1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
34 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
35 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
41 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
42 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
43 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
46 use crate::prelude::*;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
50 use crate::sync::Mutex;
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 pub struct AvailableBalances {
66 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
67 pub balance_msat: u64,
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
78 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
80 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
81 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
82 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
83 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
84 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
85 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
87 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
91 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
92 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
93 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
94 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
97 enum InboundHTLCState {
98 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
99 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
100 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
102 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
103 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
104 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
105 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
106 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
107 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
108 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
109 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
110 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
111 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
112 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
114 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
115 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
116 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
118 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
119 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
122 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
123 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
124 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
125 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
126 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
127 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
129 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
130 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
131 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
132 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
133 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
134 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
135 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
139 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
141 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
142 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
143 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
144 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
145 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
146 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
147 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
148 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
151 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
156 state: InboundHTLCState,
159 enum OutboundHTLCState {
160 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
161 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
162 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
163 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
164 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
165 /// money back (though we won't), and,
166 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
167 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
168 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
169 /// we'll never get out of sync).
170 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
171 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
172 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
174 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
175 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
176 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
177 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
178 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
179 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
180 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
181 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
182 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
187 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
188 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
193 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
194 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
197 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
200 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
201 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
206 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
207 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
209 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
215 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
219 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
220 state: OutboundHTLCState,
224 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
225 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
226 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
235 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
245 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
246 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
247 /// move on to ChannelReady.
248 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
249 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
250 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
252 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
253 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
254 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
255 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
256 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
257 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
258 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
260 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
261 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
262 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
264 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
265 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
266 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
271 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
272 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
274 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
275 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
276 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
277 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
278 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
279 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
280 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
281 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
282 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
284 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
285 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
286 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
287 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
288 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
289 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
290 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
291 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
292 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
293 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
294 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
295 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
297 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
298 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
300 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
302 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
303 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
304 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
305 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
306 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
307 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
308 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
309 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
311 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
313 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
315 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
319 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
321 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
322 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
323 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
325 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
326 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
328 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
329 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
330 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
331 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
332 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
334 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
335 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
339 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
345 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
348 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
349 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
350 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 holding_cell_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
355 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
356 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
357 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
358 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
359 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
360 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
361 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
362 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
363 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
367 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
368 struct HTLCCandidate {
370 origin: HTLCInitiator,
374 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
382 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
384 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
386 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
387 htlc_value_msat: u64,
388 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
393 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
394 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
395 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
396 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
397 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
399 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
400 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
401 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
402 htlc_value_msat: u64,
403 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
404 /// in the holding cell).
405 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
414 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
420 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
423 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
424 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
425 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
426 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
427 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
428 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
429 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
430 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
431 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
432 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
436 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
437 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
438 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
439 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
440 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
441 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
442 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
443 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
446 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
447 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
448 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
449 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
450 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
451 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
452 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
453 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
454 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
455 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
456 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
457 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
458 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
459 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
460 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
462 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
463 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
464 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
465 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
467 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
468 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
469 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
470 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
472 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
473 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
474 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
475 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
476 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
478 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
479 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
480 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
481 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
483 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
484 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
485 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
487 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
488 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
489 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
490 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
491 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
493 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
494 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
495 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
498 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
499 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
500 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
501 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
503 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
504 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
505 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
506 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
508 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
512 channel_id: [u8; 32],
515 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
516 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
518 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
519 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
520 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
522 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
523 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
524 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
525 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
527 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
528 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
530 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
532 holder_signer: Signer,
533 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
534 destination_script: Script,
536 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
537 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
538 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
540 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
541 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
542 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
543 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
544 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
545 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
547 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
548 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
549 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
550 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
551 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
552 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
554 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
556 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
557 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
558 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
559 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
560 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
561 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
563 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
565 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
566 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
567 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
568 // HTLCs with similar state.
569 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
570 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
571 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
572 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
573 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
574 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
575 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
576 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
577 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
580 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
581 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
582 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
584 update_time_counter: u32,
586 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
587 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
588 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
589 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
590 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
591 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
593 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
594 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
596 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
597 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
598 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
599 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
601 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
602 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
604 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
606 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
609 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
610 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
611 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
612 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
613 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
615 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
616 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
617 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
618 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
619 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
621 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
622 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
623 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
624 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
625 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
626 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
627 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
628 channel_creation_height: u32,
630 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
633 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
638 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
640 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
643 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
648 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
651 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
653 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
656 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
660 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
661 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
664 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
666 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
667 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
669 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
670 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
671 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
673 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
675 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
677 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
678 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
679 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
680 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
682 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
683 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
684 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
686 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
687 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
688 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
690 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
691 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
692 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
693 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
695 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
699 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
700 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
701 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
702 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
703 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
705 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
706 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
708 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
709 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
710 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
711 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
712 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
713 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
714 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
715 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
717 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
718 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
720 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
721 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
722 // the channel's funding UTXO.
724 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
725 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
726 // associated channel mapping.
728 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
729 // to store all of them.
730 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
732 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
733 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
734 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
735 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
736 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
738 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
739 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
742 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
743 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
745 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
746 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
747 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
751 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
753 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
754 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
755 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
756 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
760 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
762 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
764 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
766 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
767 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
768 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
769 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
770 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
772 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
773 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
775 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
777 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
778 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
780 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
781 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
782 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
783 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
784 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
785 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
787 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
788 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
790 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
791 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
792 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
793 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
794 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
796 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
797 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
799 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
800 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
802 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
803 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
804 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
805 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
811 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
812 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
814 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
815 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
816 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
821 macro_rules! secp_check {
822 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
825 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
830 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
831 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
832 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
833 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
835 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
837 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
838 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
839 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
841 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
844 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
846 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
849 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
850 /// required by us according to the configured or default
851 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
853 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
855 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
856 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
857 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
858 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
859 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
862 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
863 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
864 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
865 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
866 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
867 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
868 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
871 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
872 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
875 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
876 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
877 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
878 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
879 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
880 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
881 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
882 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
887 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
888 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
889 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
890 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
891 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
892 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
893 // We've exhausted our options
896 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
897 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
901 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
902 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
903 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
904 outbound_scid_alias: u64
905 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
906 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
907 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
909 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
911 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
912 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
913 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
915 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
916 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
918 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
919 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
921 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
922 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
923 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
925 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
926 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
928 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
929 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
930 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
931 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
932 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
935 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
937 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
938 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
939 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
940 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
943 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
944 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
946 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
947 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
950 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
951 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
952 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
959 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
960 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
961 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
962 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
967 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
969 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
970 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
971 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
973 channel_value_satoshis,
975 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
978 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
979 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
981 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
982 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
985 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
986 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
987 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
988 pending_update_fee: None,
989 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
990 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
991 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
992 update_time_counter: 1,
994 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
996 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
997 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
998 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
999 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1000 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1001 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1003 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1004 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1005 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1006 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1008 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1009 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1010 closing_fee_limits: None,
1011 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1013 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1015 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1016 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1017 short_channel_id: None,
1018 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1020 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1021 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1022 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1023 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1024 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1025 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1026 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1027 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1028 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1029 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1030 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1032 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1034 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1035 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1036 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1037 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1038 counterparty_parameters: None,
1039 funding_outpoint: None,
1040 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1042 funding_transaction: None,
1044 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1045 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1046 counterparty_node_id,
1048 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1050 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1052 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1053 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1055 announcement_sigs: None,
1057 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1058 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1059 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1060 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1062 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1064 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1065 outbound_scid_alias,
1067 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1069 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1070 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1072 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1076 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1077 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1078 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1080 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1081 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1082 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1083 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1084 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1085 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1086 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1087 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1089 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1090 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1091 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1092 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1093 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1094 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1095 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1096 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1098 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1099 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1103 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1108 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1109 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1110 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1111 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1112 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1113 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1114 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1115 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1116 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1119 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1120 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1122 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1123 // support this channel type.
1124 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1125 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1126 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1129 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1130 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1133 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1134 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1135 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1136 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1137 // publicly announced.
1138 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1139 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1143 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1144 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1147 channel_type.clone()
1149 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1151 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1155 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
1156 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1157 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1158 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1159 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1160 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1161 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1162 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1165 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1166 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1169 // Check sanity of message fields:
1170 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1171 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1173 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1174 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1176 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1179 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1180 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1181 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1183 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1184 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1186 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1189 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1191 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1192 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1193 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1195 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1196 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1198 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1199 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1202 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1203 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1204 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1206 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1209 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1210 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1212 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1213 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1215 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1216 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1218 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1219 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1221 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1225 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1227 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1228 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1229 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1233 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1234 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1235 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1236 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1237 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1239 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1240 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1242 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1243 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1244 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1246 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1247 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1250 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1251 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1252 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1253 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1254 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1255 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1258 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1259 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1260 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1261 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1265 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1266 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1267 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1268 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1269 if script.len() == 0 {
1272 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1273 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1275 Some(script.clone())
1278 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1279 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1280 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1285 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1286 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1289 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1290 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1291 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1295 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1296 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1298 let chan = Channel {
1301 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1302 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1304 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1309 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1311 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1312 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1313 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1316 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1319 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1320 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1322 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1323 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1324 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1326 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1327 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1328 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1329 pending_update_fee: None,
1330 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1331 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1332 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1333 update_time_counter: 1,
1335 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1337 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1338 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1339 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1340 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1341 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1342 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1344 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1345 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1346 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1347 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1349 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1350 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1351 closing_fee_limits: None,
1352 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1354 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1356 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1357 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1358 short_channel_id: None,
1359 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1361 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1362 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1363 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1364 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1365 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1366 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1367 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1368 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1369 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1370 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1371 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1372 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1374 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1376 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1377 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1378 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1379 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1380 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1381 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1382 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1384 funding_outpoint: None,
1385 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1387 funding_transaction: None,
1389 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1390 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1391 counterparty_node_id,
1393 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1395 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1397 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1398 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1400 announcement_sigs: None,
1402 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1403 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1404 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1405 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1407 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1409 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1410 outbound_scid_alias,
1412 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1414 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1415 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1423 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1424 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1425 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1426 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1427 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1429 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1430 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1431 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1432 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1433 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1434 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1435 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1437 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1438 where L::Target: Logger
1440 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1441 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1442 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1444 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1445 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1446 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1447 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1449 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1450 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1451 if match update_state {
1452 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1453 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1454 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1455 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1456 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1458 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1462 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1463 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1464 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1465 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1467 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1468 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1469 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1471 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1472 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1473 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1474 transaction_output_index: None
1479 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1480 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1481 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1482 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1483 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1486 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1488 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1489 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1490 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1492 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1493 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1496 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1497 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1500 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1502 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1503 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1504 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1506 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1507 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1513 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1514 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1515 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1516 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1517 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1518 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1519 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1523 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1524 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1526 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1528 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1529 if generated_by_local {
1530 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1531 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1540 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1542 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1543 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1544 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1545 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1546 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1547 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1548 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1551 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1552 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1553 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1554 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1558 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1559 preimages.push(preimage);
1563 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1564 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1566 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1568 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1569 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1571 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1572 if !generated_by_local {
1573 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1581 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1582 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1583 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1584 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1585 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1586 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1587 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1588 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1590 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1592 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1593 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1594 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1595 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1597 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1599 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1600 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1601 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1602 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1605 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1606 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1607 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1608 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1610 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1613 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1614 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1615 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1616 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1618 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1621 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1622 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1627 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1628 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1633 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1635 let channel_parameters =
1636 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1637 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1638 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1641 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1646 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1649 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1650 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1651 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1652 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1654 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1655 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1656 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1664 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1665 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1671 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1672 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1673 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1674 // outside of those situations will fail.
1675 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1679 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1684 1 + // script length (0)
1688 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1689 2 + // witness marker and flag
1690 1 + // witness element count
1691 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1692 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1693 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1694 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1695 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1696 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1698 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1699 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1700 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1706 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1707 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1708 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1709 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1711 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1712 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1713 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1715 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1716 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1717 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1718 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1719 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1720 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1723 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1724 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1727 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1728 value_to_holder = 0;
1731 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1732 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1733 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1734 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1736 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1737 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1740 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1741 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1745 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1746 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1747 /// our counterparty!)
1748 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1749 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1750 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1751 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1752 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1753 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1754 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1756 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1760 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1761 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1762 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1763 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1764 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1765 //may see payments to it!
1766 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1767 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1768 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1770 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1773 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1774 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1775 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1776 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1777 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1780 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1783 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1784 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1786 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1788 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1789 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1790 where L::Target: Logger {
1791 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1792 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1793 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1794 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1795 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1796 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1797 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1798 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1802 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1803 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1804 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1805 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1807 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1808 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1810 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1812 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1814 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1815 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1816 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1818 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1819 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1820 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1821 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1822 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1824 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1825 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1826 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1828 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1829 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1831 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1834 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1835 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1839 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1843 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1844 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1845 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1846 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1847 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1848 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1851 // Now update local state:
1853 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1854 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1855 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1856 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1857 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1858 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1859 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1863 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1864 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1865 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1866 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1867 // do not not get into this branch.
1868 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1869 match pending_update {
1870 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1871 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1872 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1873 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1874 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1875 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1876 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1879 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1880 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1881 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1882 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1883 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1884 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1885 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1891 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1892 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1893 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1895 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1896 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1897 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1899 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1900 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1903 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1904 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1906 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1907 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1909 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1910 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1913 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1916 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1917 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1918 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1919 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1924 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1925 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1926 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1927 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1928 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1931 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1932 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1933 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1934 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1935 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1937 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1938 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1939 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1943 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1944 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1945 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1946 /// before we fail backwards.
1947 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1948 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1949 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1950 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1951 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1953 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1955 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1956 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1957 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1959 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1960 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1961 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1963 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1964 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1965 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1967 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1972 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1973 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1979 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1980 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1981 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1982 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1983 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1987 // Now update local state:
1988 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1989 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1990 match pending_update {
1991 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1992 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1993 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1994 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1998 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1999 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2000 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2001 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2007 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2008 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2009 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2015 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2017 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2018 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2021 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2022 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2023 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2028 // Message handlers:
2030 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2031 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2033 // Check sanity of message fields:
2034 if !self.is_outbound() {
2035 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2037 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2038 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2040 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2043 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2044 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2046 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2047 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2049 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2050 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2051 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2053 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2054 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2055 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2057 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2058 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2059 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2061 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2062 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2064 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2065 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2068 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2069 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2070 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2072 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2073 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2075 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2076 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2078 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2079 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2081 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2082 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2084 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2085 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2087 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2088 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2091 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2092 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2093 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2095 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2096 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2098 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2101 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2102 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2103 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2104 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2105 if script.len() == 0 {
2108 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2109 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2111 Some(script.clone())
2114 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2115 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2116 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2121 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2122 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2123 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2124 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2125 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2127 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2128 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2130 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2133 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2134 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2135 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2136 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2137 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2138 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2141 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2142 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2143 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2146 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2147 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2149 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2150 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2155 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2156 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2158 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2159 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2161 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2162 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2163 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2164 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2165 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2166 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2167 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2168 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2169 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2172 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2173 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2175 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2176 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2177 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2178 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2180 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2181 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2183 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2184 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2187 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2188 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2191 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2192 if self.is_outbound() {
2193 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2195 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2196 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2197 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2199 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2201 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2202 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2204 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2205 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2206 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2207 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2210 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2211 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2212 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2213 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2214 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2216 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2218 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2219 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2223 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2224 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2225 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2229 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2230 initial_commitment_tx,
2233 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2234 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2237 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2238 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2240 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2242 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2243 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2244 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2245 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2246 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2247 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2248 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2249 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2250 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2252 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2254 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2256 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2257 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2258 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2259 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2261 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2263 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2264 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2266 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2269 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2270 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2271 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2272 if !self.is_outbound() {
2273 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2275 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2276 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2278 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2279 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2280 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2281 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2284 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2286 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2287 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2288 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2289 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2291 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2292 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2294 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2295 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2297 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2298 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2299 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2300 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2301 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2306 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2307 initial_commitment_tx,
2310 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2311 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2314 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2315 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2318 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2319 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2320 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2321 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2322 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2323 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2324 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2325 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2326 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2327 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2329 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2331 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2333 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2334 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2335 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2336 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2338 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2340 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2343 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2344 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2346 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2347 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2348 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2349 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2352 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2353 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2354 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2355 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2356 // when routing outbound payments.
2357 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2361 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2363 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2364 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2365 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2366 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2367 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2368 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2369 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2370 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2371 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2373 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2374 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2375 let expected_point =
2376 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2377 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2379 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2381 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2382 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2383 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2384 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2385 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2387 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2388 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2392 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2395 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2396 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2398 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2400 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2403 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2404 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2405 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2406 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2412 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2413 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2414 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2415 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2416 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2417 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2418 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2419 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2420 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2423 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2426 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2427 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2428 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2430 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2431 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2432 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2433 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2434 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2435 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2437 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2438 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2444 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2445 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2446 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2447 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2448 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2449 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2450 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2451 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2452 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2455 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2458 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2459 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2460 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2462 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2463 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2464 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2465 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2466 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2467 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2469 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2470 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2474 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2475 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2476 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2477 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2478 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2479 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2480 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2482 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2483 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2485 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2492 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2493 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2494 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2495 /// corner case properly.
2496 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2497 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2498 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2500 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2501 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2502 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2503 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2506 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2508 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2509 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2510 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2513 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2514 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2515 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2516 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2518 outbound_capacity_msat,
2519 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2520 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2521 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2527 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2528 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2531 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2532 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2533 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2534 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2535 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2536 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2539 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2540 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2542 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2543 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2546 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2547 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2548 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2550 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2551 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2553 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2556 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2557 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2559 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2560 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2562 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2563 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2565 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2566 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2570 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2571 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2577 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2578 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2579 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2582 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2583 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2584 included_htlcs += 1;
2587 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2588 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2592 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2593 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2594 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2595 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2596 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2597 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2602 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2604 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2605 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2610 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2611 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2615 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2616 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2617 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2620 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2621 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2623 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2624 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2625 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2627 total_pending_htlcs,
2628 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2629 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2630 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2632 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2633 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2634 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2636 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2638 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2643 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2644 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2645 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2647 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2648 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2650 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2653 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2654 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2656 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2657 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2659 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2660 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2662 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2663 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2667 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2668 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2674 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2675 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2676 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2677 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2678 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2679 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2682 included_htlcs += 1;
2685 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2686 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2689 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2690 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2692 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2693 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2694 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2699 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2700 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2701 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2704 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2705 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2707 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2708 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2710 total_pending_htlcs,
2711 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2712 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2713 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2715 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2716 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2717 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2719 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2721 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2726 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2727 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2728 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2729 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2730 if local_sent_shutdown {
2731 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2733 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2734 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2735 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2736 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2738 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2739 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2741 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2742 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2744 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2745 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2747 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2748 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2751 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2752 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2753 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2754 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2756 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2757 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2759 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2760 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2761 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2762 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2763 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2764 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2765 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2766 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2767 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2768 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2769 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2771 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2772 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2773 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2774 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2775 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2776 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2780 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2783 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2784 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2785 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2787 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2788 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2789 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2790 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2791 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2792 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2793 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2797 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2798 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2799 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2800 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2801 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2802 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2803 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2807 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2808 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2809 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2810 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2811 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2815 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2816 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2817 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2818 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2819 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2821 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2822 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2825 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2829 if !self.is_outbound() {
2830 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2831 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2832 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2833 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2834 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2835 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2836 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2837 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2838 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2839 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2840 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2841 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2842 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2843 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2844 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2847 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2848 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2849 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2850 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2854 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2857 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2858 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2861 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2862 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2863 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2867 // Now update local state:
2868 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2869 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2870 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2871 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2872 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2873 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2874 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2879 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2881 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2882 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2883 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2884 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2885 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2886 None => fail_reason.into(),
2887 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2888 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2889 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2890 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2892 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2896 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2897 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2898 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2899 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2901 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2902 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2907 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2910 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2911 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2912 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2914 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2915 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2918 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2921 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2922 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2923 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2925 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2926 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2929 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2933 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2934 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2935 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2937 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2938 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2941 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2945 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2946 where L::Target: Logger
2948 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2949 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2951 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2952 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2954 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2955 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2958 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2960 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2962 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2963 let commitment_txid = {
2964 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2965 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2966 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2968 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2969 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2970 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2971 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2972 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2973 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2977 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2979 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2980 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2981 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2982 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2985 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2986 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2987 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2988 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2991 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2993 if self.is_outbound() {
2994 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2995 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2996 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2997 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2998 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2999 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3000 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3001 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3002 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3003 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3009 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3010 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3013 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3014 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3015 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3016 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3017 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3018 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3019 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3021 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3022 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3023 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3024 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3025 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3026 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3027 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3028 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3030 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3032 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3036 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3037 commitment_stats.tx,
3039 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3040 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3041 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3044 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3045 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3046 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3047 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3049 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3050 let mut need_commitment = false;
3051 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3052 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3053 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3054 need_commitment = true;
3058 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3059 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3060 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3061 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3062 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3063 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3067 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3068 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3069 Some(forward_info.clone())
3071 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3072 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3073 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3074 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3075 need_commitment = true;
3078 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3079 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3080 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3081 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3082 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3083 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3084 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3085 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3086 need_commitment = true;
3090 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3091 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3092 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3093 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3095 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3096 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3097 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3098 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3099 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3100 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3101 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3102 // includes the right HTLCs.
3103 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3104 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3105 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3106 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3107 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3108 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3110 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3111 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3112 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3115 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3116 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3117 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3118 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3119 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3120 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3121 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3122 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3123 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3127 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3128 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3130 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3131 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3132 per_commitment_secret,
3133 next_per_commitment_point,
3134 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3137 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3138 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3139 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3140 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3141 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3142 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3143 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3144 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3147 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
3148 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
3149 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3150 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3151 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3152 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3153 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3155 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3156 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3157 updates: Vec::new(),
3160 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3161 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3162 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3163 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3164 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3165 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3166 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3167 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3168 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3169 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3170 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3171 // to rebalance channels.
3172 match &htlc_update {
3173 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3174 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
3175 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3178 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3179 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3180 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3181 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3182 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3183 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3184 // into the holding cell without ever being
3185 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3186 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3187 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3190 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3196 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3197 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3198 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3199 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3200 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3201 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3202 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3203 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3204 (msg, monitor_update)
3205 } else { unreachable!() };
3206 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3207 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3209 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3210 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
3211 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3212 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3213 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
3214 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
3215 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
3216 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
3217 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3220 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3222 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3229 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3230 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3232 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3233 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3238 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3239 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3240 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3241 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3242 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3244 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3245 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3246 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3248 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3250 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3252 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3255 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3257 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3261 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3262 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3263 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3264 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3265 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3266 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3267 where L::Target: Logger,
3269 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3272 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3273 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3275 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3276 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3279 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3281 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3282 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3287 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3288 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3289 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3290 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3291 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3292 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3293 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3294 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3295 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3298 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3300 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3301 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3304 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3305 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3307 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3309 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3310 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3311 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3312 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3313 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3314 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3315 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3316 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3320 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3321 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3322 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3323 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3324 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3325 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3326 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3327 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3329 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3330 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3333 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3334 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3335 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3336 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3337 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3338 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3339 let mut require_commitment = false;
3340 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3343 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3344 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3345 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3347 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3348 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3349 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3350 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3351 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3352 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3357 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3358 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3359 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3360 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3361 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3363 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3364 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3365 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3370 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3371 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3373 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3377 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3378 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3380 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3381 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3382 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3383 require_commitment = true;
3384 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3385 match forward_info {
3386 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3387 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3388 require_commitment = true;
3390 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3391 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3392 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3394 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3395 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3396 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3400 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3401 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3402 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3403 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3409 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3410 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3411 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3412 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3414 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3415 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3416 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3417 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3418 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3419 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3420 require_commitment = true;
3424 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3426 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3427 match update_state {
3428 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3429 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3430 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3431 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3432 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3434 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3435 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3436 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3437 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3438 require_commitment = true;
3439 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3440 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3445 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3446 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3447 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3448 if require_commitment {
3449 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3450 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3451 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3452 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3453 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3454 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3455 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3456 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3457 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3459 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3460 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3461 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3462 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3463 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3464 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3465 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3467 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3471 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3472 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3473 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3474 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3475 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3477 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3478 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3479 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3482 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3483 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3484 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3485 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3488 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3489 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3490 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3491 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3493 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3496 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3497 if require_commitment {
3498 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3500 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3501 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3502 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3503 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3505 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3506 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3508 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3509 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3510 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3512 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3516 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3517 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3518 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3521 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3523 commitment_update: None,
3524 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3525 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3526 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3533 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3534 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3535 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3536 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3537 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3538 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3539 if !self.is_outbound() {
3540 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3542 if !self.is_usable() {
3543 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3545 if !self.is_live() {
3546 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3549 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3550 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3551 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3552 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3553 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3554 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3555 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3556 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3557 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3558 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3562 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3563 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3564 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3565 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3566 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3569 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3570 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3574 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3575 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3579 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3580 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3582 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3583 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3588 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3589 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3590 Some(update_fee) => {
3591 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3592 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3598 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3599 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3601 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3603 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3604 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3605 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3606 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3610 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3611 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3612 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3616 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3617 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3620 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3621 // will be retransmitted.
3622 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3623 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3624 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3626 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3627 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3629 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3630 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3631 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3632 // this HTLC accordingly
3633 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3636 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3637 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3638 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3639 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3642 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3643 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3644 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3645 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3646 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3647 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3652 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3654 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3655 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3656 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3657 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3661 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3662 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3663 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3664 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3665 // the update upon reconnection.
3666 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3670 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3671 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3674 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3675 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3676 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3677 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3678 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3679 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3681 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3682 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3683 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3684 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3685 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3686 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3688 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3689 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3690 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3691 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3692 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3693 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3694 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3697 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3698 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3699 /// to the remote side.
3700 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3701 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3702 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3704 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3705 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3706 // first received the funding_signed.
3707 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3708 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3709 self.funding_transaction.take()
3711 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3712 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3713 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3714 funding_broadcastable = None;
3717 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3718 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3719 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3720 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3721 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3722 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3723 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3724 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3725 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3726 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3727 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3728 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3729 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3730 next_per_commitment_point,
3731 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3735 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3737 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3738 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3739 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3740 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3741 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3742 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3744 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3745 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3746 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3747 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3748 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3749 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3753 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3754 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3756 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3757 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3760 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3761 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3762 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3763 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3764 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3765 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3766 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3767 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3768 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3772 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3773 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3775 if self.is_outbound() {
3776 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3778 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3781 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3782 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3784 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3785 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3786 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3787 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3788 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3789 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3790 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3791 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3792 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3793 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3794 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3795 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3796 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3798 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3799 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3800 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3806 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3807 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3808 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3809 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3810 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3811 per_commitment_secret,
3812 next_per_commitment_point,
3816 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3817 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3818 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3819 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3820 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3822 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3823 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3824 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3825 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3826 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3827 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3828 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3829 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3830 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3835 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3836 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3838 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3839 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3840 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3841 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3842 reason: err_packet.clone()
3845 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3846 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3847 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3848 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3849 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3850 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3853 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3854 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3855 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3856 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3857 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3864 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3865 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3866 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3867 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3871 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3872 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3873 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3874 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3875 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3876 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3880 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3881 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3883 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3884 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3885 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3886 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3887 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3888 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3889 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3890 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3891 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3892 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3893 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3894 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3897 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3898 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3899 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3902 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3903 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3904 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3905 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3906 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3907 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3908 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3909 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3911 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3912 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3913 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3914 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3915 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3918 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3919 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3920 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3921 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3922 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3923 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3924 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3925 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3928 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3932 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3933 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3934 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3935 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3937 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3941 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3942 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3943 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3945 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3946 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3947 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3948 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3949 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3953 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3955 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3956 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3957 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3958 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3959 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3960 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3962 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3963 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3964 channel_ready: None,
3965 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3966 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3967 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3971 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3972 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3973 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3974 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3975 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3976 next_per_commitment_point,
3977 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3979 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3980 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3981 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3985 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3986 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3987 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3989 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3990 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3991 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3994 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3997 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4000 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4001 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4002 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4003 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4004 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4006 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4007 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4008 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4009 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4010 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4011 next_per_commitment_point,
4012 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4016 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4017 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4018 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4020 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4023 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4024 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4025 raa: required_revoke,
4026 commitment_update: None,
4027 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4029 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4030 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4031 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4033 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4036 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4037 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4038 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4039 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4040 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4041 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4044 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4045 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4046 raa: required_revoke,
4047 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4048 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4052 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4056 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4057 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4058 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4059 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4061 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4063 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4065 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4066 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4067 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4068 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4069 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4070 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4072 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4073 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4074 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4075 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4076 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4078 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4079 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4080 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4081 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4084 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4085 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4086 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4087 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4088 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4089 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4090 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4091 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4092 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4093 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4094 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4095 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4096 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4097 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4098 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4100 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4103 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4104 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4107 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4108 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4109 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4110 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4111 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4112 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4113 self.channel_state &
4114 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4115 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4116 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4117 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4120 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4121 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4122 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4123 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4124 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4125 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4126 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4128 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4134 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4135 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4136 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4137 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4139 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4140 return Ok((None, None));
4143 if !self.is_outbound() {
4144 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4145 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4147 return Ok((None, None));
4150 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4152 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4153 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4154 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4155 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4157 let sig = self.holder_signer
4158 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4159 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4161 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4162 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4163 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4164 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4166 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4167 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4168 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4173 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4174 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4175 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4176 where K::Target: KeysInterface
4178 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4181 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4182 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4183 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4184 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4185 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4187 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4188 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4192 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4194 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4195 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4198 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4199 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4200 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4203 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4206 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4207 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4208 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4209 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4211 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4214 assert!(send_shutdown);
4215 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4216 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4219 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4224 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4226 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4227 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4229 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4230 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4231 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4232 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4233 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4234 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4238 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4239 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4240 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4241 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4245 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4246 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4247 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4248 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4249 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4250 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4252 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4253 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4260 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4261 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4263 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4266 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4267 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4269 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4271 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4272 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4273 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4274 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4275 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4276 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4277 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4278 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4279 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4281 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4282 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4285 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4289 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4290 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4291 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4292 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4294 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4295 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4297 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4298 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4300 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4301 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4303 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4304 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4307 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4311 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4312 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4313 return Ok((None, None));
4316 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4317 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4318 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4319 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4321 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4323 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4326 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4327 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4328 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4329 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4330 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4334 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4335 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4336 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4340 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4341 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4342 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4343 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4344 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4345 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4346 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4350 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4352 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4353 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4354 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4355 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4357 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4360 let sig = self.holder_signer
4361 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4362 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4364 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4365 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4366 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4367 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4371 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4372 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4373 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4374 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4376 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4377 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4378 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4384 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4385 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4386 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4388 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4389 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4391 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4392 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4395 if !self.is_outbound() {
4396 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4397 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4398 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4399 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4401 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4402 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4403 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4405 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4406 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4409 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4410 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4411 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4412 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4413 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4414 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4415 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4416 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4418 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4421 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4422 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4423 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4424 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4426 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4430 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4431 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4432 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4433 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4435 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4441 // Public utilities:
4443 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4447 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4451 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4452 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4453 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4457 /// Gets the channel's type
4458 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4462 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4463 /// is_usable() returns true).
4464 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4465 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4466 self.short_channel_id
4469 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4470 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4471 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4474 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4475 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4476 self.outbound_scid_alias
4478 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4479 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4480 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4481 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4482 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4485 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4486 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4487 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4488 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4491 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4492 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4493 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4496 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4497 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4500 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4501 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4504 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4505 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4506 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4509 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4510 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4513 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4514 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4515 self.counterparty_node_id
4518 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4519 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4520 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4523 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4524 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4525 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4528 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4529 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4531 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4532 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4533 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4534 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4536 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4540 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4541 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4542 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4545 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4546 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4547 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4550 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4551 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4552 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4554 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4555 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4560 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4561 self.channel_value_satoshis
4564 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4565 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4568 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4569 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4572 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4573 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4576 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4577 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4578 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4581 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4582 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4583 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4586 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4587 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4588 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4591 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4592 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4593 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4594 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4595 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4598 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4600 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4601 self.prev_config = None;
4605 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4606 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4610 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4611 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4612 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4613 let did_channel_update =
4614 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4615 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4616 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4617 if did_channel_update {
4618 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4619 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4620 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4621 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4623 self.config.options = *config;
4627 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4628 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4629 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4630 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4631 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4632 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4633 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4635 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4636 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4639 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4641 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4642 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4648 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4649 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4650 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4651 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4652 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4653 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4654 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4656 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4657 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4664 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4668 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4669 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4670 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4671 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4672 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4673 // which are near the dust limit.
4674 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4675 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4676 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4677 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4678 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4680 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4681 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4683 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4686 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4687 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4690 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4691 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4694 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4695 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4699 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4704 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4706 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4707 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4708 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4709 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4710 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4711 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4713 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4715 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4723 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4724 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4728 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4729 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4730 self.update_time_counter
4733 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4734 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4737 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4738 self.config.announced_channel
4741 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4742 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4745 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4746 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4747 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4748 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4751 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4752 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4753 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4756 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4757 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4758 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4759 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4760 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4763 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4764 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4765 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4766 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4767 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4770 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4771 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4772 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4773 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4776 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4777 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4778 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4781 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4782 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4783 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4785 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4786 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4787 if self.channel_state &
4788 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4789 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4790 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4791 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4792 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4795 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4796 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4797 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4798 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4799 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4800 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4802 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4803 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4804 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4806 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4807 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4808 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4809 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4810 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4811 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4817 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4818 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4819 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4822 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4823 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4824 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4827 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4828 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4829 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4832 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4833 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4834 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4835 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4836 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4837 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4842 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4843 self.channel_update_status
4846 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4847 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4848 self.channel_update_status = status;
4851 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4853 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4854 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4855 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4859 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4860 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4861 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4864 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4868 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4869 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4870 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4872 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4873 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4874 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4876 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4877 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4880 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4881 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4882 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4883 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4884 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4885 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4886 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4887 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4888 self.channel_state);
4890 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4894 if need_commitment_update {
4895 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4896 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4897 let next_per_commitment_point =
4898 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4899 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4900 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4901 next_per_commitment_point,
4902 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4906 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4912 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4913 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4914 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4915 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4916 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4917 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4918 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4919 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4920 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4921 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4922 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4923 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4924 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4925 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4926 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4927 if self.is_outbound() {
4928 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4929 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4930 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4931 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4932 // channel and move on.
4933 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4934 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4936 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4937 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4938 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4940 if self.is_outbound() {
4941 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4942 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4943 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4944 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4945 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4946 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4950 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4951 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4952 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4953 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4954 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4958 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4959 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4960 // may have already happened for this block).
4961 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4962 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4963 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
4964 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4967 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4968 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4969 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4970 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4978 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4979 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4980 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4981 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4983 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4984 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4987 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4989 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4990 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4991 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
4994 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
4995 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4996 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4997 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4998 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5000 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5001 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5003 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5004 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5005 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5013 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5015 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5016 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5017 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5019 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5020 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5023 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5024 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5025 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5026 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5027 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5028 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5029 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5030 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5031 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5034 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5035 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5036 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5037 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5039 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5040 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5041 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5043 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5044 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5045 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5046 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5048 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5049 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5050 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5051 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5052 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5053 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5054 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5057 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5058 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5060 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5063 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5064 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5065 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5066 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5067 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5068 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5069 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5070 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5071 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5072 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5073 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5074 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5075 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5076 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5077 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5078 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5079 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5085 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5090 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5091 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5093 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5094 if !self.is_outbound() {
5095 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5097 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5098 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5101 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5102 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5105 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5106 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5110 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5111 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5112 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5113 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5114 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5115 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5116 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5117 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5118 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5119 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5120 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5121 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5122 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5123 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5124 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5125 first_per_commitment_point,
5126 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5127 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5128 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5129 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5131 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5135 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5136 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5139 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5140 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5141 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5142 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5145 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5146 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5148 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5149 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5150 if self.is_outbound() {
5151 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5153 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5154 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5156 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5157 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5159 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5160 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5163 self.user_id = user_id;
5164 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5166 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5169 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5170 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5171 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5173 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5174 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5175 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5176 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5178 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5179 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5180 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5181 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5182 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5183 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5184 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5185 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5186 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5187 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5188 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5189 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5190 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5191 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5192 first_per_commitment_point,
5193 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5194 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5195 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5197 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5201 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5202 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5204 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5206 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5207 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5210 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5211 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5212 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5213 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5214 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5215 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5218 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5219 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5220 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5221 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5222 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5223 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5224 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5225 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5226 if !self.is_outbound() {
5227 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5229 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5230 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5232 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5233 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5234 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5235 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5238 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5239 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5241 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5244 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5245 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5250 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5252 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5254 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5255 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5256 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5258 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5259 temporary_channel_id,
5260 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5261 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5266 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5267 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5268 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5269 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5271 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5274 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5275 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5276 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5277 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5279 if !self.is_usable() {
5280 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5283 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5285 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5286 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
5288 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5289 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5290 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5291 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5292 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5293 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5299 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5300 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5301 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5305 if !self.is_usable() {
5309 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5310 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5314 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5318 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5319 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5322 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5326 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5328 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5333 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5335 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5336 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5337 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5338 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5339 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5343 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5345 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5346 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5347 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5349 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5350 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5351 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5352 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5353 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5354 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5355 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5356 contents: announcement,
5359 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5363 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5364 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5365 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5366 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5367 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5369 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5371 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5372 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5373 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5374 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5376 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5377 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5378 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5379 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5382 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5383 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5384 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5385 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5388 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5391 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5392 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5393 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5394 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5397 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5399 Err(_) => return None,
5401 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5402 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5407 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5408 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5409 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5410 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5411 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5412 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5413 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5414 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5415 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5416 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5417 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5418 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5419 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5420 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5421 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5422 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5423 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5424 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5425 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5428 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5429 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5430 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5431 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5434 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5435 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5436 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5437 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5438 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5439 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5440 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5441 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5443 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5444 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5445 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5446 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5447 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5448 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5449 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5450 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5451 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5453 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5459 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5461 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5462 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5464 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5466 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5467 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5469 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5470 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5471 /// regenerate them.
5473 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
5475 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5476 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5477 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5478 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5480 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5481 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5482 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5485 if amount_msat == 0 {
5486 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5489 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5490 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5493 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5494 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5495 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5496 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5497 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5498 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5499 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5500 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5503 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5504 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5505 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5506 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5508 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5509 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5510 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5513 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
5514 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5515 if !self.is_outbound() {
5516 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5517 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5518 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5519 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5520 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5521 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5525 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5528 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5529 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5530 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5532 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5533 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5534 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5535 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5536 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5537 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5541 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5542 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5543 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5544 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5545 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5546 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5550 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5551 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5552 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5555 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5556 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5557 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5558 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5560 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5561 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5564 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5565 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5566 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5567 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5568 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5571 // Now update local state:
5572 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5573 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5578 onion_routing_packet,
5583 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5584 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5586 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5588 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5592 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5593 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5594 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5598 onion_routing_packet,
5600 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5605 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5606 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5607 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5608 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5609 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5610 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5611 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5613 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5614 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5616 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5617 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5619 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) {
5620 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5622 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5623 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5624 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5625 have_updates = true;
5627 if have_updates { break; }
5629 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5630 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5631 have_updates = true;
5633 if have_updates { break; }
5636 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5638 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5640 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5641 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5642 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5643 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5644 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5646 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5647 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5648 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5650 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5651 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5655 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5656 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5657 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5658 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5659 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5660 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5661 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5664 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5665 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5666 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5667 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5668 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5669 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5672 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5674 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5675 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5676 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5677 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5678 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5679 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5681 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5684 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5685 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5688 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5689 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5690 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5691 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5692 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5693 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5694 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5695 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5698 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5699 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5702 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5703 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5704 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5705 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5706 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5707 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5708 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5712 if !self.is_outbound() {
5713 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5714 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5715 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5716 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5717 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5718 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5719 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5720 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5721 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5722 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5729 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5730 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5734 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5735 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5737 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5739 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5740 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5741 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5742 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5744 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5745 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5746 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5747 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5748 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5749 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5753 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5754 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5757 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5760 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5761 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5762 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5764 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5765 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5766 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5767 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5768 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5774 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5775 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5776 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5779 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5780 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5781 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5783 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5784 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5785 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5786 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5792 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5793 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5794 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5795 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5796 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
5797 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5798 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5799 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5802 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5803 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5804 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5806 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5807 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5810 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5811 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5812 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5815 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5818 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5819 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5820 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5822 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5827 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5828 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5829 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5830 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5832 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5834 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5836 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5837 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5838 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5839 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5840 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5841 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5845 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5846 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5847 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5850 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5851 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5852 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5853 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5854 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5856 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5857 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5864 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5867 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5868 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5869 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5870 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5871 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5872 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5873 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5874 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5875 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5876 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5877 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5879 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5880 // return them to fail the payment.
5881 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5882 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5883 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5885 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5886 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5891 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5892 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5893 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5894 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5895 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5896 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5897 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5898 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5899 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5900 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5901 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5902 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5903 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5908 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5909 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5910 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5913 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&HTLCSource> {
5914 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5915 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5917 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, .. } => { Some(source) }
5921 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| &htlc.source))
5925 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5926 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5928 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5934 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5935 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5936 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5937 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5938 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5940 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5941 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5942 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5943 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5949 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5950 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5951 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5952 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5953 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5954 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5959 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5960 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5961 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
5962 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
5964 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5965 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5966 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
5967 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
5972 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5973 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5974 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5975 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5976 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
5977 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5982 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
5983 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5984 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
5987 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5989 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
5990 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
5991 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
5992 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
5993 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
5995 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
5996 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
5997 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
5998 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6000 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6001 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6002 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6004 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6006 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6007 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6008 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6009 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6010 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6011 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6013 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6014 // deserialized from that format.
6015 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6016 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6017 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6019 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6021 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6022 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6023 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6025 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6026 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6027 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6028 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6031 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6032 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6033 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6036 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6037 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6038 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6039 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6041 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6042 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6044 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6046 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6048 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6050 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6053 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6055 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6060 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6062 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6063 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6064 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6065 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6066 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6067 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6068 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6070 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6072 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6074 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6077 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6078 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6079 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6082 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6084 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6085 preimages.push(preimage);
6087 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6088 reason.write(writer)?;
6090 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6092 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6093 preimages.push(preimage);
6095 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6096 reason.write(writer)?;
6101 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6102 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6104 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6106 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6107 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6108 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6109 source.write(writer)?;
6110 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6112 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6114 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6115 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6117 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6119 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6120 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6125 match self.resend_order {
6126 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6127 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6130 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6131 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6132 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6134 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6135 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6136 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6137 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6140 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6141 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6142 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6143 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6144 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6147 if self.is_outbound() {
6148 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6149 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6150 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6152 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6153 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6154 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6156 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6158 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6159 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6160 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6161 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6163 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6164 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6165 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6166 // consider the stale state on reload.
6169 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6170 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6171 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6173 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6174 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6175 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6177 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6178 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6180 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6181 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6182 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6184 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6185 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6187 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6190 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6191 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6192 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6194 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6197 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6198 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6200 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6201 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6202 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6204 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6206 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6208 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6210 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6211 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6212 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6213 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6214 htlc.write(writer)?;
6217 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6218 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6219 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6221 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6222 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6224 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6225 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6226 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6227 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6228 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6229 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6230 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6232 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6233 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6234 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6235 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6236 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6238 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6240 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6241 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6242 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6243 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6245 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6246 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6247 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6248 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6249 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6250 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6251 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6253 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6254 (2, chan_type, option),
6255 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6256 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6257 (5, self.config, required),
6258 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6259 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6260 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6261 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6262 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6263 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6264 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6265 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6266 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6267 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6268 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6275 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6276 impl<'a, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>
6277 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
6278 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6279 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6280 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6282 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6283 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6284 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6285 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6287 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6289 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6290 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6291 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6292 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6293 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6295 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6296 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6299 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6300 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6301 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6303 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6305 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6306 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
6307 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
6308 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6309 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6310 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
6311 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6312 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6314 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6316 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6317 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6318 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6321 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6323 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6324 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6325 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6327 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6328 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6329 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6330 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6331 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6332 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6333 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6334 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6335 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6336 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6337 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6338 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6339 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6340 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6345 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6346 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6347 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6348 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6349 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6350 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6351 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6352 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6353 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6354 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6355 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6356 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6358 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6359 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6362 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6363 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6366 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6367 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6369 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6374 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6375 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6376 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6377 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6378 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6379 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6380 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6381 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6382 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6383 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6385 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6386 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6387 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6389 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6390 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6391 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6393 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6397 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6398 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6399 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6400 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6403 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6404 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6405 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6407 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6408 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6409 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6410 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6413 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6414 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6415 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6416 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6419 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6421 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6423 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6424 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6425 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6426 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6428 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6429 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6430 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6431 // consider the stale state on reload.
6432 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6435 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6436 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6437 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6439 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6442 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6443 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6444 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6446 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6447 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6448 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6449 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6451 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6452 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6454 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6455 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6457 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6458 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6459 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6461 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6463 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6464 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6466 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6467 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6470 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6472 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6473 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6474 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6475 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6477 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6480 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6481 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6483 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6485 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6486 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6488 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6489 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6491 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6493 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6494 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6495 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6497 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6498 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6499 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6503 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6504 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6505 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6507 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6513 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6514 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6515 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6516 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6517 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6518 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6519 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6520 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6521 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6522 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6524 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6525 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6526 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6527 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6528 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6529 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6531 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6533 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6534 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6535 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6536 (2, channel_type, option),
6537 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6538 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6539 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6540 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6541 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6542 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6543 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6544 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6545 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6546 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6547 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6548 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6549 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6550 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6553 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6554 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6555 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6557 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6558 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6560 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6561 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6566 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6567 if iter.next().is_some() {
6568 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6572 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6573 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6574 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6575 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6576 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6579 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6580 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6581 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6584 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6585 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6587 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6588 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6589 // separate u64 values.
6590 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6595 config: config.unwrap(),
6599 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6600 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6601 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6605 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6607 channel_value_satoshis,
6609 latest_monitor_update_id,
6612 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6615 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6616 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6619 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6620 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6621 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6625 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6626 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6627 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6628 monitor_pending_forwards,
6629 monitor_pending_failures,
6630 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6633 holding_cell_update_fee,
6634 next_holder_htlc_id,
6635 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6636 update_time_counter,
6639 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6640 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6641 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6642 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6644 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6645 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6646 closing_fee_limits: None,
6647 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6649 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6651 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6652 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6654 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6656 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6657 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6658 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6659 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6660 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6661 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6662 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6663 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6664 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6667 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6669 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6670 funding_transaction,
6672 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6673 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6674 counterparty_node_id,
6676 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6680 channel_update_status,
6681 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6685 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6686 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6687 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6688 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6690 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6692 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6693 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6694 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6696 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6698 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6699 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6701 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6709 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6710 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6711 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6712 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6713 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6715 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6716 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6717 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6718 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6719 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6720 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6721 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6722 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6723 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6724 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6725 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6726 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6727 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6728 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6729 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6730 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6731 use crate::util::test_utils;
6732 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6733 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6734 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6735 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6736 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6737 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6738 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6739 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6740 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6741 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6742 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6743 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6744 use crate::prelude::*;
6746 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6749 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6750 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6756 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6757 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6758 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6759 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6763 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6764 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6765 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6766 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6767 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6768 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6769 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6773 signer: InMemorySigner,
6775 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6776 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6778 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6779 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6780 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6781 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6782 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6783 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6784 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6785 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6788 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6789 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6790 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6791 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6794 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
6797 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6798 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6799 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6802 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6803 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6804 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6808 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6809 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6810 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6811 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6813 let seed = [42; 32];
6814 let network = Network::Testnet;
6815 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6816 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6817 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6820 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6821 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6822 let config = UserConfig::default();
6823 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6824 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6825 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6827 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6828 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6832 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6833 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6835 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6836 let original_fee = 253;
6837 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6838 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6839 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6840 let seed = [42; 32];
6841 let network = Network::Testnet;
6842 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6844 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6845 let config = UserConfig::default();
6846 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6848 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6849 // same as the old fee.
6850 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6851 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6852 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6856 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6857 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6858 // dust limits are used.
6859 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6860 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6861 let seed = [42; 32];
6862 let network = Network::Testnet;
6863 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6864 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6866 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6867 // they have different dust limits.
6869 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6870 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6871 let config = UserConfig::default();
6872 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6874 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6875 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6876 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6877 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6878 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6880 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6881 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6882 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6883 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6884 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6886 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6887 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6888 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6890 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6891 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6892 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6893 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6896 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6898 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6899 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6900 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6901 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6902 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6904 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6905 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6906 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6907 payment_secret: None,
6908 payment_params: None,
6912 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6913 // the dust limit check.
6914 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6915 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6916 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6917 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6919 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6920 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6921 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6922 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6923 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6924 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6925 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6929 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6930 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6931 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6932 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6933 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6934 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
6935 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6936 let seed = [42; 32];
6937 let network = Network::Testnet;
6938 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6940 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6941 let config = UserConfig::default();
6942 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6944 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
6945 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
6947 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
6948 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6949 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6950 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6951 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6952 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6954 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6955 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6956 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6957 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6958 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6960 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6962 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6963 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6964 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6965 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6966 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6968 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6969 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6970 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6971 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6972 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6976 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
6977 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6978 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6979 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6980 let seed = [42; 32];
6981 let network = Network::Testnet;
6982 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
6983 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
6984 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6986 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
6988 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6989 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6990 let config = UserConfig::default();
6991 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6993 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6994 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
6995 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6996 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6998 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
6999 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7000 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
7002 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7003 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7004 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7005 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7007 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7008 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7009 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
7011 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7012 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
7014 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7015 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7016 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7017 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7018 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7019 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7020 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7021 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7022 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7027 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7029 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7030 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7031 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7032 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7033 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7034 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7035 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7042 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7043 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7044 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7045 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7046 let seed = [42; 32];
7047 let network = Network::Testnet;
7048 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7049 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7050 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7052 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7053 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7054 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7055 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7056 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7057 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7058 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7059 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7061 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7062 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7063 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7064 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7065 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7066 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7068 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7069 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7070 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7071 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7073 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7075 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7076 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7077 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7078 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7079 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7080 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7082 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7083 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7084 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7085 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7087 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7088 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7089 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7090 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7091 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7093 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7094 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7096 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7097 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7098 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7100 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7101 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7102 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7103 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7104 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7106 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7107 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7109 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7110 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7111 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7115 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7117 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7118 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7119 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7121 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7122 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7123 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7124 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7126 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7127 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7128 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7130 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7132 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7133 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7136 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7137 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7138 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7139 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7140 let seed = [42; 32];
7141 let network = Network::Testnet;
7142 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7143 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7144 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7147 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7148 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7149 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7151 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7152 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7154 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7155 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7156 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7158 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7159 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7161 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7163 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7164 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7166 // Channel Negotiations failed
7167 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7168 assert!(result.is_err());
7173 fn channel_update() {
7174 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7175 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7176 let seed = [42; 32];
7177 let network = Network::Testnet;
7178 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7179 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7181 // Create a channel.
7182 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7183 let config = UserConfig::default();
7184 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7185 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7186 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7187 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7189 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7190 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7191 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7193 short_channel_id: 0,
7196 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7197 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7198 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7200 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7201 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7203 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7205 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7207 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7208 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7209 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7210 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7212 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7213 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7214 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7216 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7220 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7222 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7223 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7224 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7225 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7226 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7227 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7228 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7229 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7230 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7231 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7232 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7233 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7234 use crate::sync::Arc;
7236 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7237 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7238 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7239 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7241 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7243 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7244 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7245 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7246 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7247 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7248 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7250 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7251 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7256 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7257 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7258 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7260 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7261 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7262 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7263 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7264 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7265 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7267 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7269 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7270 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7271 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7272 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7273 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7274 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7276 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7277 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7278 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7279 selected_contest_delay: 144
7281 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7282 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7284 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7285 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7287 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7288 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7290 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7291 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7293 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7294 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7295 // build_commitment_transaction.
7296 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7297 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7298 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7299 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7300 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
7302 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7303 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7304 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7305 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7309 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7310 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7311 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7312 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7316 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7317 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7318 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7320 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7321 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7323 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7324 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7326 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7328 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7329 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7330 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7331 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7332 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7333 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7334 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7336 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7337 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7338 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7339 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7341 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7342 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7343 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7345 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7347 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7348 commitment_tx.clone(),
7349 counterparty_signature,
7350 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7351 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7352 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7354 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7355 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7357 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7358 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7359 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7361 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7362 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7365 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7366 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7368 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7369 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7370 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7371 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7372 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7373 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7374 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7375 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7377 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7380 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7381 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7382 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7386 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7389 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7390 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7391 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7393 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7394 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7395 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7396 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7397 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7398 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7399 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7400 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7402 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7406 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7407 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7409 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7410 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7411 "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", {});
7413 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7414 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7415 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7416 "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", {});
7418 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7419 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7421 amount_msat: 1000000,
7423 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7424 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7426 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7429 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7430 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7432 amount_msat: 2000000,
7434 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7435 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7437 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7440 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7441 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7443 amount_msat: 2000000,
7445 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7446 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7447 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7449 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7452 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7453 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7455 amount_msat: 3000000,
7457 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7458 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7459 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7461 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7464 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7465 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7467 amount_msat: 4000000,
7469 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7470 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7472 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7476 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7477 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7478 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7480 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7481 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7482 "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", {
7485 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7486 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7487 "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" },
7490 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7491 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7492 "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" },
7495 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7496 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7497 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b02000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d4335201483045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7500 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7501 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7502 "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" },
7505 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7506 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7507 "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" }
7510 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7511 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7512 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7514 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7515 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7516 "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", {
7519 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7520 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7521 "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" },
7524 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7525 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7526 "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" },
7529 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7530 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7531 "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" },
7534 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7535 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7536 "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" },
7539 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7540 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7541 "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" }
7544 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7545 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7546 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7548 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7549 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7550 "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", {
7553 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7554 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7555 "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" },
7558 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7559 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7560 "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" },
7563 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7564 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7565 "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" },
7568 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7569 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7570 "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" }
7573 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7574 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7575 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7576 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7578 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7579 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7580 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80084a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994abc996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d005101473044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc31201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7583 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7584 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7585 "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" },
7588 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7589 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7590 "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" },
7593 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7594 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7595 "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" },
7598 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7599 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7600 "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" }
7603 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7604 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7605 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7606 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7608 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7609 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7610 "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", {
7613 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7614 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7615 "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" },
7618 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7619 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7620 "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" },
7623 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7624 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7625 "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" },
7628 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7629 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7630 "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" }
7633 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7634 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7635 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7637 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7638 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7639 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7642 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7643 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7644 "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" },
7647 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7648 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7649 "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" },
7652 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7653 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7654 "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" }
7657 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7658 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7659 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7661 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7662 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7663 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7666 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7667 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7668 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de84500148304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e015430101008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7671 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7672 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7673 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a001483045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b7701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7676 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7677 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7678 "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" }
7681 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7682 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7683 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7685 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7686 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7687 "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", {
7690 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7691 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7692 "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" },
7695 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7696 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7697 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7700 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7701 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7702 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7703 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7705 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7706 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7707 "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", {
7710 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7711 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7712 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc02000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb834730440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
7715 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7716 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7717 "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" }
7720 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7721 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7722 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7723 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7725 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7726 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7727 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7730 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7731 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7732 "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" },
7735 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7736 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7737 "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" }
7740 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7741 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7742 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7744 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7745 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7746 "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", {
7749 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7750 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7751 "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" }
7754 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7755 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7756 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7757 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7759 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7760 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7761 "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", {
7764 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7765 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7766 "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" }
7769 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7770 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7771 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7772 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7774 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7775 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7776 "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", {
7779 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7780 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7781 "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" }
7784 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7785 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7786 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7787 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7789 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7790 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7791 "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", {});
7793 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7794 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7795 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7796 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7798 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7799 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7800 "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", {});
7802 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7803 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7804 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7805 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7807 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7808 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7809 "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", {});
7811 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7812 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7813 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7815 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7816 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7817 "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", {});
7819 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7820 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7821 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7822 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7824 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7825 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7826 "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", {});
7828 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7829 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7830 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7831 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7833 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7834 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7835 "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", {});
7837 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7838 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7839 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7840 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7841 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7842 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7844 amount_msat: 2000000,
7846 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7847 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7849 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7852 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7853 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7854 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7856 amount_msat: 5000000,
7858 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7859 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7860 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7862 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7865 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7866 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7868 amount_msat: 5000000,
7870 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7871 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7872 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7874 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7878 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7879 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7880 "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", {
7883 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7884 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7885 "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" },
7887 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7888 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7889 "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" },
7891 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7892 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7893 "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" }
7896 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7897 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7898 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aae9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e4501483045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a6894801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7901 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
7902 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
7903 "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" },
7905 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
7906 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
7907 "02000000000101aa443fb63abc1e8c754f98a7b96c27cb02b21d891d1242a16b630dc32c2afe290300000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb83483045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b501008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568f9010000" },
7909 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
7910 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
7911 "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" }
7916 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7917 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7919 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7920 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7921 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7922 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7924 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7925 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7926 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7928 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7929 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7931 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7932 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7934 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7935 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
7936 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
7940 fn test_key_derivation() {
7941 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
7942 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7944 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7945 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7947 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
7948 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
7950 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7951 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
7953 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7954 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
7956 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7957 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7959 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7960 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
7962 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7963 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7967 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
7968 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7969 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7970 let seed = [42; 32];
7971 let network = Network::Testnet;
7972 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7973 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7975 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7976 let config = UserConfig::default();
7977 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7978 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7980 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7981 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
7983 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7984 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
7985 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7986 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7987 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7988 assert!(res.is_ok());