1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, EntropySource, BaseSign, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
39 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
41 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
42 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
43 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
44 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use crate::prelude::*;
48 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
50 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
51 use crate::sync::Mutex;
52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
56 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
63 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
66 pub struct AvailableBalances {
67 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
68 pub balance_msat: u64,
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
77 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
79 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
81 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
82 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
83 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
84 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
85 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
86 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
88 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
92 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
93 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
94 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
95 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
98 enum InboundHTLCState {
99 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
100 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
101 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
102 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
103 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
104 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
105 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
106 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
107 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
108 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
109 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
110 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
111 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
112 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
113 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
115 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
116 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
119 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
120 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
123 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
124 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
125 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
126 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
127 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
128 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
130 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
131 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
132 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
133 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
134 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
135 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
136 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
137 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
139 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
140 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
142 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
143 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
144 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
145 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
146 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
147 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
148 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
149 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
152 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
156 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
157 state: InboundHTLCState,
160 enum OutboundHTLCState {
161 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
162 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
163 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
164 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
165 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
166 /// money back (though we won't), and,
167 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
168 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
169 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
170 /// we'll never get out of sync).
171 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
172 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
173 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
175 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
176 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
177 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
178 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
179 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
180 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
181 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
182 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
183 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
184 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
185 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
186 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
187 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
188 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
189 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
193 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
194 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
195 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
198 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
201 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
202 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
207 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
208 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
211 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
216 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
220 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
221 state: OutboundHTLCState,
225 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
226 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
227 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
231 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
233 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
236 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
241 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
245 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
246 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
247 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
248 /// move on to ChannelReady.
249 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
250 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
251 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
253 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
254 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
255 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
256 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
257 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
258 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
259 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
261 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
262 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
263 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
265 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
266 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
267 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
268 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
269 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
270 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
272 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
273 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
275 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
277 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
278 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
279 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
280 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
281 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
282 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
283 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
285 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
286 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
287 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
288 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
289 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
290 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
292 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
293 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
294 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
295 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
296 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
298 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
299 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
301 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
303 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
304 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
305 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
306 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
307 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
308 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
309 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
310 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
312 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
314 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
316 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
320 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
322 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
323 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
324 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
326 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
327 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
329 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
330 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
331 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
332 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
333 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
335 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
336 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
340 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
346 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
349 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
350 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
352 holding_cell_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
356 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
357 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
358 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
359 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
360 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
361 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
362 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
363 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
365 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
368 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
369 struct HTLCCandidate {
371 origin: HTLCInitiator,
375 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
383 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
385 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
387 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
388 htlc_value_msat: u64,
389 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
394 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
395 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
396 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
397 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
398 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
400 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
401 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
402 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
403 htlc_value_msat: u64,
404 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
405 /// in the holding cell).
406 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
408 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
409 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
413 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
415 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
416 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
421 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
424 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
425 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
426 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
427 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
428 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
429 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
430 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
431 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
432 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
433 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
434 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
437 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
438 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
439 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
440 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
441 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
442 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
443 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
444 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
447 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
448 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
449 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
450 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
451 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
452 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
453 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
454 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
455 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
456 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
457 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
458 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
459 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
460 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
461 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
463 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
464 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
465 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
466 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
468 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
469 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
470 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
471 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
473 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
474 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
475 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
476 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
477 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
479 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
480 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
481 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
482 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
484 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
485 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
486 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
488 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
489 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
490 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
491 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
492 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
494 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
495 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
496 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
499 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
500 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
501 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
502 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
504 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
505 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
506 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
507 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
509 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
513 channel_id: [u8; 32],
516 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
517 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
519 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
520 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
521 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
523 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
524 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
525 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
526 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
528 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
529 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
531 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
533 holder_signer: Signer,
534 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
535 destination_script: Script,
537 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
538 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
539 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
541 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
542 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
544 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
545 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
546 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
548 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
549 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
550 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
551 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
552 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
553 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
555 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
557 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
558 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
559 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
560 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
561 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
562 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
564 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
566 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
567 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
568 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
569 // HTLCs with similar state.
570 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
571 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
572 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
573 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
574 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
575 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
576 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
577 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
578 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
581 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
582 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
583 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
585 update_time_counter: u32,
587 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
588 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
589 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
590 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
591 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
592 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
594 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
595 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
597 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
598 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
599 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
600 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
602 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
603 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
605 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
607 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
609 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
610 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
611 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
612 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
613 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
614 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
616 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
617 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
618 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
619 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
620 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
622 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
623 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
624 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
625 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
626 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
627 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
628 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
629 channel_creation_height: u32,
631 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
634 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
636 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
639 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
641 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
644 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
646 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
648 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
649 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
652 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
654 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
656 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
657 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
659 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
661 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
665 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
667 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
668 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
670 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
671 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
674 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
676 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
678 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
679 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
680 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
681 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
683 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
684 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
685 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
687 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
688 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
689 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
691 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
692 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
693 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
694 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
695 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
696 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
697 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
698 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
700 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
701 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
702 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
703 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
704 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
706 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
707 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
709 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
710 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
711 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
712 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
713 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
714 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
715 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
716 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
718 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
719 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
721 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
722 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
723 // the channel's funding UTXO.
725 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
726 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
727 // associated channel mapping.
729 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
730 // to store all of them.
731 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
733 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
734 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
735 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
736 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
737 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
739 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
740 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
742 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
743 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
744 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
747 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
748 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
750 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
751 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
752 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
756 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
758 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
760 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
761 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
765 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
767 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
769 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
771 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
772 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
773 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
774 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
775 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
777 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
778 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
780 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
782 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
783 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
785 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
786 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
787 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
788 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
789 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
790 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
792 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
793 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
795 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
796 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
797 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
798 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
799 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
801 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
802 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
804 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
805 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
807 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
808 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
809 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
810 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
816 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
817 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
819 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
820 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
821 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
826 macro_rules! secp_check {
827 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
830 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
835 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
836 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
837 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
838 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
840 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
842 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
843 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
844 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
846 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
849 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
851 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
854 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
855 /// required by us according to the configured or default
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
858 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
860 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
861 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
862 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
863 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
864 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
867 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
868 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
869 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
870 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
871 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
872 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
873 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
876 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
877 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
880 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
881 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
882 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
883 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
884 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
885 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
886 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
887 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
892 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
893 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
894 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
895 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
896 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
897 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
898 // We've exhausted our options
901 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
902 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
906 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
907 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
908 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
909 outbound_scid_alias: u64
910 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
911 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
912 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
913 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
915 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
917 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
918 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
919 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
920 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
922 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
923 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
925 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
926 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
928 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
929 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
930 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
932 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
933 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
935 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
936 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
937 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
938 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
939 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
942 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
944 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
945 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
946 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
947 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
950 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
951 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
953 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
954 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
957 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
958 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
959 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
966 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
967 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
968 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
969 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
974 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
976 channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
977 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
978 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
980 channel_value_satoshis,
982 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
985 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
986 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
988 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
989 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
992 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
993 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
994 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
995 pending_update_fee: None,
996 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
997 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
998 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
999 update_time_counter: 1,
1001 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1003 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1004 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1005 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1006 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1007 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1008 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1010 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1011 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1012 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1013 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1015 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1016 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1017 closing_fee_limits: None,
1018 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1020 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1022 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1023 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1024 short_channel_id: None,
1025 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1027 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1028 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1029 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1030 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1031 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1032 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1033 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1034 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1035 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1036 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1037 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1039 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1041 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1042 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1043 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1044 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1045 counterparty_parameters: None,
1046 funding_outpoint: None,
1047 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1048 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1050 funding_transaction: None,
1052 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1053 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1054 counterparty_node_id,
1056 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1058 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1060 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1061 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1063 announcement_sigs: None,
1065 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1066 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1067 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1068 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1070 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1072 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1073 outbound_scid_alias,
1075 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1077 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1078 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1080 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1085 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1086 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1087 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1089 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1090 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1091 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1092 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1093 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1094 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1095 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1096 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1098 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1099 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1100 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1101 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1102 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1103 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1104 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1105 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1107 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1108 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1112 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1117 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1118 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1119 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1120 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1121 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1122 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1123 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1124 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1125 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1126 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1129 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1130 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1132 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1133 // support this channel type.
1134 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1135 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1136 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1139 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1143 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1144 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1145 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1146 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1147 // publicly announced.
1148 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1149 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1150 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1153 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1157 channel_type.clone()
1159 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1161 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1162 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1165 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1166 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1167 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1168 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1169 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1170 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1171 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1172 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1173 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1176 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1180 // Check sanity of message fields:
1181 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1182 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1184 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1187 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1190 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1191 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1194 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1195 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1197 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1198 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1200 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1202 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1203 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1204 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1206 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1209 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1210 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1213 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1214 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1217 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1220 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1223 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1226 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1229 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1232 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1236 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1238 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1239 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1240 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1244 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1245 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1246 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1247 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1250 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1251 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1253 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1254 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1255 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1257 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1258 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1261 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1262 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1263 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1264 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1265 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1266 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1269 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1270 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1271 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1272 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1273 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1276 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1277 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1278 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1279 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1280 if script.len() == 0 {
1283 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1284 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1286 Some(script.clone())
1289 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1290 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1291 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1296 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1297 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1300 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1301 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1302 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1306 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1307 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1309 let chan = Channel {
1312 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1313 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1315 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1320 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1322 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1323 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1324 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1327 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1330 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1331 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1333 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1334 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1335 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1337 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1338 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1339 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1340 pending_update_fee: None,
1341 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1342 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1343 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1344 update_time_counter: 1,
1346 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1348 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1349 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1350 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1351 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1352 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1353 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1355 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1356 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1357 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1358 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1360 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1361 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1362 closing_fee_limits: None,
1363 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1365 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1367 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1368 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1369 short_channel_id: None,
1370 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1372 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1373 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1374 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1375 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1376 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1377 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1378 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1379 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1380 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1381 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1382 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1383 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1385 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1387 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1388 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1389 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1390 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1391 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1392 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1393 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1395 funding_outpoint: None,
1396 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1397 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1399 funding_transaction: None,
1401 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1402 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1403 counterparty_node_id,
1405 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1407 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1409 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1410 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1412 announcement_sigs: None,
1414 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1415 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1416 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1417 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1419 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1421 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1422 outbound_scid_alias,
1424 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1426 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1427 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1436 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1437 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1438 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1439 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1440 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1442 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1443 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1444 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1445 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1446 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1447 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1448 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1450 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1451 where L::Target: Logger
1453 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1454 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1455 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1457 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1458 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1459 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1460 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1462 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1463 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1464 if match update_state {
1465 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1466 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1467 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1468 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1469 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1471 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1475 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1476 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1477 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1478 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1480 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1481 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1482 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1484 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1485 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1486 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1487 transaction_output_index: None
1492 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1493 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1494 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1495 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1496 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1499 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1501 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1502 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1503 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1505 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1506 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1509 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1510 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1513 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1515 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1516 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1517 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1519 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1520 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1526 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1527 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1528 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1529 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1530 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1531 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1532 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1536 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1537 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1539 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1541 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1542 if generated_by_local {
1543 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1544 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1553 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1555 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1556 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1557 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1558 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1559 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1560 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1561 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1564 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1565 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1566 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1567 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1571 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1572 preimages.push(preimage);
1576 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1577 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1579 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1581 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1582 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1584 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1585 if !generated_by_local {
1586 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1594 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1595 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1596 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1597 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1598 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1599 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1600 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1601 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1603 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1605 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1606 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1607 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1608 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1610 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1612 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1613 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1614 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1615 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1618 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1619 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1620 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1621 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1623 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1626 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1627 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1628 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1629 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1631 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1634 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1635 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1640 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1641 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1646 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1648 let channel_parameters =
1649 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1650 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1651 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1654 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1659 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1662 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1663 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1664 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1665 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1667 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1668 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1669 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1677 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1678 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1684 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1685 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1686 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1687 // outside of those situations will fail.
1688 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1692 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1697 1 + // script length (0)
1701 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1702 2 + // witness marker and flag
1703 1 + // witness element count
1704 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1705 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1706 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1707 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1708 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1709 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1711 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1712 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1713 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1719 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1720 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1721 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1722 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1724 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1725 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1726 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1728 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1729 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1730 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1731 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1732 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1733 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1736 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1737 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1740 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1741 value_to_holder = 0;
1744 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1745 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1746 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1747 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1749 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1750 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1753 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1754 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1758 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1759 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1760 /// our counterparty!)
1761 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1762 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1763 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1764 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1765 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1766 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1767 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1769 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1773 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1774 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1775 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1776 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1777 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1778 //may see payments to it!
1779 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1780 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1781 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1783 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1786 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1787 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1788 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1789 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1790 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1793 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1796 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1797 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1799 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1801 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1802 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1803 where L::Target: Logger {
1804 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1805 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1806 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1807 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1808 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1809 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1810 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1811 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1815 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1816 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1817 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1818 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1820 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1821 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1823 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1825 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1827 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1828 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1829 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1831 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1832 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1833 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1834 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1835 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1837 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1838 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1839 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1841 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1842 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1844 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1847 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1848 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1852 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1856 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1857 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1858 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1859 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1860 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1861 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1864 // Now update local state:
1866 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1867 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1868 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1869 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1870 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1871 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1872 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1876 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1877 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1878 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1879 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1880 // do not not get into this branch.
1881 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1882 match pending_update {
1883 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1884 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1885 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1886 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1887 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1888 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1889 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1892 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1893 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1894 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1895 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1896 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1897 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1898 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1904 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1905 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1906 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1908 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1909 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1910 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1912 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1913 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1916 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1917 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1919 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1920 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1922 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1923 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1926 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1929 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1930 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1931 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1932 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1937 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1938 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1939 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1940 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1941 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1944 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1945 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1946 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1947 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1948 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1950 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1951 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1952 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1956 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1957 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1958 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1959 /// before we fail backwards.
1961 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
1962 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
1963 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
1964 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
1965 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1966 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
1967 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
1970 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1971 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1972 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1973 /// before we fail backwards.
1975 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
1976 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
1977 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
1978 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
1979 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1980 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1981 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1983 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1985 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1986 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1987 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1989 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1990 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1991 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1993 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1994 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1995 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1997 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2002 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2003 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2009 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2010 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2011 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2012 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2013 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2017 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2018 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2019 force_holding_cell = true;
2022 // Now update local state:
2023 if force_holding_cell {
2024 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2025 match pending_update {
2026 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2027 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2028 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2029 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2033 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2034 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2035 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2036 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2042 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2043 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2044 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2050 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2052 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2053 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2056 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2057 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2058 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2063 // Message handlers:
2065 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2066 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2068 // Check sanity of message fields:
2069 if !self.is_outbound() {
2070 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2072 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2073 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2075 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2076 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2078 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2079 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2081 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2082 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2084 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2085 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2086 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2088 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2089 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2090 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2092 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2093 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2094 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2096 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2097 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2099 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2100 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2103 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2104 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2105 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2107 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2108 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2110 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2113 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2114 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2116 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2117 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2119 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2120 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2122 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2123 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2126 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2127 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2130 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2131 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2133 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2136 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2137 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2138 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2139 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2140 if script.len() == 0 {
2143 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2146 Some(script.clone())
2149 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2150 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2151 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2156 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2157 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2158 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2159 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2160 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2162 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2163 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2165 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2168 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2169 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2170 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2171 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2172 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2173 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2176 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2177 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2178 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2181 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2182 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2184 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2185 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2190 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2191 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2193 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2194 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2196 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2197 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2198 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2199 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2200 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2201 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2202 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2203 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2204 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2207 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2208 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2210 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2211 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2212 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2213 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2215 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2216 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2218 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2219 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2222 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2223 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2226 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2227 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2228 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2230 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2233 if self.is_outbound() {
2234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2236 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2237 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2238 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2240 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2242 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2243 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2245 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2246 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2247 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2248 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2251 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2252 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2253 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2254 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2255 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2257 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2259 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2260 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2261 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2264 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2265 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2266 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2270 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2271 initial_commitment_tx,
2274 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2275 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2278 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2279 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2281 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2283 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2284 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2285 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2286 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2287 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2288 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2289 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2290 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2291 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2292 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2293 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2295 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2297 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2299 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2300 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2301 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2302 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2304 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2306 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2307 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2309 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2312 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2313 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2314 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2315 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2316 ) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2318 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2321 if !self.is_outbound() {
2322 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2324 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2325 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2327 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2328 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2329 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2330 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2333 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2335 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2336 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2337 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2338 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2340 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2341 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2343 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2344 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2346 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2347 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2348 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2349 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2350 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2355 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2356 initial_commitment_tx,
2359 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2360 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2363 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2364 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2367 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2368 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2369 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2370 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2371 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2372 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2373 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2374 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2375 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2376 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2377 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2378 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2380 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2382 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2384 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2385 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2386 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2387 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2389 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2391 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2394 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2395 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2397 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2398 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2399 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2400 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2402 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2405 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2406 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2407 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2410 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2411 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2412 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2413 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2414 // when routing outbound payments.
2415 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2419 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2421 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2422 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2423 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2424 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2425 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2426 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2427 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2428 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2429 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2431 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2432 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2433 let expected_point =
2434 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2435 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2437 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2439 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2440 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2441 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2442 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2443 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2445 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2446 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2450 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2453 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2454 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2456 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2458 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2461 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2462 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2463 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2464 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2470 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2471 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2472 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2473 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2474 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2475 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2476 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2477 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2478 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2481 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2484 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2485 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2486 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2488 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2489 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2490 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2491 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2492 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2493 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2495 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2496 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2502 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2503 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2504 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2505 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2506 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2507 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2508 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2509 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2510 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2513 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2516 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2517 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2518 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2520 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2521 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2522 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2523 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2524 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2525 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2527 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2528 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2532 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2533 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2534 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2535 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2536 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2537 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2538 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2540 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2541 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2543 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2550 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2551 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2552 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2553 /// corner case properly.
2554 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2555 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2556 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2558 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2559 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2560 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2561 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2564 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2566 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2567 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2568 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2571 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2572 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2573 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2574 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2576 outbound_capacity_msat,
2577 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2578 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2579 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2585 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2586 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2589 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2590 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2591 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2592 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2593 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2594 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2597 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2598 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2600 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2601 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2604 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2605 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2606 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2608 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2609 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2611 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2614 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2615 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2617 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2618 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2620 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2621 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2623 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2624 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2628 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2629 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2635 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2636 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2637 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2640 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2641 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2642 included_htlcs += 1;
2645 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2646 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2650 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2651 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2652 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2653 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2654 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2655 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2660 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2662 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2663 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2668 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2669 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2673 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2674 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2675 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2678 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2679 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2681 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2682 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2683 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2685 total_pending_htlcs,
2686 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2687 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2688 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2690 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2691 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2692 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2694 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2696 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2701 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2702 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2703 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2705 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2706 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2708 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2711 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2712 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2714 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2715 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2717 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2718 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2720 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2721 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2725 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2726 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2732 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2733 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2734 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2735 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2736 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2737 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2740 included_htlcs += 1;
2743 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2744 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2747 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2748 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2750 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2751 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2752 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2757 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2758 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2759 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2762 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2763 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2765 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2766 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2768 total_pending_htlcs,
2769 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2770 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2771 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2773 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2774 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2775 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2777 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2779 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2784 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2785 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2786 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2787 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2788 if local_sent_shutdown {
2789 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2791 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2792 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2793 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2796 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2797 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2799 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2800 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2802 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2803 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2805 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2806 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2809 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2810 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2811 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2812 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2814 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2815 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2817 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2818 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2819 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2820 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2821 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2822 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2823 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2824 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2825 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2826 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2827 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2829 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2830 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2831 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2832 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2833 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2834 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2838 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2841 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2842 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2843 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2845 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2846 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2847 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2848 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2849 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2850 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2851 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2855 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2856 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2857 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2858 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2859 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2860 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2861 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2865 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2866 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2867 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2868 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2869 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2870 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2873 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2874 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2875 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2876 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2877 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2879 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2880 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2883 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2884 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2887 if !self.is_outbound() {
2888 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2889 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2890 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2891 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2892 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2893 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2894 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2895 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2896 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2897 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2898 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2899 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2900 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2901 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2902 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2905 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2906 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2907 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2908 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2909 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2912 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2913 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2915 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2916 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2919 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2920 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2921 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2925 // Now update local state:
2926 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2927 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2928 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2929 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2930 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2931 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2932 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2937 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2939 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2940 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2941 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2942 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2943 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2944 None => fail_reason.into(),
2945 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2946 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2947 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2948 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2950 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2954 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2955 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2956 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2957 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2959 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2960 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2965 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2968 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2969 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2970 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2972 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2973 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2976 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2979 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2980 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2981 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2983 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2987 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2991 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2992 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2993 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2995 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2996 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2999 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3003 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
3004 where L::Target: Logger
3006 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3007 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
3009 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3010 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
3012 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3013 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
3016 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3018 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3020 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3021 let commitment_txid = {
3022 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3023 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3024 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3026 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3027 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3028 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3029 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3030 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3031 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3035 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3037 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3038 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3039 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3040 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3043 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3044 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3045 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3046 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
3049 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3051 if self.is_outbound() {
3052 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3053 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3054 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3055 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3056 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3057 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3058 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3059 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3060 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3061 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3067 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3068 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3071 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3072 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3073 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3074 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3075 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3076 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3077 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3079 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3080 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3081 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3082 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3083 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3084 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3085 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3086 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3088 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3090 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3094 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3095 commitment_stats.tx,
3097 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3098 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3099 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3102 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3103 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3104 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3105 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3107 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3108 let mut need_commitment = false;
3109 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3110 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3111 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3112 need_commitment = true;
3116 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3117 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3118 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3119 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3120 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3121 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3125 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3126 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3127 Some(forward_info.clone())
3129 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3130 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3131 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3132 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3133 need_commitment = true;
3136 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3137 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3138 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3139 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3140 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3141 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3142 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3143 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3144 need_commitment = true;
3148 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3149 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3150 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3151 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3153 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3154 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3155 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3156 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3157 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3158 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3159 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3160 // includes the right HTLCs.
3161 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3162 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3163 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3164 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3165 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3166 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3168 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3169 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3170 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3173 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3174 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3175 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3176 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3177 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3178 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3179 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3180 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3181 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3185 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3186 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3188 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3189 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3190 per_commitment_secret,
3191 next_per_commitment_point,
3192 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3195 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3196 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3197 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3198 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3199 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3200 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3201 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3202 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3205 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3206 /// for our counterparty.
3207 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3208 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3209 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3210 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3211 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3213 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3214 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3215 updates: Vec::new(),
3218 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3219 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3220 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3221 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3222 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3223 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3224 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3225 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3226 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3227 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3228 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3229 // to rebalance channels.
3230 match &htlc_update {
3231 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3232 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3233 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3236 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3237 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3238 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3239 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3240 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3241 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3242 // into the holding cell without ever being
3243 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3244 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3245 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3248 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3254 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3255 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3256 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3257 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3258 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3259 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3260 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3261 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3262 (msg, monitor_update)
3263 } else { unreachable!() };
3264 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3265 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3267 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3268 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3269 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3270 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3271 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3272 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3273 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3274 // for a full revocation before failing.
3275 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3278 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3280 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3287 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3288 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3290 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3291 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3296 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3297 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3298 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3299 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3300 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3302 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3303 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3304 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3306 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3308 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3310 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3313 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3315 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3319 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3320 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3321 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3322 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3323 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3324 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3325 where L::Target: Logger,
3327 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3328 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3330 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3331 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3333 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3334 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3337 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3339 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3340 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3341 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3345 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3346 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3347 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3348 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3349 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3350 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3351 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3352 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3356 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3358 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3359 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3362 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3363 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3365 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3367 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3368 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3369 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3370 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3371 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3372 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3373 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3374 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3378 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3379 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3380 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3381 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3382 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3383 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3384 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3385 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3387 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3388 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3391 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3392 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3393 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3394 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3395 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3396 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3397 let mut require_commitment = false;
3398 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3401 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3402 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3403 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3405 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3406 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3407 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3408 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3409 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3410 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3415 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3416 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3417 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3418 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3419 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3421 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3422 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3423 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3428 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3429 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3431 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3435 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3436 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3438 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3439 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3440 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3441 require_commitment = true;
3442 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3443 match forward_info {
3444 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3445 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3446 require_commitment = true;
3448 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3449 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3450 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3452 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3453 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3454 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3458 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3459 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3460 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3461 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3467 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3468 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3469 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3470 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3472 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3473 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3474 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3475 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3476 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3477 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3478 require_commitment = true;
3482 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3484 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3485 match update_state {
3486 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3487 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3488 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3489 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3490 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3492 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3493 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3494 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3495 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3496 require_commitment = true;
3497 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3498 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3503 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3504 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3505 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3506 if require_commitment {
3507 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3508 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3509 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3510 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3511 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3512 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3513 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3514 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3515 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3517 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3518 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3519 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3520 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3521 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3522 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3523 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3525 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3529 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3530 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3531 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3532 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3533 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3535 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3536 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3537 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3540 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3541 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3542 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3543 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3546 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3547 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3548 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3549 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3551 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3554 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3555 if require_commitment {
3556 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3558 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3559 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3560 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3561 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3563 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3564 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3566 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3567 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3568 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3570 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3574 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3575 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3576 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3579 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3581 commitment_update: None,
3582 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3583 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3584 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3591 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3592 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3593 /// commitment update.
3594 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3595 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3596 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3599 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3600 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3601 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3602 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3604 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3605 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3606 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3607 if !self.is_outbound() {
3608 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3610 if !self.is_usable() {
3611 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3613 if !self.is_live() {
3614 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3617 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3618 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3619 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3620 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3621 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3622 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3623 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3624 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3625 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3626 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3630 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3631 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3632 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3633 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3634 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3637 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3638 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3642 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3643 force_holding_cell = true;
3646 if force_holding_cell {
3647 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3651 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3652 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3654 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3655 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3660 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3661 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3663 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3665 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3666 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3667 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3668 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3672 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3673 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3674 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3678 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3679 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3682 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3683 // will be retransmitted.
3684 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3685 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3686 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3688 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3689 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3691 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3692 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3693 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3694 // this HTLC accordingly
3695 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3698 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3699 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3700 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3701 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3704 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3705 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3706 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3707 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3708 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3709 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3714 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3716 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3717 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3718 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3719 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3723 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3724 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3725 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3726 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3727 // the update upon reconnection.
3728 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3732 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3733 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3736 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3737 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3738 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3739 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3740 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3741 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3743 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3744 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3745 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3746 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3747 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3748 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3750 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3751 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3752 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3753 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3754 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3755 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3756 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3759 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3760 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3761 /// to the remote side.
3762 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3763 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3764 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3765 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3768 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3770 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3771 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3773 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3774 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3775 // first received the funding_signed.
3776 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3777 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3778 self.funding_transaction.take()
3780 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3781 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3782 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3783 funding_broadcastable = None;
3786 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3787 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3788 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3789 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3790 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3791 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3792 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3793 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3794 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3795 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3796 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3797 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3798 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3799 next_per_commitment_point,
3800 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3804 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3806 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3807 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3808 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3809 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3810 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3811 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3813 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3814 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3815 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3816 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3817 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3818 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3822 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3823 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3825 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3826 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3829 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3830 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3831 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3832 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3833 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3834 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3835 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3836 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3837 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3841 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3842 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3844 if self.is_outbound() {
3845 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3847 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3850 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3851 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3853 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3854 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3855 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3856 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3857 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3858 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3859 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3860 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3861 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3862 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3863 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3864 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3865 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3867 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3868 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3869 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3875 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3876 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3877 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3878 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3879 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3880 per_commitment_secret,
3881 next_per_commitment_point,
3885 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3886 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3887 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3888 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3889 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3891 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3892 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3893 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3894 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3895 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3896 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3897 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3898 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3899 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3904 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3905 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3907 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3908 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3909 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3910 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3911 reason: err_packet.clone()
3914 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3915 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3916 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3917 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3918 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3919 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3922 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3923 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3924 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3925 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3926 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3933 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3934 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3935 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3936 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3940 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3941 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3942 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3943 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3944 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3945 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3949 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3950 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3952 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3953 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3954 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3955 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3956 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3957 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3958 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3959 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3962 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3964 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3965 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3966 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3967 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3968 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3971 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3972 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3973 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3976 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3977 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3978 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3979 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3980 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3981 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3982 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3983 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3985 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3986 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3987 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3988 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3989 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3992 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3993 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3994 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3995 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3996 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3997 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3998 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3999 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4002 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4006 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4007 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4008 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4009 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4011 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4015 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4016 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4017 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4019 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4020 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4021 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4022 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4023 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4027 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4029 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4030 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4031 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4032 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4033 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4034 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4036 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4037 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4038 channel_ready: None,
4039 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4040 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4041 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4045 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4046 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4047 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4048 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4049 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4050 next_per_commitment_point,
4051 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4053 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4054 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4055 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4059 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4060 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4061 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4063 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4064 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4065 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4068 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4071 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4074 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4075 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4076 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4077 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4078 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4080 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4081 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4082 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4083 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4084 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4085 next_per_commitment_point,
4086 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4090 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4091 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4092 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4094 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4097 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4098 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4099 raa: required_revoke,
4100 commitment_update: None,
4101 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4103 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4104 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4105 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4107 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4110 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4111 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4112 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4113 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4114 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4115 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4118 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4119 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4120 raa: required_revoke,
4121 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4122 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4126 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4130 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4131 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4132 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4133 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4135 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4137 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4139 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4140 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4141 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4142 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4143 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4144 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4146 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4147 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4148 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4149 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4150 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4152 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4153 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4154 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4155 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4158 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4159 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4160 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4161 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4162 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4163 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4164 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4165 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4166 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4167 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4168 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4169 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4170 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4171 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4172 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4174 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4177 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4178 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4181 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4182 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4183 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4184 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4185 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4186 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4187 self.channel_state &
4188 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4189 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4190 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4191 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4194 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4195 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4196 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4197 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4198 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4199 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4202 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4208 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4209 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4210 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4211 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4213 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4214 return Ok((None, None));
4217 if !self.is_outbound() {
4218 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4219 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4221 return Ok((None, None));
4224 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4226 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4227 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4228 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4229 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4231 let sig = self.holder_signer
4232 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4233 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4235 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4236 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4237 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4238 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4240 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4241 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4242 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4247 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4248 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4249 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4250 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4252 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4253 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4255 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4256 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4257 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4258 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4261 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4262 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4263 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4266 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4268 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4269 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4272 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4273 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4274 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4277 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4280 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4281 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4282 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4283 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4285 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4288 assert!(send_shutdown);
4289 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4290 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4291 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4293 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4298 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4300 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4301 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4303 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4304 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4305 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4306 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4307 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4308 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4312 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4313 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4314 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4315 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4319 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4320 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4321 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4322 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4323 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4324 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4326 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4327 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4334 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4335 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4337 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4340 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4341 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4343 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4345 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4346 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4347 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4348 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4349 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4350 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4351 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4352 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4353 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4355 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4356 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4359 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4363 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4364 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4365 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4366 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4368 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4369 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4371 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4374 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4375 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4377 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4378 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4381 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4382 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4385 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4386 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4387 return Ok((None, None));
4390 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4391 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4392 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4393 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4395 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4397 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4400 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4401 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4402 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4403 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4404 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4408 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4409 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4410 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4414 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4415 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4416 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4417 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4418 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4419 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4420 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4424 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4426 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4427 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4428 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4429 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4431 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4434 let sig = self.holder_signer
4435 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4436 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4438 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4439 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4440 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4441 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4445 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4446 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4447 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4448 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4450 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4451 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4452 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4458 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4459 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4460 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4462 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4463 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4465 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4466 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4469 if !self.is_outbound() {
4470 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4471 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4472 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4473 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4475 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4476 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4477 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4479 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4480 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4483 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4484 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4485 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4486 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4487 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4488 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4489 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4490 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4492 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4495 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4496 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4497 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4498 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4500 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4504 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4505 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4506 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4507 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4509 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4515 // Public utilities:
4517 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4521 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4525 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4526 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4527 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4531 /// Gets the channel's type
4532 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4536 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4537 /// is_usable() returns true).
4538 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4539 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4540 self.short_channel_id
4543 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4544 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4545 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4548 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4549 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4550 self.outbound_scid_alias
4552 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4553 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4554 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4555 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4556 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4559 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4560 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4561 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4562 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4565 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4566 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4567 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4570 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4571 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4572 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4573 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4577 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4580 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4581 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4584 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4585 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4588 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4589 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4590 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4593 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4594 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4597 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4598 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4599 self.counterparty_node_id
4602 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4603 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4604 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4607 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4608 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4609 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4612 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4613 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4615 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4616 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4617 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4618 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4620 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4624 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4625 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4626 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4629 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4630 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4631 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4634 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4635 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4636 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4638 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4639 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4644 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4645 self.channel_value_satoshis
4648 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4649 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4652 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4653 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4656 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4657 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4660 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4661 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4662 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4665 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4666 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4667 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4670 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4671 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4672 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4675 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4676 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4677 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4678 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4679 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4682 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4684 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4685 self.prev_config = None;
4689 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4690 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4694 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4695 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4696 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4697 let did_channel_update =
4698 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4699 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4700 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4701 if did_channel_update {
4702 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4703 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4704 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4705 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4707 self.config.options = *config;
4711 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4712 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4713 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4714 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4715 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4716 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4717 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4719 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4720 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4723 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4725 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4726 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4732 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4733 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4734 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4735 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4736 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4737 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4738 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4740 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4741 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4748 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4752 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4753 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4754 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4755 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4756 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4757 // which are near the dust limit.
4758 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4759 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4760 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4761 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4762 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4764 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4765 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4767 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4770 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4771 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4774 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4775 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4778 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4779 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4783 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4788 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4790 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4791 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4792 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4793 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4794 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4795 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4797 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4799 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4807 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4808 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4812 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4813 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4814 self.update_time_counter
4817 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4818 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4821 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4822 self.config.announced_channel
4825 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4826 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4829 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4830 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4831 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4832 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4835 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4836 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4837 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4840 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4841 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4842 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4843 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4844 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4847 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4848 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4849 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4850 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4851 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4854 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4855 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4856 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4857 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4860 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4861 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4862 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4865 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4866 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4867 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4869 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4870 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4871 if self.channel_state &
4872 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4873 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4874 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4875 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4876 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4879 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4880 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4881 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4882 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4883 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4884 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4886 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4887 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4888 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4890 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4891 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4892 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4893 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4894 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4895 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4901 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4902 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4903 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4906 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4907 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4908 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4911 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4912 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4913 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4916 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4917 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4918 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4919 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4920 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4921 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4926 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4927 self.channel_update_status
4930 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4931 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4932 self.channel_update_status = status;
4935 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4937 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4938 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4939 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4943 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4944 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4945 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4948 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4952 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4953 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4954 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4956 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4957 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4958 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4960 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4961 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4964 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4965 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4966 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4967 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4968 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4969 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4970 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4971 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4972 self.channel_state);
4974 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4978 if need_commitment_update {
4979 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4980 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4981 let next_per_commitment_point =
4982 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4983 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4984 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4985 next_per_commitment_point,
4986 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4990 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4996 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4997 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4998 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4999 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5000 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5001 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5002 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5004 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5007 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5008 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5009 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5010 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5011 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5012 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5013 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5014 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5015 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5016 if self.is_outbound() {
5017 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5018 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5019 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5020 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5021 // channel and move on.
5022 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5023 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5025 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5026 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5027 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5029 if self.is_outbound() {
5030 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5031 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5032 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5033 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5034 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5035 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5039 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5040 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5041 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5042 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5043 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5047 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5048 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5049 // may have already happened for this block).
5050 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5051 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5052 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5053 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5056 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5057 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5058 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5059 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5067 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5068 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5069 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5070 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5072 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5073 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5076 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5078 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5079 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5080 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5081 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5083 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5086 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5089 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5090 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5091 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5092 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5094 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5097 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5098 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5099 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5101 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5102 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5104 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5105 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5106 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5114 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5116 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5117 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5118 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5120 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5121 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5124 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5125 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5126 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5127 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5128 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5129 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5130 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5131 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5132 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5135 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5136 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5137 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5138 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5140 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5141 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5142 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5144 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5145 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5146 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5147 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5149 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5150 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5151 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5152 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5153 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5154 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5155 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5158 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5159 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5161 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5164 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5165 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5166 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5167 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5168 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5169 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5170 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5171 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5172 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5173 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5174 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5175 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5176 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5177 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5178 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5179 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5180 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5186 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5191 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5192 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5194 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5195 if !self.is_outbound() {
5196 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5198 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5199 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5202 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5203 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5206 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5207 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5211 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5212 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5213 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5214 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5215 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5216 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5217 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5218 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5219 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5220 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5221 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5222 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5223 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5224 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5225 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5226 first_per_commitment_point,
5227 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5228 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5229 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5230 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5232 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5236 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5237 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5240 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5241 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5242 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5243 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5246 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5247 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5249 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5250 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5251 if self.is_outbound() {
5252 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5254 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5255 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5257 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5258 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5260 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5261 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5264 self.user_id = user_id;
5265 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5267 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5270 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5271 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5272 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5274 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5275 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5276 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5277 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5279 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5280 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5281 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5282 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5283 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5284 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5285 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5286 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5287 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5288 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5289 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5290 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5291 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5292 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5293 first_per_commitment_point,
5294 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5295 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5296 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5298 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5302 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5303 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5305 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5307 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5308 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5311 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5312 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5313 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5314 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5315 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5316 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5319 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5320 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5321 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5322 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5323 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5324 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5325 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5326 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5327 if !self.is_outbound() {
5328 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5330 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5331 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5333 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5334 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5335 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5336 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5339 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5340 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5342 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5345 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5346 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5351 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5353 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5355 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5356 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5357 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5359 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5360 temporary_channel_id,
5361 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5362 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5367 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5368 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5369 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5370 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5372 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5375 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5376 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5377 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5378 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5379 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5380 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5382 if !self.is_usable() {
5383 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5386 let node_id = node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5387 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?;
5388 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5390 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5391 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5393 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5394 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5395 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5396 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5397 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5398 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5404 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5405 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5406 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5407 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5409 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5412 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5416 if !self.is_usable() {
5420 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5421 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5425 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5429 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5430 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5433 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5437 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5439 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5444 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5446 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5451 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5453 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5454 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5455 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5456 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5457 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5461 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5463 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5464 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5465 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5466 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5467 let our_node_key = node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5468 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?;
5469 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5471 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5472 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5473 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5474 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5475 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5476 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5477 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5478 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5479 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5480 contents: announcement,
5483 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5487 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5488 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5489 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5490 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5491 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5492 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5493 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5494 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5496 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5498 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5499 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5500 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5501 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5503 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5504 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5505 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5506 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5509 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5510 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5511 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5512 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5515 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5518 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5519 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5520 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5521 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5522 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5523 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5526 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5528 Err(_) => return None,
5530 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5531 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5536 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5537 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5538 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5539 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5540 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5541 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5542 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5543 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5544 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5545 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5546 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5547 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5548 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5549 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5550 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5551 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5552 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5553 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5554 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5557 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5558 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5559 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5560 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5563 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5564 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5565 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5566 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5567 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5568 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5569 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5570 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5572 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5573 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5574 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5575 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5576 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5577 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5578 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5579 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5580 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5582 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5588 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5590 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5591 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5592 /// commitment update.
5594 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5595 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5596 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5597 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5599 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5600 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5602 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5603 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5608 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5609 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5611 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5613 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5614 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5616 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5617 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5618 /// regenerate them.
5620 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5621 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5623 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5624 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5625 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5626 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5627 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5628 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5630 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5631 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5632 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5635 if amount_msat == 0 {
5636 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5639 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5640 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5643 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5644 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5645 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5646 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5647 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5648 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5649 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5650 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5653 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5654 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5655 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5656 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5658 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5659 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5660 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5663 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5664 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5665 if !self.is_outbound() {
5666 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5667 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5668 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5669 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5670 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5671 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5675 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5678 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5679 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5680 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5682 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5683 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5684 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5685 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5686 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5687 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5691 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5692 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5693 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5694 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5695 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5696 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5700 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5701 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5702 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5705 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5706 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5707 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5708 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5710 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5711 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5714 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5715 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5716 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5717 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5718 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5721 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5722 force_holding_cell = true;
5725 // Now update local state:
5726 if force_holding_cell {
5727 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5732 onion_routing_packet,
5737 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5738 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5740 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5742 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5746 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5747 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5748 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5752 onion_routing_packet,
5754 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5759 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5760 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5761 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5762 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5763 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5765 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5766 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5767 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5769 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5770 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5774 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5775 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5776 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5777 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5778 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5779 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5780 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5783 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5784 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5785 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5786 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5787 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5788 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5791 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5793 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5794 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5795 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5796 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5797 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5798 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5800 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5803 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5804 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5807 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5808 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5809 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5810 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5811 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5812 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5813 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5814 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5817 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5818 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5821 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5822 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5823 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5824 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5825 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5826 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5827 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5829 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5831 if !self.is_outbound() {
5832 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5833 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5834 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5835 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5836 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5837 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5838 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5839 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5840 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5841 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5848 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5849 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5853 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5854 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5856 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5858 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5859 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5860 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5861 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5863 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5864 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5865 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5866 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5867 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5868 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5872 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5873 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5876 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5879 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5880 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5882 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5883 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5884 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5885 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger)? {
5886 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5887 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5888 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5894 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5895 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5896 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5899 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5900 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5901 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5903 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5904 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5905 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5906 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5912 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5913 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5914 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5915 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5916 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5917 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5918 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5919 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5922 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5923 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5924 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5926 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5927 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5930 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5931 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5932 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5935 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5938 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5939 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5940 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5942 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5947 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5948 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5949 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5950 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5952 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5954 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5956 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5957 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5958 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5959 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5960 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5961 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5965 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5966 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5967 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5970 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5971 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5972 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5973 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5974 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5976 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5977 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5984 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5987 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5988 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5989 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5990 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5991 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5992 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5993 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5994 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5995 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5996 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5997 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5999 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6000 // return them to fail the payment.
6001 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6002 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6003 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6005 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6006 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6011 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6012 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6013 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6014 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6015 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6016 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6017 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6018 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6019 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6020 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6021 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6022 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6023 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6028 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6029 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6030 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6033 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6034 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6035 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6037 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6038 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6042 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6046 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6047 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6049 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6055 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6056 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6057 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6058 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6059 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6061 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6062 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6063 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6064 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6070 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6071 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6072 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6073 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6074 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6075 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6080 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6081 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6082 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6083 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6085 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6086 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6087 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6088 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6093 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6094 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6095 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6096 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6097 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6098 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6103 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6104 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6105 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6108 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6110 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6111 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6112 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6113 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6114 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6116 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6117 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6118 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6119 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6121 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6122 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6123 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6125 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6127 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6128 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6129 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6130 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6131 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6132 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6134 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6135 // deserialized from that format.
6136 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6137 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6138 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6140 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6142 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6143 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6144 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6146 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6147 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6148 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6149 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6152 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6153 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6154 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6157 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6158 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6159 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6160 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6162 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6163 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6165 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6167 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6169 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6171 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6174 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6176 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6181 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6183 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6184 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6185 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6186 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6187 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6188 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6189 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6191 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6193 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6195 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6198 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6199 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6200 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6203 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6205 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6206 preimages.push(preimage);
6208 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6209 reason.write(writer)?;
6211 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6213 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6214 preimages.push(preimage);
6216 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6217 reason.write(writer)?;
6222 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6223 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6225 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6227 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6228 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6229 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6230 source.write(writer)?;
6231 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6233 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6235 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6236 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6238 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6240 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6241 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6246 match self.resend_order {
6247 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6248 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6251 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6252 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6253 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6255 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6256 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6257 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6258 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6261 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6262 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6263 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6264 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6265 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6268 if self.is_outbound() {
6269 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6270 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6271 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6273 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6274 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6275 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6277 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6279 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6280 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6281 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6282 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6284 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6285 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6286 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6287 // consider the stale state on reload.
6290 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6291 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6292 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6294 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6295 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6296 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6298 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6299 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6301 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6302 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6303 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6305 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6306 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6308 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6311 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6312 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6313 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6315 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6318 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6319 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6321 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6322 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6323 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6325 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6327 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6329 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6331 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6332 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6333 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6334 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6335 htlc.write(writer)?;
6338 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6339 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6340 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6342 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6343 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6345 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6346 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6347 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6348 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6349 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6350 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6351 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6353 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6354 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6355 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6356 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6357 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6359 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6361 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6362 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6363 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6364 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6366 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6367 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6368 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6369 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6370 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6371 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6372 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6374 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6375 (2, chan_type, option),
6376 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6377 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6378 (5, self.config, required),
6379 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6380 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6381 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6382 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6383 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6384 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6385 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6386 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6387 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6388 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6389 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6390 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6397 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6398 impl<'a, 'b, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6400 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6401 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6403 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6404 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height) = args;
6405 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6407 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6408 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6409 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6410 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6412 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6414 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6415 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6416 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6417 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6418 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6420 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6421 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6424 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6425 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6426 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6428 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6430 let mut keys_data = None;
6432 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6433 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6434 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6435 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6436 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6437 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6438 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6439 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6440 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6441 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6445 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6446 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6447 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6450 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6452 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6453 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6454 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6456 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6457 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6458 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6459 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6460 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6461 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6462 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6463 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6464 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6465 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6466 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6467 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6468 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6469 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6474 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6475 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6476 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6477 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6478 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6479 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6480 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6481 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6482 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6483 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6484 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6485 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6487 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6488 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6491 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6492 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6495 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6496 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6498 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6503 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6504 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6505 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6506 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6507 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6508 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6509 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6510 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6511 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6512 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6514 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6515 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6516 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6518 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6519 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6520 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6522 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6526 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6527 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6528 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6529 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6532 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6533 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6534 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6536 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6537 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6538 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6539 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6542 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6543 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6544 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6545 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6548 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6550 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6552 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6553 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6554 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6555 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6557 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6558 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6559 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6560 // consider the stale state on reload.
6561 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6564 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6565 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6566 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6568 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6571 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6572 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6573 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6575 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6576 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6577 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6578 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6580 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6581 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6583 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6584 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6586 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6587 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6588 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6590 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6592 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6593 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6595 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6596 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6599 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6601 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6602 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6603 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6604 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6606 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6609 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6610 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6612 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6614 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6615 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6617 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6618 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6620 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6622 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6623 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6624 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6626 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6627 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6628 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6632 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6633 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6634 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6636 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6642 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6643 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6644 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6645 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6646 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6647 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6648 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6649 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6650 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6651 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6653 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6654 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6655 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6656 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6657 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6658 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6660 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6661 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6663 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6664 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6665 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6666 (2, channel_type, option),
6667 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6668 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6669 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6670 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6671 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6672 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6673 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6674 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6675 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6676 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6677 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6678 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6679 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6680 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6681 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6684 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6685 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6686 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6687 // required channel parameters.
6688 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6689 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6690 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6692 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6694 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6695 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6696 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6697 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6700 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6701 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6702 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6704 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6705 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6707 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6708 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6713 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6714 if iter.next().is_some() {
6715 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6719 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6720 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6721 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6722 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6723 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6726 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6727 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6728 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6731 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6732 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6734 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6735 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6736 // separate u64 values.
6737 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6742 config: config.unwrap(),
6746 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6747 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6748 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6752 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6754 channel_value_satoshis,
6756 latest_monitor_update_id,
6759 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6762 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6763 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6766 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6767 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6768 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6772 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6773 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6774 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6775 monitor_pending_forwards,
6776 monitor_pending_failures,
6777 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6780 holding_cell_update_fee,
6781 next_holder_htlc_id,
6782 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6783 update_time_counter,
6786 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6787 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6788 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6789 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6791 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6792 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6793 closing_fee_limits: None,
6794 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6796 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6798 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6799 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6801 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6803 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6804 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6805 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6806 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6807 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6808 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6809 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6810 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6811 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6814 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6816 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6817 funding_transaction,
6819 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6820 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6821 counterparty_node_id,
6823 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6827 channel_update_status,
6828 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6832 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6833 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6834 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6835 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6837 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6839 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6840 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6841 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6843 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6845 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6846 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6848 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6857 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6858 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6859 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6860 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6861 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6863 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6864 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6865 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6866 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6867 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6868 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6869 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6870 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6871 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6872 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6873 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6874 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
6875 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6876 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6877 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6878 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6879 use crate::util::test_utils;
6880 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6881 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6882 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6883 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6884 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6885 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6886 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6887 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6888 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6889 use crate::prelude::*;
6891 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6894 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6895 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6901 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6902 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6903 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6904 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6908 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6909 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6910 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6911 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6912 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6913 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6914 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6918 signer: InMemorySigner,
6921 impl EntropySource for Keys {
6922 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6925 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
6926 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6928 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6929 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6932 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6936 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6938 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6939 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6940 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6941 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6942 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6945 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6946 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6947 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6948 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6952 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6953 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6954 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6958 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6959 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6960 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6961 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6963 let seed = [42; 32];
6964 let network = Network::Testnet;
6965 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6966 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6967 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6970 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6971 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6972 let config = UserConfig::default();
6973 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6974 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6975 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6977 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6978 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6982 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6983 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6985 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6986 let original_fee = 253;
6987 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6988 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6989 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6990 let seed = [42; 32];
6991 let network = Network::Testnet;
6992 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6994 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6995 let config = UserConfig::default();
6996 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6998 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6999 // same as the old fee.
7000 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7001 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7002 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7006 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7007 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7008 // dust limits are used.
7009 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7010 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7011 let seed = [42; 32];
7012 let network = Network::Testnet;
7013 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7014 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7016 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7017 // they have different dust limits.
7019 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7020 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7021 let config = UserConfig::default();
7022 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7024 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7025 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7026 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7027 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7028 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7030 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7031 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7032 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7033 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7034 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7036 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7037 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7038 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7040 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7041 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7042 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7043 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7046 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7048 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7049 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7050 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7051 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7052 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7054 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7055 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7056 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7057 payment_secret: None,
7058 payment_params: None,
7062 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7063 // the dust limit check.
7064 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7065 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7066 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7067 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7069 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7070 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7071 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7072 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7073 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7074 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7075 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7079 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7080 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7081 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7082 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7083 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7084 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7085 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7086 let seed = [42; 32];
7087 let network = Network::Testnet;
7088 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7090 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7091 let config = UserConfig::default();
7092 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7094 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7095 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7097 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7098 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7099 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7100 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7101 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7102 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7104 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7105 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7106 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7107 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7108 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7110 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7112 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7113 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7114 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7115 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7116 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7118 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7119 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7120 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7121 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7122 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7126 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7127 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7128 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7129 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7130 let seed = [42; 32];
7131 let network = Network::Testnet;
7132 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7133 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7134 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7136 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7138 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7139 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7140 let config = UserConfig::default();
7141 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7143 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7144 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7145 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7146 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7148 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7149 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7150 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7152 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7153 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7154 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7155 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7157 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7158 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7159 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7161 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7162 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7164 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7165 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7166 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7167 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7168 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7169 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7170 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7171 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7172 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7177 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7179 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7180 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7181 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7182 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7183 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7184 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7185 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7192 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7193 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7194 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7195 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7196 let seed = [42; 32];
7197 let network = Network::Testnet;
7198 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7199 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7200 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7202 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7203 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7204 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7205 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7206 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7207 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7208 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7209 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7211 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7212 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7213 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7214 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7215 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7216 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7218 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7219 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7220 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7221 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7223 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7225 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7226 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7227 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7228 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7229 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7230 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7232 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7233 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7234 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7235 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7237 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7238 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7239 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7240 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7241 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7243 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7244 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7246 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7247 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7248 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7250 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7251 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7252 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7253 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7254 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7256 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7257 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7259 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7260 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7261 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7265 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7267 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7268 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7269 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7271 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7272 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7273 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7274 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7276 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7277 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7278 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7280 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7282 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7283 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7286 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7287 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7288 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7289 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7290 let seed = [42; 32];
7291 let network = Network::Testnet;
7292 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7293 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7294 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7297 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7298 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7299 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7301 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7302 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7304 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7305 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7306 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7308 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7309 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7311 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7313 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7314 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7316 // Channel Negotiations failed
7317 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7318 assert!(result.is_err());
7323 fn channel_update() {
7324 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7325 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7326 let seed = [42; 32];
7327 let network = Network::Testnet;
7328 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7329 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7331 // Create a channel.
7332 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7333 let config = UserConfig::default();
7334 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7335 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7336 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7337 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7339 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7340 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7341 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7343 short_channel_id: 0,
7346 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7347 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7348 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7350 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7351 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7353 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7355 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7357 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7358 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7359 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7360 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7362 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7363 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7364 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7366 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7370 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7372 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7373 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7374 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7375 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7376 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7377 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7378 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7379 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7380 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7381 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7382 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7383 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7384 use crate::sync::Arc;
7386 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7387 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7388 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7389 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7391 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7393 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7394 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7395 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7396 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7397 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7398 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7400 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7401 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7406 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7407 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7408 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7410 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7411 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7412 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7413 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7414 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7415 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7417 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7419 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7420 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7421 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7422 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7423 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7424 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7426 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7427 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7428 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7429 selected_contest_delay: 144
7431 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7432 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7434 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7435 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7437 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7438 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7440 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7441 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7443 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7444 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7445 // build_commitment_transaction.
7446 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7447 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7448 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7449 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7450 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7452 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7453 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7454 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7455 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7459 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7460 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7461 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7462 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7466 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7467 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7468 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7470 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7471 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7473 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7474 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7476 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7478 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7479 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7480 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7481 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7482 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7483 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7484 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7486 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7487 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7488 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7489 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7491 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7492 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7493 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7495 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7497 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7498 commitment_tx.clone(),
7499 counterparty_signature,
7500 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7501 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7502 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7504 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7505 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7507 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7508 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7509 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7511 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7512 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7515 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7516 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7518 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7519 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7520 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7521 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7522 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7523 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7524 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7525 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7527 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7530 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7531 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7532 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7536 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7539 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7540 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7541 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7543 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7544 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7545 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7546 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7547 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7548 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7549 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7550 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7552 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7556 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7557 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7559 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7560 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7561 "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", {});
7563 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7564 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7565 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7566 "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", {});
7568 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7569 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7571 amount_msat: 1000000,
7573 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7574 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7576 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7579 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7580 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7582 amount_msat: 2000000,
7584 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7585 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7587 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7590 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7591 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7593 amount_msat: 2000000,
7595 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7596 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7597 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7599 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7602 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7603 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7605 amount_msat: 3000000,
7607 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7608 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7609 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7611 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7614 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7615 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7617 amount_msat: 4000000,
7619 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7620 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7622 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7626 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7627 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7628 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7630 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7631 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7632 "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", {
7635 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7636 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7637 "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" },
7640 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7641 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7642 "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" },
7645 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7646 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7647 "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" },
7650 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7651 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7652 "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" },
7655 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7656 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7657 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7660 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7661 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7662 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7664 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7665 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7666 "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", {
7669 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7670 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7671 "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" },
7674 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7675 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7676 "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" },
7679 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7680 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7681 "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" },
7684 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7685 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7686 "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" },
7689 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7690 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7691 "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" }
7694 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7695 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7696 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7698 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7699 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7700 "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", {
7703 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7704 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7705 "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" },
7708 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7709 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7710 "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" },
7713 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7714 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7715 "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" },
7718 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7719 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7720 "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" }
7723 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7724 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7725 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7726 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7728 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7729 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7730 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80084a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994abc996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d005101473044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc31201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7733 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7734 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7735 "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" },
7738 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7739 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7740 "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" },
7743 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7744 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7745 "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" },
7748 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7749 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7750 "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" }
7753 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7754 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7755 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7756 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7758 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7759 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7760 "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", {
7763 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7764 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7765 "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" },
7768 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7769 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7770 "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" },
7773 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7774 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7775 "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" },
7778 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7779 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7780 "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" }
7783 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7784 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7785 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7787 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7788 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7789 "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", {
7792 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7793 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7794 "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" },
7797 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7798 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7799 "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" },
7802 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7803 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7804 "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" }
7807 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7808 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7809 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7811 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7812 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7813 "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", {
7816 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7817 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7818 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de84500148304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e015430101008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7821 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7822 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7823 "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" },
7826 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7827 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7828 "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" }
7831 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7832 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7833 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7835 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7836 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7837 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7840 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7841 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7842 "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" },
7845 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7846 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7847 "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" }
7850 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7851 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7852 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7853 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7855 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7856 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7857 "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", {
7860 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7861 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7862 "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" },
7865 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7866 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7867 "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" }
7870 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7871 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7872 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7873 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7875 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7876 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7877 "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", {
7880 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7881 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7882 "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" },
7885 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7886 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7887 "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" }
7890 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7891 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7892 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7894 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7895 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7896 "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", {
7899 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7900 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7901 "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" }
7904 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7905 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7906 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7907 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7909 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7910 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7911 "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", {
7914 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7915 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7916 "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" }
7919 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7920 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7921 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7922 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7924 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7925 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7926 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484ae8f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c1901483045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c9524401475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7929 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7930 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7931 "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" }
7934 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7935 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7936 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7937 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7939 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7940 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7941 "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", {});
7943 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7944 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7945 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7946 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7948 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7949 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7950 "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", {});
7952 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7953 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7954 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7955 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7957 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7958 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7959 "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", {});
7961 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7962 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7963 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7965 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7966 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7967 "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", {});
7969 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7970 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7971 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7972 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7974 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7975 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7976 "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", {});
7978 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7979 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7980 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7981 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7983 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7984 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7985 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7987 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7988 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7989 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7990 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7991 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7992 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7994 amount_msat: 2000000,
7996 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7997 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7999 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8002 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8003 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8004 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8006 amount_msat: 5000000,
8008 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8009 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8010 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8012 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8015 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8016 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8018 amount_msat: 5000000,
8020 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8021 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8022 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8024 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8028 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
8029 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
8030 "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", {
8033 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
8034 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
8035 "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" },
8037 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
8038 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
8039 "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" },
8041 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
8042 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
8043 "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" }
8046 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
8047 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
8048 "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", {
8051 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
8052 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
8053 "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" },
8055 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
8056 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
8057 "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" },
8059 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
8060 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
8061 "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" }
8066 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8067 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8069 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8070 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8071 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8072 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8074 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8075 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8076 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8078 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8079 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8081 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8082 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8084 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8085 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8086 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8090 fn test_key_derivation() {
8091 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8092 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8094 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8095 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8097 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8098 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8100 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8101 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8103 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8104 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8106 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8107 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8109 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8110 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8112 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8113 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8117 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8118 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8119 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8120 let seed = [42; 32];
8121 let network = Network::Testnet;
8122 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8123 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8125 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8126 let config = UserConfig::default();
8127 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8128 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8130 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8131 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8133 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8134 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8135 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8136 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8137 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8138 assert!(res.is_ok());