1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
230 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
231 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
232 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
236 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
238 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
239 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
240 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
243 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
248 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
253 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
254 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
255 /// move on to ChannelReady.
256 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
257 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
258 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
260 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
261 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
262 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
263 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
264 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
265 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
266 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
268 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
269 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
270 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
275 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
276 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
277 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
279 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
280 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
282 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
283 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
284 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
285 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
286 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
287 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
288 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
289 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
290 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
292 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
293 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
294 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
295 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
296 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
297 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
298 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
299 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
300 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
301 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
302 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
303 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
306 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
308 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
310 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
312 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
314 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
315 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
319 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
323 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
325 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
326 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
327 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
328 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
329 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
331 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
332 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
334 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
336 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
337 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
339 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
340 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
341 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
342 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
343 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
344 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
346 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
347 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
349 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
350 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
351 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
352 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
353 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
355 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
356 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
358 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
359 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
361 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
362 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
363 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
364 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
370 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
371 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
373 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
375 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
380 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
381 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
383 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
385 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
390 macro_rules! secp_check {
391 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
399 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
400 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
401 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
402 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
403 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
404 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
405 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
406 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
408 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
410 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
412 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
416 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
418 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
419 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
420 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
422 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
423 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
425 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
426 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
427 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
428 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
429 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
431 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
432 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
436 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
442 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
445 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
446 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
448 holding_cell_msat: u64,
449 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
452 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
453 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
454 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
455 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
456 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
457 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
458 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
459 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
461 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
464 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
465 struct HTLCCandidate {
467 origin: HTLCInitiator,
471 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
479 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
481 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
483 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 htlc_value_msat: u64,
485 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
490 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
491 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
492 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
493 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
494 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
496 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
497 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
499 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
502 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
506 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
507 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
508 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
509 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
510 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
511 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
512 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
513 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
514 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
515 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
516 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
519 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
520 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
521 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
526 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
529 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
531 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
532 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
535 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
536 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
537 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
538 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
539 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
540 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
541 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
542 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
543 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
544 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
545 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
546 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
547 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
548 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
549 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
552 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
553 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
554 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
556 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
557 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
558 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
559 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
561 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
562 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
563 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
564 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
565 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
567 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
568 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
569 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
570 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
572 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
573 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
574 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
576 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
577 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
578 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
579 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
580 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
582 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
583 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
586 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
587 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
589 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
590 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
591 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
592 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
593 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
595 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
599 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
600 (0, update, required),
601 (2, blocked, required),
604 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
605 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
606 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
608 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
609 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
610 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
611 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
613 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
617 channel_id: [u8; 32],
618 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
621 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
622 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
624 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
625 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
626 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
628 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
629 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
630 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
631 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
633 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
634 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
636 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
638 holder_signer: Signer,
639 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
640 destination_script: Script,
642 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
643 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
644 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
646 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
647 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
648 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
649 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
650 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
651 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
653 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
654 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
655 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
656 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
657 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
658 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
660 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
662 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
663 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
664 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
666 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
667 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
668 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
669 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
670 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
671 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
672 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
674 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
676 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
677 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
678 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
679 // HTLCs with similar state.
680 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
681 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
682 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
683 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
684 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
685 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
686 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
687 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
688 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
691 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
692 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
693 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
695 update_time_counter: u32,
697 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
698 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
699 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
700 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
701 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
702 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
704 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
705 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
707 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
708 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
709 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
710 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
712 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
713 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
715 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
717 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
719 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
720 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
721 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
722 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
723 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
724 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
726 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
727 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
728 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
729 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
730 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
732 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
733 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
734 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
735 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
736 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
737 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
738 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
739 channel_creation_height: u32,
741 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
744 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
746 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
749 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
754 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
756 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
758 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
759 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
762 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
764 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
766 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
767 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
769 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
771 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
772 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
773 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
775 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
777 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
778 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
780 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
781 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
782 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
784 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
786 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
788 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
789 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
790 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
791 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
793 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
794 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
795 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
797 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
798 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
799 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
801 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
802 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
803 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
804 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
805 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
806 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
807 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
808 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
810 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
811 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
812 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
813 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
814 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
816 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
817 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
819 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
820 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
821 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
822 /// unblock the state machine.
824 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
825 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
826 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
828 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
829 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
830 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
832 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
833 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
834 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
835 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
836 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
837 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
838 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
839 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
841 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
842 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
844 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
845 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
846 // the channel's funding UTXO.
848 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
849 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
850 // associated channel mapping.
852 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
853 // to store all of them.
854 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
856 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
857 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
858 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
859 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
860 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
862 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
863 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
865 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
866 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
868 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
869 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
870 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
872 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
873 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
874 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
875 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
876 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
879 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
880 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
881 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
882 self.update_time_counter
885 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
886 self.latest_monitor_update_id
889 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
890 self.config.announced_channel
893 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
894 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
897 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
898 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
899 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
900 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
903 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
904 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
905 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
908 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
909 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
910 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
911 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
912 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
915 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
916 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
917 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
918 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
919 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
924 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
928 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
930 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
931 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
932 self.temporary_channel_id
935 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
939 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
940 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
941 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
945 /// Gets the channel's type
946 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
950 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
951 /// is_usable() returns true).
952 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
953 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
954 self.short_channel_id
957 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
958 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
959 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
962 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
963 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
964 self.outbound_scid_alias
967 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
968 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
969 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
970 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
971 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
974 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
975 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
976 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
977 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
980 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
981 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
982 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
985 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
986 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
987 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
988 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
992 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
995 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
996 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
999 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1000 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1003 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1004 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1005 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1008 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1009 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1012 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1013 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1014 self.counterparty_node_id
1017 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1018 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1019 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1022 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1023 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1024 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1027 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1028 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1030 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1031 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1032 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1033 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1035 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1039 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1040 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1041 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1044 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1045 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1046 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1049 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1050 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1051 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1053 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1054 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1059 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1060 self.channel_value_satoshis
1063 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1064 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1067 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1068 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1071 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1072 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
1075 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1076 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1077 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1080 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1081 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1082 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1085 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1086 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1087 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1090 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1091 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1092 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1095 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1096 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1097 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1100 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1101 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1102 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1105 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1106 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1107 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1108 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1109 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1112 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1114 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1115 self.prev_config = None;
1119 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1120 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1124 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1125 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1126 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1127 let did_channel_update =
1128 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1129 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1130 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1131 if did_channel_update {
1132 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1133 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1134 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1135 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1137 self.config.options = *config;
1141 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1142 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1143 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1146 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1147 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1148 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1149 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1150 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1152 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1153 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1154 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1155 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1156 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1157 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1158 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1160 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1161 where L::Target: Logger
1163 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1164 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1165 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1167 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1168 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1169 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1170 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1172 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1173 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1174 if match update_state {
1175 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1176 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1177 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1178 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1179 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1181 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1185 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1186 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1187 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1188 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1190 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1191 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1192 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1194 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1195 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1196 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1197 transaction_output_index: None
1202 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1203 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1204 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1205 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1206 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1209 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1211 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1212 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1213 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1215 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1216 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1219 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1220 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1223 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1225 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1226 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1227 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1229 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1230 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1236 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1237 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1238 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1239 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1240 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1241 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1242 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1246 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1247 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1249 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1251 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1252 if generated_by_local {
1253 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1254 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1263 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1265 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1266 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1267 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1268 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1269 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1270 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1271 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1274 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1275 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1276 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1277 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1281 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1282 preimages.push(preimage);
1286 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1287 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1289 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1291 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1292 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1294 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1295 if !generated_by_local {
1296 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1304 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1305 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1306 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1307 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1308 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1309 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1310 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1311 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1313 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1315 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1316 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1317 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1318 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1320 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1322 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1323 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1324 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1325 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1328 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1329 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1330 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1331 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1333 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1336 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1337 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1338 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1339 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1341 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1344 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1345 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1350 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1351 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1356 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1358 let channel_parameters =
1359 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1360 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1361 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1368 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1371 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1372 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1373 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1374 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1376 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1377 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1378 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1386 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1387 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1393 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1394 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1395 /// our counterparty!)
1396 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1397 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1398 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1399 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1400 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1401 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1402 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1404 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1408 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1409 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1410 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1411 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1412 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1413 //may see payments to it!
1414 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1415 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1416 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1418 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1421 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1422 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1423 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1424 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1425 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1428 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1429 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1432 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1436 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1437 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1438 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1439 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1440 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1441 // which are near the dust limit.
1442 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1443 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1444 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1445 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1446 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1448 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1449 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1451 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1454 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1455 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1456 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1459 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1460 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1462 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1463 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1464 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1465 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1466 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1467 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1468 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1471 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1474 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1475 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1476 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1478 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1479 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1480 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1481 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1482 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1483 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1485 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1486 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1492 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1493 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1495 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1496 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1497 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1498 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1499 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1500 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1501 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1504 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1507 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1508 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1509 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1511 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1512 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1513 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1514 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1515 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1516 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1518 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1519 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1523 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1524 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1525 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1526 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1527 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1528 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1529 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1531 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1532 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1534 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1541 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1542 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1543 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1544 /// corner case properly.
1545 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
1546 let context = &self;
1547 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1548 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1549 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1551 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1552 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1553 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1554 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1557 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1559 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1560 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1562 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1564 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1566 if context.is_outbound() {
1567 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1568 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1570 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1571 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1573 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1574 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1575 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1576 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1579 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1580 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1581 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1582 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1584 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1585 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1586 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1587 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1588 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1589 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1590 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1591 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1592 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1593 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1595 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1598 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1599 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1600 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1601 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1602 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1605 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1606 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1608 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1609 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1610 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1612 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1613 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1614 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1615 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1619 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1621 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1622 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1623 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1624 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1625 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1626 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1628 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1629 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1631 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1632 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1633 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1635 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1636 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1637 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1638 Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1639 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1642 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1643 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1644 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1645 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1646 context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1647 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1650 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1651 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1652 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1654 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1658 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1659 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1661 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1662 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1666 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1667 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1668 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1669 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1671 outbound_capacity_msat,
1672 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1673 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1678 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1679 let context = &self;
1680 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1683 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1684 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1686 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1687 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1689 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1690 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1692 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1693 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1694 let context = &self;
1695 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1697 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1700 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1701 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1703 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1704 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1706 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1707 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1709 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1710 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1714 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1715 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1721 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1722 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1723 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1726 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1727 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1728 included_htlcs += 1;
1731 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1732 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1736 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1737 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1738 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1739 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1740 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1741 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1746 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1748 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1749 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1754 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1755 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1759 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1760 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1761 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1764 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1765 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1767 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1768 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1769 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1771 total_pending_htlcs,
1772 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1773 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1774 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1776 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1777 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1778 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1780 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1782 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1787 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1788 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1790 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1791 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1793 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1794 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1796 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1797 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1798 let context = &self;
1799 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1801 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1804 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1805 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1807 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1808 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1810 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1811 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1813 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1814 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1818 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1819 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1825 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1826 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1827 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1828 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1829 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1830 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1833 included_htlcs += 1;
1836 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1837 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1840 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1841 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1843 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1844 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1845 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1850 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1851 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1852 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1855 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1856 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1858 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1859 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1861 total_pending_htlcs,
1862 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1863 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1864 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1866 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1867 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1868 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1870 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1872 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1877 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1878 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1879 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1880 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1886 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1887 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1888 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1889 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1890 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1891 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1892 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1893 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1894 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1895 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1896 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1898 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1899 // return them to fail the payment.
1900 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1901 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1902 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1904 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1905 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1910 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1911 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1912 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1913 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1914 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1915 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1916 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1917 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1918 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1919 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1920 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1921 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1922 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1927 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1928 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1929 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1933 // Internal utility functions for channels
1935 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1936 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1937 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1939 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1941 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1942 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1943 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1945 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1948 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1950 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1953 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1954 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1955 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1957 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1959 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1960 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1961 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1962 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1963 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1966 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1967 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1968 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1969 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1970 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1971 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1972 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1975 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1976 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1978 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1979 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1982 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1983 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1984 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1985 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1986 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1987 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1990 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1991 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1992 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
1995 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
1996 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
1997 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
1998 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2001 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2002 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2004 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2005 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2006 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2010 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2011 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2012 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2013 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2015 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2016 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2017 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2018 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2019 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2020 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2021 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2022 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2024 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2025 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2026 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2027 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2028 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2029 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2030 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2031 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2033 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2034 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2038 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2044 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2045 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2046 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2047 // outside of those situations will fail.
2048 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2052 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2057 1 + // script length (0)
2061 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2062 2 + // witness marker and flag
2063 1 + // witness element count
2064 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2065 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2066 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2067 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2068 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2069 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2071 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2072 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2073 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2079 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2080 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2081 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2082 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2084 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2085 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2086 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2088 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2089 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2090 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2091 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2092 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2093 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2096 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2097 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2100 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2101 value_to_holder = 0;
2104 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2105 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2106 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2107 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2109 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2110 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2113 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2114 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2117 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2120 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2121 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2123 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2125 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2126 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2127 where L::Target: Logger {
2128 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2129 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2130 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2131 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2132 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2133 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2134 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2135 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2139 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2140 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2141 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2142 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2144 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2145 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2147 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2149 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2151 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2152 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2153 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2155 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2156 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2157 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2158 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2159 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2161 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2162 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2163 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2165 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2166 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2168 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2171 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2172 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2176 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2180 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2181 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2182 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2183 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2184 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2185 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2188 // Now update local state:
2190 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2191 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2192 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2193 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2194 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2195 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2196 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2200 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2201 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2202 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2203 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2204 // do not not get into this branch.
2205 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2206 match pending_update {
2207 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2208 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2209 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2210 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2211 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2212 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2213 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2216 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2217 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2218 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2219 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2220 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2221 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2222 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2228 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2229 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2230 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2232 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2233 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2234 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2236 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2237 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2240 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2241 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2243 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2244 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2246 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2247 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2250 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2253 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2254 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2255 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2256 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2261 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2262 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2263 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2264 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2265 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2266 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2267 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2268 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2269 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2270 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2271 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2272 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2273 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2274 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2275 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2276 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2277 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2279 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2281 let insert_pos = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2282 .unwrap_or(self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2283 let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2284 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2285 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2286 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2287 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2289 for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2290 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2293 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2294 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2295 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2296 update, blocked: true,
2301 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2302 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2303 monitor_update: &self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2304 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2308 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2312 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2313 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2314 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2315 /// before we fail backwards.
2317 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2318 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2319 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2320 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2321 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2322 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2323 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2326 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2327 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2328 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2329 /// before we fail backwards.
2331 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2332 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2333 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2334 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2335 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2336 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2337 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2339 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2341 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2342 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2343 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2345 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2346 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2347 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2349 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2350 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2351 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2353 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2358 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2359 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2365 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2366 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2367 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2368 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2369 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2373 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2374 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2375 force_holding_cell = true;
2378 // Now update local state:
2379 if force_holding_cell {
2380 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2381 match pending_update {
2382 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2383 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2384 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2385 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2389 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2390 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2391 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2392 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2398 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2399 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2400 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2406 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2408 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2409 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2412 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2413 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2414 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2419 // Message handlers:
2421 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2422 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2423 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2424 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2425 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2427 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2430 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2431 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2433 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2434 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2436 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2437 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2438 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2439 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2442 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2444 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2445 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2446 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2447 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2449 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2450 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2452 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2453 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2455 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2456 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2457 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2458 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2459 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2460 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2464 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2465 initial_commitment_tx,
2468 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2469 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2472 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2473 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2476 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2477 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2478 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2479 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2480 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2481 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2482 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2483 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2484 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2485 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2486 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2487 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2489 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2491 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2493 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2494 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2495 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2496 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2498 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2500 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2501 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2505 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2506 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2508 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2509 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2510 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2511 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2513 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2516 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2517 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2518 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2521 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2522 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2523 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2524 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2525 // when routing outbound payments.
2526 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2530 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2532 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2533 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2534 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2535 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2536 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2537 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2538 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2539 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2540 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2542 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2543 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2544 let expected_point =
2545 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2546 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2548 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2549 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2550 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2551 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2552 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2553 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2555 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2556 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2557 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2558 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2559 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2561 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2562 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2566 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2569 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2570 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2572 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2574 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2577 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2578 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2579 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2580 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2581 if local_sent_shutdown {
2582 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2584 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2585 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2586 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2587 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2589 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2592 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2593 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2595 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2596 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2598 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2599 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2602 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2603 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2604 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2605 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2607 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2608 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2610 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2611 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2612 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2613 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2614 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2615 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2616 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2617 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2618 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2619 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2620 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2622 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2623 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2624 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2625 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2626 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2627 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2631 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2634 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2635 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2636 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2638 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2639 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2640 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2641 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2642 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2643 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2644 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2648 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2649 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2650 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2651 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2652 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2653 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2654 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2658 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2659 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2660 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2661 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2662 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2663 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2666 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2667 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2668 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2669 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2670 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2672 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2673 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2676 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2677 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2680 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2681 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2682 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2683 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2684 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2685 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2686 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2687 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2688 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2689 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2690 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2691 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2692 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2693 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2694 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2695 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2698 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2699 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2700 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2701 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2702 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2705 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2706 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2708 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2709 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2712 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2713 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2714 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2718 // Now update local state:
2719 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2720 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2721 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2722 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2723 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2724 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2725 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2730 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2732 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2733 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2734 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2735 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2736 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2737 None => fail_reason.into(),
2738 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2739 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2740 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2741 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2743 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2747 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2748 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2749 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2750 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2752 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2753 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2758 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2761 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2762 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2765 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2766 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2769 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2772 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2773 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2774 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2776 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2777 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2780 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2784 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2785 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2786 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2788 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2789 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2792 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2796 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2797 where L::Target: Logger
2799 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2800 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2802 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2803 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2805 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2806 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2809 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2811 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2813 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2814 let commitment_txid = {
2815 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2816 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2817 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2819 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2820 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2821 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2822 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2823 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2824 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2828 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2830 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2831 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2832 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2833 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2836 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2837 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2838 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2839 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2842 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2844 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2845 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2846 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2847 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2848 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2849 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2850 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2851 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2852 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2853 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2854 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2860 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2861 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2864 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2865 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2866 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2867 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2868 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2869 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2870 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2871 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2872 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2873 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2874 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2875 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2876 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2879 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2880 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2881 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2882 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2883 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2884 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2885 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2887 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2888 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2889 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2890 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2891 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2892 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2893 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2894 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2896 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2897 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2900 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2902 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2903 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2904 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2907 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2910 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2911 commitment_stats.tx,
2913 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2914 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2915 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2918 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2919 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2921 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2922 let mut need_commitment = false;
2923 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2924 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2925 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2926 need_commitment = true;
2930 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2931 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2932 Some(forward_info.clone())
2934 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2935 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2936 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2937 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2938 need_commitment = true;
2941 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2942 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2943 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2944 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2945 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2946 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2947 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2948 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2949 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2950 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2951 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2952 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2953 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2954 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
2956 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
2958 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2959 need_commitment = true;
2963 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2964 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2965 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2966 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2967 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2968 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
2970 nondust_htlc_sources,
2974 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2975 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2976 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2977 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2979 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
2980 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2981 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2982 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2983 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2984 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2985 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2986 // includes the right HTLCs.
2987 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2988 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2989 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2990 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2991 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2992 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2994 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2995 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2996 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
2999 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3000 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3001 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3002 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3003 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3004 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3005 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3006 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3007 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3011 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3012 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3013 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3014 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3017 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3018 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3019 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3020 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3021 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3022 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3023 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3024 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3027 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3028 /// for our counterparty.
3029 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3030 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3031 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3032 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3033 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3035 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3036 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3037 updates: Vec::new(),
3040 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3041 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3042 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3043 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3044 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3045 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3046 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3047 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3048 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3049 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3050 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3051 // to rebalance channels.
3052 match &htlc_update {
3053 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3054 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3055 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3057 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3058 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
3060 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3063 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3064 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3065 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3066 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3067 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3068 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3069 // into the holding cell without ever being
3070 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3071 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3072 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3075 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3081 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3082 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3083 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3084 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3085 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3086 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3087 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3088 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3089 (msg, monitor_update)
3090 } else { unreachable!() };
3091 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3092 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3094 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3095 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3096 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3097 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3098 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3099 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3100 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3101 // for a full revocation before failing.
3102 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3105 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3107 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3114 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3115 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3117 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3118 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3123 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3124 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3125 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3126 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3127 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3129 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3130 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3131 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3133 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3134 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3140 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3141 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3142 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3143 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3144 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3145 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3146 where L::Target: Logger,
3148 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3149 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3151 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3154 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3155 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3158 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3160 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3161 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3162 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3166 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3167 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3168 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3169 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3170 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3171 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3172 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3173 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3174 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3177 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3179 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3180 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3183 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3184 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3186 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3188 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3189 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3190 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3191 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3192 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3193 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3194 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3195 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3199 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3200 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3201 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3202 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3203 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3204 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3205 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3206 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3207 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3209 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3210 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3213 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3214 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3215 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3216 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3217 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3218 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3219 let mut require_commitment = false;
3220 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3223 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3224 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3225 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3227 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3228 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3229 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3230 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3231 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3232 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3237 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3238 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3239 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3240 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3241 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3243 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3244 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3245 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3250 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3251 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3253 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3257 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3258 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3260 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3261 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3262 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3263 require_commitment = true;
3264 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3265 match forward_info {
3266 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3267 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3268 require_commitment = true;
3270 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3271 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3272 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3274 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3275 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3276 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3280 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3281 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3282 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3283 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3289 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3290 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3291 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3292 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3294 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3295 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3296 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3297 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3298 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3299 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3300 require_commitment = true;
3304 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3306 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3307 match update_state {
3308 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3309 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3310 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3311 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3312 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3314 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3315 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3316 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3317 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3318 require_commitment = true;
3319 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3320 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3325 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3326 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3327 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3328 if require_commitment {
3329 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3330 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3331 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3332 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3333 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3334 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3335 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3336 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3337 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3339 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3340 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3341 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3342 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3343 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3346 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3347 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3348 let mut additional_update = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3349 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3350 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3351 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3352 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3354 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3355 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3357 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3358 if require_commitment {
3359 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3361 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3362 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3363 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3364 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3366 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3367 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3368 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3369 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3371 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3372 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3373 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3379 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3380 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3381 /// commitment update.
3382 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3383 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3384 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3387 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3388 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3389 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3390 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3392 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3393 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3394 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3395 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3396 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3398 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3399 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3401 if !self.context.is_live() {
3402 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3405 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3406 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3407 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3408 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3409 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3410 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3411 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3412 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3413 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3414 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3418 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3419 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3420 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3421 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3422 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3425 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3426 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3430 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3431 force_holding_cell = true;
3434 if force_holding_cell {
3435 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3439 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3440 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3442 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3443 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3448 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3449 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3451 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3453 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3454 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3455 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3456 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3460 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3461 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3462 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3466 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3467 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3470 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3471 // will be retransmitted.
3472 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3473 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3474 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3476 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3477 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3479 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3480 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3481 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3482 // this HTLC accordingly
3483 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3486 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3487 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3488 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3489 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3492 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3493 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3494 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3495 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3496 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3497 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3502 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3504 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3505 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3506 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3507 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3511 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3512 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3513 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3514 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3515 // the update upon reconnection.
3516 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3520 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3522 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3523 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3526 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3527 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3528 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3529 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3530 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3531 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3532 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3534 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3535 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3536 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3537 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3538 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3539 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3540 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3542 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3543 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3544 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3545 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3546 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3547 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3548 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3551 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3552 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3553 /// to the remote side.
3554 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3555 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3556 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3557 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3560 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3562 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3563 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3564 let mut found_blocked = false;
3565 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3566 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3567 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3571 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3572 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3573 // first received the funding_signed.
3574 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3575 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3576 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3578 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3579 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3580 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3581 funding_broadcastable = None;
3584 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3585 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3586 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3587 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3588 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3589 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3590 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3591 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3592 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3593 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3594 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3595 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3596 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3597 next_per_commitment_point,
3598 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3602 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3604 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3605 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3606 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3607 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3608 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3609 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3611 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3612 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3613 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3614 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3615 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3616 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3620 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3621 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3623 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3624 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3625 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3628 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3629 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3630 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3631 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3632 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3633 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3634 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3635 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3636 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3640 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3641 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3643 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3646 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3647 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3649 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3650 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3652 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3653 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3654 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3655 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3656 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3657 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3658 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3659 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3660 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3661 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3662 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3663 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3664 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3666 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3667 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3668 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3674 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3675 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3676 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3677 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3678 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3679 per_commitment_secret,
3680 next_per_commitment_point,
3682 next_local_nonce: None,
3686 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3687 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3688 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3689 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3690 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3692 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3693 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3694 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3695 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3696 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3697 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3698 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3699 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3700 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3701 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3706 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3707 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3709 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3710 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3711 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3712 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3713 reason: err_packet.clone()
3716 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3717 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3718 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3719 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3720 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3721 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3724 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3725 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3726 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3727 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3728 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3735 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3736 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3737 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3738 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3742 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3743 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3744 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3745 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3746 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3747 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3751 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3752 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3754 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3755 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3756 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3757 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3758 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3759 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3760 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3761 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3764 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3766 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3767 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3768 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3769 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3770 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3773 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3774 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3775 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3778 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3779 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3780 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3781 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3782 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3783 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3785 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3786 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3787 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3788 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3789 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3792 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3793 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3794 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3795 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3796 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3797 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3798 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3799 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3803 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3804 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3805 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3806 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3808 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3812 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3813 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3814 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3815 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3817 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3818 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3819 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3820 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3821 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3825 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3827 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3828 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3829 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3830 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3831 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3832 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3834 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3835 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3836 channel_ready: None,
3837 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3838 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3839 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3843 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3844 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3845 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3846 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3847 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3848 next_per_commitment_point,
3849 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3851 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3852 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3853 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3857 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3858 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3859 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3861 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3862 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3863 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3866 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3872 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3873 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3874 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3875 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3876 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3877 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3878 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3880 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3882 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3883 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3884 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3885 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3886 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3887 next_per_commitment_point,
3888 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3892 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3893 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3894 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3896 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3899 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3900 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3901 raa: required_revoke,
3902 commitment_update: None,
3903 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3905 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3906 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3907 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3909 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3912 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3913 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3914 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3915 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3916 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3917 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3920 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3921 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3922 raa: required_revoke,
3923 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3924 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3928 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3932 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3933 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3934 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3935 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3937 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3939 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3941 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3942 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3943 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3944 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3945 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3946 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3948 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3949 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3950 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3951 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3952 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3954 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3955 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3956 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3957 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3960 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3961 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3962 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3963 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3964 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3965 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3966 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3967 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3968 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3969 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
3970 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3971 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3972 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3973 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3974 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3976 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3979 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3980 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3983 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3984 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3985 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3986 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3987 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3988 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3989 self.context.channel_state &
3990 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3991 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
3992 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
3993 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
3996 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
3997 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
3998 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
3999 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4000 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4001 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4002 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4004 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4010 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4011 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4012 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4013 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4015 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4016 return Ok((None, None));
4019 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4020 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4021 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4023 return Ok((None, None));
4026 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4028 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4029 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4030 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4031 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4033 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4034 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4035 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4037 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4038 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4039 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4040 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4042 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4043 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4044 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4049 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4050 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4052 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4053 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4056 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4057 /// within our expected timeframe.
4059 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4060 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4061 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4064 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4067 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4068 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4071 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4072 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4073 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4074 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4076 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4077 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4079 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4080 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4081 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4082 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4085 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4086 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4087 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4090 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4092 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4093 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4096 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4097 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4098 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4101 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4104 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4105 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4106 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4107 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4109 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4112 assert!(send_shutdown);
4113 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4114 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4115 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4117 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4118 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4120 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4125 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4127 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4128 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4130 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4131 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4132 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4133 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4134 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4135 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4138 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4139 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4140 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4143 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4144 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4145 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4146 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4150 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4151 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4152 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4153 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4154 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4155 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4157 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4158 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4165 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4166 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4168 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4171 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4172 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4174 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4176 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4177 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4178 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4179 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4180 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4181 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4182 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4183 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4184 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4186 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4187 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4190 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4194 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4195 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4196 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4197 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4199 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4202 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4205 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4206 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4208 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4212 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4213 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4216 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4217 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4218 return Ok((None, None));
4221 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4222 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4223 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4226 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4228 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4231 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4232 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4233 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4234 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4235 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4239 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4240 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4245 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4246 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4247 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4248 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4249 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4250 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4251 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4255 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4257 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4258 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4259 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4260 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4262 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4265 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4266 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4267 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4269 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4270 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4271 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4272 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4276 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4277 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4278 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4279 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4281 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4282 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4283 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4289 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4290 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4291 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4293 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4294 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4296 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4297 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4300 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4301 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4302 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4303 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4304 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4306 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4308 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4310 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4311 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4314 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4315 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4316 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4317 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4318 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4319 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4320 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4321 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4323 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4326 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4327 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4328 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4329 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4335 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4336 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4337 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4338 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4340 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4346 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4347 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4348 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4349 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4350 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4351 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4352 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4354 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4355 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4358 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4360 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4361 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4367 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4368 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4369 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4370 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4371 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4372 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4373 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4375 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4376 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4383 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4384 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4387 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4388 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4391 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4392 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4396 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4397 &self.context.holder_signer
4401 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4403 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4404 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4405 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4406 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4407 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4408 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4410 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4412 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4420 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4421 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4425 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4426 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4427 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4428 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4431 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4432 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4433 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4436 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4437 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4438 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4439 for i in 0..self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
4440 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
4441 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
4442 return Some((&self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
4443 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
4449 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
4450 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
4451 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
4452 let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
4453 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4454 update, blocked: !release_monitor
4459 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
4460 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
4462 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4463 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4464 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
4465 if release_monitor { self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
4468 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
4469 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
4472 pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4473 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
4474 if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
4475 assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
4481 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4482 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
4485 /// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
4486 pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4487 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
4488 .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
4491 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4492 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4493 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4495 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4496 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4497 if self.context.channel_state &
4498 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4499 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4500 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4501 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4502 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4505 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4506 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4507 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4508 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4509 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4510 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4512 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4513 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4514 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4516 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4517 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4518 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4519 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4520 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4521 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4527 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4528 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4529 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4532 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4533 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4534 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4537 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4538 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4539 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4542 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4543 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4544 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4545 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4546 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4547 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4552 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4553 self.context.channel_update_status
4556 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4557 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4558 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4561 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4563 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4564 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4565 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4569 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4570 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4571 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4574 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4578 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4579 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4580 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4582 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4583 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4584 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4586 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4587 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4590 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4591 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4592 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4593 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4594 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4595 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4596 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4597 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4598 self.context.channel_state);
4600 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4604 if need_commitment_update {
4605 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4606 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4607 let next_per_commitment_point =
4608 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4609 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4610 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4611 next_per_commitment_point,
4612 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4616 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4622 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4623 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4624 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4625 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4626 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4627 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4628 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4630 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4633 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4634 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4635 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4636 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4637 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4638 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4639 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4640 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4641 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4642 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4643 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4644 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4645 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4646 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4647 // channel and move on.
4648 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4649 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4651 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4652 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4653 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4655 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4656 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4657 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4658 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4659 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4660 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4661 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4665 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4666 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4667 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4668 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4669 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4673 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4674 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4675 // may have already happened for this block).
4676 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4677 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4678 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4679 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4682 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4683 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4684 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4685 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4693 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4694 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4695 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4696 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4698 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4699 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4702 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4704 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4705 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4706 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4707 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4709 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4712 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4715 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4716 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4717 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4718 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4720 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4723 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4724 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4725 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4727 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4728 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4730 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4731 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4732 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4740 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4742 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4743 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4744 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4746 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4747 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4750 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4751 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4752 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4753 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4754 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4755 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4756 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4757 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4758 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4761 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4762 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4763 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4764 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4766 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4767 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4768 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4770 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4771 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4772 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4773 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4775 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4776 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4777 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4778 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4779 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4780 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4781 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4784 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4785 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4787 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4790 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4791 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4792 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4793 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4794 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4795 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4796 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4797 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4798 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4799 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4800 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4801 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4802 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4803 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4804 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4805 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4806 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4812 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4817 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4818 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4820 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4821 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4822 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4823 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4825 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4828 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4829 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4830 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4831 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4832 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4833 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4835 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4836 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4839 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4840 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4841 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4842 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4844 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4845 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4847 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4848 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4849 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4850 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4851 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4852 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4858 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4859 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4860 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4861 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4863 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4866 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4870 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4874 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4875 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4879 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4883 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4884 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4887 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4891 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4893 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4898 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4900 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4905 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4907 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4908 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4909 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4910 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4911 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4915 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4917 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4918 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4919 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4920 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4921 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4922 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4923 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4925 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4926 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4927 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4928 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4929 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4930 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4931 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4932 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4933 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4934 contents: announcement,
4937 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4941 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4942 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4943 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4944 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4945 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4946 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4947 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4948 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4950 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4952 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4953 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4954 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4955 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4957 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4958 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4959 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4960 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4963 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4964 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4965 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4966 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4969 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4972 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4973 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4974 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4975 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
4976 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4977 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4980 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
4982 Err(_) => return None,
4984 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
4985 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4990 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4991 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4992 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4993 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4994 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4995 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4996 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4997 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4998 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4999 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5000 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5001 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5002 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5003 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5004 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5005 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5008 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5011 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5012 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5013 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5014 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5015 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5016 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5017 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5018 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5019 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5021 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5022 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5023 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5024 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5025 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5026 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5027 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5028 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5029 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5031 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5032 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5033 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5034 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5035 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5036 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5037 next_funding_txid: None,
5042 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5044 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5045 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5046 /// commitment update.
5048 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5049 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(
5050 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5051 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5052 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5054 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5055 skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
5056 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5058 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5059 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5064 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5065 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5067 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5069 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5070 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5072 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5073 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5074 /// regenerate them.
5076 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5077 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5079 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5080 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(
5081 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5082 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5083 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5084 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5085 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5086 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5088 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5089 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5090 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5093 if amount_msat == 0 {
5094 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5097 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
5098 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5099 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5100 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5103 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5104 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5105 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5108 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5109 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5110 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5111 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5112 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5113 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5114 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5115 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5118 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5119 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5120 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5121 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5122 else { "to peer" });
5124 if need_holding_cell {
5125 force_holding_cell = true;
5128 // Now update local state:
5129 if force_holding_cell {
5130 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5135 onion_routing_packet,
5141 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5142 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5144 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5146 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5151 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5152 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5153 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5157 onion_routing_packet,
5160 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5165 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5166 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5167 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5168 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5170 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5171 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5172 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5174 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5175 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5179 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5180 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5181 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5182 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5183 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5184 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5185 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5188 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5189 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5190 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5191 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5192 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5193 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5196 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5198 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5199 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5200 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5202 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5203 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5206 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5207 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5208 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5209 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5210 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5211 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5212 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5213 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5216 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5220 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5221 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5222 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5223 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5225 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5227 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5228 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5229 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5230 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5231 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5232 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5233 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5234 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5235 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5236 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5237 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5243 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5246 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5247 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5248 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5249 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5250 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5251 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5253 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5254 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5255 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5256 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5259 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5260 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5264 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5265 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5267 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5269 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5270 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5271 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5272 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5274 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5275 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5276 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5277 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5278 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5279 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5283 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5284 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5288 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5289 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5292 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5293 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5295 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5296 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5297 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(
5298 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5299 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5300 ) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5301 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5302 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger);
5303 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5306 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5307 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5308 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5314 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5315 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5316 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5318 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5319 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5320 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5321 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5327 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5328 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5330 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5331 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5332 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5333 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5334 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5335 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5336 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5337 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5338 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5341 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5342 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5343 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5345 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5346 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5349 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5350 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5352 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5353 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5354 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5357 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5358 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5359 let mut chan_closed = false;
5360 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5364 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5366 None if !chan_closed => {
5367 // use override shutdown script if provided
5368 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5369 Some(script) => script,
5371 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5372 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5373 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5374 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5378 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5379 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5381 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5387 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5388 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5389 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5390 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5392 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5394 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5396 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5397 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5398 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5399 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5400 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5401 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5404 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5405 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
5406 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
5409 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5410 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5411 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5414 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5415 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5416 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5417 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5418 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5420 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5421 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5428 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5429 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5431 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5434 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5435 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5436 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5438 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5439 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5443 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5447 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5448 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5449 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5452 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5453 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5454 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5455 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5456 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5457 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5458 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5459 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5460 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5462 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5463 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5464 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5465 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5467 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5468 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5470 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5471 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5473 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5474 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5475 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5477 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5478 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5480 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5481 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5482 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5483 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5484 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5487 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5488 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5490 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5492 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5493 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5494 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5495 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5498 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5499 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5501 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5502 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5503 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5504 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5508 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5509 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5510 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5514 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5515 Ok(script) => script,
5516 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5519 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5522 context: ChannelContext {
5525 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5526 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5527 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5528 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5533 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5535 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5536 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5537 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5538 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5540 channel_value_satoshis,
5542 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5545 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5548 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5549 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5552 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5553 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5554 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5555 pending_update_fee: None,
5556 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5557 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5558 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5559 update_time_counter: 1,
5561 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5563 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5564 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5565 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5566 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5567 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5568 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5570 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5571 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5572 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5573 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5575 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5576 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5577 closing_fee_limits: None,
5578 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5580 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5582 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5583 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5584 short_channel_id: None,
5585 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5587 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5588 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5589 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5590 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5591 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5592 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5593 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5594 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5595 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5596 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5597 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5598 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5600 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5602 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5603 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5604 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5605 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5606 counterparty_parameters: None,
5607 funding_outpoint: None,
5608 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5610 funding_transaction: None,
5612 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5613 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5614 counterparty_node_id,
5616 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5618 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5620 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5621 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5623 announcement_sigs: None,
5625 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5626 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5627 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5628 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5630 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5631 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5633 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5634 outbound_scid_alias,
5636 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5637 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5639 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5640 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5645 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5650 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5651 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5652 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5653 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5654 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5655 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5658 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5659 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5660 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5661 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5662 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5663 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5664 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5665 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5666 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5667 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5668 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5670 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5671 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5673 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5674 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5675 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5676 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5679 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5680 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5682 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5685 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5686 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5687 return Err((self, e));
5691 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5693 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5695 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5696 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5697 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5699 let channel = Channel {
5700 context: self.context,
5703 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5704 temporary_channel_id,
5705 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5706 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5709 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5711 next_local_nonce: None,
5715 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5716 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5717 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5718 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5719 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5720 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5721 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5722 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5723 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5724 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5727 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5728 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5729 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5730 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5731 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5732 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5738 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5739 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5740 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5741 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5742 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5743 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5744 // We've exhausted our options
5747 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5748 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5751 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5752 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5753 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5754 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5756 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5757 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5758 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5759 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5760 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5762 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5764 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5765 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5768 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5769 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5770 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5772 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5773 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5776 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5777 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5780 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5781 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5785 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5786 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5787 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5788 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5789 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5790 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5791 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5792 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5793 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5794 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5795 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5796 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5797 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5798 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5799 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5800 first_per_commitment_point,
5801 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5802 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5803 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5804 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5806 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5811 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5812 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5814 // Check sanity of message fields:
5815 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5816 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5818 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5819 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5821 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5822 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5824 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5825 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5827 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5828 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5830 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5831 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5832 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5834 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5835 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5836 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5838 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5839 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5840 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5842 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5843 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5845 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5846 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5849 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5850 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5851 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5853 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5854 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5856 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5857 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5859 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5860 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5862 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5863 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5865 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5866 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5868 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5869 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5872 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5873 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5874 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5876 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5877 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5879 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5880 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5881 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5883 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
5884 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
5887 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5888 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5889 &Some(ref script) => {
5890 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5891 if script.len() == 0 {
5894 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5895 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5897 Some(script.clone())
5900 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5902 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5907 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5908 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5909 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5910 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5911 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5913 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5914 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5916 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5919 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5920 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5921 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5922 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5923 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5924 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5927 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5928 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5929 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5932 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5933 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5935 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5936 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5942 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5943 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5944 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5947 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5948 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5949 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5950 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5951 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5952 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5953 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5954 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5955 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5956 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5957 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5958 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5961 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
5963 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
5964 // support this channel type.
5965 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
5966 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
5967 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
5970 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
5971 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
5972 // `static_remote_key`.
5973 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
5974 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
5976 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
5977 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
5978 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
5980 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
5981 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
5983 channel_type.clone()
5985 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5986 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5987 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5992 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
5993 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5994 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5995 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5996 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5997 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5998 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5999 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6000 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6003 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6004 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6007 // Check sanity of message fields:
6008 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6009 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6011 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6012 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6014 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6017 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6018 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6021 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6022 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6024 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6025 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6027 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6029 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6030 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6031 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6033 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6034 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6036 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6037 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6040 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6041 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6044 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6047 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6050 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6051 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6053 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6054 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6056 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6057 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6059 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6060 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6063 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6065 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6066 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6067 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6071 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6072 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6073 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6074 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6075 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6077 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6078 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6080 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6081 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6082 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6084 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6085 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6088 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6089 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6090 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6091 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6092 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6093 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6096 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6097 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6098 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6099 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6103 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6104 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6105 &Some(ref script) => {
6106 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6107 if script.len() == 0 {
6110 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6113 Some(script.clone())
6116 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6123 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6124 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6125 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6126 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6130 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6131 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6132 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6136 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6137 Ok(script) => script,
6138 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6141 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6142 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6145 context: ChannelContext {
6148 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6149 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6151 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6156 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6158 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6159 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6160 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6161 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6164 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6167 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6170 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6171 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6172 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6174 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6175 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6176 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6177 pending_update_fee: None,
6178 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6179 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6180 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6181 update_time_counter: 1,
6183 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6185 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6186 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6187 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6188 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6189 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6190 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6192 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6193 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6194 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6195 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6197 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6198 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6199 closing_fee_limits: None,
6200 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6202 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6204 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6205 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6206 short_channel_id: None,
6207 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6209 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6210 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6211 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6212 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6213 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6214 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6215 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6216 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6217 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6218 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6219 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6220 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6221 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6223 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6225 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6226 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6227 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6228 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6229 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6230 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6231 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6233 funding_outpoint: None,
6234 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6236 funding_transaction: None,
6238 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6239 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6240 counterparty_node_id,
6242 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6244 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6246 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6247 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6249 announcement_sigs: None,
6251 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6252 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6253 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6254 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6256 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6257 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6259 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6260 outbound_scid_alias,
6262 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6263 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6265 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6266 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6271 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6278 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6279 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6282 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6283 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6284 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6285 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6288 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6289 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6291 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6292 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6293 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6294 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6296 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6297 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6299 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6300 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6302 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6303 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6306 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6307 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6309 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6312 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6313 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6314 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6316 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6317 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6318 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6319 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6321 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6322 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6323 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6324 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6325 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6326 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6327 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6328 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6329 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6330 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6331 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6332 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6333 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6334 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6335 first_per_commitment_point,
6336 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6337 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6338 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6340 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6342 next_local_nonce: None,
6346 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6347 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6349 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6351 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6352 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6355 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6356 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6358 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6359 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6361 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6362 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6363 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6364 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6365 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6366 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6367 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6368 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6369 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6372 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6373 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6375 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6376 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6377 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6378 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6380 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6381 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6383 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6384 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6387 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6388 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6389 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6391 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6394 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6395 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6397 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6398 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6399 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6401 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6403 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6404 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6406 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6407 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6408 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6409 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6412 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6413 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6414 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6415 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6416 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6418 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6420 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6421 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6422 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6425 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6426 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6427 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6431 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6432 initial_commitment_tx,
6435 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6436 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6439 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6440 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6443 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6445 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6446 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6447 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6448 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6449 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6450 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6451 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6452 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6453 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6454 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6455 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6457 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6459 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6461 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6462 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6463 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6464 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6466 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6468 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6469 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6470 let mut channel = Channel {
6471 context: self.context,
6473 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6474 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6475 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6477 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6481 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6482 }, channel_monitor))
6486 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6487 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6489 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6495 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6496 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6497 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6498 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6499 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6501 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6502 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6503 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6504 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6510 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6511 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6512 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6513 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6514 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6515 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6520 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6521 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6522 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6523 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6525 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6526 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6527 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6528 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6533 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6534 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6535 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6536 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6537 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6538 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6543 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6544 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6545 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6548 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6550 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6551 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6552 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6553 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6554 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6556 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6557 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6558 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6559 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6561 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6562 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6563 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6565 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6567 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6568 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6569 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6570 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6571 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6572 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6574 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6575 // deserialized from that format.
6576 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6577 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6578 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6580 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6582 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6583 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6584 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6586 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6587 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6588 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6589 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6592 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6593 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6594 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6597 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6598 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6599 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6600 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6602 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6603 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6605 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6607 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6609 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6611 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6614 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6616 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6621 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6622 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6624 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6625 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6626 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6627 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6628 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6629 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6630 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6632 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6634 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6636 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6639 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6640 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6641 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6644 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6646 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6647 preimages.push(preimage);
6649 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6650 reason.write(writer)?;
6652 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6654 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6655 preimages.push(preimage);
6657 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6658 reason.write(writer)?;
6661 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6662 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6663 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6665 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6666 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6667 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6671 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6672 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6673 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6675 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6676 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6680 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6681 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6682 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6683 source.write(writer)?;
6684 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6686 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6687 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6688 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6690 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6691 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6693 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6695 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6696 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6698 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6700 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6701 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6706 match self.context.resend_order {
6707 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6708 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6711 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6712 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6713 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6715 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6716 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6717 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6718 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6721 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6722 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6723 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6724 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6725 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6728 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6729 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6730 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6731 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6733 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6734 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6735 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6737 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6739 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6740 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6741 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6742 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6744 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6745 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6746 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6747 // consider the stale state on reload.
6750 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6751 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6752 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6754 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6755 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6756 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6758 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6759 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6761 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6762 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6763 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6765 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6766 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6768 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6771 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6772 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6773 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6775 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6778 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6779 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6781 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6782 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6783 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6785 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6787 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6789 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6791 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6792 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6793 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6794 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6795 htlc.write(writer)?;
6798 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6799 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6800 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6802 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6803 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6805 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6806 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6807 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6808 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6809 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6810 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6811 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6813 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6814 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6815 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6816 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6817 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6819 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6820 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6822 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6823 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6824 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6825 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6827 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6829 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6830 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6831 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6832 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6833 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6834 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6835 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6837 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6838 (2, chan_type, option),
6839 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6840 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6841 (5, self.context.config, required),
6842 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6843 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6844 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6845 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6846 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6847 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6848 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6849 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6850 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6851 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6852 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6853 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6854 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6855 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6856 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6857 (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6858 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6859 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6866 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6867 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6869 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6870 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6872 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6873 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6874 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6876 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6877 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6878 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6879 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6881 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6883 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6884 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6885 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6886 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6887 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6889 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6890 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6893 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6894 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6895 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6897 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6899 let mut keys_data = None;
6901 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6902 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6903 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6904 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6905 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6906 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6907 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6908 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6909 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6910 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6914 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6915 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6916 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6919 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6921 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6922 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6923 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6925 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6927 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6928 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6929 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6930 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6931 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6932 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6933 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6934 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6935 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6936 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6937 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6938 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6939 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6944 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6945 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6946 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6947 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6948 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6949 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6950 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6951 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6952 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6953 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6954 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6955 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6957 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6958 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6961 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6962 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6965 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6966 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6968 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6970 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6974 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6975 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6976 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6977 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6978 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6979 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6980 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6981 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6982 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6983 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6984 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6986 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6987 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6988 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6990 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6991 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6992 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6994 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6998 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6999 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7000 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7001 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7004 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7005 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7006 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7008 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7009 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7010 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7011 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7014 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7015 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7016 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7017 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7020 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7022 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7024 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7025 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7026 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7027 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7029 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7030 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7031 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7032 // consider the stale state on reload.
7033 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7036 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7037 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7038 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7040 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7043 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7044 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7045 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7047 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7048 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7049 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7050 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7052 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7053 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7055 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7056 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7058 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7059 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7060 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7062 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7064 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7065 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7067 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7068 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7071 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7073 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7074 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7075 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7076 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7078 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7081 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7082 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7084 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7086 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7087 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7089 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7090 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7092 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7094 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7095 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7096 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7098 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7099 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7100 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7104 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7105 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7106 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7108 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7114 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7115 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7116 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7117 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7118 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7119 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7120 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7121 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7122 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7123 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7125 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7126 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7127 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7128 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7129 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7130 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7131 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7133 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7134 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7135 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7136 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7138 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7140 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7141 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7143 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7144 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7145 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7146 (2, channel_type, option),
7147 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7148 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7149 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7150 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7151 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7152 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7153 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7154 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7155 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7156 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7157 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7158 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7159 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7160 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7161 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7162 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7163 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7164 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7165 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7166 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7167 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7170 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7171 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7172 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7173 // required channel parameters.
7174 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7175 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7176 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7178 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7180 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7181 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7182 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7183 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7186 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7187 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7188 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7190 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7191 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7193 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7194 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7199 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7200 if iter.next().is_some() {
7201 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7205 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7206 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7207 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7208 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7209 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7212 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7213 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7214 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7216 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7217 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7219 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7220 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7221 // separate u64 values.
7222 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7224 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7226 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7227 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7228 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7229 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7231 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7232 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7234 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7235 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7236 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7237 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7238 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7241 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7242 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7246 context: ChannelContext {
7249 config: config.unwrap(),
7253 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7254 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7255 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7258 temporary_channel_id,
7260 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7262 channel_value_satoshis,
7264 latest_monitor_update_id,
7267 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7270 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7271 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7274 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7275 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7276 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7277 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7281 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7282 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7283 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7284 monitor_pending_forwards,
7285 monitor_pending_failures,
7286 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7289 holding_cell_update_fee,
7290 next_holder_htlc_id,
7291 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7292 update_time_counter,
7295 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7296 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7297 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7298 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7300 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7301 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7302 closing_fee_limits: None,
7303 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7305 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7307 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7308 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7310 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7312 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7313 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7314 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7315 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7316 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7317 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7318 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7319 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7320 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7323 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7325 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7326 funding_transaction,
7328 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7329 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7330 counterparty_node_id,
7332 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7336 channel_update_status,
7337 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7341 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7342 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7343 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7344 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7346 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7347 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7349 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7350 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7351 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7353 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7354 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7356 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7357 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7359 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7362 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7371 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7372 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7373 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7374 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7375 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7377 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7378 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7379 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7380 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7381 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7382 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7383 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7384 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7385 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7386 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7387 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7388 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7389 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7390 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7391 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7392 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7393 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7394 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7395 use crate::util::test_utils;
7396 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7397 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7398 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7399 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7400 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7401 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7402 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7403 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7404 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7405 use crate::prelude::*;
7407 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7410 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7411 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7417 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7418 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7419 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7420 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7424 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7425 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7426 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7427 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7428 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7429 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7430 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7434 signer: InMemorySigner,
7437 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7438 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7441 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7442 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7444 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7445 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7448 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7452 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7454 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7455 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7456 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7457 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7458 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7461 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7462 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7463 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7464 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7468 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7469 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7470 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7474 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7475 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7476 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7477 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7479 let seed = [42; 32];
7480 let network = Network::Testnet;
7481 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7482 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7483 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7486 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7487 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7488 let config = UserConfig::default();
7489 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7490 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7491 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7493 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7494 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7498 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7499 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7501 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7502 let original_fee = 253;
7503 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7504 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7505 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7506 let seed = [42; 32];
7507 let network = Network::Testnet;
7508 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7510 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7511 let config = UserConfig::default();
7512 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7514 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7515 // same as the old fee.
7516 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7517 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7518 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7522 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7523 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7524 // dust limits are used.
7525 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7526 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7527 let seed = [42; 32];
7528 let network = Network::Testnet;
7529 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7530 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7531 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7533 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7534 // they have different dust limits.
7536 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7537 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7538 let config = UserConfig::default();
7539 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7541 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7542 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7543 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7544 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7545 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7547 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7548 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7549 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7550 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7551 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7553 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7554 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7555 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7556 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7558 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7559 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7560 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7562 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7563 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7565 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7566 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7567 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7569 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7570 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7571 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7572 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7575 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7577 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7578 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7579 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7580 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7581 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7582 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7583 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7584 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7585 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7587 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7590 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7591 // the dust limit check.
7592 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7593 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7594 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7595 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7597 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7598 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7599 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7600 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7601 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7602 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7603 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7607 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7608 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7609 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7610 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7611 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7612 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7613 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7614 let seed = [42; 32];
7615 let network = Network::Testnet;
7616 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7618 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7619 let config = UserConfig::default();
7620 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7622 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7623 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7625 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7626 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7627 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7628 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7629 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7630 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7632 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7633 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7634 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7635 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7636 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7638 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7640 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7641 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7642 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7643 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7644 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7646 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7647 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7648 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7649 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7650 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7654 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7655 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7656 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7657 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7658 let seed = [42; 32];
7659 let network = Network::Testnet;
7660 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7661 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7662 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7664 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7666 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7667 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7668 let config = UserConfig::default();
7669 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7671 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7672 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7673 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7674 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7676 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7677 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7678 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7680 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7681 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7682 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7683 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7685 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7686 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7687 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7689 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7690 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7692 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7693 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7694 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7695 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7696 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7697 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7698 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7700 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7702 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7703 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7704 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7705 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7706 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7710 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7711 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7712 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7713 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7714 let seed = [42; 32];
7715 let network = Network::Testnet;
7716 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7717 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7718 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7720 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7721 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7722 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7723 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7724 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7725 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7726 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7727 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7729 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7730 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7731 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7732 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7733 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7734 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7736 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7737 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7738 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7739 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7741 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7743 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7744 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7745 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7746 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7747 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7748 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7750 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7751 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7752 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7753 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7755 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7756 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7757 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7758 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7759 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7761 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7762 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7764 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7765 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7766 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7768 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7769 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7770 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7771 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7772 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7774 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7775 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7777 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7778 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7779 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7783 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7785 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7786 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7787 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7789 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7790 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7791 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7792 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7794 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7795 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7796 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7798 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7800 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7801 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7804 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7805 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7806 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7807 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7808 let seed = [42; 32];
7809 let network = Network::Testnet;
7810 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7811 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7812 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7815 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7816 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7817 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7819 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7820 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7822 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7823 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7824 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7826 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7827 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7829 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7831 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7832 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7834 // Channel Negotiations failed
7835 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7836 assert!(result.is_err());
7841 fn channel_update() {
7842 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7843 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7844 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7845 let seed = [42; 32];
7846 let network = Network::Testnet;
7847 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7848 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7849 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7851 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7852 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7853 let config = UserConfig::default();
7854 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7856 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7857 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7858 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7859 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7860 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7862 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7863 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7864 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7865 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7866 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7868 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7869 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7870 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7871 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7873 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7874 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7875 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7877 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7878 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7880 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7881 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7882 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7884 short_channel_id: 0,
7887 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7888 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7889 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7891 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7892 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7894 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7896 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7898 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7899 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7900 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7901 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7903 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7904 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7905 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7907 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7911 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7913 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7914 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7915 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7916 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7917 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7918 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7919 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7920 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7921 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7922 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7923 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7924 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7925 use crate::sync::Arc;
7927 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7928 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7929 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7930 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7932 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7934 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7935 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7936 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7937 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7938 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7940 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7941 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7947 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7948 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7949 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7951 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7952 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7953 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7954 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7955 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7956 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7958 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7960 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7961 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7962 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7963 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7964 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7965 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7967 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7968 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7969 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7970 selected_contest_delay: 144
7972 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7973 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7975 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7976 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7978 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7979 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7981 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7982 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7984 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7985 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7986 // build_commitment_transaction.
7987 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7988 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7989 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7990 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7991 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7993 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7994 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7995 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7996 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8000 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8001 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8002 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8003 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8007 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8008 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8009 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8011 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8012 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8014 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8015 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8017 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8019 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8020 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8021 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8022 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8023 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8024 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8025 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8027 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8028 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8029 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8030 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8032 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8033 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8034 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8036 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8038 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8039 commitment_tx.clone(),
8040 counterparty_signature,
8041 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8042 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8043 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8045 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8046 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8048 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8049 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8050 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8052 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8053 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8056 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8057 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8059 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8060 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8061 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8062 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8063 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8064 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8065 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8066 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8068 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8071 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8072 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8073 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8077 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8080 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8081 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8082 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8084 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8085 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8086 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8087 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8088 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8089 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8090 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8091 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8093 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8097 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8098 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8099 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8100 "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", {});
8102 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8103 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8105 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8106 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8107 "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", {});
8109 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8110 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8111 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8112 "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", {});
8114 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8115 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8117 amount_msat: 1000000,
8119 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8120 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8122 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8125 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8126 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8128 amount_msat: 2000000,
8130 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8131 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8133 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8136 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8137 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8139 amount_msat: 2000000,
8141 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8142 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8143 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8144 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8146 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8149 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8150 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8152 amount_msat: 3000000,
8154 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8155 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8156 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8157 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8159 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8162 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8163 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8165 amount_msat: 4000000,
8167 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8168 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8170 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8174 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8175 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8176 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8178 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8179 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8180 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e0a06a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea01473044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8183 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8184 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8185 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b00000000000000000001e8030000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b014730440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
8188 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8189 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8190 "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" },
8193 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8194 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8195 "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" },
8198 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8199 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8200 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8203 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8204 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8205 "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" }
8208 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8209 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8210 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8212 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8213 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8214 "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", {
8217 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8218 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8219 "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" },
8222 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8223 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8224 "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" },
8227 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8228 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8229 "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" },
8232 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8233 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8234 "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" },
8237 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8238 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8239 "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" }
8242 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8243 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8244 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8246 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8247 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8248 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8251 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8252 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8253 "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" },
8256 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8257 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8258 "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" },
8261 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8262 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8263 "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" },
8266 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8267 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8268 "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" }
8271 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8272 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8273 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8274 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8276 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8277 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8278 "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", {
8281 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8282 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8283 "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" },
8286 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8287 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8288 "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" },
8291 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8292 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8293 "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" },
8296 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8297 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8298 "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" }
8301 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8302 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8303 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8304 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8306 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8307 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8308 "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", {
8311 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8312 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8313 "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" },
8316 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8317 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8318 "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" },
8321 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8322 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8323 "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" },
8326 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8327 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8328 "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" }
8331 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8332 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8333 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8335 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8336 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8337 "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", {
8340 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8341 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8342 "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" },
8345 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8346 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8347 "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" },
8350 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8351 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8352 "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" }
8355 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8356 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8357 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8359 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8360 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8361 "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", {
8364 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8365 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8366 "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" },
8369 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8370 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8371 "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" },
8374 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8375 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8376 "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" }
8379 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8380 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8381 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8383 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8384 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8385 "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", {
8388 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8389 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8390 "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" },
8393 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8394 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8395 "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" }
8398 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8399 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8400 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8401 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8402 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8403 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8405 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8406 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8407 "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", {
8410 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8411 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8412 "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" },
8415 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8416 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8417 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc03000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd727183483045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8420 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8421 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8422 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8423 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8424 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8426 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8427 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8428 "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", {
8431 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8432 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8433 "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" },
8436 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8437 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8438 "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" }
8441 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8442 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8443 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8445 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8446 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8447 "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", {
8450 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8451 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8452 "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" }
8455 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8456 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8457 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8458 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8459 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8461 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8462 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8463 "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", {
8466 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8467 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8468 "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" }
8471 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8472 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8473 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8474 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8475 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8477 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8478 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8479 "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", {
8482 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8483 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8484 "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" }
8487 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8488 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8489 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8490 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8492 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8493 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8494 "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", {});
8496 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8497 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8498 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8499 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8500 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8502 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8503 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8504 "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", {});
8506 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8507 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8508 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8509 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8510 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8512 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8513 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8514 "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", {});
8516 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8517 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8518 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8520 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8521 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8522 "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", {});
8524 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8525 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8526 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8527 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8528 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8530 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8531 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8532 "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", {});
8534 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8535 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8536 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8537 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8538 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8540 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8541 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8542 "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", {});
8544 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8545 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8546 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8547 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8548 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8549 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8551 amount_msat: 2000000,
8553 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8554 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8556 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8559 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8560 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8561 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8563 amount_msat: 5000001,
8565 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8566 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8567 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8568 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8570 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8573 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8574 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8576 amount_msat: 5000000,
8578 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8579 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8580 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8581 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8583 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8587 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8588 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8589 "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", {
8592 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8593 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8594 "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" },
8596 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8597 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8598 "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" },
8600 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8601 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8602 "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" }
8605 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8606 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8607 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8608 "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", {
8611 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8612 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8613 "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" },
8615 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8616 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8617 "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" },
8619 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8620 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8621 "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" }
8626 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8627 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8629 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8630 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8631 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8632 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8634 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8635 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8636 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8638 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8639 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8641 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8642 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8644 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8645 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8646 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8650 fn test_key_derivation() {
8651 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8652 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8654 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8655 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8657 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8658 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8660 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8661 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8663 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8664 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8666 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8667 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8669 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8670 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8672 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8673 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8677 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8678 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8679 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8680 let seed = [42; 32];
8681 let network = Network::Testnet;
8682 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8683 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8685 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8686 let config = UserConfig::default();
8687 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8688 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8690 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8691 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8693 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8694 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8695 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8696 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8697 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8698 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8699 assert!(res.is_ok());
8703 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8704 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8705 // resulting `channel_type`.
8706 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8707 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8708 let network = Network::Testnet;
8709 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8710 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8712 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8713 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8715 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8716 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8718 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8719 // need to signal it.
8720 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8721 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8722 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8725 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8727 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8728 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8729 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8731 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8732 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8733 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8736 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8737 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8738 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8739 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8740 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8743 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8744 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8748 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8749 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8750 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8751 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8752 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8753 let network = Network::Testnet;
8754 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8755 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8757 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8758 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8760 let config = UserConfig::default();
8762 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8763 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8764 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8765 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8766 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8768 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8769 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8770 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8773 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8774 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8775 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8777 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8778 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8779 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8780 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8781 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8782 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8784 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8788 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8789 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8791 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8792 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8793 let network = Network::Testnet;
8794 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8795 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8797 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8798 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8800 let config = UserConfig::default();
8802 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8803 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8804 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8805 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8806 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8807 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8808 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8809 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8811 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8812 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8813 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8814 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8815 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8816 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8819 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8820 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8822 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8823 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8824 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8825 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8827 assert!(res.is_err());
8829 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8830 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8831 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8833 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8834 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8835 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8838 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8840 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8841 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8842 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8843 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8846 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8847 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8849 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8850 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8852 assert!(res.is_err());