1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
13 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
26 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
27 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
30 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
31 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
35 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
40 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
42 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
43 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
44 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
45 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
46 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
49 use crate::prelude::*;
50 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
52 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
53 use crate::sync::Mutex;
54 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
59 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
61 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
65 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
66 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
69 pub struct AvailableBalances {
70 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
71 pub balance_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
73 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
75 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
76 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
79 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
82 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
84 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
86 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
87 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
88 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
89 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
90 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
91 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
93 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
97 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
98 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
99 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
100 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
103 enum InboundHTLCState {
104 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
105 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
106 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
107 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
108 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
109 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
110 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
111 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
112 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
113 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
114 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
115 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
116 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
117 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
118 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
120 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
124 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
125 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
126 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
128 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
129 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
130 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
131 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
132 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
133 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
135 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
136 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
137 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
138 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
139 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
140 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
141 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
142 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
144 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
145 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
147 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
148 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
149 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
150 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
151 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
152 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
153 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
154 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
157 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
161 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
162 state: InboundHTLCState,
165 enum OutboundHTLCState {
166 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
167 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
168 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
169 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
170 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
171 /// money back (though we won't), and,
172 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
173 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
174 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
175 /// we'll never get out of sync).
176 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
177 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
178 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
180 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
181 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
182 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
187 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
188 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
189 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
190 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
191 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
192 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
193 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
194 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
198 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
200 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
201 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
204 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
207 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
208 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
213 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
214 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
216 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
217 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
222 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
226 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
227 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
232 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
233 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
234 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
238 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
240 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
241 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
242 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
245 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
250 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
254 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
255 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
256 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
257 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
258 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
259 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
260 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
262 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
263 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
264 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
265 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
266 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
267 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
268 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
270 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
271 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
272 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
277 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
278 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
279 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
281 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
282 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
284 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
285 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
286 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
287 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
288 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
289 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
290 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
291 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
292 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
294 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
295 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
296 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
297 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
298 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
299 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
300 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
301 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
302 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
303 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
304 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
305 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
306 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
307 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
308 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
309 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
311 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
312 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
313 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
314 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
315 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
316 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
317 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
318 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
320 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
321 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
322 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
323 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
325 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
327 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
329 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
330 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
331 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
332 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
336 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
338 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
340 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
342 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
343 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
344 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
345 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
346 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
348 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
349 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
351 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
353 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
354 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
356 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
357 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
358 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
359 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
360 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
361 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
363 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
364 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
366 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
367 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
368 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
369 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
370 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
372 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
373 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
375 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
376 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
378 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
379 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
380 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
381 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
387 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
388 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
390 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
391 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
392 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
397 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
398 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
400 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
401 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
407 macro_rules! secp_check {
408 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
411 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
416 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
417 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
418 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
419 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
420 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
421 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
422 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
423 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
425 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
427 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
429 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
433 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
435 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
436 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
437 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
439 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
440 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
442 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
443 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
444 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
445 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
446 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
448 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
449 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
453 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
459 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
462 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
463 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
464 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
465 holding_cell_msat: u64,
466 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
469 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
470 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
471 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
472 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
473 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
474 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
475 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
476 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
477 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
478 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
481 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
482 struct HTLCCandidate {
484 origin: HTLCInitiator,
488 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
496 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
498 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
500 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
501 htlc_value_msat: u64,
502 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
507 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
508 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
509 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
510 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
511 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
513 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
514 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
515 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
516 htlc_value_msat: u64,
518 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
519 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
523 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
524 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
525 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
526 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
527 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
528 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
529 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
530 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
531 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
532 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
533 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
536 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
537 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
538 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
539 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
540 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
541 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
542 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
543 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
546 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
548 /// Contains a tuple with the following:
549 /// - An optional (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
550 /// - A list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this channel's
551 /// counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
552 /// - An optional transaction id identifying a corresponding batch funding transaction.
553 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
554 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
555 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
559 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
560 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
561 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
562 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
563 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
564 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
565 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
566 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
567 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
568 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
569 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
570 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
571 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
572 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
573 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
575 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
576 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
577 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
578 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
580 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
581 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
582 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
583 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
585 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
586 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
587 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
588 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
589 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
591 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
592 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
593 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
594 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
596 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
597 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
598 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
600 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
601 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
602 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
603 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
604 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
606 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
607 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
610 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
611 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
613 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
614 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
615 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
616 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
618 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
619 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
621 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
622 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
625 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
626 (0, update, required),
629 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
630 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
631 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
632 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
633 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
637 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
638 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
639 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
641 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
643 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
644 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
645 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
649 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
651 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
652 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
653 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
658 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
659 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
660 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
661 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
662 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
664 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
665 /// in a timely manner.
666 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
669 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
670 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
671 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
673 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
674 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
675 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
676 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
680 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
681 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
682 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
684 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
685 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
686 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
687 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
689 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
693 /// The current channel ID.
694 channel_id: ChannelId,
695 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
696 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
697 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
700 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
701 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
703 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
704 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
705 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
707 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
708 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
709 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
710 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
712 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
713 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
715 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
717 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
718 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
719 destination_script: Script,
721 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
722 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
723 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
725 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
726 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
727 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
728 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
729 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
730 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
732 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
733 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
734 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
735 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
736 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
737 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
739 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
741 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
742 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
743 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
745 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
746 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
747 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
748 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
749 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
750 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
751 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
753 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
755 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
756 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
757 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
758 // HTLCs with similar state.
759 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
760 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
761 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
762 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
763 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
764 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
765 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
766 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
767 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
770 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
771 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
772 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
774 update_time_counter: u32,
776 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
777 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
778 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
779 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
780 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
781 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
783 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
784 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
786 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
787 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
788 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
789 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
791 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
792 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
794 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
796 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
798 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
799 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
800 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
801 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
802 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
803 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
804 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
805 channel_creation_height: u32,
807 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
810 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
812 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
815 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
817 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
820 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
822 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
824 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
825 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
828 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
830 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
832 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
833 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
835 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
837 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
838 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
839 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
841 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
843 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
844 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
845 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
847 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
848 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
849 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
851 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
853 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
855 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
856 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
857 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
858 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
860 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
861 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
862 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
864 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
865 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
866 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
868 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
869 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
870 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
871 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
872 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
873 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
874 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
875 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
877 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
878 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
879 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
880 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
881 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
883 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
884 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
886 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
887 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
888 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
889 /// unblock the state machine.
891 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
892 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
893 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
895 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
896 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
897 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
899 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
900 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
901 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
902 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
903 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
904 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
905 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
906 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
908 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
909 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
911 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
912 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
913 // the channel's funding UTXO.
915 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
916 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
917 // associated channel mapping.
919 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
920 // to store all of them.
921 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
923 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
924 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
925 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
926 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
927 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
929 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
930 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
932 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
933 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
935 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
936 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
937 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
939 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
940 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
941 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
944 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
945 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
946 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
947 self.update_time_counter
950 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
951 self.latest_monitor_update_id
954 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
955 self.config.announced_channel
958 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
959 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
962 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
963 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
964 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
965 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
968 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
969 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
970 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
973 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
974 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
975 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
976 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
977 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
980 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
981 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
982 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
983 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
985 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
986 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
988 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
989 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
991 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
992 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
994 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
997 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
998 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
999 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1000 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1001 self.channel_state &
1002 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1003 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1004 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1005 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1008 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1009 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1010 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1011 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1012 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1015 // Public utilities:
1017 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1021 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1023 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1024 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1025 self.temporary_channel_id
1028 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1032 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1033 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1034 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1038 /// Gets the channel's type
1039 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1043 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1045 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1046 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1047 self.short_channel_id
1050 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1051 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1052 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1055 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1056 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1057 self.outbound_scid_alias
1060 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1061 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1062 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1063 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1064 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1065 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1068 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1069 /// get_funding_created.
1070 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1071 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1074 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1075 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1076 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1079 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1080 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1081 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1082 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1086 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1089 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1090 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1093 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1094 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1097 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1098 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1099 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1102 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1103 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1106 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1107 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1108 self.counterparty_node_id
1111 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1112 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1113 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1116 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1117 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1118 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1121 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1122 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1124 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1125 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1126 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1127 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1129 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1133 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1134 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1135 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1138 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1139 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1140 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1143 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1144 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1145 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1147 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1148 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1153 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1154 self.channel_value_satoshis
1157 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1158 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1161 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1162 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1165 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1166 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1167 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1169 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1170 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1171 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1172 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1173 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1175 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1179 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1180 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1181 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1184 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1185 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1186 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1189 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1190 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1191 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1194 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1195 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1196 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1199 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1200 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1201 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1204 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1205 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1206 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1209 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1210 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1211 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1212 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1213 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1216 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1218 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1219 self.prev_config = None;
1223 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1224 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1228 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1229 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1230 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1231 let did_channel_update =
1232 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1233 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1234 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1235 if did_channel_update {
1236 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1237 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1238 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1239 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1241 self.config.options = *config;
1245 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1246 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1247 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1248 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1249 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1252 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1253 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1254 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1255 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1256 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1258 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1259 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1260 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1261 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1262 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1263 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1264 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1266 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1267 where L::Target: Logger
1269 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1270 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1271 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1273 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1274 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1275 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1276 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1278 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1279 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1280 if match update_state {
1281 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1282 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1283 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1284 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1285 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1287 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1291 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1292 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1293 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1295 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1297 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1298 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1299 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1301 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1302 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1303 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1304 transaction_output_index: None
1309 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1310 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1311 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1312 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1313 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1316 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1318 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1319 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1320 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1322 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1323 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1326 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1327 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1330 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1332 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1333 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1334 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1336 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1337 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1343 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1344 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1345 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1346 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1347 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1348 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1349 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1353 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1354 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1356 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1358 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1359 if generated_by_local {
1360 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1361 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1370 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1372 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1373 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1374 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1375 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1376 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1377 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1378 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1381 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1382 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1383 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1384 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1388 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1389 preimages.push(preimage);
1393 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1394 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1396 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1398 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1399 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1401 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1402 if !generated_by_local {
1403 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1411 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1412 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1413 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1414 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1415 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1416 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1417 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1418 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1420 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1422 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1423 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1424 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1425 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1427 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1429 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1430 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1431 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1432 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1435 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1436 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1437 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1438 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1440 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1443 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1444 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1445 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1446 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1448 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1451 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1452 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1457 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1458 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1463 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1465 let channel_parameters =
1466 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1467 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1468 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1475 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1478 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1479 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1480 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1481 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1483 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1484 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1485 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1493 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1494 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1500 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1501 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1502 /// our counterparty!)
1503 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1504 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1505 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1506 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1507 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1508 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1509 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1511 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1515 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1516 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1517 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1518 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1519 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1520 //may see payments to it!
1521 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1522 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1523 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1525 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1528 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1529 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1530 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1531 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1532 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1535 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1536 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1539 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1543 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1544 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1545 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1546 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1547 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1548 // which are near the dust limit.
1549 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1550 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1551 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1552 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1553 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1555 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1556 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1558 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1561 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1562 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1563 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1566 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1567 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1569 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1570 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1571 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1572 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1573 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1574 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1575 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1578 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1581 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1582 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1583 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1585 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1586 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1587 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1588 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1589 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1590 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1592 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1593 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1599 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1600 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1602 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1603 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1604 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1605 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1606 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1607 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1608 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1611 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1614 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1615 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1616 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1618 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1619 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1620 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1621 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1622 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1623 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1625 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1626 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1630 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1631 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1632 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1633 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1634 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1635 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1636 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1638 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1639 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1641 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1648 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1649 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1650 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1651 /// corner case properly.
1652 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1653 -> AvailableBalances
1654 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1656 let context = &self;
1657 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1658 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1659 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1661 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1662 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1663 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1664 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1667 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1669 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1670 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1672 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1674 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1676 if context.is_outbound() {
1677 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1678 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1680 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1681 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1683 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1684 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1685 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1686 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1689 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1690 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1691 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1692 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1694 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1695 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1696 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1697 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1698 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1699 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1700 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1701 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1702 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1703 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1705 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1708 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1709 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1710 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1711 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1712 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1715 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1716 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1718 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1719 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1720 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1722 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1723 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1724 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1725 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1729 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1731 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1732 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1733 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1734 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1735 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1736 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1737 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1739 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1740 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1742 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1743 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1744 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1746 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1747 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1748 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1749 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1750 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1753 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1754 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1755 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1756 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1757 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1758 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1761 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1762 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1763 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1765 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1769 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1770 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1772 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1773 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1777 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1778 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1779 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1780 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1782 outbound_capacity_msat,
1783 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1784 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1789 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1790 let context = &self;
1791 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1794 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1795 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1797 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1798 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1800 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1801 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1803 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1804 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1805 let context = &self;
1806 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1808 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1811 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1812 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1814 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1815 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1817 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1818 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1820 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1821 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1825 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1826 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1832 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1833 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1834 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1837 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1838 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1839 included_htlcs += 1;
1842 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1843 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1847 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1848 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1849 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1850 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1851 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1852 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1857 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1859 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1860 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1865 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1866 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1870 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1871 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1872 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1875 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1876 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1878 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1879 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1880 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1882 total_pending_htlcs,
1883 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1884 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1885 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1887 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1888 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1889 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1891 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1893 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1898 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1899 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1901 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1902 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1904 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1905 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1907 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1908 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1909 let context = &self;
1910 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1912 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1915 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1916 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1918 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1919 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1921 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1922 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1924 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1925 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1929 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1930 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1936 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1937 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1938 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1939 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1940 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1941 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1944 included_htlcs += 1;
1947 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1948 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1951 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1952 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1954 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1955 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1956 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1961 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1962 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1963 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1966 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1967 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1969 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1970 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1972 total_pending_htlcs,
1973 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1974 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1975 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1977 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1978 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1979 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1981 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1983 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1988 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
1989 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
1990 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
1991 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
1998 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2000 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2001 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2004 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2006 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2007 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2008 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2012 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2013 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2014 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2017 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2019 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2020 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2023 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2024 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2025 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2026 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2027 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2028 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2029 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2030 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2031 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2032 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2033 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2035 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2036 // return them to fail the payment.
2037 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2038 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2039 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2041 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2042 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2047 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2048 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2049 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2050 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2051 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2052 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2053 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2054 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2055 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2056 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2057 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2058 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2059 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2063 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2065 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2066 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2067 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid)
2071 // Internal utility functions for channels
2073 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2074 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2075 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2077 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2079 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2080 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2081 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2083 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2086 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2088 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2091 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2092 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2093 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2095 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2097 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2098 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2099 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2100 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2101 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2104 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2105 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2106 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2107 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2108 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2109 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2110 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2113 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2114 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2116 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2117 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2120 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2121 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2122 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2123 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2124 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2125 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2128 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2129 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2130 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2131 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2134 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2135 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2137 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2138 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2139 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2143 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2144 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2145 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2147 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2148 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2149 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2150 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2152 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2153 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2154 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2155 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2156 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2157 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2158 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2159 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2160 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2161 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2166 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2167 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2168 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2169 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2170 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2171 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2173 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2175 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2176 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2177 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2178 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2179 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2180 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2181 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2182 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2184 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2185 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2189 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2195 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2196 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2197 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2198 // outside of those situations will fail.
2199 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2203 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2208 1 + // script length (0)
2212 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2213 2 + // witness marker and flag
2214 1 + // witness element count
2215 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2216 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2217 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2218 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2219 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2220 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2222 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2223 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2224 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2230 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2231 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2232 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2233 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2235 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2236 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2237 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2239 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2240 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2241 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2242 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2243 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2244 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2247 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2248 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2251 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2252 value_to_holder = 0;
2255 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2256 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2257 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2258 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2260 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2261 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2264 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2265 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2268 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2271 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2272 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2274 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2276 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2277 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2278 where L::Target: Logger {
2279 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2280 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2281 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2282 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2283 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2284 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2285 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2286 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2290 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2291 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2292 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2293 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2295 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2296 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2298 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2300 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2301 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2302 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2304 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2305 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2306 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2307 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2308 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2309 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2310 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2312 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2313 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2314 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2316 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2317 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2319 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2322 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2323 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2327 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2331 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2332 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2333 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2334 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2335 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2336 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2339 // Now update local state:
2341 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2342 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2343 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2344 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2345 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2346 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2347 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2351 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2352 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2353 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2354 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2355 // do not not get into this branch.
2356 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2357 match pending_update {
2358 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2359 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2360 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2361 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2362 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2363 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2364 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2367 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2368 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2369 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2370 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2371 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2372 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2373 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2379 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2380 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2381 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2383 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2384 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2385 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2387 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2388 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2391 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2392 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2394 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2395 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2397 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2398 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2401 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2404 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2405 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2406 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2407 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2412 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2413 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2414 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2415 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2416 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2417 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2418 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2419 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2420 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2421 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2422 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2423 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2424 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2425 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2426 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2428 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2429 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2430 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2431 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2432 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2435 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2436 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2437 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2443 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2444 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2446 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2450 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2451 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2452 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2453 /// before we fail backwards.
2455 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2456 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2457 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2458 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2459 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2460 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2461 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2464 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2465 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2466 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2467 /// before we fail backwards.
2469 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2470 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2471 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2472 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2473 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2474 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2475 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2477 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2479 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2480 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2481 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2483 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2484 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2485 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2487 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2488 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2489 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2491 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2496 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2497 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2503 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2504 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2505 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2506 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2507 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2511 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2512 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2513 force_holding_cell = true;
2516 // Now update local state:
2517 if force_holding_cell {
2518 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2519 match pending_update {
2520 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2521 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2522 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2523 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2527 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2528 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2529 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2530 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2536 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2537 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2538 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2544 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2546 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2547 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2550 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2551 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2552 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2557 // Message handlers:
2559 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2560 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2561 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2562 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2563 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2567 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2568 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2570 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2573 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2574 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2575 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2576 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2579 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2581 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2582 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2583 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2584 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2586 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2587 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2589 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2590 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2592 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2593 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2594 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2595 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2596 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2597 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2601 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2602 initial_commitment_tx,
2605 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2606 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2609 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2610 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2613 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2614 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2615 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2616 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2617 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2618 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2619 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2620 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2621 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2622 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2623 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2624 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2626 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2628 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2629 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2630 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2631 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2632 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2633 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2634 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2636 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2637 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2638 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2640 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2642 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2643 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2645 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2647 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2648 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2652 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2653 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2654 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2655 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2656 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2657 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2658 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2661 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2662 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2664 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2665 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2666 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2667 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2669 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2672 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2673 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2674 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2677 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2678 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2679 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2680 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2681 // when routing outbound payments.
2682 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2686 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2688 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2689 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2691 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2692 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2694 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2695 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2696 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2697 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2698 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2699 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2700 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2701 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2702 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2704 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2705 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2706 let expected_point =
2707 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2708 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2710 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2711 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2712 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2713 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2714 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2715 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2717 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2718 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2719 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2720 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2721 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2723 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2724 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2728 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2731 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2732 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2734 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2736 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2739 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2740 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2741 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2742 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2743 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2744 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2746 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2747 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2748 if local_sent_shutdown {
2749 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2751 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2752 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2753 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2754 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2756 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2757 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2759 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2760 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2762 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2765 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2766 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2769 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2770 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2771 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2772 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2774 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2775 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2777 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2778 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2779 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2780 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2781 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2782 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2783 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2784 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2785 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2786 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2787 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2789 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2790 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2791 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2792 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2793 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2794 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2798 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2799 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2802 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2803 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2804 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2806 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2807 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2808 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2809 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2810 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2811 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2812 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2816 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2817 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2818 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2819 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2820 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2821 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2822 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2826 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2827 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2828 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2829 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2830 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2831 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2834 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2835 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2836 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2837 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2838 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2840 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2841 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2844 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2845 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2848 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2849 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2850 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2851 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2852 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2853 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2854 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2855 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2856 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2857 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2858 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2859 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2860 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2861 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2862 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2863 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2866 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2867 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2868 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2869 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2870 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2873 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2874 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2876 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2877 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2880 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2881 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2882 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2886 // Now update local state:
2887 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2888 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2889 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2890 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2891 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2892 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2893 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2898 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2900 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2901 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2902 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2903 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2904 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2905 None => fail_reason.into(),
2906 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2907 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2908 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2909 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2911 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2915 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2916 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2917 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2918 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2920 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2921 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2926 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2929 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2930 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2931 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2933 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2934 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2937 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2940 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2941 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2944 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2945 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2948 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2952 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2953 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2954 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2956 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2957 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2960 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2964 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2965 where L::Target: Logger
2967 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2968 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2970 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2971 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2973 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2974 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2977 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2979 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2981 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2982 let commitment_txid = {
2983 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2984 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2985 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2987 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2988 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2989 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2990 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
2991 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2992 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2996 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2998 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2999 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3000 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3001 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3004 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3005 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3006 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3010 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3012 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3013 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3014 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3015 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3016 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3017 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3018 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3019 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3020 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3021 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3022 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3028 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3029 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3032 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3033 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3034 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3035 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3036 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3037 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3038 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3039 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3040 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3041 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3042 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3043 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3044 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3047 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3048 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3049 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3050 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3051 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3052 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3053 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3055 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3056 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3057 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3058 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3059 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3060 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3061 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3062 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3064 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3065 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3068 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3070 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3071 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3072 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3075 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3078 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3079 commitment_stats.tx,
3081 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3082 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3083 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3086 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3087 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3089 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3090 let mut need_commitment = false;
3091 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3092 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3093 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3094 need_commitment = true;
3098 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3099 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3100 Some(forward_info.clone())
3102 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3103 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3104 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3105 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3106 need_commitment = true;
3109 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3110 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3111 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3112 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3113 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3114 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3115 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3116 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3117 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3118 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3119 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3120 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3121 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3122 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3124 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3126 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3127 need_commitment = true;
3131 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3132 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3133 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3134 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3135 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3136 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3138 nondust_htlc_sources,
3142 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3143 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3144 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3145 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3147 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3148 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3149 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3150 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3151 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3152 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3153 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3154 // includes the right HTLCs.
3155 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3156 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3157 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3158 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3159 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3160 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3162 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3163 &self.context.channel_id);
3164 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3167 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3168 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3169 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3170 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3171 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3172 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3173 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3174 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3175 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3179 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3180 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3181 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3182 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3185 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3186 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3187 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3188 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3189 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3190 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3191 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3193 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3194 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3195 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3196 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3199 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3200 /// for our counterparty.
3201 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3202 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3203 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3204 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3206 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3207 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3208 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3209 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3211 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3212 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3213 updates: Vec::new(),
3216 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3217 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3218 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3219 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3220 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3221 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3222 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3223 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3224 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3225 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3226 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3227 // to rebalance channels.
3228 match &htlc_update {
3229 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3230 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3231 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3233 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3234 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3236 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3239 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3240 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3241 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3242 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3243 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3244 // into the holding cell without ever being
3245 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3246 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3247 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3250 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3256 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3257 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3258 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3259 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3260 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3261 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3262 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3263 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3264 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3265 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3266 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3267 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3269 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3270 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3271 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3272 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3273 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3274 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3275 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3276 // for a full revocation before failing.
3277 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3278 update_fail_count += 1;
3281 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3283 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3290 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3291 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3293 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3294 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3299 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3300 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3301 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3302 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3303 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3305 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3306 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3307 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3309 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3310 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3316 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3317 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3318 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3319 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3320 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3321 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3322 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3323 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3324 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3326 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3329 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3332 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3333 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3336 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3338 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3339 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3340 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3344 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3345 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3346 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3347 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3348 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3349 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3350 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3351 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3355 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3357 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3358 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3361 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3362 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3363 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3364 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3366 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3370 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3371 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3372 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3373 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3374 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3375 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3376 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3377 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3381 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3382 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3383 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3384 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3385 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3386 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3387 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3388 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3389 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3391 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3392 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3395 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3396 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3397 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3398 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3399 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3400 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3401 let mut require_commitment = false;
3402 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3405 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3406 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3407 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3409 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3410 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3411 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3412 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3413 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3414 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3419 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3420 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3421 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3422 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3423 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3425 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3426 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3427 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3432 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3433 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3435 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3439 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3440 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3442 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3443 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3444 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3445 require_commitment = true;
3446 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3447 match forward_info {
3448 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3449 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3450 require_commitment = true;
3452 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3453 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3454 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3456 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3457 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3458 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3462 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3463 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3464 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3465 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3471 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3472 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3473 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3474 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3476 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3477 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3478 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3479 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3480 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3481 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3482 require_commitment = true;
3486 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3488 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3489 match update_state {
3490 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3491 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3492 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3493 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3494 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3496 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3497 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3498 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3499 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3500 require_commitment = true;
3501 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3502 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3507 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3508 let release_state_str =
3509 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3510 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3511 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3512 if !release_monitor {
3513 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3514 update: monitor_update,
3516 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3518 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3523 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3524 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3525 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3526 if require_commitment {
3527 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3528 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3529 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3530 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3531 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3532 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3533 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3534 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3535 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3537 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3538 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3539 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3540 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3541 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3544 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3545 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3546 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3547 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3548 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3549 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3551 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3552 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3554 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3555 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3557 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3558 if require_commitment {
3559 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3561 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3562 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3563 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3564 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3566 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3567 &self.context.channel_id(),
3568 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3571 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3572 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3574 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3575 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3577 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3578 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3584 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3585 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3586 /// commitment update.
3587 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3588 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3589 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3591 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3592 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3595 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3596 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3597 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3598 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3600 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3601 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3602 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3603 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3604 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3605 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3606 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3608 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3609 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3611 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3612 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3614 if !self.context.is_live() {
3615 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3618 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3619 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3620 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3621 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3622 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3623 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3624 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3625 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3626 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3627 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3631 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3632 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3633 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3634 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3635 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3636 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3639 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3640 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3644 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3645 force_holding_cell = true;
3648 if force_holding_cell {
3649 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3653 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3654 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3656 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3657 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3662 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3663 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3665 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3667 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3668 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3669 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3670 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3674 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3675 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3676 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3680 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3681 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3684 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3685 // will be retransmitted.
3686 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3687 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3688 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3690 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3691 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3693 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3694 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3695 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3696 // this HTLC accordingly
3697 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3700 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3701 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3702 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3703 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3706 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3707 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3708 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3709 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3710 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3711 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3716 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3718 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3719 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3720 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3721 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3725 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3726 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3727 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3728 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3729 // the update upon reconnection.
3730 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3734 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3736 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3737 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3741 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3742 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3743 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3744 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3745 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3746 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3747 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3749 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3750 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3751 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3752 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3753 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3754 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3755 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3757 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3758 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3759 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3760 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3761 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3762 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3763 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3766 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3767 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3768 /// to the remote side.
3769 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3770 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3771 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3772 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3775 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3777 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3778 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3780 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3781 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3782 // first received the funding_signed.
3783 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3784 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3785 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3787 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3788 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3789 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3790 funding_broadcastable = None;
3793 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3794 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3795 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3796 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3797 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3798 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3799 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3800 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3801 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3802 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3803 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3804 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3805 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3806 next_per_commitment_point,
3807 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3811 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3813 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3814 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3815 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3816 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3817 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3818 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3820 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3821 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3822 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3823 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3824 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3825 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3829 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3830 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3832 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3833 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3834 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3837 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3838 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3839 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3840 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3841 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3842 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3843 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3844 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3845 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3849 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3850 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3852 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3853 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3855 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3856 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3858 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3859 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3861 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3862 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3863 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3864 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3865 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3866 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3867 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3868 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3869 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3870 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3871 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3872 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3873 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3874 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3876 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3877 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3878 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3884 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3885 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3886 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3887 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3888 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3889 per_commitment_secret,
3890 next_per_commitment_point,
3892 next_local_nonce: None,
3896 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3897 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3898 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3899 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3900 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3902 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3903 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3904 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3905 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3906 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3907 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3908 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3909 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3910 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3911 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3916 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3917 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3919 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3920 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3921 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3922 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3923 reason: err_packet.clone()
3926 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3927 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3928 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3929 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3930 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3931 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3934 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3935 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3936 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3937 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3938 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3945 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3946 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3947 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3948 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3952 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3953 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3954 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3955 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3956 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3957 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3961 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3962 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3963 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3964 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3965 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3966 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3967 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3972 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3973 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3975 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3976 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3977 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3978 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3979 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3980 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3981 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3982 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3985 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3987 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3988 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3989 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3990 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3991 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3994 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3995 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3996 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
3999 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4000 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4001 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4002 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4003 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4004 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4006 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4007 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4008 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4009 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4010 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4013 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4014 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4015 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4016 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4017 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4018 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4019 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4020 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4024 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4025 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4026 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4027 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4029 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4033 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4034 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4035 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4036 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4038 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4040 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4042 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4043 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4044 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4045 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4046 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4047 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4049 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4050 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4051 channel_ready: None,
4052 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4053 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4054 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4058 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4059 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4060 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4061 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4062 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4063 next_per_commitment_point,
4064 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4066 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4067 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4068 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4072 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4073 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4074 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4076 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4077 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4078 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4081 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4084 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4087 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4088 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4089 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4090 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4091 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4092 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4093 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4095 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4097 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4098 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4099 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4100 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4101 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4102 next_per_commitment_point,
4103 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4107 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4108 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4109 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4111 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4114 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4115 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4116 raa: required_revoke,
4117 commitment_update: None,
4118 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4120 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4121 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4122 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4124 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4127 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4128 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4129 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4130 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4131 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4132 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4135 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4136 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4137 raa: required_revoke,
4138 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4139 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4143 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4147 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4148 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4149 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4150 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4152 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4154 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4156 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4157 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4158 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4159 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4160 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4161 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4163 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4164 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4165 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4166 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4167 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4169 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4170 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4171 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4172 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4175 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4176 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4177 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4178 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4179 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4180 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4181 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4182 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4183 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4184 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4185 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4186 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4187 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4188 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4189 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4191 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4194 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4195 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4198 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4199 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4200 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4201 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4202 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4203 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4206 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4207 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4208 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4209 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4210 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4211 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4214 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4220 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4221 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4222 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4223 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4225 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4226 return Ok((None, None));
4229 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4230 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4231 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4233 return Ok((None, None));
4236 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4238 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4239 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4240 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4241 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4243 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4244 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4246 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4247 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4249 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4250 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4251 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4252 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4254 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4255 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4256 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4263 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4264 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4266 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4267 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4270 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4271 /// within our expected timeframe.
4273 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4274 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4275 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4278 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4281 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4282 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4286 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4287 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4289 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4290 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4292 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4293 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4294 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4295 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4298 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4299 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4300 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4303 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4305 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4306 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4309 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4310 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4311 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4314 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4317 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4318 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4319 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4320 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4322 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4325 assert!(send_shutdown);
4326 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4327 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4328 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4330 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4333 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4338 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4340 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4341 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4343 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4344 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4345 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4346 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4347 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4348 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4351 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4352 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4354 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4355 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4356 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4357 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4361 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4362 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4363 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4364 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4365 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4366 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4368 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4369 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4376 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4377 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4379 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4382 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4383 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4385 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4387 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4388 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4389 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4390 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4391 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4392 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4393 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4394 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4395 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4397 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4398 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4401 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4405 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4406 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4407 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4408 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4410 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4413 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4414 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4416 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4417 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4419 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4420 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4423 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4424 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4427 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4428 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4429 return Ok((None, None));
4432 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4433 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4434 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4435 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4437 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4439 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4442 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4443 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4444 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4445 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4446 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4450 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4451 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4452 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4456 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4457 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4458 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4459 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4460 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4461 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4462 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4466 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4468 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4469 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4470 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4471 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4473 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4476 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4477 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4479 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4480 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4482 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4483 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4484 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4485 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4489 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4490 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4491 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4492 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4494 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4495 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4496 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4504 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4505 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4506 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4508 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4509 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4511 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4512 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4515 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4516 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4517 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4518 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4519 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4521 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4522 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4523 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4525 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4526 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4529 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4530 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4531 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4532 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4533 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4534 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4535 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4536 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4538 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4541 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4542 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4543 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4544 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4546 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4550 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4551 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4552 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4553 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4555 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4561 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4562 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4563 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4564 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4565 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4566 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4567 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4569 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4570 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4573 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4575 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4576 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4582 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4583 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4584 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4585 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4586 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4587 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4588 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4590 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4591 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4598 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4599 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4602 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4603 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4606 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4607 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4611 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4612 &self.context.holder_signer
4616 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4618 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4619 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4620 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4621 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4622 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4623 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4625 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4627 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4635 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4636 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4640 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4641 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4642 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4643 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4646 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4647 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4648 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4649 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4652 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4653 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4654 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4655 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4656 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4657 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4660 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4661 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4662 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4663 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4664 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4665 if !release_monitor {
4666 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4675 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4676 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4679 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4680 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4681 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4683 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4684 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4685 if self.context.channel_state &
4686 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4687 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4688 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4689 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4690 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4693 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4694 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4695 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4696 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4697 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4698 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4700 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4701 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4702 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4704 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4705 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4706 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4707 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4708 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4709 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4715 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4716 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4717 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4720 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4721 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4722 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4725 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4726 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4727 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4730 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4731 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4732 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4733 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4734 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4735 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4740 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4741 self.context.channel_update_status
4744 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4745 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4746 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4749 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4751 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4752 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4753 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4757 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4758 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4759 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4762 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4766 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4767 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4768 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4769 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4770 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4772 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4773 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4774 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4776 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4777 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4780 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4781 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4782 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4783 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4784 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4785 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4786 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4787 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4788 self.context.channel_state);
4790 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4794 if need_commitment_update {
4795 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4796 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4797 let next_per_commitment_point =
4798 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4799 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4800 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4801 next_per_commitment_point,
4802 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4806 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4812 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4813 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4814 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4815 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4816 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4817 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4818 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4820 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4823 let mut msgs = (None, None);
4824 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4825 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4826 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4827 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4828 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4829 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4830 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4831 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4832 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4833 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4834 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4835 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4836 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4837 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4838 // channel and move on.
4839 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4840 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4842 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4843 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4844 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4846 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4847 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4848 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4849 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4850 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4851 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4852 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4853 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4858 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4859 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4860 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4861 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4862 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4865 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4866 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4867 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4868 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4869 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4870 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
4873 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4874 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4875 // may have already happened for this block).
4876 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4877 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4878 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4879 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
4882 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4883 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4884 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4885 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4893 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4894 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4895 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4896 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4898 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4899 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4902 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4904 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4905 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4906 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4907 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4909 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4912 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4915 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4916 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4917 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4918 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4920 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4923 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4924 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4925 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4927 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4928 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4930 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4931 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4932 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4940 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4942 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4943 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
4944 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4946 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4947 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4950 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4951 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4952 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4953 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4954 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4955 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4956 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4957 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4958 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4961 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4962 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4963 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4964 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4966 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4967 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4968 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4970 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4971 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4972 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4973 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4975 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4976 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4977 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
4978 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4979 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4980 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4981 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4984 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
4985 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4987 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4990 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4991 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4992 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4993 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4994 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4995 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4996 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4997 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4998 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4999 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5000 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5001 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5002 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5003 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5004 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5005 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5006 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5012 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5017 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5018 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5020 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5021 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5022 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5023 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5025 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5028 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5030 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5031 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5032 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5033 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5034 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5035 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5037 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5038 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5041 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5042 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5043 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5044 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5045 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5046 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5048 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5049 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5052 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5053 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5054 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5055 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5056 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5062 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5063 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5064 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5065 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5067 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5070 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5074 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5078 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5079 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5083 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5087 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5088 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5091 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5095 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5097 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5102 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5103 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5104 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5106 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5111 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5113 None => return None,
5116 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5118 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5119 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5121 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5122 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5128 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5130 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5131 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5132 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5133 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5134 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5135 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5136 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5138 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5139 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5140 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5141 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5142 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5143 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5144 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5145 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5146 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5147 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5148 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5149 contents: announcement,
5154 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5158 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5159 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5160 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5161 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5162 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5163 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5164 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5165 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5167 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5169 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5170 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5171 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5172 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5174 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5175 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5176 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5177 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5180 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5181 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5182 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5183 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5186 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5189 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5190 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5191 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5192 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5193 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5194 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5197 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5199 Err(_) => return None,
5201 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5202 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5207 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5208 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5209 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5210 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5211 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5212 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5213 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5214 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5215 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5216 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5217 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5218 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5219 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5220 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5221 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5222 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5225 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5228 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5229 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5230 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5231 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5232 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5233 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5234 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5235 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5236 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5238 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5239 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5240 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5241 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5242 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5243 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5244 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5245 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5246 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5248 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5249 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5250 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5251 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5252 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5253 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5254 next_funding_txid: None,
5259 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5261 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5262 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5263 /// commitment update.
5265 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5266 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5267 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5268 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5269 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5270 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5271 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5274 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5275 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5276 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5278 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5279 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5284 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5285 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5287 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5289 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5290 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5292 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5293 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5294 /// regenerate them.
5296 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5297 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5299 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5300 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5301 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5302 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5303 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5304 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5305 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5307 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5308 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5310 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5311 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5312 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5315 if amount_msat == 0 {
5316 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5319 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5320 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5321 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5322 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5325 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5326 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5327 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5330 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5331 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5332 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5333 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5334 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5335 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5336 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5337 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5340 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5341 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5342 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5343 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5344 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5345 else { "to peer" });
5347 if need_holding_cell {
5348 force_holding_cell = true;
5351 // Now update local state:
5352 if force_holding_cell {
5353 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5358 onion_routing_packet,
5364 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5365 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5367 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5369 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5374 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5375 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5376 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5380 onion_routing_packet,
5383 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5388 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5389 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5390 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5391 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5393 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5394 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5395 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5397 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5398 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5402 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5403 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5404 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5405 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5406 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5407 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5408 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5411 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5412 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5413 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5414 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5415 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5416 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5419 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5421 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5422 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5423 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5424 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5425 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5427 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5428 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5431 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5432 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5433 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5434 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5435 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5436 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5437 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5438 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5439 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5440 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5441 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5444 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5448 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5449 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5450 where L::Target: Logger
5452 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5453 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5454 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5456 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5458 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5459 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5460 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5461 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5462 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5463 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5464 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5465 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5466 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5467 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5468 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5474 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5477 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5478 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5479 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5480 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5481 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5482 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5484 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5485 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5486 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5488 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5489 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5490 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5493 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5494 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5498 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5499 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5501 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5503 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5504 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5505 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5506 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5508 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5509 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5510 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5511 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5512 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5513 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5517 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5518 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5522 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5523 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5528 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5529 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5531 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5532 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5533 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5534 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5535 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5536 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5537 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5538 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5540 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5541 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5542 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5545 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5546 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5547 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5553 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5555 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5556 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5557 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5558 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5559 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5561 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5563 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5569 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5570 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5572 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5573 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5574 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5575 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5576 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5578 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5579 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5580 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5583 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5584 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5585 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5587 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5588 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5591 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5592 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5594 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5595 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5596 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5599 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5600 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5601 let mut chan_closed = false;
5602 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5606 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5608 None if !chan_closed => {
5609 // use override shutdown script if provided
5610 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5611 Some(script) => script,
5613 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5614 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5615 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5616 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5620 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5621 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5623 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5629 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5630 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5631 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5632 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5634 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5636 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5638 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5639 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5640 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5641 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5642 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5643 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5646 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5647 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5649 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5650 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5651 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5654 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5655 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5656 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5657 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5658 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5660 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5661 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5668 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5669 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5671 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5674 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5675 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5676 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5678 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5679 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5683 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5687 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5688 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5689 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5690 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5693 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5694 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5695 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5696 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5697 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5698 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5699 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5700 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5702 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5703 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5704 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5705 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5707 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5708 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5710 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5711 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5713 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5714 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5715 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5717 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5718 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5720 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5721 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5722 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5723 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5724 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5727 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5728 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5730 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5731 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5733 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5735 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5737 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5738 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5739 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5740 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5743 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5744 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5746 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5747 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5748 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5749 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5753 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5754 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5755 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5759 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5760 Ok(script) => script,
5761 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5764 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5767 context: ChannelContext {
5770 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5771 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5772 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5773 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5778 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5780 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5781 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5782 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5783 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5785 channel_value_satoshis,
5787 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5789 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5790 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5793 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5794 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5797 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5798 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5799 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5800 pending_update_fee: None,
5801 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5802 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5803 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5804 update_time_counter: 1,
5806 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5808 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5809 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5810 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5811 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5812 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5813 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5815 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5816 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5817 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5818 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5820 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5821 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5822 closing_fee_limits: None,
5823 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5825 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5826 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5827 short_channel_id: None,
5828 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5830 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5831 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5832 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5833 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5834 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5835 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5836 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5837 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5838 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5839 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5840 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5841 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5843 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5845 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5846 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5847 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5848 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5849 counterparty_parameters: None,
5850 funding_outpoint: None,
5851 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5853 funding_transaction: None,
5854 is_batch_funding: None,
5856 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5857 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5858 counterparty_node_id,
5860 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5862 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5864 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5865 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5867 announcement_sigs: None,
5869 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5870 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5871 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5872 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5874 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5875 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5877 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5878 outbound_scid_alias,
5880 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5881 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5883 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5884 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5889 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5891 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5895 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5896 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5897 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5898 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5899 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5900 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5901 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5902 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5903 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5908 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5909 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5910 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5911 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5912 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5913 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5914 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5915 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
5916 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5917 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5918 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5920 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5921 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5923 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5924 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5925 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5926 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5929 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5930 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5932 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5935 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5936 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5937 return Err((self, e));
5941 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5943 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5945 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5946 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5948 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
5949 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
5950 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
5951 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5952 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5953 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5956 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5957 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
5959 let channel = Channel {
5960 context: self.context,
5963 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5964 temporary_channel_id,
5965 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5966 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5969 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5971 next_local_nonce: None,
5975 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5976 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5977 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5978 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5979 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5980 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5981 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5982 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5983 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5984 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5987 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5988 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5989 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5990 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5991 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5992 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5998 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5999 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6000 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6001 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6002 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6003 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6005 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6007 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6008 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6009 // We've exhausted our options
6012 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6013 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6016 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6017 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6018 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6019 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6021 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6022 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6023 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
6024 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6025 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6026 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6028 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6030 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6031 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6034 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6035 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6036 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6038 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6039 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6042 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6043 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6046 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6047 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6051 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6052 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6053 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6054 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6055 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6056 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6057 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6058 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6059 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6060 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6061 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6062 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6063 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6064 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6065 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6066 first_per_commitment_point,
6067 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6068 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6069 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6070 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6072 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6077 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6078 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6080 // Check sanity of message fields:
6081 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6082 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6084 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6085 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6087 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6088 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6090 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6091 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6093 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6094 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6096 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6097 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6098 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6100 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6101 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6102 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6104 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6105 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6108 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6109 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6111 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6112 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6115 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6116 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6117 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6119 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6120 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6122 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6123 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6125 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6126 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6128 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6131 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6132 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6134 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6135 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6138 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6139 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6142 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6143 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6145 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6146 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6149 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6150 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6153 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6154 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6155 &Some(ref script) => {
6156 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6157 if script.len() == 0 {
6160 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6163 Some(script.clone())
6166 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6173 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6174 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6175 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6176 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6177 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6179 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6180 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6182 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6185 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6186 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6187 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6188 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6189 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6190 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6193 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6194 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6195 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6198 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6199 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6201 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6202 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6208 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6209 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6210 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6211 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6214 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6215 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6216 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6217 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6218 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6219 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6220 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6221 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6222 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6223 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6224 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6227 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6229 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6230 // support this channel type.
6231 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6232 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6236 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6237 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6238 // `static_remote_key`.
6239 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6240 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6242 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6243 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6246 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6247 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6249 channel_type.clone()
6251 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6252 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6253 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6258 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6259 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6260 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6261 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6262 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6263 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6264 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6265 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6266 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6269 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6270 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6273 // Check sanity of message fields:
6274 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6277 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6280 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6283 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6284 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6285 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6287 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6288 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6290 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6291 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6293 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6295 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6296 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6297 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6299 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6300 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6302 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6303 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6306 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6307 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6308 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6310 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6311 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6313 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6316 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6317 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6319 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6322 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6323 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6325 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6326 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6329 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6331 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6332 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6333 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6337 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6338 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6339 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6340 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6341 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6343 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6344 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6346 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6347 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6348 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6350 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6351 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6354 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6355 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6356 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6357 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6358 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6359 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6362 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6363 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6364 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6365 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6366 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6369 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6370 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6371 &Some(ref script) => {
6372 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6373 if script.len() == 0 {
6376 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6377 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6379 Some(script.clone())
6382 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6384 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6389 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6390 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6391 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6392 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6396 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6397 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6398 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6402 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6403 Ok(script) => script,
6404 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6407 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6408 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6410 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6413 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6417 context: ChannelContext {
6420 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6421 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6423 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6428 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6430 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6431 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6432 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6433 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6436 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6438 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6439 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6442 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6443 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6444 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6446 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6447 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6448 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6449 pending_update_fee: None,
6450 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6451 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6452 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6453 update_time_counter: 1,
6455 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6457 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6458 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6459 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6460 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6461 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6462 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6464 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6465 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6466 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6467 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6469 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6470 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6471 closing_fee_limits: None,
6472 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6474 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6475 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6476 short_channel_id: None,
6477 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6479 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6480 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6481 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6482 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6483 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6484 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6485 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6486 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6487 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6488 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6489 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6490 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6493 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6495 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6496 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6497 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6498 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6499 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6500 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6501 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6503 funding_outpoint: None,
6504 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6506 funding_transaction: None,
6507 is_batch_funding: None,
6509 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6510 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6511 counterparty_node_id,
6513 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6515 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6517 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6518 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6520 announcement_sigs: None,
6522 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6523 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6524 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6525 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6527 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6528 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6530 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6531 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6533 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6534 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6536 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6537 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6542 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6544 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6550 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6551 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6553 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6554 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6555 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6556 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6558 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6559 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6561 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6562 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6565 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6568 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6569 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6570 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6572 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6573 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6574 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6575 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6577 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6578 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6579 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6580 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6581 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6582 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6583 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6584 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6585 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6586 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6587 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6588 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6589 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6590 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6591 first_per_commitment_point,
6592 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6593 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6594 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6596 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6598 next_local_nonce: None,
6602 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6603 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6605 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6607 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6608 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6611 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6612 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6614 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6615 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6617 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6618 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6619 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6620 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6621 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6622 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6623 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6624 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6625 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6628 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6629 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6631 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6632 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6633 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6634 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6636 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6637 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6638 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6639 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6640 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6642 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6643 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6648 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6649 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6650 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6654 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6655 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6657 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6658 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6659 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6661 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6663 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6664 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6665 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6666 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6669 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6670 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6671 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6672 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6673 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6675 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6677 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6678 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6679 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6682 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6683 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6684 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6688 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6689 initial_commitment_tx,
6692 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6693 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6696 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6697 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6700 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6702 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6703 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6704 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6705 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6706 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6707 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6708 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6709 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6710 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6711 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6712 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6714 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6716 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6717 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6718 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6719 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6720 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6721 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6723 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6724 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6725 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6726 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6728 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6730 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6731 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6732 let mut channel = Channel {
6733 context: self.context,
6735 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6736 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6737 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6739 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6743 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6744 }, channel_monitor))
6748 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6749 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6751 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6757 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6758 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6759 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6760 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6761 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6763 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6764 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6765 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6766 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6772 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6773 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6774 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6775 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6776 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6777 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6782 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6783 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6784 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6785 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6787 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6788 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6789 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6790 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6795 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6796 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6797 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6798 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6799 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6800 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6805 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6806 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6807 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6810 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6812 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6813 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6814 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6815 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6816 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6818 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6819 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6820 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6821 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6823 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6824 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6825 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6827 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6829 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6830 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6831 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6832 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6833 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6834 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6835 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6837 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6838 // deserialized from that format.
6839 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6840 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6841 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6843 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6845 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6846 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6847 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6849 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6850 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6851 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6852 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6855 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6856 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6857 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6860 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6861 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6862 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6863 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6865 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6866 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6868 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6870 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6872 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6874 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6877 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6879 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6884 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6885 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6887 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6888 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6889 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6890 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6891 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6892 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6893 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6895 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6897 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6899 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6902 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6903 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6904 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6907 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6909 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6910 preimages.push(preimage);
6912 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6913 reason.write(writer)?;
6915 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6917 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6918 preimages.push(preimage);
6920 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6921 reason.write(writer)?;
6924 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6925 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6926 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6928 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6929 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6930 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6934 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6935 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6936 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6938 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6939 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6943 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6944 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6945 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6946 source.write(writer)?;
6947 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6949 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6950 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6951 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6953 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6954 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6956 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6958 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6959 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6961 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6963 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6964 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6969 match self.context.resend_order {
6970 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6971 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6974 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6975 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6976 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6978 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6979 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6980 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6981 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6984 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6985 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6986 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6987 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6988 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6991 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6992 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6993 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6994 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6996 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6997 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6998 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7000 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7002 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7003 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7004 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7005 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7007 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7008 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7009 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7010 // consider the stale state on reload.
7013 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7014 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7015 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7017 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7018 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7019 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7021 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7022 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7024 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7025 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7026 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7028 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7029 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7031 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7034 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7035 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7036 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7038 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7041 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7042 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7044 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7045 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7046 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7048 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7050 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7052 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7054 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7055 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7056 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7057 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7058 htlc.write(writer)?;
7061 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7062 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7063 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7065 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7066 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7068 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7069 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7070 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7071 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7072 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7073 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7074 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7076 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7077 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7078 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7079 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7080 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7082 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7083 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7085 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7086 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7087 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7088 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7090 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7092 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7093 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7094 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7095 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7096 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7097 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7098 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7100 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7101 (2, chan_type, option),
7102 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7103 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7104 (5, self.context.config, required),
7105 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7106 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7107 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7108 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7109 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7110 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7111 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7112 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7113 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7114 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7115 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7116 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7117 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7118 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7119 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7120 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7121 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7122 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7123 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7130 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7131 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7133 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7134 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7136 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7137 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7138 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7140 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7141 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7142 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7143 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7145 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7147 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7148 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7149 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7150 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7151 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7153 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7154 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7157 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7158 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7159 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7161 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7163 let mut keys_data = None;
7165 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7166 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7167 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7168 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7169 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7170 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7171 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7172 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7173 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7174 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7178 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7179 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7180 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7183 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7185 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7186 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7187 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7189 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7191 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7192 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7193 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7194 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7195 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7196 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7197 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7198 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7199 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7200 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7201 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7202 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7203 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7208 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7209 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7210 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7211 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7212 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7213 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7214 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7215 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7216 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7217 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7218 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7219 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7221 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7222 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7225 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7226 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7229 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7230 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7232 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7234 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7238 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7239 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7240 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7241 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7242 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7243 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7244 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7245 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7246 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7247 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7248 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7250 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7251 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7252 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7254 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7255 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7256 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7258 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7262 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7263 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7264 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7265 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7268 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7269 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7270 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7272 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7273 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7274 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7275 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7278 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7279 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7280 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7281 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7284 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7286 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7288 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7289 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7290 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7291 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7293 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7294 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7295 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7296 // consider the stale state on reload.
7297 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7300 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7301 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7302 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7304 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7307 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7308 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7309 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7311 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7312 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7313 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7314 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7316 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7317 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7319 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7320 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7322 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7323 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7324 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7326 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7328 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7329 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7331 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7332 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7335 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7337 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7338 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7339 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7340 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7342 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7345 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7346 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7348 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7350 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7351 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7353 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7354 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7356 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7358 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7359 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7360 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7362 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7363 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7364 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7368 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7369 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7370 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7372 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7378 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7379 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7380 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7381 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7382 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7383 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7384 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7385 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7386 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7387 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7389 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7390 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7391 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7392 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7393 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7394 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7395 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7397 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7398 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7399 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7400 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7402 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7404 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7405 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7407 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7409 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7410 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7411 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7412 (2, channel_type, option),
7413 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7414 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7415 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7416 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7417 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7418 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7419 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7420 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7421 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7422 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7423 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7424 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7425 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7426 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7427 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7428 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7429 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7430 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7431 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7432 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7433 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7434 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7437 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7438 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7439 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7440 // required channel parameters.
7441 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7442 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7443 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7445 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7447 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7448 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7449 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7450 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7453 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7454 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7455 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7457 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7458 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7460 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7461 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7466 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7467 if iter.next().is_some() {
7468 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7472 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7473 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7474 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7475 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7476 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7479 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7480 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7481 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7483 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7484 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7486 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7487 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7488 // separate u64 values.
7489 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7491 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7493 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7494 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7495 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7496 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7498 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7499 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7501 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7502 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7503 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7504 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7505 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7508 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7509 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7513 context: ChannelContext {
7516 config: config.unwrap(),
7520 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7521 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7522 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7525 temporary_channel_id,
7527 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7529 channel_value_satoshis,
7531 latest_monitor_update_id,
7533 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7534 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7537 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7538 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7541 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7542 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7543 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7544 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7548 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7549 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7550 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7551 monitor_pending_forwards,
7552 monitor_pending_failures,
7553 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7556 holding_cell_update_fee,
7557 next_holder_htlc_id,
7558 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7559 update_time_counter,
7562 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7563 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7564 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7565 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7567 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7568 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7569 closing_fee_limits: None,
7570 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7572 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7573 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7575 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7577 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7578 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7579 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7580 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7581 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7582 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7583 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7584 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7585 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7588 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7590 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7591 funding_transaction,
7594 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7595 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7596 counterparty_node_id,
7598 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7602 channel_update_status,
7603 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7607 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7608 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7609 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7610 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7612 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7613 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7615 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7616 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7617 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7619 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7620 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7622 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7623 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7625 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7628 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7637 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7638 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7639 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7640 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7641 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7643 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7644 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7645 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7646 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7647 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7648 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7649 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7650 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7651 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7652 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7653 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7654 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7655 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7656 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7657 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7658 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7659 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7660 use crate::util::test_utils;
7661 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7662 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7663 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7664 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7665 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7666 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7667 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7668 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7669 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7670 use crate::prelude::*;
7672 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7675 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7676 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7682 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7683 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7684 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7685 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7689 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7690 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7691 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7692 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7693 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7694 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7695 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7696 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7700 signer: InMemorySigner,
7703 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7704 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7707 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7708 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7710 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7711 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7714 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7718 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7720 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7721 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7722 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7723 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7724 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7727 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7728 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7729 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7730 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7734 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7735 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7736 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7740 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7741 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7742 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7743 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7745 let seed = [42; 32];
7746 let network = Network::Testnet;
7747 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7748 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7749 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7752 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7753 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7754 let config = UserConfig::default();
7755 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7756 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7757 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7759 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7760 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7764 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7765 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7767 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7768 let original_fee = 253;
7769 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7770 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7771 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7772 let seed = [42; 32];
7773 let network = Network::Testnet;
7774 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7776 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7777 let config = UserConfig::default();
7778 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7780 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7781 // same as the old fee.
7782 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7783 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7784 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7788 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7789 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7790 // dust limits are used.
7791 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7792 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7793 let seed = [42; 32];
7794 let network = Network::Testnet;
7795 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7796 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7797 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7799 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7800 // they have different dust limits.
7802 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7803 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7804 let config = UserConfig::default();
7805 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7807 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7808 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7809 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7810 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7811 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7813 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7814 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7815 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7816 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7817 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7819 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7820 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7821 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7822 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7824 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7825 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7826 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7828 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7829 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7831 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7832 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7833 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7835 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7836 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7837 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7838 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7841 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7843 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7844 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7845 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7846 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7847 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7848 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7849 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7850 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7851 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7853 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7856 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7857 // the dust limit check.
7858 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7859 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7860 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7861 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7863 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7864 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7865 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7866 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7867 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7868 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7869 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7873 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7874 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7875 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7876 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7877 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7878 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7879 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7880 let seed = [42; 32];
7881 let network = Network::Testnet;
7882 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7884 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7885 let config = UserConfig::default();
7886 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7888 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7889 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7891 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7892 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7893 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7894 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7895 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7896 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7898 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7899 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7900 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7901 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7902 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7904 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7906 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7907 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7908 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7909 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7910 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7912 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7913 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7914 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7915 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7916 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7920 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7921 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7922 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7923 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7924 let seed = [42; 32];
7925 let network = Network::Testnet;
7926 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7927 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
7928 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7930 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7932 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7933 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7934 let config = UserConfig::default();
7935 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7937 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7938 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7939 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7940 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7942 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7943 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7944 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7946 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7947 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7948 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7949 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7951 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7952 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7953 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7955 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7956 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7958 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7959 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7960 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7961 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7962 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7963 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7964 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7966 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7968 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7969 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7970 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7971 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7972 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7976 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7977 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7978 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7979 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7980 let seed = [42; 32];
7981 let network = Network::Testnet;
7982 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7983 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7984 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7986 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7987 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7988 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7989 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7990 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7991 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7992 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7993 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7995 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7996 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7997 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7998 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7999 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8000 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8002 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8003 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8004 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8005 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8007 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8009 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8010 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8011 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8012 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8013 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8014 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8016 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8017 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8018 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8019 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8021 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8022 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8023 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8024 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8025 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8027 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8028 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8030 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8031 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8032 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8034 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8035 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8036 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8037 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8038 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8040 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8041 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8043 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8044 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8045 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8049 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8051 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8052 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8053 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8055 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8056 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8057 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8058 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8060 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8061 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8062 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8064 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8066 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8067 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8070 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8071 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8072 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8073 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8074 let seed = [42; 32];
8075 let network = Network::Testnet;
8076 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8077 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8078 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8081 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8082 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8083 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8085 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8086 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8088 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8089 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8090 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8092 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8093 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8095 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8097 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8098 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8100 // Channel Negotiations failed
8101 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8102 assert!(result.is_err());
8107 fn channel_update() {
8108 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8109 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8110 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8111 let seed = [42; 32];
8112 let network = Network::Testnet;
8113 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8114 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8115 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8117 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8118 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8119 let config = UserConfig::default();
8120 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8122 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8123 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8124 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8125 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8126 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8128 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8129 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8130 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8131 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8132 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8134 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8135 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8136 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8137 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8139 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8140 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8141 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8143 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8144 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8146 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8147 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8148 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8150 short_channel_id: 0,
8153 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8154 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8155 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8157 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8158 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8160 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8162 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8164 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8165 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8166 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8167 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8169 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8170 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8171 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8173 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8176 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8179 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8181 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8182 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8183 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8184 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8185 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8186 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8187 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8188 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8189 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8190 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8191 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8192 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8193 use crate::sync::Arc;
8195 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8196 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8197 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8198 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8200 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8202 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8203 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8204 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8205 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8206 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8208 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8209 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8215 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8216 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8217 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8219 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8220 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8221 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8222 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8223 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8224 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8226 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8228 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8229 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8230 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8231 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8232 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8233 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8235 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8236 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8237 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8238 selected_contest_delay: 144
8240 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8241 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8243 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8244 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8246 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8247 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8249 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8250 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8252 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8253 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8254 // build_commitment_transaction.
8255 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8256 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8257 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8258 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8259 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8261 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8262 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8263 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8264 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8268 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8269 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8270 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8271 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8275 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8276 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8277 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8279 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8280 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8282 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8283 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8285 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8287 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8288 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8289 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8290 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8291 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8292 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8293 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8295 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8296 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8297 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8298 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8300 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8301 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8302 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8304 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8306 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8307 commitment_tx.clone(),
8308 counterparty_signature,
8309 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8310 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8311 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8313 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8314 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8316 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8317 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8318 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8320 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8321 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8324 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8325 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8327 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8328 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8329 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8330 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8331 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8332 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8333 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8334 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8336 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8339 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8340 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8341 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8345 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8348 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8349 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8350 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8352 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8353 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8354 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8355 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8356 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8357 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8358 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8359 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8361 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8365 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8366 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8367 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8368 "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", {});
8370 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8371 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8373 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8374 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8375 "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", {});
8377 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8378 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8379 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8380 "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", {});
8382 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8383 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8385 amount_msat: 1000000,
8387 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8388 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8390 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8393 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8394 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8396 amount_msat: 2000000,
8398 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8399 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8401 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8404 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8405 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8407 amount_msat: 2000000,
8409 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8410 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8411 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8412 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8414 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8417 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8418 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8420 amount_msat: 3000000,
8422 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8423 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8424 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8425 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8427 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8430 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8431 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8433 amount_msat: 4000000,
8435 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8436 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8438 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8442 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8443 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8444 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8446 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8447 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8448 "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", {
8451 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8452 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8453 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b00000000000000000001e8030000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b014730440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
8456 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8457 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8458 "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" },
8461 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8462 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8463 "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" },
8466 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8467 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8468 "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" },
8471 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8472 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8473 "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" }
8476 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8477 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8478 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8480 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8481 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8482 "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", {
8485 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8486 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8487 "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" },
8490 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8491 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8492 "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" },
8495 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8496 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8497 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8500 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8501 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8502 "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" },
8505 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8506 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8507 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8510 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8511 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8512 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8514 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8515 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8516 "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", {
8519 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8520 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8521 "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" },
8524 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8525 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8526 "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" },
8529 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8530 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8531 "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" },
8534 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8535 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8536 "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" }
8539 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8540 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8541 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8542 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8544 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8545 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8546 "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", {
8549 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8550 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8551 "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" },
8554 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8555 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8556 "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" },
8559 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8560 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8561 "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" },
8564 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8565 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8566 "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" }
8569 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8570 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8571 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8572 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8574 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8575 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8576 "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", {
8579 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8580 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8581 "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" },
8584 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8585 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8586 "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" },
8589 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8590 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8591 "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" },
8594 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8595 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8596 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8599 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8600 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8601 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8603 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8604 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8605 "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", {
8608 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8609 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8610 "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" },
8613 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8614 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8615 "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" },
8618 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8619 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8620 "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" }
8623 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8624 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8625 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8627 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8628 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8629 "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", {
8632 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8633 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8634 "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" },
8637 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8638 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8639 "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" },
8642 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8643 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8644 "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" }
8647 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8648 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8649 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8651 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8652 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8653 "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", {
8656 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8657 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8658 "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" },
8661 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8662 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8663 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8666 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8667 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8668 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8669 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8670 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8671 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8673 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8674 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8675 "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", {
8678 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8679 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8680 "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" },
8683 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8684 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8685 "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" }
8688 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8689 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8690 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8691 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8692 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8694 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8695 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8696 "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", {
8699 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8700 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8701 "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" },
8704 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8705 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8706 "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" }
8709 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8710 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8711 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8713 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8714 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8715 "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", {
8718 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8719 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8720 "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" }
8723 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8724 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8725 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8726 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8727 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8729 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8730 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8731 "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", {
8734 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8735 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8736 "02000000000101542562b326c08e3a076d9cfca2be175041366591da334d8d513ff1686fd95a6002000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c83483045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8739 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8740 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8741 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8742 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8743 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8745 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8746 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8747 "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", {
8750 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8751 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8752 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8755 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8756 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8757 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8758 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8760 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8761 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8762 "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", {});
8764 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8765 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8766 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8767 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8768 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8770 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8771 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8772 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ad0886a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd01483045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b9501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8774 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8775 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8776 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8777 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8778 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8780 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8781 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8782 "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", {});
8784 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8785 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8786 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8788 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8789 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8790 "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", {});
8792 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8793 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8794 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8795 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8796 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8798 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8799 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8800 "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", {});
8802 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8803 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8804 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8805 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8806 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8808 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8809 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8810 "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", {});
8812 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8813 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8814 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8815 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8816 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8817 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8819 amount_msat: 2000000,
8821 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8822 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8824 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8827 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8828 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8829 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8831 amount_msat: 5000001,
8833 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8834 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8835 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8836 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8838 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8841 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8842 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8844 amount_msat: 5000000,
8846 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8847 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8848 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8849 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8851 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8855 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8856 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8857 "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", {
8860 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8861 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8862 "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" },
8864 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8865 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8866 "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" },
8868 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8869 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8870 "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" }
8873 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8874 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8875 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8876 "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", {
8879 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8880 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8881 "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" },
8883 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8884 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8885 "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" },
8887 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8888 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8889 "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" }
8894 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8895 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8897 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8898 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8899 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8900 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8902 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8903 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8904 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8906 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8907 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8909 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8910 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8912 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8913 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8914 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8918 fn test_key_derivation() {
8919 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8920 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8922 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8923 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8925 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8926 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8928 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8929 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8931 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8932 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8934 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8935 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8937 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8938 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8940 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8941 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8945 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8946 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8947 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8948 let seed = [42; 32];
8949 let network = Network::Testnet;
8950 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8951 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8953 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8954 let config = UserConfig::default();
8955 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8956 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8958 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8959 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8961 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8962 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8963 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8964 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8965 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8966 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8967 assert!(res.is_ok());
8971 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8972 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8973 // resulting `channel_type`.
8974 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8975 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8976 let network = Network::Testnet;
8977 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8978 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8980 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8981 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8983 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8984 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8986 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8987 // need to signal it.
8988 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8989 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8990 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8993 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8995 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8996 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8997 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8999 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9000 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9001 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9004 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9005 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9006 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9007 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9008 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9011 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9012 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9016 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9017 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9018 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9019 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9020 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9021 let network = Network::Testnet;
9022 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9023 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9025 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9026 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9028 let config = UserConfig::default();
9030 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9031 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9032 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9033 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9034 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9036 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9037 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9038 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9041 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9042 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9043 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9045 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9046 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9047 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9048 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9049 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9050 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9052 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9056 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9057 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9059 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9060 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9061 let network = Network::Testnet;
9062 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9063 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9065 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9066 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9068 let config = UserConfig::default();
9070 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9071 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9072 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9073 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9074 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9075 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9076 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9077 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9079 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9080 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9081 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9082 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9083 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9084 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9087 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9088 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9090 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9091 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9092 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9093 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9095 assert!(res.is_err());
9097 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9098 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9099 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9101 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9102 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9103 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9106 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9108 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9109 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9110 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9111 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9114 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9115 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9117 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9118 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9120 assert!(res.is_err());
9124 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9125 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9126 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9127 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9128 let seed = [42; 32];
9129 let network = Network::Testnet;
9130 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9131 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9132 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9134 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9135 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9136 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9137 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9139 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9140 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9141 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9146 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9155 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9156 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9157 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9162 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9163 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9169 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9172 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9173 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9174 &accept_channel_msg,
9175 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9176 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9179 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9180 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9181 let tx = Transaction {
9183 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9187 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9190 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9193 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9194 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9199 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9200 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9201 &funding_created_msg,
9205 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9206 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9214 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9215 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9216 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9217 &funding_signed_msg,
9222 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9229 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9230 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9231 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9232 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9234 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9235 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9236 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9239 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9240 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9241 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9249 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9250 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9251 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9252 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9255 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9256 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9258 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9259 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9260 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9262 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());