if require_commitment {
5073 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5075 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
5076 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
5077 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5078 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
5080 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
5081 &self.context.channel_id(),
5082 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
5085 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5086 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5088 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
5089 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
5091 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5092 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5098 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5099 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5100 /// commitment update.
5101 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
5102 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5103 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5105 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
5106 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
5109 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
5110 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
5111 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
5112 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
5114 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
5115 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5116 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5117 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5118 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5119 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
5120 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5122 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5123 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
5125 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5126 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
5128 if !self.context.is_live() {
5129 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
5132 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
5133 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5134 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw), dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5135 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
5136 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, true, logger);
5137 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
5138 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - htlc_stats.outbound_holding_cell_msat;
5139 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
5140 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
5141 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
5145 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
5146 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5147 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5148 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5151 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5152 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5156 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5157 force_holding_cell = true;
5160 if force_holding_cell {
5161 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
5165 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
5166 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
5168 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5169 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5174 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
5175 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
5177 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
5179 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
5180 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5181 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5182 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5186 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5187 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
5188 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
5192 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
5193 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
5196 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
5197 // will be retransmitted.
5198 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
5199 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
5200 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
5202 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
5203 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5205 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
5206 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
5207 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
5208 // this HTLC accordingly
5209 inbound_drop_count += 1;
5212 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
5213 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
5214 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
5215 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
5218 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
5219 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
5220 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
5221 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
5222 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
5223 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
5228 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
5230 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5231 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
5232 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5233 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5237 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5238 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5239 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
5240 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
5241 // the update upon reconnection.
5242 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
5246 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5248 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
5249 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
5253 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
5254 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
5255 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
5256 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
5257 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
5258 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
5259 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5261 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5262 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5263 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5264 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5265 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5266 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5267 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5269 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5270 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5271 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5272 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5273 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5274 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5275 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5278 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5279 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5280 /// to the remote side.
5281 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5282 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5283 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5284 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5287 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5289 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5290 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5292 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5293 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5294 // first received the funding_signed.
5295 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5296 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5297 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5298 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5300 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5302 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5303 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5304 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5305 funding_broadcastable = None;
5308 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5309 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5310 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5311 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5312 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5313 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5314 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5315 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5316 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5317 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5318 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
5321 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5323 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5324 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5325 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5326 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5327 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5328 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5329 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
5330 mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
5332 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5333 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5334 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5335 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5336 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5337 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds,
5338 funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5342 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5343 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5345 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5346 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5348 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5349 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5352 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5353 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5354 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5355 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5356 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5357 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5358 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5359 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5360 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5361 pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5365 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5366 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5368 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5369 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5371 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5374 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5376 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5377 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5378 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5379 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5380 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5381 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5382 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5383 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5384 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5386 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5387 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5388 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5393 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5395 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5396 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5397 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5398 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5400 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5401 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5403 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5404 self.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger)
5407 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5408 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5409 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5410 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5412 SignerResumeUpdates {
5419 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5420 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() <= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER + 2);
5421 // TODO: handle non-available case when get_per_commitment_point becomes async
5422 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
5423 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
5424 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() + 2);
5425 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5426 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5427 per_commitment_secret,
5428 next_per_commitment_point,
5430 next_local_nonce: None,
5434 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5435 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5436 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5437 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5438 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5439 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5441 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5442 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5443 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5444 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5445 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5446 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5447 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5448 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5449 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5450 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5451 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5456 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5457 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5459 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5460 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5461 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5462 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5463 reason: err_packet.clone()
5466 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5467 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5468 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5469 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5470 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5471 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5474 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5475 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5476 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5477 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5478 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5485 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5486 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5487 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5488 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5492 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5493 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5494 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5495 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5496 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5497 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5498 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5502 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5503 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5505 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5506 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5507 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5508 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5513 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5514 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5519 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5520 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5521 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5522 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5523 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5524 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5525 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5530 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5531 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5533 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5534 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5535 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5536 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5537 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5538 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5539 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5540 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5543 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5545 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5546 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5547 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5548 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5549 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5552 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5553 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5554 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5557 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1;
5558 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5559 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5560 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5561 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5562 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5563 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5565 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5566 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5567 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5568 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5569 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5572 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5573 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5574 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5575 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5576 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5577 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5578 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5579 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5583 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5584 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5585 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5586 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5587 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5588 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5589 our_commitment_transaction
5593 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5594 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5595 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5596 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5598 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5600 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger);
5602 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5603 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5604 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5605 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5606 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5607 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5609 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5610 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5611 channel_ready: None,
5612 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5613 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5614 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5618 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5619 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5620 channel_ready: Some(self.get_channel_ready()),
5621 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5622 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5623 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5627 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5628 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5629 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5631 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5632 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5633 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5636 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5639 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5640 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5641 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5642 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5643 our_commitment_transaction
5647 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5648 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5649 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5650 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5651 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5652 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5653 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5655 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5657 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == 1 {
5658 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5659 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
5662 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5663 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5664 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5666 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5669 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5670 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5671 raa: required_revoke,
5672 commitment_update: None,
5673 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5675 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5676 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5677 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5679 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5682 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5683 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5684 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5685 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5686 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5687 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5690 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5691 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5692 raa: required_revoke,
5693 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5694 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5697 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5698 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5699 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5700 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5701 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5704 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5705 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5706 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5707 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5712 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5713 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5714 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5715 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5717 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5719 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5721 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5722 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5723 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5724 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5725 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5726 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5727 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5728 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5730 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5731 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5732 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5733 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5734 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5736 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5737 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5738 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5739 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5742 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5743 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5744 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5745 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5746 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5747 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5748 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5749 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5750 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5751 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5752 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5753 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5754 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5755 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5756 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5758 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5761 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5762 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5765 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5766 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5767 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5768 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5769 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5770 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5773 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5774 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5775 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5776 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5777 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5778 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5781 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5787 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5788 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5789 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5790 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5792 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5793 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5794 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5795 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5796 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5797 return Ok((None, None, None));
5800 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5801 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5802 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5804 return Ok((None, None, None));
5807 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5808 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5809 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5810 return Ok((None, None, None));
5813 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5815 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5816 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5817 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5818 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5820 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5821 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5823 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5824 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5826 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5827 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5828 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5829 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5831 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5832 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5833 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5837 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5843 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5844 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5846 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5847 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5850 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5851 /// within our expected timeframe.
5853 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5854 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5855 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5858 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5861 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5862 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5866 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5867 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5869 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5870 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5872 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5873 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5874 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5875 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5878 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5879 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5880 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5883 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5885 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5886 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5889 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5890 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5891 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5894 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5897 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5898 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5899 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5900 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5902 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5905 assert!(send_shutdown);
5906 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5907 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5908 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5910 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5911 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5913 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5918 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5920 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5921 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5923 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5924 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5925 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5926 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5927 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5928 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5929 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5931 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5933 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5934 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5936 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5937 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5938 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5939 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5943 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5944 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5945 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5946 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5947 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5948 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5950 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5951 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5958 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5959 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5961 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5964 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5965 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5967 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5969 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5970 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5971 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5972 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5973 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5974 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5975 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5976 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5977 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5979 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5980 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5983 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5987 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5988 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5989 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5990 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5992 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5993 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5995 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5996 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5998 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5999 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
6001 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
6002 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
6005 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
6006 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
6009 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6010 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
6011 return Ok((None, None, None));
6014 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6015 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
6016 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
6017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
6019 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6021 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6024 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
6025 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
6026 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
6027 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6028 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
6032 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
6033 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6034 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
6038 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
6039 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
6041 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
6044 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
6045 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
6046 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6047 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
6049 monitor_update: None,
6050 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6051 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
6052 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6053 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
6054 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6055 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
6056 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
6057 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
6059 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
6060 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
6061 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6062 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
6066 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
6068 macro_rules! propose_fee {
6069 ($new_fee: expr) => {
6070 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6071 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
6073 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
6076 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
6077 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6079 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6080 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
6081 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6082 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
6084 monitor_update: None,
6085 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6086 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
6087 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6088 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
6089 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6090 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
6091 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
6092 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
6094 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
6095 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6096 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
6097 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
6102 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
6103 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
6104 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6105 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
6107 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
6108 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
6109 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
6111 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
6113 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6120 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
6121 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
6122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
6124 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6125 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6127 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6128 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6131 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6132 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
6133 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
6134 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
6135 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
6137 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6138 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
6139 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
6141 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
6142 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6145 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
6146 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
6147 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
6148 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
6149 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
6150 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6151 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
6152 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6154 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6157 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
6158 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6159 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
6160 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6166 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6167 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6168 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6169 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6171 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6177 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
6178 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
6179 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6180 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
6181 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
6182 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
6183 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
6185 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
6186 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
6189 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
6191 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
6192 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
6198 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
6199 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
6200 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
6201 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
6202 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
6203 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6204 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
6206 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
6207 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
6214 pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6215 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L
6216 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)>
6218 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6221 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6222 return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8))
6225 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
6226 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6227 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6228 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6231 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
6232 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
6233 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
6235 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
6236 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
6237 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6238 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6239 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6240 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6241 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6244 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
6245 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, &self.context.channel_type);
6246 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
6247 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
6248 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6249 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to tx fee dust at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6250 counterparty_tx_dust_exposure, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6251 return Err(("Exceeded our tx fee dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6255 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6256 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
6257 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6258 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6259 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
6260 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6261 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6265 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6266 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
6271 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
6272 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6273 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6274 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6275 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6276 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6280 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
6281 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
6282 let pending_remote_value_msat =
6283 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
6285 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6286 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
6287 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
6288 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
6289 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
6290 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6291 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
6292 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6293 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
6295 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
6296 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
6297 return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7));
6304 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6305 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() + 1
6308 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6309 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6312 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6313 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6317 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6318 &self.context.holder_signer
6322 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6324 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6325 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6326 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6327 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6328 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6329 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6331 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6333 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6341 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6342 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6346 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6347 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6348 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6349 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6352 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6353 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6354 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6355 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6358 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6359 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6360 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6361 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6362 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6363 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6366 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6367 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6368 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6369 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6370 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6371 if !release_monitor {
6372 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6381 /// On startup, its possible we detect some monitor updates have actually completed (and the
6382 /// ChannelManager was simply stale). In that case, we should simply drop them, which we do
6383 /// here after logging them.
6384 pub fn on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, loaded_mon_update_id: u64) {
6385 let channel_id = self.context.channel_id();
6386 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.retain(|update| {
6387 if update.update.update_id <= loaded_mon_update_id {
6390 "Dropping completed ChannelMonitorUpdate id {} on channel {} due to a stale ChannelManager",
6391 update.update.update_id,
6401 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6402 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6405 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6406 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6407 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6409 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6410 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6412 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6413 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6415 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6416 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6417 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6420 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6421 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6422 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6423 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6424 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6425 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6427 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6428 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6429 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6431 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6432 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6433 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6434 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6435 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6436 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6442 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6443 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6444 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6445 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6448 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6449 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6450 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6453 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6454 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6455 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6458 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6459 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6460 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6463 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6464 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6465 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6466 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6467 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6470 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6471 self.context.channel_update_status
6474 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6475 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6476 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6479 fn check_get_channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady>
6480 where L::Target: Logger
6483 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6484 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6485 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6489 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6490 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6491 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6494 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6498 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6499 // channel_ready yet.
6500 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6501 // TODO: set signer_pending_channel_ready
6502 log_debug!(logger, "Can't produce channel_ready: the signer is pending funding.");
6506 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6507 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6508 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6509 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6511 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6512 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6513 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6515 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6516 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6519 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6520 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6522 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6523 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6524 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6525 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6526 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6527 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6528 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6529 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6531 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6535 if !need_commitment_update {
6536 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: we do not need a commitment update");
6540 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6541 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: a monitor update is in progress. Setting monitor_pending_channel_ready.");
6542 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6546 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6547 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: the peer is disconnected.");
6551 // TODO: when get_per_commiment_point becomes async, check if the point is
6552 // available, if not, set signer_pending_channel_ready and return None
6554 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
6557 fn get_channel_ready(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReady {
6558 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
6559 msgs::ChannelReady {
6560 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6561 next_per_commitment_point: self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point(),
6562 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6566 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6567 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6568 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6569 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6570 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6571 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6572 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6574 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6577 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6578 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6579 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6580 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6581 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6582 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6583 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6584 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6585 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
6586 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6587 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6588 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6589 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6590 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6591 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6592 // channel and move on.
6593 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6594 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6596 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6597 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6598 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6600 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6601 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
6602 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6603 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6604 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6605 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6606 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6607 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6612 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6613 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6614 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6615 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6616 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6619 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6620 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6621 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
6622 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6623 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6624 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6627 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6628 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6629 // may have already happened for this block).
6630 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height, logger) {
6631 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6632 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6633 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6636 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6637 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6638 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6639 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6647 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6648 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6649 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6650 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6652 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6653 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6656 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6658 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6659 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6660 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6661 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6663 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6666 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6669 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6670 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6671 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6672 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6674 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6677 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6678 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6679 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6681 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6682 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6684 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6685 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6686 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6694 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6696 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height, logger) {
6697 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6698 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6700 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6701 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6704 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6705 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6706 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6707 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6708 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6709 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6710 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6711 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6714 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6715 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6716 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6717 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6719 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6720 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6721 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6723 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6724 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6725 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6726 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6728 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6729 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6730 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6731 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6732 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6733 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6734 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6737 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6738 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6740 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6743 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6744 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6745 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6746 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6747 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6748 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6749 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6750 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6751 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6752 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6753 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6754 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6755 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6756 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6757 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6758 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6759 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6765 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6770 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6771 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6773 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6774 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6775 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6776 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6778 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6781 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6783 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6784 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6785 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6786 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6787 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6788 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6790 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6791 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6794 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6795 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6796 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6797 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6798 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6799 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6801 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6802 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6805 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6806 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6807 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6808 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6809 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6815 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6816 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6817 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6818 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6820 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6823 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6827 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6831 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6832 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6836 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6840 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6841 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6844 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6848 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6850 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6855 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6856 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6857 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6859 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6864 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6866 None => return None,
6869 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6871 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6872 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6874 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6875 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6878 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6884 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6886 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6887 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6888 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6889 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6890 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6891 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6892 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6894 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6895 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6896 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6897 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6898 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6899 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6900 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6901 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6902 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6903 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6904 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6905 contents: announcement,
6908 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6913 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6917 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6918 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6919 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6920 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6921 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6922 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6923 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6924 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6926 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6928 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6929 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6930 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6931 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6933 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6934 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6935 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6936 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6939 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6940 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6941 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6942 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6945 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6948 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6949 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6950 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6951 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6952 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6953 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6956 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6958 Err(_) => return None,
6960 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6961 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6966 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6967 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6968 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6969 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6970 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6971 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6972 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6973 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6974 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6975 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6976 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6977 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6978 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6979 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6980 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6981 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6984 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6987 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6988 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6989 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6990 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6991 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6992 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6993 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6994 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6995 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6997 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6998 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6999 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(),
7000 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
7001 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
7002 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
7003 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
7004 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
7005 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
7007 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
7008 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
7009 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
7010 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
7011 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
7012 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
7013 next_funding_txid: None,
7018 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
7020 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
7021 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
7022 /// commitment update.
7024 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
7025 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7026 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
7027 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7028 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7029 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
7030 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7033 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
7034 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
7035 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
7037 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
7038 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
7043 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
7044 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
7046 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
7048 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
7049 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
7051 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
7052 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
7053 /// regenerate them.
7055 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
7056 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
7058 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
7059 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7060 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
7061 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
7062 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
7063 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7064 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
7065 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7067 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
7068 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
7069 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
7071 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
7073 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7074 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
7075 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
7078 if amount_msat == 0 {
7079 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
7082 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
7083 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
7084 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
7085 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7088 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
7089 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
7090 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
7093 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
7094 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
7095 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
7096 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
7097 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
7098 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
7099 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
7100 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
7103 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
7104 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
7105 payment_hash, amount_msat,
7106 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
7107 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
7108 else { "to peer" });
7110 if need_holding_cell {
7111 force_holding_cell = true;
7114 // Now update local state:
7115 if force_holding_cell {
7116 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7121 onion_routing_packet,
7128 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7129 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
7131 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
7133 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
7139 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
7140 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7141 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
7145 onion_routing_packet,
7149 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
7154 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
7155 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
7156 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
7157 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
7159 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7160 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
7161 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
7163 if let Some(state) = new_state {
7164 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7168 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7169 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
7170 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7171 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
7172 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
7173 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
7174 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
7177 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7178 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
7179 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
7180 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
7181 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
7182 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
7185 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
7187 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
7188 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7189 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
7190 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
7191 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
7193 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
7194 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
7197 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7198 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7199 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7200 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7201 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
7202 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
7203 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
7204 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7205 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7206 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
7207 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
7208 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
7210 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7212 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
7216 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
7217 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
7218 where L::Target: Logger
7220 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7221 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7222 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
7224 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7226 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7227 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
7228 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
7229 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
7230 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
7231 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
7232 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
7233 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
7234 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
7235 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
7236 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
7242 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
7245 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
7246 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
7247 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7248 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
7249 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7250 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7252 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7253 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7254 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
7256 match &self.context.holder_signer {
7257 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7258 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
7261 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
7262 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7266 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7267 &commitment_stats.tx,
7268 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7269 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7270 &self.context.secp_ctx,
7271 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7273 htlc_signatures = res.1;
7275 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7276 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7277 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7278 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7280 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7281 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7282 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7283 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7284 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7285 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7289 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7290 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7294 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7295 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7297 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7303 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7304 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7306 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7307 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7308 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7309 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7310 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7311 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7312 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7313 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7315 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7316 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7317 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7320 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7321 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7322 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7328 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7330 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7331 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7332 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7333 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7334 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7336 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7338 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7344 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7345 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7346 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7347 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7348 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7350 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7351 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7352 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7355 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7356 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7358 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7359 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7361 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7362 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7364 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7365 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7366 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7369 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7372 // use override shutdown script if provided
7373 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7374 Some(script) => script,
7376 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7377 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7378 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7379 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7383 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7384 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7386 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7391 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7392 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7393 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7394 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7395 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7397 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7398 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7399 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7400 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7401 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7402 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7403 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7405 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7407 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7408 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7410 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7411 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7412 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7415 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7416 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7417 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7418 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7419 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7421 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7422 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7429 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7430 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7432 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7435 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7436 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7437 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7439 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7440 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7444 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7448 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7449 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7450 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7451 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7454 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7455 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7456 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7457 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7458 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7459 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7460 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7461 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7463 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7464 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7465 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7466 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7467 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7468 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7471 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7472 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7473 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7476 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7480 counterparty_node_id,
7482 channel_value_satoshis,
7486 current_chain_height,
7487 outbound_scid_alias,
7488 temporary_channel_id,
7489 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7494 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7499 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7500 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7501 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7502 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7503 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7504 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7505 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7506 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7507 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7509 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7514 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7515 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7516 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7519 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7520 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7521 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7522 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7525 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7527 next_local_nonce: None,
7531 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7532 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7533 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7534 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7535 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7536 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7537 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7538 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7539 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7540 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7541 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7544 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7545 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7547 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7549 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7550 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7551 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7552 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7555 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7556 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7558 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7560 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7561 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7563 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7564 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7565 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
7566 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7567 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7568 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7571 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7572 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7574 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7575 if funding_created.is_none() {
7576 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7577 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7579 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7580 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7581 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7582 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7590 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7591 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7592 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7593 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7594 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7595 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7597 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7599 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7600 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7603 /// Returns true if we can resume the channel by sending the [`msgs::OpenChannel`] again.
7604 pub fn is_resumable(&self) -> bool {
7605 !self.context.have_received_message() &&
7606 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER
7609 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7610 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7611 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7613 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7614 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7617 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7618 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7621 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
7622 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
7623 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7626 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7628 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7629 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7630 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7631 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7632 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7633 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7634 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7635 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7636 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7637 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7638 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7639 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7640 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7641 first_per_commitment_point,
7642 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7643 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7644 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7645 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7647 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7649 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7650 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7655 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7656 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7658 // Check sanity of message fields:
7659 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7660 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7662 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7663 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7665 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7666 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7668 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7669 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7671 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7672 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7674 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7675 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7676 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7678 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7679 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7680 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7682 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7683 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7684 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7686 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7687 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7689 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7690 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7693 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7694 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7695 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7697 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7698 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7700 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7701 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7703 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7704 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7706 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7707 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7709 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7710 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7712 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7713 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7716 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7717 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7718 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7720 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7721 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7723 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7724 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7725 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7727 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7728 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7731 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7732 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7733 &Some(ref script) => {
7734 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7735 if script.len() == 0 {
7738 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7739 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7741 Some(script.clone())
7744 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7746 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7751 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7752 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7753 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7754 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7755 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7757 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7758 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7760 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7763 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7764 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7765 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7766 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7767 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7768 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7771 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7772 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7773 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7776 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7777 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7779 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7780 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7782 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7787 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7788 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7789 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7790 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7791 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7795 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7796 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7798 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7799 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7801 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7802 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7803 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7804 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7807 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7809 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7810 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7811 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7812 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7814 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7815 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7817 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
7818 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7820 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7821 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7822 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7823 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7824 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7825 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7829 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7830 initial_commitment_tx,
7833 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7834 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7838 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7839 if validated.is_err() {
7840 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7843 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7844 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7845 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7846 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7847 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7848 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7849 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7850 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7851 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7852 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7853 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7854 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7856 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7857 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7858 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7859 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7860 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7861 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7862 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7863 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7865 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7866 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7867 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7869 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7871 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
7872 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7874 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7876 let mut channel = Channel {
7877 context: self.context,
7878 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7879 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7882 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger).is_some();
7883 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7884 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7887 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7889 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7890 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7891 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7892 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7893 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7898 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7899 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7900 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7901 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7904 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7905 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7906 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7907 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7908 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7909 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7910 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7911 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7912 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7915 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7916 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7917 // `static_remote_key`.
7918 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7919 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7921 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7922 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7923 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7925 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7926 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7927 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7929 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7931 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7932 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7939 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7940 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7941 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7942 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7943 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7944 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7945 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7946 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7947 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7948 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7949 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7952 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
7954 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7955 // support this channel type.
7956 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7958 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7959 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7960 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7961 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7962 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7963 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7964 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7968 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7972 counterparty_node_id,
7976 current_chain_height,
7981 counterparty_pubkeys,
7983 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7984 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7986 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7988 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7993 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7994 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7996 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7997 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7998 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7999 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8002 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8003 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8005 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
8007 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8008 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
8011 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
8014 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8015 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8016 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8018 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
8019 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
8020 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
8021 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point();
8022 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8024 msgs::AcceptChannel {
8025 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8026 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
8027 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8028 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8029 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8030 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8031 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8032 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8033 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8034 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8035 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8036 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8037 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8038 first_per_commitment_point,
8039 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8040 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8041 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8043 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8045 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8047 next_local_nonce: None,
8051 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8052 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8054 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
8056 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
8057 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
8060 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
8061 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8063 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys();
8064 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
8065 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
8066 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8067 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8068 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
8069 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
8070 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
8071 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
8072 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
8073 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
8075 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
8078 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
8079 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
8080 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
8084 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8085 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
8088 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8089 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8091 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
8092 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
8094 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
8096 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
8097 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
8098 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8099 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
8102 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
8103 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
8104 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
8105 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
8106 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8108 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
8110 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
8111 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
8112 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
8115 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
8116 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
8117 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
8121 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8122 initial_commitment_tx,
8125 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8126 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8129 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
8130 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
8133 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
8135 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
8136 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
8137 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
8138 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
8140 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
8142 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8143 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
8144 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
8145 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
8146 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
8147 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8148 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
8149 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8150 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
8151 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
8152 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8154 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
8155 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
8156 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
8157 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
8158 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8159 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
8160 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
8162 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
8163 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
8165 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
8166 // `ChannelMonitor`.
8167 let mut channel = Channel {
8168 context: self.context,
8169 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8170 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
8172 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger).is_some();
8173 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
8175 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
8179 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8180 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8181 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8182 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8183 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8184 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8185 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8188 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8189 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8190 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
8191 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8192 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
8193 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
8194 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
8195 ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
8196 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8197 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8199 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
8200 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8201 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
8203 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
8205 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8206 funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8208 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
8209 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
8212 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
8216 counterparty_node_id,
8222 current_chain_height,
8223 outbound_scid_alias,
8224 temporary_channel_id,
8225 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8230 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8231 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8232 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8233 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
8234 funding_tx_locktime,
8235 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8241 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
8242 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
8243 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
8244 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
8245 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
8246 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
8248 F::Target: FeeEstimator
8250 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
8251 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
8254 pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8255 if self.context.have_received_message() {
8256 debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
8259 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8260 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8263 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8264 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(),
8265 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8266 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8267 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1,
8268 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8269 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8271 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8272 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8274 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8275 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8276 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8277 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8278 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8279 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8280 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8281 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8282 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8283 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8284 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8285 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8286 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8287 first_per_commitment_point,
8288 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8289 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8290 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8291 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8293 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8295 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8296 second_per_commitment_point,
8297 locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8298 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8303 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8304 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8305 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8306 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8307 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8308 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8311 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8312 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8313 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8314 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8315 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8316 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8317 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8318 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8319 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8320 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8321 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8322 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8325 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8326 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8327 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8328 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8329 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8331 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8332 // support this channel type.
8333 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8334 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8335 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8337 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8339 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8340 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8341 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8342 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8343 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8344 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8347 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8351 counterparty_node_id,
8355 current_chain_height,
8361 counterparty_pubkeys,
8363 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8364 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8365 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8366 msg.common_fields.clone(),
8368 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8369 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8370 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8371 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8375 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8376 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8377 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8378 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8379 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8380 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8387 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8388 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8390 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8391 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8392 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8393 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8396 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8397 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8399 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8401 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8402 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8405 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8408 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8409 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8410 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8412 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8413 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8414 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8415 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &self.context.secp_ctx);
8416 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8417 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8418 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8420 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8421 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8422 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8423 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8424 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8425 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8426 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8427 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8428 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8429 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8430 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8431 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8432 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8433 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8434 first_per_commitment_point,
8435 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8436 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8437 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8439 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8441 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8442 second_per_commitment_point,
8443 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8447 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8448 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8450 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8452 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8453 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8457 // Unfunded channel utilities
8459 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8460 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8461 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8462 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8463 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8464 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8465 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8466 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8467 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8468 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8471 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8472 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8473 // `only_static_remotekey`.
8474 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8475 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8476 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8482 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
8483 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8485 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8491 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8492 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8493 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8494 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8495 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8497 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8498 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8499 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8500 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8506 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8507 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8508 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8509 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8510 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8511 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8516 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8517 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8518 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8519 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8521 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8522 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8523 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8524 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8529 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8530 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8531 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8532 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8533 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8534 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8539 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8540 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8541 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8544 let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
8545 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
8546 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8547 matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
8551 SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8553 MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8555 write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8557 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8558 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8559 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8560 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8561 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8563 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8564 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8565 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8566 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8568 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8570 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8571 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8572 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8574 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8576 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8578 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8580 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8582 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8583 // deserialized from that format.
8584 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8585 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8586 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8588 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8590 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number().write(writer)?;
8591 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8592 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8594 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8595 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8596 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8597 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8600 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8601 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8602 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8605 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8606 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8607 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8608 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8610 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8611 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8613 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8614 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8615 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8620 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8623 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8625 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8626 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8627 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8632 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8635 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8638 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8640 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8645 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8646 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8647 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8649 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8650 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8651 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8652 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8653 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8654 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8655 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8657 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8659 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8661 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8664 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8665 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8666 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8669 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8671 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8672 preimages.push(preimage);
8674 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8675 reason.write(writer)?;
8677 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8679 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8680 preimages.push(preimage);
8682 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8683 reason.write(writer)?;
8686 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8687 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8690 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8691 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8692 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8693 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8694 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8695 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8697 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8698 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8699 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8702 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8703 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8704 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8705 source.write(writer)?;
8706 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8708 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8709 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8711 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8713 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8714 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8716 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8718 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8719 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8721 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8722 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8724 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8725 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8726 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8728 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8730 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8731 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8736 match self.context.resend_order {
8737 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8738 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8741 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8742 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8743 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8745 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8746 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8747 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8748 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8751 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8752 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8753 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8754 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8755 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8758 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8759 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8760 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8761 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8763 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8764 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8765 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8767 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8769 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8770 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8771 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8772 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8774 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8775 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8776 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8777 // consider the stale state on reload.
8780 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8781 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8782 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8784 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8785 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8786 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8788 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8789 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8791 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8792 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8793 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8795 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8796 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8798 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8801 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8802 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8803 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8805 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8808 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8809 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8811 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8812 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8813 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8815 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8817 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8819 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8821 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8822 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8823 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8824 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8825 htlc.write(writer)?;
8828 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8829 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8830 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8832 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8833 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8835 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8836 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8837 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8838 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8839 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8840 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8841 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8843 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8844 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8845 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8846 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8847 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8849 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8850 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8852 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8853 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8854 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8855 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8857 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8859 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
8860 if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
8861 monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
8864 // `current_point` will become optional when async signing is implemented.
8865 let cur_holder_commitment_point = Some(self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point());
8866 let next_holder_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.next_point();
8868 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8869 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8870 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8871 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8872 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8873 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8874 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8876 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8877 (2, chan_type, option),
8878 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8879 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8880 (5, self.context.config, required),
8881 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8882 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8883 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8884 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8885 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8886 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8887 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8888 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8889 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8890 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8891 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8892 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8893 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8894 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8895 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8896 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8897 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8898 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8899 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8900 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8901 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8902 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8903 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8904 (45, cur_holder_commitment_point, option),
8905 (47, next_holder_commitment_point, option),
8906 (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8913 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8914 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8916 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8917 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8919 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8920 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8921 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8923 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8924 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8925 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8926 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8928 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8930 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8931 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8932 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8933 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8934 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8936 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8937 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8940 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8941 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8942 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8944 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8946 let mut keys_data = None;
8948 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8949 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8950 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8951 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8952 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8953 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8954 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8955 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8956 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8957 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8961 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8962 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8963 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8966 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8968 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8969 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8970 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8972 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8974 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8975 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8976 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8977 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8978 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8979 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8980 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8981 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8983 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8984 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8986 Readable::read(reader)?
8988 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
8991 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8992 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8994 Readable::read(reader)?
8996 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
8998 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8999 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
9000 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9005 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9006 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
9007 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
9008 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9009 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9010 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
9011 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
9012 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
9013 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
9014 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9015 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9016 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9018 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9019 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
9022 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9023 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
9026 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9027 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
9029 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9031 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9032 blinding_point: None,
9036 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9037 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
9038 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
9039 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9040 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9041 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
9042 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
9043 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
9044 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
9045 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
9046 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9047 blinding_point: None,
9049 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9050 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
9051 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9053 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9054 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9055 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
9057 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9061 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9062 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
9063 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
9064 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9067 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
9068 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
9069 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
9071 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9072 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
9073 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
9074 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
9077 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9078 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
9079 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
9080 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
9083 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9085 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
9087 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9088 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9089 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
9090 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
9092 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
9093 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
9094 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
9095 // consider the stale state on reload.
9096 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9099 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9100 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9101 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
9103 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9106 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
9107 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
9108 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9110 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
9111 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
9112 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
9113 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
9115 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
9116 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
9118 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
9119 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9121 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
9122 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
9123 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
9125 let mut minimum_depth = None;
9127 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
9128 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
9130 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
9131 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9134 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9136 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
9137 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
9138 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
9139 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
9141 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9144 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
9145 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9147 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
9149 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
9150 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9152 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9153 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
9155 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
9157 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9158 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
9159 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9161 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9162 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
9163 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
9167 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
9168 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
9169 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
9171 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
9177 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
9178 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
9179 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
9180 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
9181 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
9182 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
9183 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
9184 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
9185 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
9186 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
9188 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
9189 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
9190 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
9191 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
9192 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
9193 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
9194 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
9196 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
9197 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9198 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
9199 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
9201 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
9203 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9204 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9206 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
9208 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
9210 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9211 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9213 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
9214 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
9216 let mut cur_holder_commitment_point_opt: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9217 let mut next_holder_commitment_point_opt: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9219 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9220 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
9221 (1, minimum_depth, option),
9222 (2, channel_type, option),
9223 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9224 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9225 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
9226 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
9227 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
9228 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
9229 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
9230 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
9231 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
9232 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
9233 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
9234 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
9235 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
9236 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9237 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
9238 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
9239 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
9240 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
9241 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
9242 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
9243 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9244 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9245 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
9246 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9247 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9248 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
9249 (45, cur_holder_commitment_point_opt, option),
9250 (47, next_holder_commitment_point_opt, option),
9251 (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
9254 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
9255 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
9256 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
9257 // required channel parameters.
9258 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
9259 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
9261 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
9263 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
9264 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9265 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
9266 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
9269 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
9270 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
9271 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9273 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9274 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9276 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9277 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9282 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
9283 if iter.next().is_some() {
9284 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9288 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
9289 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
9290 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
9291 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
9292 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
9295 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
9296 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
9297 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
9299 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9300 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9302 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
9303 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
9304 // separate u64 values.
9305 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
9307 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
9309 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
9310 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9311 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9312 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9314 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9315 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9317 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
9318 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9319 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9320 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9321 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9324 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9325 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9327 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9328 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9329 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9330 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9332 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9333 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9335 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9336 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9337 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9338 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9339 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9342 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9343 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9346 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9347 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9348 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9349 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9350 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9351 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9354 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9355 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9356 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9358 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9362 // If we're restoring this channel for the first time after an upgrade, then we require that the
9363 // signer be available so that we can immediately populate the current commitment point. Channel
9364 // restoration will fail if this is not possible.
9365 let holder_commitment_point = match (cur_holder_commitment_point_opt, next_holder_commitment_point_opt) {
9366 (Some(current), Some(next)) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9367 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, current, next
9369 (Some(current), _) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9370 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, current,
9371 next: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &secp_ctx),
9373 (_, _) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9374 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9375 current: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &secp_ctx),
9376 next: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &secp_ctx),
9381 context: ChannelContext {
9384 config: config.unwrap(),
9388 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9389 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9390 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9393 temporary_channel_id,
9395 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9397 channel_value_satoshis,
9399 latest_monitor_update_id,
9401 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9402 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9405 holder_commitment_point,
9406 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9409 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9410 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9411 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9412 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9416 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9417 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9418 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9419 monitor_pending_forwards,
9420 monitor_pending_failures,
9421 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9422 monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9424 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9425 signer_pending_funding: false,
9428 holding_cell_update_fee,
9429 next_holder_htlc_id,
9430 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9431 update_time_counter,
9434 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9435 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9436 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9437 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9439 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9440 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9441 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9442 closing_fee_limits: None,
9443 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9445 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9446 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9448 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9450 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9451 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9452 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9453 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9454 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9455 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9456 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9457 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9458 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9461 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9463 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9464 funding_transaction,
9467 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9468 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9469 counterparty_node_id,
9471 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9475 channel_update_status,
9476 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9480 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9481 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9482 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9483 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9485 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9486 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9488 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9489 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9490 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9492 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9493 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9495 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9496 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9498 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9501 local_initiated_shutdown,
9503 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9505 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9506 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9514 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9515 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9516 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
9517 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9518 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
9519 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9520 use crate::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9521 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9522 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9523 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9524 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9525 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9526 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9527 use crate::ln::msgs;
9528 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9529 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9530 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9531 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9532 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9533 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9534 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9535 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9536 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9537 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9538 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9539 use crate::util::test_utils;
9540 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9541 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9542 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9543 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9544 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9545 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9546 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9547 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
9548 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9549 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
9550 use crate::prelude::*;
9553 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9554 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9555 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9556 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9558 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9559 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9560 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9561 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9564 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9567 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9568 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9574 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9575 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9576 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9577 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9581 signer: InMemorySigner,
9584 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9585 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9588 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9589 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9591 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9593 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9594 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9597 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9601 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9603 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9604 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9605 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9606 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9607 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9610 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9611 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9612 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9613 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9617 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9618 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9619 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9623 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9624 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9625 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9626 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9629 let seed = [42; 32];
9630 let network = Network::Testnet;
9631 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9632 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9633 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9636 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9637 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9638 let config = UserConfig::default();
9639 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9640 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9641 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9643 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9644 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9648 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9649 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9651 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9652 let original_fee = 253;
9653 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9654 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9655 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9656 let seed = [42; 32];
9657 let network = Network::Testnet;
9658 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9660 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9661 let config = UserConfig::default();
9662 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9664 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9665 // same as the old fee.
9666 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9667 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9668 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9672 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9673 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9674 // dust limits are used.
9675 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9676 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9677 let seed = [42; 32];
9678 let network = Network::Testnet;
9679 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9680 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9681 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9683 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9684 // they have different dust limits.
9686 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9687 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9688 let config = UserConfig::default();
9689 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9691 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9692 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9693 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9694 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9695 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9697 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9698 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9699 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9700 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9701 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9703 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9704 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9705 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9706 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9708 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9709 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9710 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9712 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9713 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9714 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9716 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9717 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9718 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9720 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9721 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9722 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9723 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9726 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9728 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9729 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9730 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9731 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9732 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9733 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9734 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9735 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9736 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9738 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9739 blinding_point: None,
9742 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9743 // the dust limit check.
9744 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9745 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9746 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9747 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9749 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9750 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9751 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9752 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9753 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9754 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9755 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9759 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9760 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9761 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9762 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9763 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9764 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9765 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9766 let seed = [42; 32];
9767 let network = Network::Testnet;
9768 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9770 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9771 let config = UserConfig::default();
9772 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9774 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9775 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9777 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9778 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9779 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9780 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9781 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9782 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9784 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9785 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9786 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9787 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9788 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9790 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9792 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9793 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9794 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9795 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9796 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9798 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9799 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9800 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9801 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9802 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9806 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9807 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9808 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9809 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9810 let seed = [42; 32];
9811 let network = Network::Testnet;
9812 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9813 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9814 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9816 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9818 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9819 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9820 let config = UserConfig::default();
9821 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9823 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9824 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9825 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9826 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9828 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9829 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9830 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9832 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9833 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9834 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9835 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9837 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9838 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9839 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9841 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9842 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9843 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9845 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9846 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9847 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9848 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9849 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9850 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9851 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9853 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9855 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9856 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9857 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9858 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9859 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9863 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9864 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9865 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9866 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9867 let seed = [42; 32];
9868 let network = Network::Testnet;
9869 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9870 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9871 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9873 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9874 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9875 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9876 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9877 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9878 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9879 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9880 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9882 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9883 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9884 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9885 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9886 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9887 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9889 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9890 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9891 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9892 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9894 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9896 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9897 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9898 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9899 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9900 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9901 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9903 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9904 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9905 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9906 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9908 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9909 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9910 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9911 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9912 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9914 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9915 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9917 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9918 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9919 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9921 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9922 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9923 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9924 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9925 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9927 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9928 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9930 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9931 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9932 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9936 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9938 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9939 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9940 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9942 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9943 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9944 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9945 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9947 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9948 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9949 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9951 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9953 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9954 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9957 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9958 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9959 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9960 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9961 let seed = [42; 32];
9962 let network = Network::Testnet;
9963 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9964 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9965 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9968 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9969 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9970 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9972 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9973 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9975 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9976 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9977 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9979 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9980 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9982 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9984 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9985 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9987 // Channel Negotiations failed
9988 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9989 assert!(result.is_err());
9994 fn channel_update() {
9995 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9996 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9997 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9998 let seed = [42; 32];
9999 let network = Network::Testnet;
10000 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10001 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10002 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10004 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
10005 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10006 let config = UserConfig::default();
10007 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10009 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
10010 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
10011 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10012 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10013 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
10015 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
10016 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10017 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10018 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
10019 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
10021 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
10022 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10023 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10024 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10026 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10027 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10028 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10030 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
10031 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
10032 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10034 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
10035 let update = ChannelUpdate {
10036 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
10038 short_channel_id: 0,
10041 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
10042 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
10043 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
10044 fee_base_msat: 110,
10045 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
10046 excess_data: Vec::new(),
10048 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
10050 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
10052 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
10053 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
10054 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
10055 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
10057 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
10058 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
10059 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
10061 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
10064 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
10068 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
10069 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
10071 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10072 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10073 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10074 let seed = [42; 32];
10075 let network = Network::Testnet;
10076 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10077 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10079 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10080 let config = UserConfig::default();
10081 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
10082 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10083 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10085 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10086 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10087 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
10089 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
10090 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10091 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
10093 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10094 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
10095 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
10096 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
10097 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
10100 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10102 hops: vec![RouteHop {
10103 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
10104 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
10105 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
10109 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
10110 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
10111 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
10113 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
10116 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
10118 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10119 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
10120 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10121 blinding_point: None,
10123 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
10124 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
10126 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
10129 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
10132 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
10134 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
10137 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
10138 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
10139 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
10141 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
10142 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
10145 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10146 blinding_point: None,
10148 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
10149 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
10152 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
10153 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
10155 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
10156 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
10158 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
10161 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
10162 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
10163 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
10164 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
10165 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
10166 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
10167 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
10168 } = &mut dummy_add {
10169 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
10170 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
10171 } else { panic!() }
10172 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
10173 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
10174 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
10176 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
10179 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
10181 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
10182 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
10183 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
10184 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
10185 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
10186 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
10187 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
10188 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
10191 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
10193 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
10194 use bitcoin::sighash;
10195 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
10196 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
10197 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
10198 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
10199 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
10200 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
10201 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
10202 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
10203 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
10204 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
10205 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
10206 use crate::sync::Arc;
10207 use core::str::FromStr;
10208 use hex::DisplayHex;
10210 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
10211 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
10212 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
10213 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10215 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
10217 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10218 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10219 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10220 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10221 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10223 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
10224 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
10230 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10231 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
10232 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
10234 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10235 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10236 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
10237 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
10238 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10239 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
10241 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
10243 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
10244 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
10245 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
10246 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
10247 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
10248 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
10250 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
10251 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
10252 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
10253 selected_contest_delay: 144
10255 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
10256 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
10258 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
10259 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10261 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10262 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
10264 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10265 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10267 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
10268 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
10269 // build_commitment_transaction.
10270 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
10271 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10272 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10273 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
10274 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
10276 macro_rules! test_commitment {
10277 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10278 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10279 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
10283 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
10284 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10285 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10286 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
10290 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
10291 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
10292 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
10294 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
10295 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
10297 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
10298 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
10300 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
10302 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
10303 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
10304 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10305 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10306 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
10307 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
10308 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
10310 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
10311 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10312 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
10313 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10315 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10316 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
10317 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
10319 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
10321 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
10322 commitment_tx.clone(),
10323 counterparty_signature,
10324 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
10325 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
10326 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
10328 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10329 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
10331 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10332 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
10333 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
10335 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
10336 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
10339 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10340 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10342 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10343 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10344 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10345 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10346 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10347 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10348 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10349 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10351 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10354 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10355 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10356 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10360 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10363 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10364 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10365 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10366 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10367 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10368 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10370 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10371 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10372 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10373 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10374 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10375 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10376 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10377 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10378 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10379 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10381 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10382 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10383 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10384 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10385 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10386 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10388 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10392 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10393 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10394 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10395 "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", {});
10397 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10398 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10400 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10401 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10402 "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", {});
10404 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10405 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10406 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10407 "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", {});
10409 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10410 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10412 amount_msat: 1000000,
10414 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10415 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10417 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10420 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10421 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10423 amount_msat: 2000000,
10425 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10426 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10428 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10431 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10432 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10434 amount_msat: 2000000,
10436 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10437 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10438 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10439 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10440 blinding_point: None,
10442 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10445 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10446 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10448 amount_msat: 3000000,
10450 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10451 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10452 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10453 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10454 blinding_point: None,
10456 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10459 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10460 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10462 amount_msat: 4000000,
10464 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10465 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10467 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10471 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10472 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10473 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10475 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10476 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10477 "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", {
10480 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10481 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10482 "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" },
10485 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10486 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10487 "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" },
10490 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10491 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10492 "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" },
10495 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10496 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10497 "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" },
10500 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10501 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10502 "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" }
10505 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10506 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10507 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10509 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10510 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10511 "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", {
10514 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10515 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10516 "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" },
10519 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10520 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10521 "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" },
10524 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10525 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10526 "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" },
10529 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10530 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10531 "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" },
10534 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10535 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10536 "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" }
10539 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10540 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10541 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10543 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10544 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10545 "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", {
10548 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10549 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10550 "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" },
10553 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10554 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10555 "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" },
10558 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10559 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10560 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
10563 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10564 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10565 "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" }
10568 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10569 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10570 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10571 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10573 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10574 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10575 "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", {
10578 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10579 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10580 "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" },
10583 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10584 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10585 "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" },
10588 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10589 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10590 "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" },
10593 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10594 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10595 "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" }
10598 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10599 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10600 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10601 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10603 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10604 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10605 "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", {
10608 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10609 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10610 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10613 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10614 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10615 "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" },
10618 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10619 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10620 "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" },
10623 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10624 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10625 "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" }
10628 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10629 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10630 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10632 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10633 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10634 "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", {
10637 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10638 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10639 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10642 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10643 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10644 "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" },
10647 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10648 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10649 "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" }
10652 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10653 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10654 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10656 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10657 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10658 "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", {
10661 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10662 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10663 "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" },
10666 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10667 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10668 "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" },
10671 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10672 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10673 "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" }
10676 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10677 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10678 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10680 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10681 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10682 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10685 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10686 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10687 "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" },
10690 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10691 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10692 "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" }
10695 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10696 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10697 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10698 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10699 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10700 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10702 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10703 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10704 "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", {
10707 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10708 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10709 "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" },
10712 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10713 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10714 "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" }
10717 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10718 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10719 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10720 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10721 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10723 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10724 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10725 "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", {
10728 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10729 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10730 "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" },
10733 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10734 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10735 "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" }
10738 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10739 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10740 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10742 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10743 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10744 "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", {
10747 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10748 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10749 "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" }
10752 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10753 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10754 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10755 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10756 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10758 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10759 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10760 "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", {
10763 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10764 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10765 "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" }
10768 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10769 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10770 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10771 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10772 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10774 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10775 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10776 "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", {
10779 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10780 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10781 "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" }
10784 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10785 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10786 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10787 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10789 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10790 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10791 "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", {});
10793 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10794 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10795 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10796 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10797 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10799 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10800 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10801 "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", {});
10803 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10804 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10805 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10806 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10807 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10809 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10810 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10811 "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", {});
10813 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10814 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10815 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10817 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10818 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10819 "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", {});
10821 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10822 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10823 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10824 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10825 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10827 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10828 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10829 "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", {});
10831 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10832 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10833 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10834 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10835 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10837 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10838 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10839 "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", {});
10841 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10842 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10843 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10844 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10845 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10846 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10848 amount_msat: 2000000,
10850 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10851 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10853 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10856 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10857 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10858 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10860 amount_msat: 5000001,
10862 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10863 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10864 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10865 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10866 blinding_point: None,
10868 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10871 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10872 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10874 amount_msat: 5000000,
10876 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10877 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10878 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10879 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10880 blinding_point: None,
10882 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10886 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10887 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10888 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a69f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c0147304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10891 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10892 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10893 "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" },
10895 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10896 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10897 "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" },
10899 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10900 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10901 "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" }
10904 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10905 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10906 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10907 "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", {
10910 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10911 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10912 "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" },
10914 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10915 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10916 "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" },
10918 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10919 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10920 "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" }
10925 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10926 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10928 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10929 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10930 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10931 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10933 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10934 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10935 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10937 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10938 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10940 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10941 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10943 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10944 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10945 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10949 fn test_key_derivation() {
10950 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10951 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10953 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10954 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10956 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10957 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10959 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10960 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10962 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10963 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10965 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10966 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10968 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10969 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10973 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10974 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10975 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10976 let seed = [42; 32];
10977 let network = Network::Testnet;
10978 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10979 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10981 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10982 let config = UserConfig::default();
10983 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10984 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10986 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10987 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10989 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10990 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10991 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10992 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10993 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10994 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10995 assert!(res.is_ok());
10999 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
11000 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
11001 // resulting `channel_type`.
11002 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11003 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
11004 let network = Network::Testnet;
11005 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
11006 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11008 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
11009 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
11011 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
11012 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11014 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
11015 // need to signal it.
11016 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11017 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
11018 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
11019 &config, 0, 42, None
11021 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11023 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
11024 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
11025 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
11027 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11028 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
11029 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
11033 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11034 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11035 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
11036 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11037 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11040 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
11041 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
11045 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
11046 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
11047 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
11048 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11049 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
11050 let network = Network::Testnet;
11051 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
11052 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11054 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
11055 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
11057 let config = UserConfig::default();
11059 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
11060 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
11061 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
11062 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
11063 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
11065 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11066 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
11067 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
11071 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
11072 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11073 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
11075 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
11076 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
11077 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11078 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
11079 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
11080 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11082 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
11086 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
11087 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
11089 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11090 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
11091 let network = Network::Testnet;
11092 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
11093 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11095 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
11096 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
11098 let config = UserConfig::default();
11100 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
11101 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
11102 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
11103 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
11104 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
11105 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
11106 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
11107 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
11109 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
11110 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
11111 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
11112 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11113 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
11114 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
11118 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11119 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
11121 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11122 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
11123 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
11124 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11126 assert!(res.is_err());
11128 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
11129 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
11130 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
11132 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11133 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
11134 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
11137 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11139 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11140 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
11141 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11142 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11145 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
11146 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
11148 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
11149 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
11151 assert!(res.is_err());
11155 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
11156 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
11157 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11158 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11159 let seed = [42; 32];
11160 let network = Network::Testnet;
11161 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
11162 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
11163 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
11165 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
11166 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
11167 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
11168 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
11170 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
11171 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11172 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11177 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11187 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11188 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
11189 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11194 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
11195 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11201 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
11204 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
11205 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
11206 &accept_channel_msg,
11207 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
11208 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11211 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
11212 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
11213 let tx = Transaction {
11215 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
11219 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
11222 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
11225 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
11226 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
11227 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
11228 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11229 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
11230 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
11234 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11235 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11243 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
11244 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
11245 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
11246 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
11248 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
11249 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11256 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
11257 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
11258 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
11259 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
11260 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
11262 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
11263 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
11264 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
11272 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
11273 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
11276 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
11277 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
11278 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
11279 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0, &&logger).is_some());