1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use ln::channelmanager::{CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
42 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
43 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 pub struct AvailableBalances {
66 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
67 pub balance_msat: u64,
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
78 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
80 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
81 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
82 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
83 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
84 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
85 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
87 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
91 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
92 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
93 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
94 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
97 enum InboundHTLCState {
98 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
99 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
100 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
102 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
103 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
104 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
105 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
106 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
107 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
108 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
109 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
110 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
111 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
112 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
114 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
115 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
116 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
118 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
119 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
122 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
123 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
124 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
125 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
126 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
127 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
129 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
130 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
131 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
132 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
133 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
134 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
135 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
139 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
141 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
142 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
143 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
144 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
145 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
146 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
147 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
148 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
151 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
156 state: InboundHTLCState,
159 enum OutboundHTLCState {
160 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
161 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
162 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
163 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
164 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
165 /// money back (though we won't), and,
166 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
167 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
168 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
169 /// we'll never get out of sync).
170 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
171 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
172 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
174 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
175 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
176 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
177 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
178 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
179 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
180 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
181 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
182 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
187 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
188 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
193 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
194 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
197 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
200 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
201 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
206 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
207 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
209 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
215 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
219 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
220 state: OutboundHTLCState,
224 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
225 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
226 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
235 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
245 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
246 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
247 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
248 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
249 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
250 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
252 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
253 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
254 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
255 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
256 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
257 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
258 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
260 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
261 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
262 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
264 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
265 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
266 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
269 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
271 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
272 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
274 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
275 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
276 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
277 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
278 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
279 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
280 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
281 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
282 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
284 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
285 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
286 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
287 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
288 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
289 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
290 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
291 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
292 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
293 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
294 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
295 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
297 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
298 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
300 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
302 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
303 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
304 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
305 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
306 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
307 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
308 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
309 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
311 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
313 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
315 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
319 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
321 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
322 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
323 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
325 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
326 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
328 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
329 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
330 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
331 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
332 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
334 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
335 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
339 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
345 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
348 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
349 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
350 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 holding_cell_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
355 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
356 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
357 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
358 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
359 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
360 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
361 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
362 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
363 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
367 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
368 struct HTLCCandidate {
370 origin: HTLCInitiator,
374 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
382 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
384 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
386 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
387 htlc_value_msat: u64,
388 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
393 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
394 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
395 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
396 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
397 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
399 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
400 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
401 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
402 htlc_value_msat: u64,
403 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
404 /// in the holding cell).
405 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
414 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
420 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
423 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
424 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
425 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
426 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
427 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
428 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
429 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
430 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
431 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
432 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
436 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
437 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
438 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
439 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
440 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
441 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
442 pub mon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
443 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
444 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
445 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
448 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
449 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
450 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
451 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
452 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
453 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
454 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
455 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
456 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
457 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
458 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
459 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
460 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
461 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
462 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
464 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
465 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
466 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
467 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
469 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
470 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
471 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
472 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
474 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
475 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
476 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
477 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
478 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
480 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
481 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
482 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
483 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
485 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
486 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
487 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
489 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
490 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
491 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
492 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
493 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
495 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
496 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
497 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
500 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
501 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
502 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
503 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
505 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
506 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
507 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
508 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
510 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
514 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
518 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
520 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
521 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
522 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
524 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
525 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
526 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
527 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
530 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
532 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
534 holder_signer: Signer,
535 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
536 destination_script: Script,
538 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
539 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
540 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
542 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
544 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
545 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
546 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
547 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
549 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
550 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
551 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
552 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
553 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
554 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
556 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
558 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
559 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
560 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
561 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
562 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
563 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
565 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
567 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
568 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
569 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
570 // HTLCs with similar state.
571 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
572 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
573 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
574 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
575 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
576 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
577 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
578 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
579 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
582 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
583 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
584 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
586 update_time_counter: u32,
588 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
589 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
590 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
591 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
592 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
593 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
595 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
596 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
598 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
599 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
600 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
601 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
603 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
604 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
606 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
610 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
611 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
612 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
613 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
614 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
615 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
617 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
618 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
619 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
620 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
621 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
623 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
624 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
625 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
626 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
627 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
628 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
629 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
630 channel_creation_height: u32,
632 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
637 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
640 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
642 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
649 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
650 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
653 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
657 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
660 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
664 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
666 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
668 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
669 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
671 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
673 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
675 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
677 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
679 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
680 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
681 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
682 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
684 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
685 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
686 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
688 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
689 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
690 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
692 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
693 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
694 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
695 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
698 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
699 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
701 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
702 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
703 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
704 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
705 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
707 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
708 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
711 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
712 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
713 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
714 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
715 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
716 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
717 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
719 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
720 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
722 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
723 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
724 // the channel's funding UTXO.
726 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
727 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
728 // associated channel mapping.
730 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
731 // to store all of them.
732 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
734 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
735 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
736 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
737 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
738 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
741 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
742 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
744 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
745 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
746 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
750 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
752 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
753 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
754 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
755 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
761 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
763 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
765 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
766 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
767 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
768 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
769 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
771 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
772 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
774 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
776 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
777 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
779 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
780 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
781 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
782 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
783 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
784 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
786 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
787 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
789 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
790 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
791 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
792 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
793 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
795 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
796 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
798 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
799 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
800 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
801 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
807 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
808 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
810 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
811 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
812 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
817 macro_rules! secp_check {
818 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
821 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
826 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
827 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
828 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
829 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
831 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
833 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
834 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
835 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
837 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
840 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
842 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
845 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
848 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
850 /// This is used both for new channels and to figure out what reserve value we sent to peers
851 /// for channels serialized before we included our selected reserve value in the serialized
853 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
854 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
855 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
858 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
859 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
862 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
863 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
864 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
865 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
866 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
867 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
868 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
869 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
874 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
875 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
876 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
877 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
878 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
879 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
880 // We've exhausted our options
883 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
884 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
888 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
889 fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
890 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
891 outbound_scid_alias: u64
892 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
893 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
894 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
896 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
898 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
899 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
900 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
902 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
903 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
905 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
906 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
908 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
909 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
910 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
912 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
913 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
915 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
916 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
920 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
922 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
923 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
924 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
928 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
929 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
931 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
932 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
935 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
936 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
937 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
944 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
945 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
946 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
947 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
952 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
954 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
955 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
956 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
958 channel_value_satoshis,
960 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
963 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
964 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
966 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
967 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
970 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
971 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
972 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
973 pending_update_fee: None,
974 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
975 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
976 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
977 update_time_counter: 1,
979 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
981 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
982 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
983 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
984 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
985 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
986 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
988 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
989 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
990 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
991 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
993 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
994 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
995 closing_fee_limits: None,
996 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
998 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1000 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1001 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1002 short_channel_id: None,
1003 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1005 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1006 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1007 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1008 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1009 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1010 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1011 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1012 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1013 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1014 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1015 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1017 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1019 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1020 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1021 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1022 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1023 counterparty_parameters: None,
1024 funding_outpoint: None,
1025 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1027 funding_transaction: None,
1029 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1030 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1031 counterparty_node_id,
1033 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1035 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1037 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1038 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1040 announcement_sigs: None,
1042 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1043 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1044 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1045 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1047 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1049 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1050 outbound_scid_alias,
1052 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1053 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1055 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1059 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1060 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1062 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1063 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1064 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1065 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1066 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1067 fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1068 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1071 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1072 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1073 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1074 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1075 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1076 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1077 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1082 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1083 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1084 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1085 fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1086 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1087 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1088 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1089 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1090 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1093 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1094 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1096 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1097 // support this channel type.
1098 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1099 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1103 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1104 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1107 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1108 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1109 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1110 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1111 // publicly announced.
1112 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1113 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1117 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1121 channel_type.clone()
1123 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1125 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1126 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1129 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
1130 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1131 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1132 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1133 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1134 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1135 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1136 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1139 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1143 // Check sanity of message fields:
1144 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1147 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1150 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1153 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1154 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1155 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1157 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1158 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1160 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1163 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
1165 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1166 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1169 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1170 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1172 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1173 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1176 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1177 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1178 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1180 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1181 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1183 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1184 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1186 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1189 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1190 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1192 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1193 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1195 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1196 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1199 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1201 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1202 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1207 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
1208 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1209 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1211 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). Channel value is ({} - {}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1214 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1215 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1216 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1218 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1219 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1222 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1223 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1224 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1225 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1226 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1230 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1231 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1232 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1233 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1237 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1238 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1239 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1240 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1241 if script.len() == 0 {
1244 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1247 Some(script.clone())
1250 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1251 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1252 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1257 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1258 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1261 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1262 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1267 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1268 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1270 let chan = Channel {
1273 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1274 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1276 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1281 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1283 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1284 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1285 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1288 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1291 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1292 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1294 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1295 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1296 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1298 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1299 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1300 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1301 pending_update_fee: None,
1302 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1303 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1304 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1305 update_time_counter: 1,
1307 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1309 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1310 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1311 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1312 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1313 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1314 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1316 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1317 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1318 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1319 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1321 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1322 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1323 closing_fee_limits: None,
1324 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1326 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1328 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1329 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1330 short_channel_id: None,
1331 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1333 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1334 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1335 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1336 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1337 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1338 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1339 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1340 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1341 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1342 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1343 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1344 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1346 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1348 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1349 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1350 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1351 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1352 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1353 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1354 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1356 funding_outpoint: None,
1357 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1359 funding_transaction: None,
1361 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1362 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1363 counterparty_node_id,
1365 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1367 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1369 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1370 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1372 announcement_sigs: None,
1374 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1375 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1376 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1377 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1379 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1381 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1382 outbound_scid_alias,
1384 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1385 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1393 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1394 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1395 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1396 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1397 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1399 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1400 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1401 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1402 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1403 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1404 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1405 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1407 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1408 where L::Target: Logger
1410 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1411 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1412 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1414 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1415 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1416 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1417 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1419 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1420 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1421 if match update_state {
1422 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1423 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1424 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1425 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1426 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1428 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1432 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1433 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1434 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1435 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1437 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1438 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1439 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1441 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1442 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1443 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1444 transaction_output_index: None
1449 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1450 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1451 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1452 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1453 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) {
1454 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1455 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1457 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1458 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1461 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1462 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) {
1463 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1464 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1466 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1467 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1473 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1474 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1475 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1476 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1477 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1478 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1479 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1483 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1484 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1486 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1488 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1489 if generated_by_local {
1490 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1491 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1500 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1502 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1503 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1504 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1505 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1506 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1507 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1508 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1511 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1512 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1513 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1514 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1518 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1519 preimages.push(preimage);
1523 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1524 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1526 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1528 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1529 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1531 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1532 if !generated_by_local {
1533 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1541 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1542 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1543 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1544 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1545 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1546 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1547 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1548 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1550 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1552 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1553 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1554 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1555 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1557 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1559 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1560 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1561 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1562 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1565 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1566 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1567 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1568 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1570 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1573 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1574 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1575 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1576 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1578 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1581 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1582 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1587 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1588 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1593 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1595 let channel_parameters =
1596 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1597 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1598 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1601 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1606 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1609 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1610 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1611 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1612 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1614 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1615 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1616 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1624 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1625 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1631 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1632 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1633 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1634 // outside of those situations will fail.
1635 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1639 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1644 1 + // script length (0)
1648 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1649 2 + // witness marker and flag
1650 1 + // witness element count
1651 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1652 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1653 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1654 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1655 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1656 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1658 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1659 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1660 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1666 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1667 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1668 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1669 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1671 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1672 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1673 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1675 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1676 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1677 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1678 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1679 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1680 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1683 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1684 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1687 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1688 value_to_holder = 0;
1691 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1692 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1693 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1694 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1696 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1697 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1700 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1701 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1705 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1706 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1707 /// our counterparty!)
1708 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1709 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1710 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1711 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1712 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1713 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1714 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1716 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1720 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1721 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1722 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1723 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1724 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1725 //may see payments to it!
1726 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1727 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1728 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1730 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1733 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1734 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1735 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1736 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1737 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1740 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1743 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1744 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1746 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1748 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1749 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1750 where L::Target: Logger {
1751 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1752 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1753 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0);
1754 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1755 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1756 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1757 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1758 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1762 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1763 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1764 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1765 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1767 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1768 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1770 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1772 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1774 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1775 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1776 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1778 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1779 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1780 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1781 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1782 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1784 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1785 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1786 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1788 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1789 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1791 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1794 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1795 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1799 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1803 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1804 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1805 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1806 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1807 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1808 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1811 // Now update local state:
1813 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1814 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1815 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1816 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1817 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1818 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1819 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1823 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1824 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1825 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1826 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1827 // do not not get into this branch.
1828 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1829 match pending_update {
1830 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1831 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1832 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1833 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1834 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1835 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1836 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1839 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1840 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1841 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1842 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1843 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1844 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1845 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1851 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1852 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1853 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1855 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1856 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1857 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1859 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1860 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1863 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1864 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1866 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1867 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1869 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1870 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1873 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1876 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1877 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1878 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1879 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1884 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1885 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1886 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1887 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1888 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1891 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1892 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1893 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1894 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1895 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1897 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1898 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1899 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1903 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1904 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1905 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1906 /// before we fail backwards.
1907 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1908 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1909 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1910 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1911 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1913 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1915 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1916 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1917 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1919 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1920 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1921 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1923 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1924 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1925 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1927 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1932 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1933 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1939 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1940 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1941 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1942 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1943 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1947 // Now update local state:
1948 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1949 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1950 match pending_update {
1951 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1952 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1953 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1954 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1958 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1959 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1960 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1961 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1967 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1968 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1969 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1975 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1977 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1978 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1981 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1982 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1983 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1988 // Message handlers:
1990 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1991 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
1993 // Check sanity of message fields:
1994 if !self.is_outbound() {
1995 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1997 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1998 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2000 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2001 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2003 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2004 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2006 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2007 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2009 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2010 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2011 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2013 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2014 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2017 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2018 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2021 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2022 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2024 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2025 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2028 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2029 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2030 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2032 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2035 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2036 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2038 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2039 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2041 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2044 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2047 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2051 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2052 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2053 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2055 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2056 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2058 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2061 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2062 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2063 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2064 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2065 if script.len() == 0 {
2068 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2071 Some(script.clone())
2074 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2075 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2076 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2081 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2082 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2083 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2084 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2085 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2087 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2088 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2090 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2093 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2094 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2095 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2096 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2097 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2098 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2101 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2102 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2103 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2106 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2107 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2109 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2110 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2115 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2116 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2118 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2119 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2121 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2122 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2123 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2124 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2125 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2126 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2127 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2128 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2129 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2132 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2133 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2135 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2136 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2137 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2138 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2140 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2141 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2143 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2144 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2147 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2148 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2151 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2152 if self.is_outbound() {
2153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2155 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2156 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2157 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2161 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2162 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2164 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2165 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2166 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2167 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2170 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2171 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2172 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2173 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2174 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2176 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2178 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2179 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2180 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2183 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2184 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2185 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2189 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2190 initial_commitment_tx,
2193 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2194 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2197 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2198 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2200 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2202 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2203 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2204 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2205 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2206 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2207 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2208 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2209 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2210 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2212 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
2214 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2216 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2217 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2218 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2219 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2221 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2223 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2224 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2226 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2229 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2230 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2231 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2232 if !self.is_outbound() {
2233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2235 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2236 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2238 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2239 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2240 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2241 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2244 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2246 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2247 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2248 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2249 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2251 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2252 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2254 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2255 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2257 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2258 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2259 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2260 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2261 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2266 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2267 initial_commitment_tx,
2270 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2271 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2274 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2275 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2278 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2279 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2280 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2281 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2282 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2283 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2284 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2285 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2286 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2287 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2289 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
2291 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2293 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2294 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2295 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2296 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2298 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2300 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2303 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2304 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2306 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2307 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2308 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2309 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2312 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2313 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2314 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2315 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2316 // when routing outbound payments.
2317 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2321 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2323 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2324 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2325 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2326 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2327 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2328 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 ||
2329 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2330 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2331 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2333 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2334 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2335 let expected_point =
2336 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2337 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2339 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2341 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2342 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2343 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2344 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2345 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2347 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2355 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2356 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2358 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2360 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2363 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2364 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2365 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2366 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2372 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2373 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2374 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2375 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2376 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2377 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2378 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2379 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2380 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2383 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2384 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2385 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2386 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2387 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2388 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2390 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2391 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2397 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2398 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2399 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2400 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2401 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2402 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2403 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2404 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2405 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2408 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2409 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2410 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2411 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2412 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2413 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2415 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2416 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2420 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2421 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2422 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2423 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2424 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2425 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2426 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2428 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2429 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2431 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2438 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2439 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2440 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2441 /// corner case properly.
2442 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2443 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2444 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2446 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2447 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2448 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2449 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2452 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2454 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2455 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2456 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2459 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2460 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2461 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2462 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2464 outbound_capacity_msat,
2465 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2466 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2467 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2473 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2474 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2477 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2478 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2479 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2480 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2481 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2482 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2485 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2486 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2488 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2489 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2492 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2493 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2494 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2496 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2497 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2499 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2500 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2502 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2503 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2505 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2506 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2510 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2511 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2517 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2518 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2519 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2522 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2523 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2524 included_htlcs += 1;
2527 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2528 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2532 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2533 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2534 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2535 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2536 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2537 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2542 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2544 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2545 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2550 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2551 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2555 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2556 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2557 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2560 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2561 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2563 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2564 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2565 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2567 total_pending_htlcs,
2568 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2569 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2570 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2572 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2573 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2574 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2576 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2578 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2583 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2584 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2585 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2587 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2588 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2590 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2591 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2593 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2594 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2596 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2597 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2601 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2602 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2608 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2609 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2610 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2611 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2612 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2613 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2616 included_htlcs += 1;
2619 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2620 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2623 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2624 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2626 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2627 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2628 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2633 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2634 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2635 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2638 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2639 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2641 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2642 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2644 total_pending_htlcs,
2645 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2646 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2647 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2649 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2650 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2651 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2653 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2655 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2660 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2661 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2662 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2663 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2664 if local_sent_shutdown {
2665 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2667 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2668 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2669 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2670 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2672 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2673 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2675 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2676 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2678 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2681 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2682 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2685 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2686 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2687 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2688 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2690 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2691 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2693 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2694 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2695 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2696 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2697 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2698 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2699 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2700 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2701 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2702 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2703 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2705 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2706 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2707 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2708 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2709 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2710 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2714 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2715 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2716 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2717 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2718 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2719 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2720 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2724 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2725 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2726 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2727 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2728 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2729 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2730 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2734 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2735 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2736 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2737 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2738 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2739 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2742 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2743 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2744 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2745 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2746 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2748 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2749 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2752 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2753 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2756 if !self.is_outbound() {
2757 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2758 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2759 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2760 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2761 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2762 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2763 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2764 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2765 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2766 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2767 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2768 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2769 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2770 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2771 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2774 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2775 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2776 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2777 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2778 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2781 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2782 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2784 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2785 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2788 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2789 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2790 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2794 // Now update local state:
2795 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2796 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2797 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2798 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2799 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2800 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2801 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2806 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2808 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2809 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2810 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2811 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2812 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2813 None => fail_reason.into(),
2814 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2815 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2816 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2817 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2819 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2823 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2824 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2825 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2826 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2828 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2829 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2834 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2837 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2838 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2839 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2841 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2842 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2845 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2848 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2849 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2850 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2852 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2853 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2856 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2860 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2861 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2862 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2864 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2865 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2868 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2872 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2873 where L::Target: Logger
2875 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2876 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2878 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2879 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2881 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2882 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2885 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2887 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2889 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2890 let commitment_txid = {
2891 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2892 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2893 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2895 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2896 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2897 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2898 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2899 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2900 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2904 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2906 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2907 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2908 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2909 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2912 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2913 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2914 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2915 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2918 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2920 if self.is_outbound() {
2921 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2922 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2923 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2924 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2925 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2926 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2927 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2928 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2929 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2930 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2936 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2937 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
2940 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2941 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2942 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2943 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2944 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2945 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
2946 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2948 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
2949 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2950 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2951 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2952 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2953 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2954 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2955 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2957 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2959 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2963 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2964 commitment_stats.tx,
2966 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2967 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2968 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2971 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2972 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2973 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
2974 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2976 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2977 let mut need_commitment = false;
2978 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
2979 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2980 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2981 need_commitment = true;
2985 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2986 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2987 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2988 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2989 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2990 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2994 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2995 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2996 Some(forward_info.clone())
2998 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2999 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3000 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3001 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3002 need_commitment = true;
3005 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3006 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3007 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3008 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3009 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3010 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3011 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3012 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3013 need_commitment = true;
3017 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3018 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3019 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3020 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3022 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3023 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3024 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3025 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3026 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3027 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3028 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3029 // includes the right HTLCs.
3030 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3031 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3032 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3033 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3034 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3035 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3037 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3038 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3039 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3042 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3043 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3044 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3045 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3046 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3047 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3048 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3049 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3050 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3054 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3055 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3057 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3058 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3059 per_commitment_secret,
3060 next_per_commitment_point,
3061 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3064 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3065 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3066 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3067 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3068 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
3069 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3070 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3071 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3074 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
3075 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
3076 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3077 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
3078 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3079 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3080 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3082 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3083 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3084 updates: Vec::new(),
3087 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3088 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3089 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3090 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3091 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3092 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3093 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3094 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3095 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3096 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3097 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3098 // to rebalance channels.
3099 match &htlc_update {
3100 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3101 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
3102 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3105 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3106 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3107 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3108 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3109 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3110 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3111 // into the holding cell without ever being
3112 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3113 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3114 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3117 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3123 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3124 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3125 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3126 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3127 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3128 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3129 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3130 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3131 (msg, monitor_update)
3132 } else { unreachable!() };
3133 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3134 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3136 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3137 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
3138 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3139 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3140 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
3141 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
3142 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
3143 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
3144 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3147 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3149 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3156 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3157 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3159 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3160 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3165 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3166 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3167 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3168 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3169 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3171 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3172 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3173 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3175 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3177 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3179 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3182 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3184 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3188 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3189 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3190 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3191 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3192 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3193 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3194 where L::Target: Logger,
3196 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3199 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3202 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3206 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3208 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3209 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3214 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3215 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3216 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3217 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3218 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3219 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3220 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3221 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3225 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3227 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3228 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3231 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3232 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3234 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3236 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3237 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3238 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3239 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3240 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3241 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3242 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3243 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3247 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3248 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3249 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3250 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3251 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3252 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3253 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3254 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3256 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3257 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3260 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3261 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3262 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3263 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3264 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3265 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3266 let mut require_commitment = false;
3267 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3270 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3271 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3272 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3274 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3275 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3276 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3277 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3278 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3279 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3284 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3285 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3286 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3287 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3288 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3290 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3291 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3292 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3297 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3298 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3300 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3304 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3305 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3307 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3308 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3309 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3310 require_commitment = true;
3311 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3312 match forward_info {
3313 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3314 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3315 require_commitment = true;
3317 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3318 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3319 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3321 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3322 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3323 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3327 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3328 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3329 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3330 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3336 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3337 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3338 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3339 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3341 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3342 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3343 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3344 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3345 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3346 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3347 require_commitment = true;
3351 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3353 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3354 match update_state {
3355 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3356 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3357 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3358 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3359 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3361 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3362 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3363 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3364 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3365 require_commitment = true;
3366 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3367 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3372 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
3373 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3374 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3375 if require_commitment {
3376 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3377 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3378 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3379 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3380 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3381 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3382 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3383 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3384 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3386 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3387 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3388 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3389 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3390 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3391 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3392 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3394 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3398 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3399 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3400 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3401 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3402 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3404 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3405 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3406 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3409 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3410 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3411 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3412 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3415 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3416 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3417 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3418 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3420 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3423 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3424 if require_commitment {
3425 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3427 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3428 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3429 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3430 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3432 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3433 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3435 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3436 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3437 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3439 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3443 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3444 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3445 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3448 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3450 commitment_update: None,
3451 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3452 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3453 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3460 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3461 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3462 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3463 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3464 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3465 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3466 if !self.is_outbound() {
3467 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3469 if !self.is_usable() {
3470 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3472 if !self.is_live() {
3473 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3476 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3477 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3478 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3479 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3480 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3481 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3482 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3483 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3484 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3485 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3489 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3490 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3491 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3492 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3493 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3496 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3497 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3501 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3502 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3506 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3507 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3509 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3510 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3515 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3516 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3517 Some(update_fee) => {
3518 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3519 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3525 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3526 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3528 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3530 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3531 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3532 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3533 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3537 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3538 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3541 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3542 // will be retransmitted.
3543 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3544 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3545 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3547 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3548 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3550 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3551 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3552 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3553 // this HTLC accordingly
3554 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3557 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3558 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3559 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3560 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3563 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3564 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3565 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3566 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3567 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3568 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3573 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3575 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3576 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3577 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3578 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3582 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3583 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3584 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3585 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3586 // the update upon reconnection.
3587 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3591 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3592 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3595 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
3596 /// updates are partially paused.
3597 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
3598 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
3599 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
3600 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
3601 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3602 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3603 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3604 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3606 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3607 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3608 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3609 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3610 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3611 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3612 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
3615 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3616 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3617 /// to the remote side.
3618 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3619 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3620 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3622 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3623 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3624 // first received the funding_signed.
3625 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3626 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3627 self.funding_transaction.take()
3629 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3630 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3631 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3632 funding_broadcastable = None;
3635 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
3636 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
3637 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3638 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3639 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3640 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3641 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3642 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3643 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3644 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3645 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3646 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3647 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3648 next_per_commitment_point,
3649 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3653 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3655 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3656 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3657 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3658 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3659 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3660 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3662 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3663 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3664 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3665 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3666 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3667 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3671 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3672 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3674 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3675 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3678 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3679 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3680 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3681 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3682 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3683 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3684 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3685 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3686 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3690 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3691 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3693 if self.is_outbound() {
3694 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3696 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3697 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3699 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3700 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3702 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3703 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3704 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3705 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3706 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3707 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3708 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3709 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3710 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3711 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3712 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3713 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3714 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3716 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3717 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3718 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3724 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3725 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3726 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3727 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3728 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3729 per_commitment_secret,
3730 next_per_commitment_point,
3734 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3735 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3736 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3737 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3738 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3740 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3741 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3742 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3743 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3744 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3745 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3746 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3747 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3748 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3753 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3754 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3756 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3757 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3758 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3759 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3760 reason: err_packet.clone()
3763 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3764 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3765 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3766 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3767 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3768 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3771 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3772 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3773 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3774 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3775 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3782 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3783 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3784 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3785 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3789 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3790 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3791 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3792 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3793 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3794 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3798 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3799 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3801 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3802 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3803 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3804 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3805 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3806 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3807 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3808 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3809 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3810 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3811 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3815 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3816 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3817 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3820 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3821 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3822 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3823 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3824 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3825 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3826 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3827 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3829 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3830 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3831 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3832 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3833 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3836 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3837 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3838 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3839 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3840 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3841 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3842 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3843 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3846 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3850 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3851 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3852 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3853 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3855 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3859 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3860 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3861 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3863 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3864 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3865 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3866 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3867 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3871 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3873 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3874 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3875 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3876 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3877 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3878 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3880 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3881 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3882 channel_ready: None,
3883 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3884 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3885 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3886 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3890 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3891 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3892 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3893 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3894 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3895 next_per_commitment_point,
3896 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3898 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3899 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3900 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3901 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3905 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3906 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3907 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3909 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3910 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3911 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3914 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3917 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3920 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3921 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3922 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3923 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3924 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3926 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3927 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending ChannelReady
3928 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3929 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3930 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3931 next_per_commitment_point,
3932 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3936 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3937 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3938 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3940 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3943 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3944 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3945 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3946 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3948 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3949 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3950 Err(ChannelError::Warn(_)) | Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) =>
3951 panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3952 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3953 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3954 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3955 raa: required_revoke,
3956 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3957 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
3958 mon_update: Some(monitor_update),
3959 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
3962 Ok((None, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3963 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3964 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3965 raa: required_revoke,
3966 commitment_update: None,
3967 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
3969 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
3974 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3975 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3976 raa: required_revoke,
3977 commitment_update: None,
3978 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
3980 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3983 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3984 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3985 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3987 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3990 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3991 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3992 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3993 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3994 commitment_update: None, raa: None, mon_update: None,
3995 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
3996 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3999 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4000 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4001 raa: required_revoke,
4002 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4003 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4005 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4009 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4013 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4014 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4015 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4016 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> (u64, u64)
4017 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4019 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4021 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4022 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4023 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4024 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4025 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4026 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4028 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4029 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4030 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4031 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4032 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4034 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4035 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4036 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4037 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4040 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4041 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4042 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4043 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4044 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4045 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4046 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4047 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4048 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4049 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4050 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4051 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4052 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4053 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4054 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4056 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4059 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4060 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4063 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4064 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4065 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4066 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4067 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4068 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4069 self.channel_state &
4070 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4071 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)
4072 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4073 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4076 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4077 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4078 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4079 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4080 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4081 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4082 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4084 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4090 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
4091 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4092 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4094 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4095 return Ok((None, None));
4098 if !self.is_outbound() {
4099 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4100 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4102 return Ok((None, None));
4105 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4107 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4108 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4109 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4110 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4112 let sig = self.holder_signer
4113 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4114 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4116 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4117 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4118 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4119 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4121 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4122 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4123 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4128 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4129 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4130 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4131 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
4133 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4134 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4136 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4137 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4138 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4139 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4142 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4143 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4144 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4147 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4149 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4150 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4153 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4154 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4155 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4158 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4161 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4162 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4163 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4164 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4166 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4169 assert!(send_shutdown);
4170 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4171 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4172 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4174 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4179 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4181 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4182 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4184 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4185 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4186 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4187 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4188 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4189 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4193 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4194 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4195 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4196 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4200 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4201 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4202 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4203 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4204 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4205 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4207 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4208 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4215 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4216 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4218 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4221 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4222 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4224 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4226 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4227 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4228 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4229 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4230 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4231 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4232 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4233 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4234 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4236 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4237 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4240 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4244 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4245 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4247 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4250 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4251 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4253 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4254 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4256 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4257 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4260 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4264 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 != 0 {
4265 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4266 return Ok((None, None));
4269 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4270 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4271 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4272 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4274 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4276 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4279 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4280 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4281 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4282 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4283 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4287 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4288 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4289 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4293 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4294 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4295 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4296 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4297 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4298 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4299 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4303 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4305 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4306 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4307 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4308 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4310 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4313 let sig = self.holder_signer
4314 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4315 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4317 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4318 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4319 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4320 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4324 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4325 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4326 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4327 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4329 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4330 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4331 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4337 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4338 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4339 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4341 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4342 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4344 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4345 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4348 if !self.is_outbound() {
4349 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4350 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4351 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4352 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4354 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4355 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4356 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4358 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4359 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4362 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4363 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4364 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4365 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4366 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4367 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4368 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4369 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4371 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4374 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4375 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4376 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4377 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4379 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4383 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4384 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4385 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4386 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4388 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4394 // Public utilities:
4396 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4400 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4404 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4405 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4406 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
4410 /// Gets the channel's type
4411 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4415 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4416 /// is_usable() returns true).
4417 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4418 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4419 self.short_channel_id
4422 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4423 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4424 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4427 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4428 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4429 self.outbound_scid_alias
4431 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4432 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4433 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4434 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4435 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4438 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4439 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4440 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4441 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4444 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4445 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4448 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4449 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4452 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4453 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4454 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4457 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4458 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4461 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4462 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4463 self.counterparty_node_id
4466 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4467 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4468 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4471 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4472 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4473 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4476 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4477 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4479 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4480 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4481 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4482 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4484 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4488 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4489 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4490 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4493 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4494 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4495 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4498 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4499 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4500 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4502 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4503 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4508 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4509 self.channel_value_satoshis
4512 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4513 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4516 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4517 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4520 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4521 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4524 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4525 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4526 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4529 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4530 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4531 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4532 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4533 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4536 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4538 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4539 self.prev_config = None;
4543 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4544 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4548 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4549 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4550 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4551 let did_channel_update =
4552 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4553 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4554 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4555 if did_channel_update {
4556 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4557 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4558 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4559 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4561 self.config.options = *config;
4565 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4566 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4567 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4568 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4569 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4570 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4571 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4573 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4574 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4577 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4579 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4580 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4586 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4587 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4588 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4589 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4590 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4591 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4592 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4594 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4595 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4602 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4606 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4607 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4608 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4609 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4610 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4611 // which are near the dust limit.
4612 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4613 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4614 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4615 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4616 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4618 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4619 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4621 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4624 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4625 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4628 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4629 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4632 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4633 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4637 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4642 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4644 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4645 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4646 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4647 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4648 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4649 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4651 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4653 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4661 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4662 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4666 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4667 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4668 self.update_time_counter
4671 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4672 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4675 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4676 self.config.announced_channel
4679 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4680 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4683 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4684 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4685 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4686 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4689 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4690 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4691 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4694 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4695 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4696 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4697 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4698 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4701 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4702 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4703 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4704 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4705 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4708 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4709 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4710 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4711 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
4714 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4715 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4716 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4719 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4720 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4721 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32
4724 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4725 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4726 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4729 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4730 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4731 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4734 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4735 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4736 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4737 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4738 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4739 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4744 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4745 self.channel_update_status
4748 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4749 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4750 self.channel_update_status = status;
4753 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4754 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4758 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4759 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4760 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4763 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4767 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4768 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4769 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4771 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4772 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4773 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4775 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4776 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4779 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
4780 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4781 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4782 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4783 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4784 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4785 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4786 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4787 self.channel_state);
4789 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4793 if need_commitment_update {
4794 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
4795 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4796 let next_per_commitment_point =
4797 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4798 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4799 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4800 next_per_commitment_point,
4801 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4805 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4811 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4812 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4813 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4814 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4815 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4816 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4817 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4818 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4819 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4820 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4821 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4822 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4823 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4824 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4825 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4826 if self.is_outbound() {
4827 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4828 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4829 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4830 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4831 // channel and move on.
4832 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4833 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4835 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4836 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4837 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4839 if self.is_outbound() {
4840 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4841 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4842 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4843 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4844 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4845 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4849 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4850 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4851 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4852 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4853 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4857 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4858 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4859 // may have already happened for this block).
4860 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4861 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4862 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
4863 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4866 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4867 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4868 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4869 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4877 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4878 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4879 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4880 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4882 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4883 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4886 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4888 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4889 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4890 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
4893 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
4894 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4895 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4896 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4897 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4899 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4900 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4902 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4903 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4904 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4912 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4914 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4915 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
4916 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
4918 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4919 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4922 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4923 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
4924 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4925 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4926 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4927 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4928 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4929 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4930 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4933 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4934 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4935 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4936 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4938 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4939 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the `ChannelManager::short_to_id` map
4940 // being inconsistent, so we currently have to.
4941 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4942 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4943 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4944 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4946 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4947 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4948 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4949 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4950 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
4951 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4952 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4955 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
4956 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
4958 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4961 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4962 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4963 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4964 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4965 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4966 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4967 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4968 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4969 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4970 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4971 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4972 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
4973 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
4974 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4975 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4976 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4977 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4983 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4988 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4989 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4991 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
4992 if !self.is_outbound() {
4993 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
4995 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
4996 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
4999 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5000 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5003 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5004 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5008 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5009 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5010 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5011 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5012 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5013 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5014 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5015 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5016 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5017 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5018 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5019 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5020 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5021 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5022 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5023 first_per_commitment_point,
5024 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5025 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5026 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5027 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5029 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5033 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5034 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5037 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5038 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5039 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5040 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5043 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5044 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5046 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5047 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u64) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5048 if self.is_outbound() {
5049 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5051 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5052 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5054 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5055 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5057 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5058 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5061 self.user_id = user_id;
5062 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5064 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5067 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5068 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5069 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5071 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5072 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5073 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5074 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5076 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5077 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5078 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5079 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5080 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5081 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5082 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5083 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5084 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5085 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5086 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5087 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5088 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5089 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5090 first_per_commitment_point,
5091 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5092 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5093 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5095 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5099 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5100 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5102 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5104 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5105 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5108 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5109 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5110 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5111 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5112 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5113 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5116 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5117 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5118 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5119 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5120 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5121 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5122 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5123 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5124 if !self.is_outbound() {
5125 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5127 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5128 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5130 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5131 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5132 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5133 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5136 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5137 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5139 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5142 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5143 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5148 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5150 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5152 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5153 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5154 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5156 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5157 temporary_channel_id,
5158 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5159 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5164 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5165 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5166 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5167 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5169 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5172 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5173 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5174 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5175 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5177 if !self.is_usable() {
5178 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5181 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5183 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5184 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
5186 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5187 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5188 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5189 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5190 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5191 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5197 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5198 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5199 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5203 if !self.is_usable() {
5207 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5208 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5212 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5216 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5217 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5220 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5224 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5226 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5231 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5233 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5234 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5235 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5236 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5237 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5241 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5243 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5244 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5245 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5247 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5248 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5249 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5250 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5251 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5252 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5253 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5254 contents: announcement,
5257 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5261 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5262 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5263 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5264 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5265 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5267 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5269 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5270 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5271 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5272 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5274 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5276 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5277 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5280 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5281 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5282 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5283 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5286 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5289 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5290 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5291 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5292 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5295 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5297 Err(_) => return None,
5299 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5300 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5305 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5306 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5307 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5308 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5309 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5310 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5311 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5312 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5313 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5314 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5315 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5316 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5317 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5318 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5319 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5320 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5321 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5322 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5323 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5326 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5327 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5328 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5329 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5332 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5333 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5334 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5335 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5336 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5337 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5338 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5339 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5341 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5342 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5343 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5344 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5345 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5346 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5347 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5348 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5349 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5351 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5357 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5359 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5360 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5362 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5364 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5365 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5367 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
5368 /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
5371 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
5373 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5374 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5375 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
5376 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5378 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5379 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5380 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5383 if amount_msat == 0 {
5384 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5387 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5388 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5391 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5392 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5393 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5394 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5395 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5396 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5397 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5398 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5401 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5402 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5403 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5404 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5406 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5407 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5408 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5411 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
5412 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5413 if !self.is_outbound() {
5414 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5415 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5416 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5417 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5418 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5419 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5423 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5424 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5425 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5426 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5427 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5428 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5432 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5433 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5434 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5435 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5436 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5437 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5441 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5442 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5443 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5446 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5447 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5448 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5449 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5451 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5452 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5455 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5456 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5457 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5458 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5459 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5462 // Now update local state:
5463 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
5464 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5469 onion_routing_packet,
5474 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5475 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5477 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5479 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5483 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5484 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5485 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5489 onion_routing_packet,
5491 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5496 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5497 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5498 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5499 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5500 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5501 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
5502 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5504 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5505 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5507 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5508 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5510 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
5511 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5513 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5514 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5515 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5516 have_updates = true;
5518 if have_updates { break; }
5520 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5521 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5522 have_updates = true;
5524 if have_updates { break; }
5527 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5529 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5531 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5532 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5533 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5534 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5535 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5537 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5538 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5539 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5541 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5542 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5546 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5547 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5548 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5549 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5550 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5551 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5552 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5555 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5556 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5557 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5558 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5559 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5560 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5563 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5565 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5566 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5567 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5568 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5569 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5570 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5572 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5575 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5576 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5579 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5580 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5581 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5582 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5583 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5584 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5585 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5586 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5589 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5590 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5593 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5594 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5595 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5596 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5597 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5598 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5599 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5601 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5603 if !self.is_outbound() {
5604 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5605 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5606 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5607 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5608 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5609 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5610 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5611 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5612 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5613 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5620 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5621 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5625 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5626 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5628 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5630 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5631 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5632 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5633 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5635 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5636 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5637 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5638 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5639 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5640 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5644 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5645 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5648 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5651 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5652 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5653 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5655 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5656 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5657 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5658 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5659 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5665 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5666 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5667 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5670 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5671 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5672 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5674 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5675 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5676 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5677 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5683 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5684 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5685 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5686 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5687 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5688 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5689 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5690 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5693 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5694 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5695 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5697 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5698 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5701 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5702 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
5703 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5706 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5709 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5710 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5711 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5713 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5718 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5719 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5720 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5721 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5723 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5725 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5727 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5728 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5729 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5730 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5731 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5732 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5736 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5737 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5738 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5741 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5742 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5743 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5744 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5745 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5747 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5748 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5755 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5758 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5759 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5760 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5761 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5762 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5763 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
5764 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5765 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5766 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5767 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5768 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5770 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5771 // return them to fail the payment.
5772 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5773 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5775 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5776 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
5781 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5782 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5783 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5784 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5785 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5786 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5787 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5788 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5789 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5790 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5791 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5792 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5793 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5798 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5799 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5800 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5804 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5805 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5807 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5813 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5814 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5815 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5816 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5817 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5819 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5820 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5821 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5822 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5828 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5829 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5830 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5831 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5832 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5833 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5838 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5839 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5840 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
5841 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
5843 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5844 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5845 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
5846 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
5851 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5852 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5853 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5854 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5855 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
5856 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5861 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
5862 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5863 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
5866 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5868 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
5870 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
5871 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
5872 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
5873 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
5875 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
5876 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
5877 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5879 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
5881 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
5882 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
5883 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
5884 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
5885 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
5886 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
5888 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
5889 // deserialized from that format.
5890 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
5891 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
5892 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
5894 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
5896 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5897 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5898 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
5900 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
5901 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5902 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5903 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
5906 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
5907 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5908 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
5911 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5912 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5913 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5914 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5916 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
5917 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
5919 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5921 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
5923 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5925 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5928 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
5930 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
5935 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
5937 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5938 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5939 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5940 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5941 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5942 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5943 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
5945 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
5947 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
5949 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5952 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
5953 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
5954 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
5957 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
5959 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
5960 preimages.push(preimage);
5962 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
5963 reason.write(writer)?;
5965 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
5967 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
5968 preimages.push(preimage);
5970 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
5971 reason.write(writer)?;
5976 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5977 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5979 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
5981 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5982 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5983 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5984 source.write(writer)?;
5985 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
5987 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
5989 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
5990 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5992 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
5994 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5995 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6000 match self.resend_order {
6001 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6002 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6005 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6006 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6007 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6009 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6010 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6011 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6012 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6015 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6016 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6017 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6018 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6019 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6022 if self.is_outbound() {
6023 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6024 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6025 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6027 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6028 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6029 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6031 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6033 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6034 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6035 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6036 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6038 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6039 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6040 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6041 // consider the stale state on reload.
6044 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6045 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6046 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6048 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6049 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6050 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6052 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6053 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6055 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6056 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6057 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6059 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6060 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6062 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6065 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6066 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6067 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6069 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6072 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6073 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6075 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6076 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6077 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6079 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6081 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6083 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6085 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6086 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6087 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6088 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6089 htlc.write(writer)?;
6092 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6093 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6094 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6096 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6097 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6099 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6100 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6101 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6102 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6103 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6104 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6105 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6107 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6108 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6109 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6110 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6111 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6113 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6114 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6115 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6116 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6117 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6118 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6119 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6121 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6122 (2, chan_type, option),
6123 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6124 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6125 (5, self.config, required),
6126 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6127 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6128 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6129 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6130 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6131 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6132 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6133 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6134 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6141 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6142 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<Signer>
6143 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
6144 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6145 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6146 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6148 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6150 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6152 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6153 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6154 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6155 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6156 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6158 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6159 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6162 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6163 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6164 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6166 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6168 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6169 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
6170 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
6171 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6172 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6173 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
6174 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6175 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6177 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6179 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6180 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6181 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6184 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6186 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6187 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6188 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6190 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6191 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6192 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6193 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6194 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6195 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6196 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6197 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6198 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6199 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6200 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6201 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6202 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6203 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6208 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6209 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6210 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6211 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6212 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6213 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6214 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6215 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6216 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6217 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6218 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6219 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6221 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6222 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6225 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6226 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6229 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6230 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6232 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6237 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6238 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6239 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6240 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6241 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6242 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6243 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6244 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6245 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6246 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6248 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6249 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6250 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6252 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6253 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6254 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6256 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6260 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6261 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6262 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6263 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6266 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6267 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6268 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6270 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6271 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6272 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6273 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6276 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6277 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6278 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6279 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6282 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6284 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6286 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6287 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6288 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6289 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6291 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6292 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6293 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6294 // consider the stale state on reload.
6295 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6298 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6299 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6300 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6302 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6305 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6306 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6307 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6309 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6310 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6311 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6312 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6314 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6315 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6317 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6318 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6320 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6321 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6322 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6324 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6326 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6327 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6329 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6330 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6333 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6335 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6336 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6337 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6338 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6340 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6343 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6344 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6346 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6348 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6349 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6351 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6352 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6354 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6356 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6357 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6358 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6360 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6361 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6362 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6366 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6367 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6368 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6370 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6376 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6377 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6378 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6379 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6380 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6381 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6382 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6383 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6384 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6385 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6387 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6388 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6389 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6390 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6391 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6393 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6394 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6395 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6396 (2, channel_type, option),
6397 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6398 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6399 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6400 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6401 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6402 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6403 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6404 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6405 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6406 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6407 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6408 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6411 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6412 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6413 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6415 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6416 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6418 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6419 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6424 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6425 if iter.next().is_some() {
6426 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6430 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6431 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6432 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6433 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6434 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6437 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6438 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6439 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6442 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6443 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6448 config: config.unwrap(),
6452 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6453 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6454 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6458 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6460 channel_value_satoshis,
6462 latest_monitor_update_id,
6465 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6468 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6469 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6472 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6473 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6474 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6478 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6479 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6480 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6481 monitor_pending_forwards,
6482 monitor_pending_failures,
6483 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6486 holding_cell_update_fee,
6487 next_holder_htlc_id,
6488 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6489 update_time_counter,
6492 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6493 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6494 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6495 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6497 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6498 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6499 closing_fee_limits: None,
6500 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6502 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6504 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6505 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6507 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6509 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6510 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6511 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6512 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6513 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6514 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6515 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6516 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6517 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6520 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6522 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6523 funding_transaction,
6525 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6526 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6527 counterparty_node_id,
6529 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6533 channel_update_status,
6534 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6538 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6539 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6540 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6541 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6543 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6545 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6546 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6547 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6549 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6550 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6552 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6559 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6560 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6561 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6562 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6563 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6565 use ln::PaymentHash;
6566 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6567 use ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6568 use ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS};
6569 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures};
6570 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
6571 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6573 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6574 use chain::BestBlock;
6575 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
6576 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6577 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6578 use util::config::UserConfig;
6579 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6580 use util::errors::APIError;
6581 use util::test_utils;
6582 use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6583 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6584 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6585 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6586 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6587 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6588 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6589 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6590 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6591 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6594 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6597 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6598 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6604 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6605 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6606 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6607 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6611 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6612 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6613 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6614 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 }, u32::max_value()).is_err());
6618 signer: InMemorySigner,
6620 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6621 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6623 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6624 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6625 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6626 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6627 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6628 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6629 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6632 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6633 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6634 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6635 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6638 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
6641 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6642 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6643 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6646 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6647 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6648 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6652 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6653 let features = InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6654 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6655 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6657 let seed = [42; 32];
6658 let network = Network::Testnet;
6659 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6660 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6661 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6664 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 };
6665 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6666 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6667 let config = UserConfig::default();
6668 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6669 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6670 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6672 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6673 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6677 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6678 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6680 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6681 let original_fee = 253;
6682 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6683 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6684 let seed = [42; 32];
6685 let network = Network::Testnet;
6686 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6688 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6689 let config = UserConfig::default();
6690 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6692 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6693 // same as the old fee.
6694 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6695 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6696 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6700 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6701 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6702 // dust limits are used.
6703 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
6704 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6705 let seed = [42; 32];
6706 let network = Network::Testnet;
6707 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6708 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6710 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6711 // they have different dust limits.
6713 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6714 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6715 let config = UserConfig::default();
6716 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6718 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6719 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6720 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6721 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6722 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6724 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6725 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6726 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6727 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
6728 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6730 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6731 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6732 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6734 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6735 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6736 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6737 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6740 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6742 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6743 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6744 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6745 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6746 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6748 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6749 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6750 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6751 payment_secret: None,
6752 payment_params: None,
6756 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6757 // the dust limit check.
6758 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6759 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6760 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6761 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6763 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6764 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6765 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6766 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6767 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6768 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6769 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6773 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6774 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6775 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6776 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6777 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6778 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
6779 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6780 let seed = [42; 32];
6781 let network = Network::Testnet;
6782 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6784 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6785 let config = UserConfig::default();
6786 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6788 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
6789 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
6791 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
6792 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6793 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6794 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6795 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6796 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6798 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6799 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6800 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6801 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6802 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6804 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6806 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6807 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6808 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6809 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6810 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6812 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6813 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6814 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6815 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6816 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6820 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
6821 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
6822 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6823 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6824 let seed = [42; 32];
6825 let network = Network::Testnet;
6826 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
6827 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
6828 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6830 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
6832 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6833 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6834 let config = UserConfig::default();
6835 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6837 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6838 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
6839 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6840 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6842 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
6843 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6844 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
6846 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
6847 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
6848 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6849 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
6851 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
6852 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
6853 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
6855 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
6856 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
6858 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
6859 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
6860 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
6861 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
6862 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
6863 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
6864 match msg.data_loss_protect {
6865 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
6866 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
6871 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
6873 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
6874 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
6875 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
6876 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
6877 match msg.data_loss_protect {
6878 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
6879 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
6886 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6887 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
6888 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6889 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6890 let seed = [42; 32];
6891 let network = Network::Testnet;
6892 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6893 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6894 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6896 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
6897 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
6898 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
6899 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
6900 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
6901 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
6902 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
6903 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
6905 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
6906 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
6907 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
6908 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6909 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6910 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
6912 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
6913 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6914 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6915 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
6917 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6919 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
6920 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
6921 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
6922 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6923 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6924 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
6926 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
6927 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6928 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6929 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
6931 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
6932 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
6933 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6934 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6935 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
6937 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
6938 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
6940 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6941 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6942 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
6944 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
6945 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
6946 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6947 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6948 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
6950 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
6951 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
6953 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6954 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6955 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
6959 fn channel_update() {
6960 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
6961 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6962 let seed = [42; 32];
6963 let network = Network::Testnet;
6964 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6965 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6967 // Create a channel.
6968 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6969 let config = UserConfig::default();
6970 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6971 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
6972 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
6973 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
6975 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
6976 let update = ChannelUpdate {
6977 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
6979 short_channel_id: 0,
6982 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
6983 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
6984 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
6986 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
6987 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6989 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
6991 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
6993 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
6994 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
6995 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
6996 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
6998 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
6999 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7000 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7002 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7006 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7008 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7009 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7010 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7011 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7012 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7013 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7014 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7015 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7016 use ln::PaymentPreimage;
7017 use ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7018 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7019 use util::logger::Logger;
7022 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7023 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7024 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7025 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7027 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7029 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7030 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7031 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7032 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7033 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7034 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7036 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7037 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7042 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7043 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7044 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7046 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7047 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7048 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7049 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7050 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7051 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7053 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7055 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7056 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7057 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7058 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7059 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7060 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7062 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7063 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7064 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7065 selected_contest_delay: 144
7067 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7068 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7070 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7071 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7073 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7074 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7076 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7077 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7079 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7080 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7081 // build_commitment_transaction.
7082 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7083 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7084 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7085 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7086 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
7088 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7089 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7090 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7091 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7095 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7096 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7097 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7098 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7102 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7103 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7104 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7106 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7107 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7109 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7110 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7112 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7114 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7115 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7116 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7117 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7118 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7119 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7120 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7122 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7123 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7124 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7125 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7127 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7128 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7129 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7131 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7133 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7134 commitment_tx.clone(),
7135 counterparty_signature,
7136 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7137 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7138 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7140 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7141 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7143 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7144 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7145 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7147 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7148 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7151 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7152 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7154 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7155 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7156 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7157 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7158 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7159 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7160 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7161 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7163 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7166 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7167 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7168 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7172 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7175 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7176 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7177 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7179 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7180 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7181 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7182 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7183 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7184 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7185 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7186 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7188 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7192 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7193 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7195 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7196 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7197 "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", {});
7199 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7200 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7201 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7202 "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", {});
7204 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7205 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7207 amount_msat: 1000000,
7209 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7210 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7212 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7215 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7216 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7218 amount_msat: 2000000,
7220 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7221 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7223 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7226 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7227 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7229 amount_msat: 2000000,
7231 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7232 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7233 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7235 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7238 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7239 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7241 amount_msat: 3000000,
7243 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7244 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7245 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7247 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7250 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7251 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7253 amount_msat: 4000000,
7255 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7256 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7258 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7262 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7263 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7264 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7266 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7267 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7268 "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", {
7271 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7272 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7273 "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" },
7276 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7277 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7278 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7281 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7282 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7283 "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" },
7286 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7287 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7288 "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" },
7291 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7292 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7293 "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" }
7296 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7297 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7298 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7300 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7301 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7302 "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", {
7305 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7306 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7307 "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" },
7310 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7311 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7312 "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" },
7315 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7316 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7317 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7320 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7321 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7322 "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" },
7325 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7326 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7327 "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" }
7330 // anchors: commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7331 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7332 chan.feerate_per_kw = 644;
7334 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e0106830467a558c07544a3de7715610c1147062e7d091deeebe8b5c661cda9402202ad049c1a6d04834317a78483f723c205c9f638d17222aafc620800cc1b6ae35",
7335 "3045022100ef82a405364bfc4007e63a7cc82925a513d79065bdbc216d60b6a4223a323f8a02200716730b8561f3c6d362eaf47f202e99fb30d0557b61b92b5f9134f8e2de3681",
7336 "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", {
7339 "304402205912d91c58016f593d9e46fefcdb6f4125055c41a17b03101eaaa034b9028ab60220520d4d239c85c66e4c75c5b413620b62736e227659d7821b308e2b8ced3e728e",
7340 "30440220473166a5adcca68550bab80403f410a726b5bd855030527e3fefa8c1e4b4fd7b02203b1dc91d8d69039473036cb5c34398b99e8eb90ae500c22130a557b62294b188",
7341 "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" },
7344 "3045022100c6b4113678039ee1e43a6cba5e3224ed2355ffc05e365a393afe8843dc9a76860220566d01fd52d65a89ba8595023884f9e8f2e9a310a6b9b85281c0bce06863430c",
7345 "3045022100d0d86307ea55d5daa80f453ad6d64b78fe8a6504aac25407c73e8502c0702c1602206a0809a02aa00c8dc4a53d976bb05d4605d8bb0b7b26b973a5c4e2734d8afbb4",
7346 "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" },
7349 "304402203c3a699fb80a38112aafd73d6e3a9b7d40bc2c3ed8b7fbc182a20f43b215172202204e71821b984d1af52c4b8e2cd4c572578c12a965866130c2345f61e4c2d3fef4",
7350 "304402205bcfa92f83c69289a412b0b6dd4f2a0fe0b0fc2d45bd74706e963257a09ea24902203783e47883e60b86240e877fcbf33d50b1742f65bc93b3162d1be26583b367ee",
7351 "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" },
7354 "304402200f089bcd20f25475216307d32aa5b6c857419624bfba1da07335f51f6ba4645b02206ce0f7153edfba23b0d4b2afc26bb3157d404368cb8ea0ca7cf78590dcdd28cf",
7355 "3045022100e4516da08f72c7a4f7b2f37aa84a0feb54ae2cc5b73f0da378e81ae0ca8119bf02207751b2628d8e2f62b4b9abccda4866246c1bfcc82e3d416ad562fd212102c28f",
7356 "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" },
7359 "3045022100aa72cfaf0965020c73a12c77276c6411ca68c4de36ac1998adf86c917a899a43022060da0a159fecfe0bed37c3962d767f12f90e30fed8a8f34b1301775c21a2bd3a",
7360 "304402203cd12065c2a42963c762e6b1a981e17695616ecb6f9fb33d8b0717cdd7ca0ee4022065500005c491c1dcf2fe9c4024f74b1c90785d572527055a491278f901143904",
7361 "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" }
7364 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7365 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7366 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7368 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7369 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7370 "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", {
7373 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7374 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7375 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7378 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7379 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7380 "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" },
7383 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7384 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7385 "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" },
7388 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7389 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7390 "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" }
7393 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7394 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7395 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7397 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7398 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7399 "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", {
7402 "30440220446f9e5c375db6a61d6eeee8b59219a30a4a37372afc2670a1a2889c78e9b943022061895f6088fb48b490ab2140a4842c277b64bf25ff591625dd0356e0c96ab7a8",
7403 "3045022100c1621ba26a99c263fd885feff5fda5ca2cc73df080b3a49ecf15164ee244d2a5022037f4cc7fd4441af39a83a0e44c3b1db7d64a4c8080e8697f9e952f85421a34d8",
7404 "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" },
7407 "3044022027a3ffcb8a007e3349d75382efbd4b3fb99fcbd479a18555e58697bd1278d5c402205c8303d46211c3ae8975fe84a0df08b4623119fecd03bc93b49d7f7a0c64c710",
7408 "3045022100b697aca55c6fb15e5348bb7387b584815fd15e8dd306afe0c477cb550d0c2d40022050b0f7e370f7604d2fec781fefe86715dbe95dff4dab88d628f509d62f854de1",
7409 "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" },
7412 "30440220013975ae356e6daf22a86a29f21c4f35aca82ed8f731a1103c60c74f5ed1c5aa02200350d4e5455cdbcacb7ccf174db5bed8286019e509a113f6b4c5e606ee12c9d7",
7413 "3045022100e69a29f78779577830e73f327073c93168896f1b89432124b7846f5def9cd9cb02204433db3697e6ed7ac89574ca066a749640e0c9e114ac2e0ee4545741fcf7b7e9",
7414 "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" },
7417 "304402205257017423644c7e831f30bc0c334eecfe66e9a6d2e92d157c5bece576b2be4f022047b21cf8e955e22b7471940563922d1a5852fb95459ca32905c7d46a19141664",
7418 "304402204f5de65a624e3f757adffb678bd887eb4e656538c5ea7044922f6ee3eed8a06202206ff6f7bfe73b565343cae76131ac658f1a9c60d3ca2343358cda60b9e35f94c8",
7419 "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" }
7422 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7423 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7424 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7426 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7427 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7428 "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", {
7431 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7432 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7433 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7436 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7437 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7438 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7441 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7442 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7443 "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" },
7446 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7447 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7448 "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" }
7451 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7452 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7453 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2060;
7455 test_commitment_with_anchors!("304402206208aeb34e404bd052ce3f298dfa832891c9d42caec99fe2a0d2832e9690b94302201b034bfcc6fa9faec667a9b7cbfe0b8d85e954aa239b66277887b5088aff08c3",
7456 "304402201ce37a44b95213358c20f44404d6db7a6083bea6f58de6c46547ae41a47c9f8202206db1d45be41373e92f90d346381febbea8c78671b28c153e30ad1db3441a9497",
7457 "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", {
7460 "30440220011f999016570bbab9f3125377d0f35096b4dbe155f97c20f71829ead2817d1602201f23f7e17f6928734601c5d8613431eed5c90aa41c3106e8c1cb02ce32aacb5d",
7461 "3044022017da96dfb0eb4061fa0162dc6fa6b2e07ecc5040ab5e6cb07be59838460b3e58022079371ffc95002cc1dc2891ec38198c9c25aca8164304fe114f1b55e2ffd1ddd5",
7462 "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" },
7465 "304402202d2d9681409b0a0987bd4a268ffeb112df85c4c988ac2a3a2475cb00a61912c302206aa4f4d1388b7d3282bc847871af3cca30766cc8f1064e3a41ec7e82221e10f7",
7466 "304402206426d67911aa6ff9b1cb147b093f3f65a37831a86d7c741d999afc0666e1773d022000bb71821650c70ea58d9bcdd03af736c41a5a8159d436c3ee0408a07394dcce",
7467 "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" },
7470 "3045022100f51cdaa525b7d4304548c642bb7945215eb5ae7d32874517cde67ca23ab0a12202206286d59e4b19926c6ac844be6f3ab8149a1ddb9c70f5026b7e83e40a6c08e6e1",
7471 "304502210091b16b1ac63b867e7a5ca0344f7b2aa1cdd49d4b72eac86a31e7ec6f069e20640220402bfb571ba3a9c49e3b0061c89303453803d0241059d899222aaac4799b5076",
7472 "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" },
7475 "304402202f058d99cb5a54f90773d43ba4e7a0089efd9f8269ef2da1b85d48a3e230555402205acc4bd6561830867d45cd7b84bba9fa35ad2b345016471c1737142bc99782c4",
7476 "304402202913f9cacea54efd2316cffa91219def9e0e111977216c1e76e9da80befab14f022000a9a69e8f37ebe4a39107ab50fab0dde537334588f8f412bbaca57b179b87a6",
7477 "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" }
7480 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7481 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7482 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7484 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7485 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7486 "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", {
7489 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7490 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7491 "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" },
7494 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7495 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7496 "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" },
7499 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7500 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7501 "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" }
7504 // anchors: commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7505 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7506 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2061;
7508 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100a2faf2ad7e323b2a82e07dc40b6847207ca6ad7b089f2c21dea9a4d37e52d59d02204c9480ce0358eb51d92a4342355a97e272e3cc45f86c612a76a3fe32fc3c4cb4",
7509 "304402204ab07c659412dd2cd6043b1ad811ab215e901b6b5653e08cb3d2fe63d3e3dc57022031c7b3d130f9380ef09581f4f5a15cb6f359a2e0a597146b96c3533a26d6f4cd",
7510 "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", {
7513 "3045022100e10744f572a2cd1d787c969e894b792afaed21217ee0480df0112d2fa3ef96ea02202af4f66eb6beebc36d8e98719ed6b4be1b181659fcb561fc491d8cfebff3aa85",
7514 "3045022100c3dc3ea50a0ca20e350f97b50c52c5514717cfa36cb9600918caac5cb556842b022049af018d676dde0c8e28ecf325f3ff5c1594261c4f7511d501f9d62d0594d2a2",
7515 "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" },
7518 "3045022100e1f51fb72fec604b029b348a3bb6363454e1869f5b1e24fd736f860c8039f8070220030a2c90186437d8c9b47d4897798c024521b1274991c4cdc125970b346094b1",
7519 "3045022100ec7ade6037e531629f24390ca9713782a04d648065d17fbe6b015981cdb296c202202d61049a6ecba2fb5314f3edcda2361cad187a89bea6e5d15185354d80c0c085",
7520 "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" },
7523 "304402203479f81a1d83c516957679dc98bf91d35deada967739a8e3869e3e8db08246130220053c8e154b97e3019048dcec3d51bfaf396f36861fbda6d33f0e2a57155c8b9f",
7524 "3045022100a558eb5caa04e35a4417c1f0123ac12eec5f6badee28f5764dc6b69486e594f802201589b12784e242f205832d2d032149bd4e79433ec304c05394241fc7dcba5a71",
7525 "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" }
7528 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7529 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7530 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7532 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7533 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7534 "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", {
7537 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7538 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7539 "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" },
7542 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7543 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7544 "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" },
7547 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7548 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7549 "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" }
7552 // anchors: commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7553 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7554 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2184;
7556 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022013d326f80ff7607cf366c823fcbbcb7a2b10322484825f151e6c4c756af24b8f02201ba05b9d8beb7cea2947f9f4d9e03f90435e93db2dd48b32eb9ca3f3dd042c79",
7557 "30440220555c05261f72c5b4702d5c83a608630822b473048724b08640d6e75e345094250220448950b74a96a56963928ba5db8b457661a742c855e69d239b3b6ab73de307a3",
7558 "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", {
7561 "304402202e03ba1390998b3487e9a7fefcb66814c09abea0ef1bcc915dbaefbcf310569a02206bd10493a105ac69048e9bcedcb8e3301ef81b55018d911a4afd297297f98d30",
7562 "304402200c3952ca04be0c60dcc0b7873a0829f560607524943554ae4a27d8d967166199022021a68657b88e22f9bf9ac6065be412685aff643d17049f04f2e99e86197dabb1",
7563 "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" },
7566 "304402201f8a6adda2403bc400c919ea69d72d315337291e00d02cde085ea32953dbc50002202d65230da98df7af8ebefd2b60b457d0945232988ee2d7460a94a77d414a9acc",
7567 "3045022100ea69c9273b8914ac62b5b7082d6ac1da2b7b065ebf2ef3cd6403f5305ce3f26802203d98736ea97638895a898dfcc5ee0d0c55eb496b3964df0bb25d223688ea8b87",
7568 "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" },
7571 "3045022100ea6e4c9b8f56dd9cf5799492a201cdd65b8bc9bc089c3cff34107896ae313f90022034760f7760975cc68e8917a7f62894e25583da7be11af557c4fc402661d0cbf8",
7572 "30440220717012f2f7ef6cac590aaf66c2109132c93ffba245959ac62d82e394ba80191302203f00fd9cb37c92c6b0ad4b33e62c3e55b04e5c2cfa0adcca5a9bc49774eeca8a",
7573 "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" }
7576 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7577 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7578 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7580 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7581 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7582 "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", {
7585 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7586 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7587 "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" },
7590 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7591 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7592 "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" }
7595 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7596 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7597 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7599 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7600 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7601 "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", {
7604 "304502210094480e38afb41d10fae299224872f19c53abe23c7033a1c0642c48713e7863a10220726dd9456407682667dc4bd9c66975acb3744961770b5002f7eb9c0df9ef2f3e",
7605 "304402203148dac61513dc0361738cba30cb341a1e580f8acd5ab0149bf65bd670688cf002207e5d9a0fcbbea2c263bc714fa9e9c44d7f582ea447f366119fc614a23de32f1f",
7606 "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" },
7609 "304402200dbde868dbc20c6a2433fe8979ba5e3f966b1c2d1aeb615f1c42e9c938b3495402202eec5f663c8b601c2061c1453d35de22597c137d1907a2feaf714d551035cb6e",
7610 "3045022100b896bded41d7feac7af25c19e35c53037c53b50e73cfd01eb4ba139c7fdf231602203a3be049d3d89396c4dc766d82ce31e237da8bc3a93e2c7d35992d1932d9cfeb",
7611 "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" }
7614 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7615 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7616 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7618 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7619 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7620 "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", {
7623 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7624 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7625 "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" },
7628 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7629 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7630 "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" }
7633 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7634 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7635 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3686;
7637 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220784485cf7a0ad7979daf2c858ffdaf5298d0020cea7aea466843e7948223bd9902206031b81d25e02a178c64e62f843577fdcdfc7a1decbbfb54cd895de692df85ca",
7638 "3045022100c268496aad5c3f97f25cf41c1ba5483a12982de29b222051b6de3daa2229413b02207f3c82d77a2c14f0096ed9bb4c34649483bb20fa71f819f71af44de6593e8bb2",
7639 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80064a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994b80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a29896a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c268496aad5c3f97f25cf41c1ba5483a12982de29b222051b6de3daa2229413b02207f3c82d77a2c14f0096ed9bb4c34649483bb20fa71f819f71af44de6593e8bb2014730440220784485cf7a0ad7979daf2c858ffdaf5298d0020cea7aea466843e7948223bd9902206031b81d25e02a178c64e62f843577fdcdfc7a1decbbfb54cd895de692df85ca01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7642 "304402202cfe6618926ca9f1574f8c4659b425e9790b4677ba2248d77901290806130ffe02204ab37bb0287abcdb8b750b018d41a09effe37cb65ff801fa70d3f1a416599841",
7643 "3044022030b318139715e3b34f19be852cc01c1c0e1599e8b926a73df2bfb70dd186ddee022062a2b7398aed9f563b4014da04a1a99debd0ff663ceece68a547df5982dc2d72",
7644 "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" },
7647 "30440220687af8544d335376620a6f4b5412bfd0da48de047c1785674f26e669d4a3ff82022058591c1e3a6c50017427d38a8f756eb685bdab88ec73838eed3530048861f9d5",
7648 "30440220109f1a62b5a13d28d5b7634dd7693b1d5994eb404c4bb4a9a80aa540d3984d170220307251107ff8499a23e99abce7dda4f1c707c98abddb9405a83de0081cde8ace",
7649 "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" }
7652 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7653 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7654 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7656 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7657 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7658 "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", {
7661 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7662 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7663 "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" }
7666 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7667 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7668 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7670 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7671 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7672 "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", {
7675 "3045022100b287bb8e079a62dcb3aaa8b6c67c0f434a87ebf64ab0bcfb2fc14b55576b859f02206d37c2eb5fd04cfc9eb0534c76a28a98da251b84a931377cce307af39dfaed74",
7676 "3045022100a497c64faea286ec4221f48628086dc6403fd7b60a23c4176e8ebbca15ae70dc0220754e20e968e96cf6421fd2a672c8c26d3bc6e19218cfc8fc2aa51fce026c14b1",
7677 "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" }
7680 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7681 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7682 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7684 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7685 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7686 "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", {
7689 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7690 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7691 "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" }
7694 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7695 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7696 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4893;
7698 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100a8771147109e4d3f44a5976c3c3de98732bbb77308d21444dbe0d76faf06480e02200b4e916e850c3d1f918de87bbbbb07843ffea1d4658dfe060b6f9ccd96d34be8",
7699 "30440220086288faceab47461eb2d808e9e9b0cb3ffc24a03c2f18db7198247d38f10e58022031d1c2782a58c8c6ce187d0019eb47a83babdf3040e2caff299ab48f7e12b1fa",
7700 "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", {
7703 "30450221008db80f8531104820b3e894492b4463f074f965b542e1b5c153ddfb108a5ea642022030b203d857a2b3581c2087a7bf17c95d04fadc1c6cdae88c620477f2dccb1ee4",
7704 "3045022100e5fbae857c47dbfc050a05924bd449fc9804798bd6442002c578437dc34450810220296589bc387645512345299e307116aaac4ce9fc752abcd1936b802d03526312",
7705 "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" }
7708 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7709 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7710 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7712 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7713 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7714 "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", {});
7716 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7717 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7718 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7720 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7721 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7722 "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", {});
7724 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7725 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7726 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7728 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7729 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7730 "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", {});
7732 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7733 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7734 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7736 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7737 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7738 "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", {});
7740 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7741 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7742 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7744 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7745 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7746 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a04004830450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1014830450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7748 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7749 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7750 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7752 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7753 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7754 "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", {});
7756 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7757 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7758 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7759 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7760 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7761 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7763 amount_msat: 2000000,
7765 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7766 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7768 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7771 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7772 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7773 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7775 amount_msat: 5000000,
7777 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7778 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7779 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7781 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7784 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7785 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7787 amount_msat: 5000000,
7789 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7790 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7791 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7793 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7797 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7798 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7799 "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", {
7802 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7803 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7804 "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" },
7806 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7807 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7808 "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" },
7810 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7811 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7812 "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" }
7815 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7816 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7817 "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", {
7820 "304402202060a5acb12105e92f27d7b86e6caf1e003d9d82068338e5a8a9a0d14cba11260220030ca4dba8fad24a2e395906220c991eccd5369bc4b0f216d217b5f86d1fc61d",
7821 "3044022044f5425fe630fa614f349f55642e4a0b76e2583054b21543821660d9e8f3735702207f70424835b541874ca8bf0443cca4028afa2f6c03a17b0688df85d5c44eeefc",
7822 "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" },
7824 "304402206fde7eb6d7a47fdc63705d3db2169054e229f10342dea66f150b163381f48a0802201be28509c2de9be4b7ab72c569c6fd51c0ce0904fea459142f31d442cd043eb8",
7825 "3045022100ad0236a78dbd029d3a8f583f7f82ee62892273d45303d00ef5a03fecf8903a36022004b2db33f8ff2f4a08ca6127c9cbfd9144c691a2feb9287e36ae6bc7c83c5a5f",
7826 "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" },
7828 "304402205eebc78d8ae6a36c27ef80172359eb757fb18e99fa75b28c37ffe3444b967bc7022060a01c33398d4d8244c42c762fb699e9f61c1f034ff976df2c94350c5a6032a7",
7829 "3045022100ad3fd523594e1b876316401774a30ee6c48bb7fa0efd768bf9a2d022201311ff02207bed627ed8e01041137f03dbaf03c836970be27a4d50f69d90cf1282ff2815e3",
7830 "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" }
7835 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7836 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7838 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7839 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7840 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7841 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7843 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7844 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7845 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7847 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7848 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7850 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7851 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7853 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7854 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
7855 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
7859 fn test_key_derivation() {
7860 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
7861 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7863 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7864 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7866 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
7867 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
7869 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7870 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
7872 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7873 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
7875 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7876 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7878 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7879 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
7881 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7882 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7886 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
7887 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7888 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7889 let seed = [42; 32];
7890 let network = Network::Testnet;
7891 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7892 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7894 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7895 let config = UserConfig::default();
7896 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7897 node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7899 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7900 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
7902 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7903 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
7904 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7905 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7906 node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7907 assert!(res.is_ok());